THE SOLITARY ICE CUBE PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R000300270043-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2005
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: November 5, 1974
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2c PIA-RDP83MOO171 R000300270043-9
NOW MW
SUBJECT: The Solitary Ice Cube Problem
1. In our summarization of PRD reactions to the NIB and DIN,
we seem to have overlooked several addressed to fragmentation and
the lack of continuity of coverage in the daily periodicals. Note the
following :
"The articles should, whenever possible, fit
into a pattern of other contributions... Articles
which violate (this) principle and which are not
otherwise distinguished, fade quickly from
memory, like a solitary ice cube in a glass. "
"I doubt that the average, non-intelligence
community reader has either the time or the
inclination to piece daily fragments of informa-
tion into a meaningful mosaic. "
". . . there is apparent lack of integration within
a given NIB issue. No threads binding the
publication together seem to exist. "
"... unless you keep a written running record of
what has been produced in the NIB and the DIN...
you are unlikely to recall details of what was in
these products and you are equally unlikely to
go to the trouble of finding and sifting through
back copies for that old information. "
2. I think these are highly significant criticisms and may identify
the chief reason why the NIB and the DINs lack readership appeal.
What the consumer reads today more often than not has little reference
to what he read yesterday or what he will read tomorrow. He thus has
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/ QSj' Ell-R P83M00171 R000300270043-9
 Approved For Relmse 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP83M00l71 ROW300270043-9
little of that sense of anticipation which one gets from a periodical that
implicitly or explicitly says "Continued in our next. " On the contrary,
he is often irritated by being unable to recall and piece together the
background of a situation being reported on.
3. To remedy this weakness, I would propose restructuring the
NIB into three sections, entitled Special Developments, Weekly Round-
ups, and Daily Briefs. Section III would consist of six parts covering
the following geographic and functional areas:
a. Soviet and PRC
b. Western Europe
c. Middle East and South Asia
d. Far East and South East Asia
e. Economics and Energy
f. Africa and Latin America
The items in Section III would be primarily reportorial and as brief
as possible.
4. Section II would cover only one of the foregoing areas each
day of the week, e. g. , Soviet and PRC on Mondays, Western Europe
on Tuesdays, etc. These articles would be analytical and estimative.
5. Section I would cover special developments too urgent to await
coverage during the normal weekly cycle. It might also include an
occasional article on subjects (e. g., The Law of the Sea Conference
and international narcotics) that do not fit logically into any one of
the six major categories covered by Section III.
6. In order to accommodate Danny Graham's desire for special
focus on military intelligence, I would suggest adding a seventh category
to Section III of the NIB. Interpretative articles on military developments
should appear in Section II, tied to the appropriate geographic area, or
perhaps occasionally in Section I. (Additional categories could also be
used for S&T items, narcotics, and terrorism. )
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : gftR"JlVl001 71 R000300270043-9
 Approved For ReI 'se 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00l71 R0Q0300270043-9
7. I do not see any need to change the criteria for the kinds of
information appearing in this restructured NIB. Since it would draw
a clearer distinction between reportorial items (Section III) and
interpretative articles (Sections I and II), the former are likely to
be shorter and the latter longer than the average article now appearing
in the NIB. The overall size of the publication, however, need be no
greater than now and possibly considerably smaller.
8. A NIB structured in this way would appear to have at least
four major advantages over the current NIB. The consumer would
know where to look for, and when to expect, the community's latest
views of his area of interest. He would be provided with a chronological
log, updated daily, of all key developments in his area of interest. He
would be provided with a weekly "think piece" on developments in his
area. He would also feel confident that, if anything of urgent significance
occurred, he would be alerted to it immediately by a Special article.
9. This proposal is not, of course, applicable to the DINs.
10. I would appreciate reactions to this proposal from all PRD
hands -- perhaps in a staff meeting.
25X1
Deputy Chief, PRD
IC/PRD/
Distribution:
Original - Addressee v
1 - PRD Subject
1 - PRD Chrono
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : Cl rffp y0171 R000300270043-9
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R000300270043-9
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R000300270043-9
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171 ROQ0300270043-9
. ADEQUACY OF COVERAGE
Tech intel gets short thrift because NIB and DIN editorial
staffs lack tech "advocates.-' Tech items not used are often
more significant than many non-tech items which are used.
S&T types feel more comfortable using their own S&T
publications.
"Integrate tech analysis more extensively into national
products. "
Almost no coverage of Soviet internal political and Sino-
Soviet relations.
Overkill on Brezhnev visit to East German parade and
routine improvements in East German and Bulgarian military
capabilitie s.
Good coverage on Soviet economics, Soviet relations with
Arabs, Yugoslavia.
Hence, plethora of ite-us of marginal or no interest to top
policy level.
QUALITY OF COVERAGE AND PUBLICATIONS
Economic intelligence does not fit comfortably into daily
periodicals, primarily because of its multi-national nature and
broad sweep. Primary media are weeklies (EIW and IOD), which
top policy people probably don't read. To remedy this, effort
being made to increase input to NID.
Scatter-gun nature of )IN confusing.
NIB too long (17 pages) for busy consumer.
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R000300270043-9
 Approved For ReJgase 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00l71 R000300270043-9
QUALITY OF COVERAGE AND PUBLICATIONS (continued)
NIB--too many marginal articles.
Too much technical detail--not enough analysis. Address
significance rather than tech details.
DIN product generally weak.
DIN--many useless articles--meant primarily for low-
level analysts.
Too little analytical carntent, but better in NIB than DIN.
Too many marginal or useless articles--maybe half.
Few analytical pieces.
? DIN political analysis shallow.
"Too much production for production's sake. "
A related and more s,ibstantial weakness in the DINS was
the superficiality that sometimes marred analyses of European
politics.
On NIB--most articles benefited from concise and coherent
exposition, not always true of the DINGo and offered some analysis
of the events described. That the articles appeared a day or two
later than similar articles in the DIN did not appear consequential.
Treatment in the Daily Intelligence Notices (DINS) of more
narrowly military subjects tended to be somewhat better; they
were, in any case, more self-confident.
3. RELATIONSHIP OF COVERAGE TO KIQs
Response to KIQs in literal sense is good-but only because
KIQs so broad.
Response to sub-KIC~s is poor, chiefly because items are
reportorial rather than analytic.
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00l71 R000300270043-9
 Approved For ReleUe 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP83M00171 ROQ2300270043-9
RELATIONSHIP OF COVERAGE TO KIOe (continued)
RIQs per se do not in::luence NIB and DIN production
very much.
Little relevance to MOs.
Nearly a third of the DINe and a somewhat larger fraction
of the NIB articles had some relevance to the key intelligence
questions on Western Europe& but I suspect that in such instances
both the KIQe and the article* were informed by the same, prior
understanding of what wall important. There were in both publica-
tions articles of considerable usefulness which had very little to
do with the KIQa.
4. REDUNDANCY OF COVERAGE
NIB/DIN redundancy--an irritant to the consumer.
Only 25 percent overlap in NIB and DIN reporting--clearly
have different production standards.
5. PRD METHODOLOGY
PRD review lacks significant input--consumer evaluation
of product.
All PRD officers should use same summary chart, or
tool, to draw up monthly conclusions.
Add column on review form in re source.
6. OTHER PROBLEM=
NIB exclusion of TE unacceptable for a `national" product.
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R000300270043-9