USSR-IRAN: A SHIFT IN POLICY?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300170010-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 29, 2007
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: April 11, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/05/29: CIA-RDP8
I
25X1
SPECIAL REPORT
USSR-IRAN: A SHIFT IN POLICY?
11 APRIL 1980
4 25X1
Copy of 1 75 Copies
I 2t
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 20077057 9 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000300170010-9
 Approved For Release 2007/05/29: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300170010-9
Approved For Release 2007/05/29: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300170010-9
 Approved For Release 2007/05/29: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300170010-9
TOFECRET
It is the function of the Strategic Warning Staff to provide a
thorough airing of serious alternative explanations of key
intelligence issues with strategic warning implications. This
report examines alternatives different than those agreed to in
the 13 March IIM on Soviet Intentions and Options in Southwest
Asia: Near Term Prospects. Evidence that has become available
since the 7 March cutoff for that document suggests an alternative
and more ominous view of current Soviet policy toward military
intervention in Iran.
This special report is the product of the Strategic Warning Staff and
has not been coordinated with the rest of the intelligence community.
Comments were solicited and incorporated at the discretion of the
Strategic Warning Staff. Questions or comments on this report should
ed to the Director, Strategic Warning Staff, 5X1
TOP SECRET
roved For Release 2007/05/29: CIA-RDP83BO1027R 000300170010-9
 Approved For Release 2007/05/29: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300170010-9
TOP SECRET
USSR-IRAN; A Shift in Policy?
Although the USSR would clearly prefer to achieve its broader aims
in Iran without using military force, Moscow's frustration over
relations with Iran, its clandestine activities there and its recent
military activity in the Caucasus suggest that at sometime since
December the USSR opted to step up its support for ethnic dissidents
and exploit the ensuin disruption even to the extent ofVinvading
Aaarbay
jan
~
. eats e
1. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has entailed some real near-
term costs for Moscow's policy toward the Khomeini regime. Recent
Iranian criticism of the USSR's dealings with its own Muslim population
coupled with Iran's apparent efforts to increase support for unrest in
Iraq and Afghanistan likely have been viewed with concern in Moscow,
The prospects of a consolidated Islamic Revolutionary regime in Teheran
taking steps to export its revolution to the Muslim areas of the USSR
has probably led to nervousness in Moscow. In addition, the Soviets
have indicated dissatisfaction with:
-- Teheran's support of the UN resolution calling for the removal
of all foreign troops from Afghanistan.
-- Iran's participation in the Islamic Conference.
-- Iran's movement toward closer cooperation with Pakistan.
-- An electoral system for the National Assembly which is
disadvantageous to the minority parties, virtually insuring
that the pro-Soviet Tudeh Communist Party remains an
insignificant political force in Teheran.
The National Assembly, which will apparently play an important role in
determining Iran's future policies, seems almost certain to be dominated
by Islamic radicals who will reaffirm most of these anti-Soviet trends.
It also probably will encourage the regime in Teheran to embark on
policies more hostile to Soviet interests in the area. 25X1
2. As a result of trends within Iran, Moscow may have concluded that
in the coming months the regime in Teheran will move to crack down on
the Tudeh party for backing Moscow and to increase aid to the Afghan
TOP SECRET
C/~
roved For Release 2007/05/29: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300170010-9
 Approved For Release 2007/05/29: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300170010-9
TO
25X1
25X1
rebels conspicuously. Moscow probably believes that the government
in Teheran will be predisposed toward policies hostile to Soviet
interests and its ideological orientation will become more anti-
Communist and anti-Soviet. u 25X1
3. At the same time, a government increasingly influenced by Islamic
radicals will probably deal more stringently with minority demands
for self rule, which could lead to increasing instability in areas
such as Azarbayjan and Kurdistan. These same radicals are inclined
to interfere in the internal affairs of neighboring nations, especially
Iraq, to the extent that hostilities with these countries have become
a strong possibility. Moscow may view such developments as providing
it the opportunity to step-up its involvement in northwest Iran even
to the extent of employing military force under the pretext of a
threat to security. The Soviets might, for example, view a conflict
between Iran and Iraq as an opportunity to intervene on the behalf of
one of them or on behalf of an "autonomous Azarbayjan Democratic
Republic."
4. Although we are uncertain over what specific event_Lal occasion
Soviet intervention, Moscow's response to the renewed suppression of
Tudeh would probably be limited to verbal criticism while increased
Iranian-supported Afghan rebel activity would likely lead to cross-
border operations by the Soviets. In recent weed, the Soviets both
in public and private statements, have expressed concern over the
direction of events in Iran and indicated that increasing instability
and civil war on its southern borders would be intolerable, suggesting
that harsh responses such as militar terms of 25X1
the 1921 treaty would be necessary.
5. Although publicly disavowing any hostile designs on Iran and
attempting to present itself to Teheran as a deterrent to U.S. aggression,
we believe Moscow's activities over the past two months suggest a shift
toward a more active exploitation of instability in Iran, including
preparations for a limited military intervention. Indicators of this
s F1 in Soviet policy include:
A marked increase in clandestine activitljin Iran y and especially
in the Azarbayjani-populated areas of the northwest.
Sending large numbers of ethnic Azarbayjanis back from the USSR
including prominent exiles dating from the post-war Soviet
sponsored Azarbayjan Democratic Republic.
TOP SECRET
 Approved For Release 2007/05/29: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300170010-9
TO
-- Apparent reactivation of the Azarbayjani Democratic Party
which closely cooperates with the Tudeh Party.
-- Aid to ethnic dissident groups, including arms and guerilla
training.
25X1
25X1
In the aggregate these indicators lead us to believe that a military inter-
vention in Azarbayjan has become more acceptable to Moscow. We believe,
much if not all, of the military preparations and activities that we see
in the Transcaucasus Military District are reflective of a shift toward
an option to intervene. It is harder to explain these activities as
a whole in terms of ge ral preparedness unrelated to some special new
contingency Tannin 25X1
Transcaucasus in this sense appears to be a s p e c i a l believe, to special Soviet activities in Iran.
TOP SECRET
5X1
 Approved For Release 2007/05/29: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300170010-9
TOPSECRE
6. Based on public statements to the Iranians and on Soviet military
planning, Moscow does not appear to be especially apprehensive about
the possibility of a direct military response by the U.S. to a Soviet
invasion limited to the Azarbayjan area. Barring the involvement of
Turkey, the planners in the Kremlin are almost certainly aware of the
logistical difficulties the U.S. would encounter in trying to deploy
rapidly sufficient numbers of ground forces to that part of Iran.
Moreover, as long as the Iranians hold the US Embassy hostages, Moscow
is likely to assume that the U.S. President will have difficulty in
mobilizing the U.S. public opinion in favor of military action by the
U.S. to restore Iran's territorial integrity, especially where oil is
not directly involved. In view of this, the USSR might judge that a
limited military option, not extending to the oil producing areas, has
a relatively low risk of direct military confrontation with the U.S.
In invading Azarbayjan the Soviets almost certainly would invoke the
1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty as a legal justification--as they have
already been doing obliquely in the press--and might also claim that
they were invited b the Azarbayjan Democratic Party or the Tudeh
Communist Party.
7. Nonetheless, such a venture would be seen by the Soviets as extremely
serious and would probably require some additional high level deliberations
before a final decision to invade. For example, the CPSU Central
Committee Plenum, which may be held again in late April or May, could
be used as an opportunity to form the broader consensus within the
Politburo. The last CPSU Central Committee Plenum, in late November,
was almost certainly used as an occasion for the full Politburo to
ratify the decision to intervene in Afghanistan one month later. After
such a decision, the Soviet military would probably be able to move much
more swiftly against Iranian Azarbayjan than it did against Afghanistan.
The current posture in the Transcaucasus would enable them to move more
quickly, significantly reducing the time period during which unambiguous
warning could be given prior to the initiation of military operations.
What appears to be a higher level of readiness among the cadres of the
ground units is likely to reduce of time required between
mobilization and an invasion. 25X1
5X1
TOP SECRET
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2007/05/29: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300170010-9
TOFECRE
9. The Soviets, on the other hand, have not yet taken the economically
expensive action of mobilizing the 30,000 to 60,000 personnel which
would probably be called up for an Azarbayjan operation. Based on
past Soviet performance, firm evidence that large numbers of reservists
are being assembled in the Transcaucasus would be a clear indicator of
impending hostilities. 25X1
10. Q we believe that the Soviets have already deliberated 25X1
over the general proposition of intervening
by invasinnI -1 25Y,1
Fu- I The situation in the Trans 1
caucasus leads us to conclude that reservist and equipment mobilization
may be indicators of a Soviet move on Azarbayjan-25X1
Although policy level deliberations over actually implementing an invasion
Plan probably 25X1
25X1
TOP SECRE'Ti
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2007/05/29: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300170010-9
Approved For Release 2007/05/29: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300170010-9
 Approved *For Release 2007/05/29: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300170010-9
DISTRIBUTION LIST
CIA
DCI
ODDCI
DDCI/IC
DDCI/NIO
NFIB
COMIREX
ODDS&T
NPIC
OS I (D5 w R')
0/DDO
NFAC
OPS/CTR ~OCOj
FBIS
NFAC/CS-1
OCR
D/OIA
DC/OGCR(J
OER
D/OSR
RAD
D/NIO/SS
OPA
D/OPA
CH/USSR DIV
CH/MESA
D/OSWR
NIO/USSR
NI O/GPF
NIO/jESA
STATE DEPT
I NR/PMT
DIA (See attached list)
NSA
?
Draft reports will be reviewed by V36. After review, V36 will
request the required number of copies for NSA internal distribution.
 Approved'For Release 2007/05/29: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300170010-9
NSC STAFF
Mr. Brzezinski
Col Odom
MGen Welch
Mr. Ermarth
?
AFIS INI
NFOIO
USAITAC
WHITE HOUSE SIT ROOM
NOSIC
ACDA
NI TO/W
Q
Approved For Release 2007/05/29: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300170010-9
 Approved For Release 2007/05/29: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300170010-9
Approved For Release 2007/05/29: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300170010-9