POSSIBLE IRANIAN-IRAQI CONFLICT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300170011-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 29, 2007
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: April 11, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/05/29: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300170011-8
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 11 April 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/W
SUBJECT: Possible Iranian-Iraqi Conflict
1. Events in the Iraqi-Iranian area deserve attention. Possible Soviet
intervention in Iran as a byproduct of Iranian-Iraqi hostilities is
important enough to the U.S. government to warrant a special report from
the intelligence community. I fear that the focus by mid-East experts
on their area of expertise is overlooking the far graver potential threat
to peace involved with a Soviet military intervention from the Caucasus
into Iran. The fo aragraphs provide some basis for concern that
such might occur. 25X1
2. Recent Soviet commentary indicates a tilt in favor of Iran in its
feud with Iraq. In the past week, Moscow has firmly endorsed Teheran's
position on the US Embassy hostages, and a 10 April Tass commentary accused
Iraq of waging an anti-Iranian campaign. We believe, this tilt toward
Iran, could presage more concerted support for Teheran by Moscow in the
event of large-scale hostilities with Baghdad. Although long and generous
supporters of Iraq, the long history of Soviet-Iraqi relations has shown
the Iraqis to be unrelia nd resistant to Soviet efforts-to meddle in
Iraqi internal affairs. 25X1
3. In spite of their basic animosity for the Soviets, the Iranians,
according to their Minister of Defense, are inclined to accept assistance
from the Soviet Union in expelling outside "aggressors." For its part,
Moscow might view intervention in Iran against Iraqi forces to be more
profitable than supporting the Iraqis because intervention would bring
Soviet forces freely into Iran through Azarbayjan and provide an opportunity
for setting up some form of Soviet control there. The Soviets probably
believe that further breakdown in Iranian central government control of
Azarbayjan, attendant to an Iran-Iraq conflict, would offer a fertile
field for Soviet efforts. The Soviets probably also believe that a tilt
toward Iran, if the conflict does not take place, would p broader
base for the Tudeh Communist Party support within Iran. 25X1
4. Even without Iran's acquiesence, the Soviets might view an Iraqi-
Iranian conflict as an opportunity to intervene on behalf of the central
government in Iran or on behalf of some "autonomous Democratic Republic"
in Azarbayjan area. In doing so the Soviets would almost certainly invoke
the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty as a legal justification, or claim that
they were invited by the Azarbayjan Democratic Party or the Tudeh C uni X1
Party.
inr
TOP UcReI
 5. In the past two months or so, the Soviets have improved the posture
of their tract opposite northwestern Iran
s a result, should scow ec de
to move 1n to ran, or whatever reason, their current posture in the
6. Evidence indicates that Iraq has probably planned to initiate a
major military move against Iran with the aim of toppling the Khomeini
regime.
KI
-- Since the first of the year official Iraqi diplomatic contacts
sought to engage the Kuwaitis to act as intermediary in obtaining
United States approval and support for Iraqi military action against Iran.
Since these earlier indicators of Iraqi planning,their relations with
Iran have become violent and unpredictable. Over the last two mks
the situation has deteriorated and the military forces seem to be
moving uncontrollably toward war. The following are -illustrative
of the situation:
I *Q
8 April Iraq extends service of con-
scripts and recalls all
reservist soldiers born
in 1948.
T~ SECRET
 9 April Iraqis summon ambassador from
Caracas to take over as Army
Chief of Staff.
Iranians note the new Iraqi
Chief of Staff's past military
experience in actions on their
border. 25X1
10 April
T Director, SWS
TOP SECRET
 Approved For Release 2007/05/29: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300 1-8
Appr?Wed For Release 2007/05/29: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300170011-8
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R a 2 05/29: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000$001/~'
Attached is our final the spec;
report. I believe it inv. r~ yes the
comments you gave me earlier in the week..
Unless otherwise directed, we will send.
this to the printer tonight.
Approved For Release 2007/05/29: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300170011-8
 Approved For Release 2007/05/29 :
? Top
Forward
It is the function of the Strategic Warning Staff to provide a thorough
airing of serious alternative explanations of key intelligence issues with
strategic warning implications. This report examines alternatives different
than those agreed to in the 13 March 1114 on Soviet Intentions and Options
in Southwest Asia: Near Term Prospects., Evidence that has become available
since the 7 March cutoff for that documr?nt suggests an alternative and more
ominous view of current Soviet policy toward military intervention in Iran.
TOP CRET RUFF
Approved For Release 2007/05/29: CIA-RDP83B -