END-OF-CONTRACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE STUDY: NFIP SUPPORT TO CONTINGENCY FORCES
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP83M00171R000400090003-2
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 21, 2005
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 19, 1980
Content Type:
MF
File:
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Body:
Approved For Release 200DDC1 E IA-RDP83M00171 R000400090003-2
DCI/RM 2027-80
19 December 1980
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MEMORANDUM FOR: I
D/DCI/RM
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VIA:
I I
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FROM:
PAU
SUBJECT: End-of-Contract Assessment for the Study: NFIP Support
to Contingency Forces
REFERENCE: PAO Staff Memorandum No. 7, dated 6 October 1980, on
Termination of Contractual Arrangement
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Background
The request for contractor assistance to study NFIP support to
contingency forces was initiated by PAO to provide a more in-depth look at
problem areas identified in the RMS Air/Land Support to Operating Forces
(STOF) Study of July 1979. The original objective of the study, as
described in the study prospectus of 14 December 1979, was to identify and
assess alternatives for making NFIP resources and procedures more
responsive to the needs of military forces in planning and executing
contingency operations. The proposed approach, outlined in the
prospectus, was to:
"(1) identify represenative contingency operations. To do this
we will initially examine previous contingency operations and
identify ways to categorize them (e.g., by geographical region, kind
of operations, force deficiencies, critical problems, significant
political-military events preceding the crisis).
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WARNING NOTICE
INTEL L1r Ec!cE SOURCES
AND MET ODS INVOLVED
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SUBJECT: End-of-Contract Assessment for the Study: NFIP Support to
Contingency Forces
(2) identify information needs for each category-of-operation
and operational phase by examining post mortems, interviewing
representatives of organizations involved in past incidents, and
reviewing current planning procedures.
(3) assess how well these needs can be satisfied with current
intelligence assets. This will include looking at needs that
historically have not been satisfied and estimating whether the
capabilities of current and planned NFIP and IRA systems are still
deficient in satisfying them.
(4) estimate the impact of these remaining information
shortfalls on overall mission performance. Impacts need not be
estimated precisely but should provide a basis for ranking shortfalls
in a rough priority order.
(5) for those shortfalls that are most serious and prevalent,
suggest ways to alleviate them (including new collection
requirements, or better procedures for processing, analyzing, and
disseminating existing information) that can be achieved using NFIP
resources and. estimate their costs. Costs of relevant initiatives
already being considered in the FY82 budget can be easily determined;
cost estimates for new solutions will require participation by the
cognizant program manager." (S)
In retrospect, the study accomplished the overall objectives, and the
approach actually used generally followed that proposed. The most
significant problems encountered in conducting the study were in gathering
detailed information on tactical intelligence needs and the utilization of
national assets based on actual contingency operations. This was due to a
combination of :
no post-mortems being available in some instances,
DoD sensitivities to ICS and contractor access to reports
that did exist, and
NSC rules prohibiting contractor access to its records. (S)
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Approved For Release CIA-RDP83M00171 R000400090003-2
SUBJECT: End-of-Contract Assessment for the Study: NFIP Support to
Contingency Forces
Of those reports on actual operations that were made available, some
commented on general shortfalls in intelligence support, but many made no
references to tactical intelligence. As a result of these restrictions,
the information contained in the study was based more on personal
interviews than originally anticipated. (S)
3. Impact of Report
Based on comments received on interim drafts, the report has
generally been well received within the community. It has focused
community attention on specific, cross-program problems that currently
constrain intelligence support to a mission which will likely become more
important in the next few years. In addition, the study was the basis for
a decision paper written during Program Review which resulted in the
reranking and inclusion in the FY82 budget of a number of GDIP, CCP, and
CIAP packages that might otherwise
have been ignore see nnex isting of the
packages). (S)
4. Status of Reommendations
A complete list of recommendations is included in Chapter V of the
report. The DCI's FY83-87 Guidance will assign responsibilities to the
program managers for follow-up actions on selected recommendations with
resource implications. For example, the GDIP program manager is asked in
Guidance to take the community lead and report progress to the DCI by next
June in the following areas:
-- working with the RDJTF and the Services to define a
prioritized set of minimum essential information needs for
supporting contingency force planning and execution,
-- identifying shortfalls in community data base holdings and
dissemination techniques which inhibit satisfaction of
these needs, and
investigating the value and cost of establishing a point of
contact that could provide complete services for tactical
organizations requesting national-level support. (S)
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SUBJECT: End-of-Contract Assessment for the Study: NFIP Support to
Contingency Forces
In addition, RMS is committed, via Guidance, to continue monitoring
resource initiatives proposed to improve contingency support and to
highlight for the DCI in the FY83 Program and Budget reviews those
proposals judged most promising. Finally,.PAO plans to work with
community representatives to determine the feasibility of maintaining a
Crisis Area Watch List like that proposed in the study which could be used
by the community to focus limited collection and production resources on
likely crisis spots. (S)
5. Disposition of Report
The final report is being distributed to the addressees listed in
Annex 9 of the study. Unless specifically requested by them, distribution
to Congressional committees -is not recommended. (S)
6. Final Observations
Among the "lessons learned" from monitoring this contract are the
following:
o the amount of time required to monitor a contract is easily
underestimated. I had originally estimated that about 40 percent of
my time wou be required; in actuality about 70 percent was
required. This was due in part to the breadth of the study, the
large number of DoD and intelligence organizations involved, and the
fact that much of the information needed was available only through
personal interviews. I spent a large amount of time contacting
organizations, describing the study, alleviating sensitivities about
why the Resource Management Staff was studying this area,
establishing contractor clearances, etc. In addition, I accompanied
the SPC analysts on all initial interviews, played an active role in
developing the study outline, and helped rewrite portions of the
report. In my opinion, this level of participation was necessary to
ensure the final product was relevant and useful.
o analysts were flexible and
conscientious in responding to guidance, they were concerned about
the quality of the final product, and they were willing to expend the
extra effort required to meet deadlines
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SECROA
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Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R000400090003-2