WARNING REPORT: USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300130003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 7, 1978
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Notional Intelligence Officers
NFAC #5443-78
7 December 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA . Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM .
ssistant National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
SUBJECT : Warning Report: USSR
1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your
information. 25X1
2. Background: Community representatives and Soviet specialists
met on 27 November for the second monthly meeting on warning, with
A/NIO/USSR-EE in the chair. We reviewed and reevaluated the contingencies
discussed last month in the light of accumulating evidence, and canvassed
opinion on new items that have surfaced that might appropriately be
flagged under our general guidelines. of highlighting emerging possibilities,
however improbable, which would be of major concern to policymakers if they
came to pass. Attached is my understanding of the consensus of this meeting.
As before, it has not been coordinated with participants, but is now being
circulated to them. 25X1
Attachment:
As Stated
Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DCI
1-
1 - Exec. Reg.
1 - DD/NFA
I - NIO/Warning
1 - NFAC Reg.
2 - NIO/USSR-EE
A/NIO/USSR-EE
(6Dec78)
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(27 November 1978)
the next 60-90 days:
1. Summary. Intelligence Community analysts flagged the
following contingencies as especially worth watching for during
-- The possibility that the Soviets will bring military, economic,
or political pressure to bear on Romania. Any such Soviet move would
be in response to Ceausescu's rejection of Soviet demands at the recent
Warsaw Pact meeting -- particularly on military investments and Soviet
control over Romanian forces -- and his spectacular defiance of the
Soviets in publicly justifying his stand.
unpalatable economic choices that face them.
a background of differences of view within the Polish leadership over the
-- The chance of a popular flareup in Poland this winter, against
and for increased Soviet control over Romanian forces assigned to the Warsaw
Pact. Brezhnev has now harshly alluded to Ceausescu's "demogogy." The upshot
is a clear need for the community to watch closely for any evidence of Soviet
military, economic, or political pressures in response, or Soviet preparation
to apply any such pressures.
demands at the Moscow Pact gathering for increased Romanian military expenditures
-- The continued potential for escalation into Sino-Soviet conflict
latent in the present upsurge in Vietnamese-Cambodian fighting.
-- Soviet efforts to exploit the Shah's difficulties and the turmoil
in Iran to weaken US ties with the country and to begin to create a Soviet
political role there.
2. Romania. It was the consensus of the analysts that the outstanding
new item that merits careful watching involves Soviet-Romanian tensions.
Accumulating sensitive evidence immediately prior to the recent Warsaw Pact
meeting in Moscow had suggested considerable Romanian intransigence in
preliminary negotiations with the Soviets over the documents the Soviets
wanted the meeting to approve -- notably on China and the Middle East. This
was supplemented by evidence that Gromyko's November meeting with Ceausescu
was highly acrimonious, that Romanian economic problems had been intensified
by a fuel shortage resulting from a major refinery accident, and that the
Soviets could be aggravating these problems by delays in deliveries of steel
and coking coal to Romania which may or may not have been politically inspired.
All this has been reinforced, since our warning meeting was held, by a series
of spectacular Ceausescu statements alleging that he had rejected Soviet
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3. Poland. Analysts also felt that the situation in Poland is
worth careful attention this winter. While there have been no major
events there recently comparable in gravity to those involving Romania,
there are several ongoing signs of malaise which bear watching against
the background of the demonstrated volatility and unpredictability of
the Polish population. Most of these relate to problems in the Polish
leadership -- evidence that there may have been recent serious conflict
between Gierek and an important provincial leader, evidence that Gierek
has been ailing to the degree that his effectiveness has been significantly
reduced, and evidence of a continuing policy debate over whether to cut
back imports and impose a reduction of real income which would carry
important political risks. This economic dilemma can only have been made
more serious if Ceausescu is correct in alleging that the Soviets have
sought to force all the East Europeans to raise their military expenditures.
While there is no evidence at the moment of the kind of food shortages or
imminent price rises that have ignited trouble in the past, we should remain
particularly alert for political changes or decisions that could do so as
well as for any hints we may get of increasing popular tension.
4. Indochina. We continue to see significant potential for escalation
latent in the Vietnamese-Cambodian conflict, with some possibility of Sino-
Soviet conflict growing out of Chinese and Soviet commitments to the two sides.
The level of fighting along the Vietnamese-Cambodian border has now increased,
but it is still too soon to tell if the Vietnamese intend to mount a challenge
to the viability of the Cambodian regime which might be sufficient to incite
the Chinese to risky action and thus to Soviet counter-action. The two chief
developments on the Soviet side in the last month are 25X1
that Brezhnev may visit Vietnam in December, and evidence that the may
have delivered two Petya-class frigates to Vietnam. Both events, if they
occurred, would be testimony to the growing Soviet stake in Vietnam.
5. Sino-Soviet. Meanwhile, analysts noted the recent signs of new
contention in the Chinese leadership, and suggested that the Soviets are
likely to be watching events in Peking closely for any evidence that shifting
power relationships could bring a modification in the Chinese posture toward
the Soviet Union (and, conceivably, the US). There is no evidence whatever
of this to date, and it does not seem likely. Nevertheless, we, no less than
the Soviets, have an obligation to remain alert for the possibility.
6. Afghanistan. The situation here has not significantly changed in
the last month, with tribal revolts continuing at a low boil in the eastern
provinces, but thus far still not mounting a serious challenge to the regime.
We continue to feel that if such a challenge did emerge, there would be some
possibility that the Soviets could be drawn in to help defend the regime.
Afghan spokesman in the last month have gone to unusual lengths to stress
their identification with the USSR, and after the warning meeting was held
Premier Taraki visited Moscow and signed a friendship treaty with the USSR.
It is likely that the local security situation was one of the topics discussed.
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7. Iran. We have noted that as the Shah's position has continued
to deteriorate, the Soviets have appeared to be slowly changing their
estimate of his chances of surviving. They have evacuated large numbers
of Soviet dependents in apparent anticipation of violence during the
current Moslem holidays. In their propaganda -- and in Brezhnev's
statement warning the US against interference in Iran -- they have begun
cautiously to appeal to the interests of the opposition, while seeking
increasingly to blacken the US in the eyes of the opposition as the defender
of the Shah. There is some difference of opinion about the mixture of
motives underlying the Brezhnev statement -- some community analysts
believe that Brezhnev was at least in part reacting defensively to the
US charges about MIG-23s in Cuba, while others feel the Soviets were
genuinely concerned about the possibility of US intervention in Iran.
It is the consensus, however, that Brezhnev's statement in any case
asserted an unprecedented claim to a Soviet say in Iranian security
affairs, and that the Soviets now anticipate continued turmoil with
the possibility of widening opportunities for themselves in the area.
8. Elsewhere in the Middle East, the Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement
encouraged by the USSR as a response to Camp David continues, although
we are receiving considerable evidence of Soviet misgivings about this,
as well as evidence of Soviet.friction with the Syrians about arms supply.
We continue to see some possibility of eventual Egyptian-Libyan clashes
which could impose serious choices upon the USSR and the US, but we have
received no evidence in the last month suggesting this is imminent.
9. Africa. Analysts noted that Numayri in Sudan is now once more
faced by a local tribal revolt, and suggested Libya and the Soviets may
see this as an opportunity to exploit. Further south, we observed that
Kaunda in Zambia was reported to be seeking large-scale arms aid from the
Soviet Union (as well as from other sources such as India) as a result of
disillusionment with the ability and willingness of Britain to supply him
with the wherewithall to beat off Rhodesian attacks. Should the Zambian
army in fact begin receiving Soviet weapons in significant quantities,
this could open the door for expansion of Soviet influence in Lusaka.
In southern Angola, we have noticed the creation of Soviet-Cuban defensive
positions evidently intended to help guard against any South African retaliatory
strikes in response to SWAPO raids into Namibia. This could increase the
possibility of future South African-Cuban clashes. Finally, in the Horn,
we have seen signs of renewed Soviet overtures to the Somalis and increased
Somali-Soviet contacts. Although there are likely to be limits as to how
far the USSR can go in this direction without antagonizing Mengistu, some
improvement in Soviet-Somali relations could be in the cards.
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10. Brezhnev's NAKth. We continue to fee at u rez nev
contract influenza th winter as he did last year, th isks to his
life would be greater. Nevertheless, we also note that at the present
phase of Brezhnev's gradually descending spiral, reports suggest that
he is at the moment performing somewhat better than he has in some time.
The past record suggests that this could change abruptly and without
visible forewarning. A visit to Vietnam, should it materialize this
month, would be likely at a minimum to put a considerable strain on
Brezhnev. We have no evidence yet available to suggest that another
downturn will come soon, although for the past few years his health
has shown a downward dip in the late winter and spring.
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