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December 16, 2016
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June 6, 2005
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July 26, 1978
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oLLnr' a/ 1 :1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R000200220010-1 DD/SUT-3457-78 2 6 JUL 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Performance Evaluation and Improvement FROM: Deputy Director for Science and Technology REFERENCE: Assessment of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligeacc Activities and Developments F I Your memo dated 12 July 1978, same subject 25X1 1. The following material responds to your requests for data made in the reference. The reference requests a three part response which corresponds to the three attachments to the memo. That is, Attachment 1 addresses the series of questions, Attachment 2 summarizes our resource allocations for FY's 77, 78 and 79 and Attachment 3 lists external contracts showing funding and contractors. Please note that the dollar figures provided in Attachment 3 are RDFE and Processing contract dollars only and include support or Collection costs. . 2. 1 We feel it is extremely important to point out that the projects discussed in the Attachments contain collection technology which is demonstrably applicable not only to nuclear proliferation but also other nuclear issues such as nuclear weapons movement and logistics. We perceive a disturbing tendency to try to compartmentize our nuclear collection program activities into one or the other category as a principal way in which to measure their responsiveness to intelligence objectives. This is a mis- leading practice for reasons expanded upon in Attachment I Question #2. In order to deal with this issue, we have taken the following approach: for those projects which result in hardware or technology applicable to. both proliferation and other nuclear issues, we reflect,fifty percent of the project cost in the chart. For those cases where a system or technology was developed or is planned for application exclusively to proliferation - type targets, all costs associated with the project are shown. 3. If we can be of any further assistance in this matter please contact us. Attachment: a/s Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R000200220010-1 25X1 SECRET E-2 IMPDET CL BY Signe-25X1 5r c:x~ i 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R000200220010-1 Attachment 1 DD/S&T-3457-'18 QUESTION #1 Including what is achieved in the Interagency Intelligence Working Group/Nuclear Proliferation (IIWWG/NP), is there more effective coordination of the various collection and production) components of the Intelligence Community (at least to the extelt that various components know what the others are doing)? Suggest changes that may be needed to improve coordination within the Community. ANSWER/COMMENT A. We have not been directly involved in the IIWG/NP, so we cannot comment on any contribution it may have made to improve- ments in Community coordination on collection or production. B. From our perspective, "coordination" between Community members may have improved over the last few years--insofar as this means we know more about each other's activities. If, however, the goal of Community coordination is a well-focused nuclear proliferation collection program with clearly defined roles for each Agency and effective evaluation cf performance in response .o those roles, the Community has a long way to go. QUESTION #2 Are the analytical, collection, and other resources of tfe Community now being effectively utilized and applied? Identify possible misal,locations and provide suggestions for greater elf?.ciency. ANSWER/COMMENT A. General Comments It is our perception that Community resources are not yet being applied effectively to nuclear proliferation collection. The causes for this shortfall may not lie in the proliferation issue itself so much as in the overall inertia of Community mechanisms by which resources are tied to intelligence issues Whatever the intelligence topic, the Community in general and is members in particular are usually slow to: (1) Recognize long-range information needs and to make specific arrangements to cover them effectively-; (2) Agree upon and highlig'it those issues which de.seve priority attention; Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R000200220010-1 SECRET/ 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R000200220010-1 Attachment I DD/SfT-34S7- 71 Page 2 QUESTION #2 ANSWER/COMMENT (Cont'd) (3) Decide, among competing information needs, how, where, and in what proportion, resources should be allocated or redistributed to address these needs; (4) Communicate effective guidance to multi-issue resources managers in a way that will help them do better at allocating resources among organizational elements competing for them; (5) Independently monitor resource allocation and progress for important issues on a continuing basis, implementing mechanisms for informed, constructive review. One of the fundamental problems which seems to underlie all of the above areas is the basic difficulty in connecting intelligence issues with the practical business of applying resources to them. Resources, and the line managers who apply them, are not "subject-specific"; that is, generally speaking, funds and people can be applied to a wide range of important problems. The mix is more or less at the discretion:. of.the.line manager where it should undoubtedly remain. Community panels, committees, and councils convened on a particular collection issue, such as proliferation, may suggest initiatives, plan strategies, and exhort managers on the importance of the subject. This guidance, however, has little credibility unless it can either provide the line manager with funds and people or can he linked in some practical way with the other issues among which he must re- apportion his resources. Of course, these other issues have their own advocates within and without the line manager's organization. While line managers are beginning to hear "the .word" on proliferation, they are still in the process of juggling their personnel and budgets to effectively accommodate the subject, and it is not likely to be before 1980 that the inertia in the system will have been overcome. B. Connecting Resources with Intelligence Issues In numerous requests for information about our nuclear development program we perceive a disturbing tendency to ask line-item by line-item whether a particular technique or system under development supports proliferation collection or some other form of nuc-lear collection, such as weapons movement. While we appreciate the need for linkage between intelligence issues and the resource expenditures, we think Approved For Release 2(%5A6609 : 00171 R000200220010-1 25X1 SECRET/I Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R000200220010-1 Attachemnt 1 DD/S&T-3457_78 Page 3 that this particular approach could be very misleading. [Example #1 - Each of the projects in the charts accompanying these comments contains technology which could be applied either to proliferation or weapons movement targets. In reviewing the current (77/78) programs and their responsiveness to proliferation issues, it should be remembered that some of our current systems have first been deployed against weapons movement targets only because these targets already exist and, in most cases, proliferation targets for these approaches do not. A better way to look at the technolcg; would be to determine what specific questions a system can answer about a particular aspect of the proliferation issue (along'with the other issues it may also address), how widely is it likely to be used, and what is the likely value to the Community of the resulting information in comparison with the system cost. QUESTION #3 Is the collection, research, and production program of the Community commensurate with the priorities for nuclear proliferation intelligence, and is it responsive to the needs of key policymakers? Describe tiny shortcomings and propose appropriate means of improvement. ANSWER/COMMENT See Question #2, Answer/Comment QUESTION #4 What progress has been made toward design and implementa-_i,,n of common nuclear proliferation data bases? What problems have been encountered? What are the milestones for the next year? ANSWER/COMMENT No # C19M94For Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP83M00171R000200220010-1 25X1 SECRET/I 25X1 SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R000200220010-1 Attachment to DD/S$T-3457-75 Page 4 QUESTION #5 Based on the past year's experience, what, if any, administrative actions or structural changes would be recommenced to speed progress and improve the prospects of the nuclear proliferation intelligence program? ANSWER/COH\IENT Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R000200220010-1 SECRET/ 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R000200220010-1 Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R000200220010-1 Approved For Release 2005 gtUk~ -RDP83M00171 R000200220010-1 a'5 JUl MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Performance Evaluation and Improvement, IC Staff ATTENTION: SUBJECT: REFERENCE: Eloise R. Page Acting Associate Deputy Director for Operations Assessment of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence Activities and Developments Your memorandum (IC 2361-78) dated 1 June 1978, same subject 1. As a result of the initiatives of the Interagency Intelligence Working Group/Nuclear Proliferation (IIWG/NP), the CIA/Directorate of Operations has received guidance on the priorities for collection against specific nuclear pro1.iferating countries.. This guidance has assisted us in the allocation of resources and in directing collection resources in target countries toward those areas that appear to have the greatest intelligence potential. For example, the greater emphasis by the IIWG/NP on non-technical collec- tion in target countries is now reflected in specific guidance to field stations. 2. We see some possibility for improvement in the development of Collection Strategies. We have already observed one instance where a Collection Strategy was con- strued as a tasking document. This led to initiatives being taken by individual components that could have jeopardized ongoing collection operations, or confused planning efforts. 25X1 25X1 Furthermore, it recommended a itiona co ec ion tasks w lc , if these had been carried out, could have conflicted with the DIA effort. While sensitive opera- tions must be protected, particularly against wide Community dissemination of specific operational tasks, we recommend ,SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RE Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R000200220010-1 SECRET that some steps be undertaken to avoid Collection Strategies from being used as a basis for new ititiatives that might affect ongoing or planned operations. 3. In this context, we should also like to suggest that the possibility be explored of evaluating various collection means that could be employed against a given target. Since the employment of clandestine resources is expensive in terms of risks, they should obviously be used only when other resources are unable to collect the required information. Therefore, we should appreciate some evaluation of the potential of other collection means (COMINT, Foreign Service, attaches, etc.) to gain the intelligence objectives for each target country. Such an assessment might identify more clearly those areas that require a clandestine' human collection effort for lack of reasonable alternatives. 25X1 Eloise age 1 Attachment FY 77/78/79 Estimate Approved For Relea Erp r 9 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R000200220010-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R000200220010-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R000200220010-1 Approved For Release 2005/66RDP83M00171R000200220010-1 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505 Notional Intelligence Officers NFAC-2748-78 3 July 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Resource Management FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Nuclear Proliferation SUBJECT : Assessment of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence Activities and Developments REFERENCE : IC-2361-78, 1 June 78, Subject (same as above), Secret 1. The following paragraphs provide preliminary answers to the questions you posed on the management of nuclear proliferation intelli- gence activities. While it mainly represents my office's views, it partly also reflects views solicited from the Nuclear Energy Division of the Office of Scientific Intelligence. In the next few weeks, I will be soliciting additional views from other offices in the National Foreign Assessment Center and will be considering the answers to your questions provided by other components of the community. So, I would like to reserve further comments and suggestions for an early review of your draft report. 2. The coordination of nuclear proliferation intelligence activities has already improved substantially. Still, I am considering additional changes in the division of labor, assignment of responsibility, and in the conduct of studies by various agencies to optimize the quality, coverage, and efficiency of intelligence analysis. U on discovering a suspect .military test facility in the I established an inter- age ncy watch team to insure adequately competitive analyses of information on intentions and capabilities to conduct a nuclear explosion. the same time, some mutually duplicative efforts were undertaken on the initiative of individual agencies without informing my office. Subsequent to these highly urgent but somewhat redundant efforts, the Interagency Intelligence Working Group on Nuclear Proliferation (IIWG/NP), which I chair, began to develop a comprehensive community production program. I initiated, in addition, an interagency study of I nuclear program and policies in cooperation with the National Intelligence Officerl In response to a special 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171R000200220010-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R000200220010-1 request of the DCI from the Interagency Committee on Internal Security, I also had the IIWG/NP undertake a community study of prospects for foreign. threats of nuclear terrorism. The IIWG/NP has further served as a. forum: for guiding the development of a community data base on nuclear proliferation; reviewing the production plans, roles, and missions of various intelligfnc- components; insuring community participation in the drafting of country- specific collection strategies; and conveying new intelligence needs anc. priorities that derive from the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Non-Proliferation as well as other policy-making bodies. Most of these efforts are continuirg, and they will lead to the issuance of successive interagency studies, tt-e complete coordination of a community production program, and the drafting of additional collection strategies by the end of Fiscal Year 1.978. 3. The increasingly effective coordination of the community production and collection efforts on nuclear proliferation intelligence has entailed more efficient as well as more abundant utilization of resources. Not only has there been a disproportionate increase in the quantity of intelligence produced by a limited number of analysts, but the quality of their finished contributions to the policy-making process ha!. improved even more markedly. However, strategic, political, and economic analysis of nuclear proliferation has only begun to match the quality and quantity of scientific-technical intelligence. New provisions have been made for political and economic analysts dedicated to nuclear prolifera,icrr intelligence, and regionally or functionally specialized analysts have begun to acquire new skills in elucidating nuclear issues. For instance, country-specialized economic analysts have completed a comparative appraisal of developing countries' nuclear energy programs; country- specialized political analysts have undertaken more comprehensive assessments of the nuclear energy, technology, and weapons-related pro grarfs such key countries as 25X1 I I and strategic analysts have participated in sc;m? of 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R0002002,20010-1 - under DCID 1/2. Ho.wrever, the total size and immediate productivity o these efforts have been deliberately limited by the long-term need to improve both the quality of analysis and the efficiency of resource utilization at the same time. So, initial efforts were intended to produce finished studies on the most policy-urgent countries 25X1 , to_ undertake comparable ;studies of other key countries, and to prepare specialized studies, data-bases, and collection strategies for all countries of concern. In addition, the community nas responded to a wide variety of ad hoc requests from policy-makers for timely assessments of foreign nuclear policy developments, e_g. 25X1 5. Substantial progress has been made in the development of a comprehensive, community data base on special nuclear materials. (An 25X1 up-to-date progress report on the project, undertaken by DoE/ISA/LL . should summarize the results of a works op I conducted there under the auspices of the IIWG/NP, June 27-28. The 0 project Teader promised to send me a report on this workshop by mid-July.) Elements of a comprehensive, community data base on nuclear scientists and technicians. sensitive fuel-cycle facilities,. weapons research and development activities, strategic doctrines, and other items critical to nuclear proliferation-intelligence have also been identified. However, there are no current plans to institutionalize a mechanism for integrating these elements into a formally established data base on nuclear proliferation intelligence. Instead, under the auspices of the IIWG/NP, I plan to review periodically the progress made in improving the scope, content, and accessibility of specialized data bases. As deficiencies are. identified, new needs emerge, and priorities change, I will propose appropriate measures to responsible offices and agencies. 6. 1 can not now identify specific administrative actions or structural changes needed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of nuclear proliferation intelligence activities. In'due course, I intend to make some specific recommendations on the basis of future proposals. by individual components of the intelligence community. In general, though, the structural changes that were instituted last year have been working, producing results, and promising further progress. Given the established priorities for nuclear proliferation intelligence, my office is still needed to lead national production of nuclear proliferation intelligence. 7. New and Unfinished Business. Unless the diplomacy of nuclear ron- .proliferation and international conflict resolution actually halt the spread of nuclear explosive materials and new national interests in nuclear arms, policy needs for nuclear proliferation intelligence will continue to grow. They are likely to expand in several ways -- in the Approved For Release 2005/06/09 CIA-RDP83M00171 R000200220010-1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 20W6il-O91: CIA-RDP83M00171 R00020022001 0-1 number of countries concerned, in the complexity and detail of issues raised, and in the strategic importance of answers provided. Nuclear proliferation intelligence already needs not only to support diplomatic efforts aimed at stemming proliferation and limiting conflict, but it must also anticipate the possible failure of diplomacy and the exigencies of'future crisis management. Consequently, nuclear proliferation intelli- gence is likely to merge, country by country. with strategic intelligence on medium and lesser powers such as Moreover, the most serious shortcomings of nuclear proliferation in elligerce to date are attirbutable to inadequate assessments of proliferating countries' political-military interests in and approaches toward.the development of nuclear explosives. These deficiencies could eventually result in the unexpected deployment (and unforeseen plans for employment) of nuclear weapons unless the long-term strategies of medium and lesser powers are more thoroughly researched, carefully analyzed, and correctly understood. Insofar as nuclear proliferation intelligence may elucidate those countries' nuclear strategies, plans, and intentions, it should also contribute to better intelligence on their associated conventional research and development strategies, arms production and deployment plans, and political-military intentions. So, among the more important items of new and unfinished business for nuclear proliferation intelligence are the long-term threat perceptions, force development programs, contingency plans. and political security needs of incipient nuclear powers. 25X1 f 25)1 Approved For Release 20051 6109 : CIA-RDP83MOOl71 R000200220010-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 CIA-RDP83M00171 R000200220010-1 NFAC-2748-78 SUBJECT: Assessment of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence Activities and Developments Distribution: 1 - DD/RM 1 - DD/NFAC 1 - D/ORPA 1 - D/OSI 1 - D/OER 1 - D./OSR 1 - NFAC Reg 2 - NIO/NP 7" "T Approved For Release 2005/06109'4, CI -RDP83M00171 R000200220010-1. 1Ppproyed For Release 200 65W TCIA-RDP83M00171 8000200220010-1 F- 1The IIWG/NP has provided a mechanis.m for listing produc tD on of nuclear proliferation projects by several of the int.elli g(rce agencies. To date, however, no attempt has been made to coordinate these production programs. This will probably to a difficult exercise as some agencies will want to produce pects of when OER may ma tie a contribution. 2. Not applicable. 3. Not applicable. 4, We have recently completed a detailed 1)o