COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN VERIFICATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R000500050011-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2007
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 5, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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NSC REVIEW COMPLETED, 7/2/03.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John N. McMahon
Associate Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community
25X1
SUBJECT Comprehensive Test Ban Verification
o You are scheduled to meet with Major General Edward
Giller, USAF (Ret.), Deputy Assistant Administrator for National
Security and Senior Intelligence Officer of ERDA, at 1030 hours
on Tuesday, 24 May 1977, to discuss Comprehensive Test Ban
Verification (CTB). General Giller raised CTB questions in a
letter to the DCI dated 5 May and before the NFIB on 17 May.
Expected participants at the meeting include:
- John LaBarre, Assistant Director for Intelligence,
ISA/ERDA
- Bob Duff, Assistant Director for Arms Control, ISA/ERDA
What follows are background information and some points you may
wish to raise in your discussion.
o Highlights of ERDA (Giller) letter dated 5 May 1977 (Tab A)
New CTB would expand and increase technical dimensions
of verification problem to all nuc and many non-nuc
weapon states.
- New CTB would change fundamental verification issue
from determination of location of nuc explosion
(atmosphere, space or underwater vice underground)
to determine nature of explosion (nuc vice non-nuc).
DOE review completed
TS 77-0544
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- Pol/mil implications of undetected violations of
a CTB (whether by NWS or NNWS) might be more
significant than for a LTBT.
- CTB raises 2 basically political issues:
--Release of info to other nations without
jeopardizing sensitive sources
--On-site inspection by U.S. must be
acceptable to the foreign countries
involved.
- In view of above, Gilley feels it essential for
NFIB to undertake an in-depth review of the issue
asap believing it useful for NFIB to address funda-
mental Community intelligence responsibilities to
support the interactional verification of a CTB.
o Summary of D/DCI/IC response to Giller letter
- Memo to Bowie dated 23 May asking that his staff
develop an assessment in response to ERDA's request
and stating plans to schedule CTB verification for
NFIB in June.
- Note to Giller dated 23 May relaying intentions (as
specified above re memo to Bowie).
-1 memo dated 23 May to
citing inherent relationship of nuclear proliferation
issues to the proposed CTB and the need for close
collaboration between the NIO/SP and the NIO/NP.
o Related Treaties: LTBT, NPT, TTBT, and PNET (See Tab B).
o PRM/NSC-16 Nuc Testing requirement for initial review
(25 June 1977) addressed to: V. President, Sec State,
Sec De , DCI, CJCS, D CDA, RJDA
- Essential elements of PRM :L6:
--A preliminary analysis of the major problems
of verifying a complete ban on. all testing
weapons as well as peaceful nuclear explosions
by the US and the USSR, and other nuclear
powers.
--The effect of such a ban on US weapons testing
programs as well as the likely effect on Soviet
programs.
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--Alternative diplomatic scenarios that might
be adopted to move towards this goal, including
the advantages and disadvantages of several
alternatives: a unilateral US moratorium; a
bilateral US/Soviet moratorium; and approaches
to other nuclear powers to join such a
moratorium. Consideration should also be
given to a more permanent arrangement; for
example, amending the Limited Test Ban Treaty.
There should also be an examination of the
advantages and disadvantages of moving ahead
with or holding the Threshold Test Ban Treaty
and PNE Agreement already before the Congress.
o Principal PRM/NSC 16 Actors:
- SCC Test Ban Working Group, chaired by John Marcum,
NSC Staff.
- Exec Summary drafted by group chaired by NSC staff
member with one representative from: State, ERDA,
JCS, OSD, ACDA, CIA
- Principal intelligence subjects are U.S. verification
capabilities and the impact of a CTB on
--foreign nuclear capabilities (ERDA, CIA)
--US allies (State, ACDA)
--proliferation (State, ACDA)
Input on all these elements coordinated within CIA
but not formally coordinated with other intelligence
agencies. Verification section prepared by CIA with
major technical inputs from the Air Force Technical
Applications Center.
- CIA/DDI (OSI/NED) has the action on behalf of the DCI.
o ACDA and ERDA expressed belief there are serious risks in
attempting to accommodate "peaceful- nuclear explosions" within
a CTB. Draft PD/NSC , 11 May 1977, states US negotiating
position should be the prohibition of PNEs as well as nuc
weapons tests.
o Draft PD/NSC dated 11 May 1977 (See Tab C)
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o Points and/or questions to be raised
You should agree to listen to proposals.
- Cite D/DCI/IC response to Giller
--Memo to Bowie calling for assessment of Giller
recommendations and
--Plan to schedule CTB verification topic at NFIB
in June
- Note apparent close relation of NIO/SP and NIO/NP
functions as they relate to CTB
Raise question of the need for an ad hoc committee
to deal with the issues raised by Giller
- Query Giller on the expected role ERDA ought to play
in the development of an in-depth review of CTB
verification
1,ET
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 UNITED STATES
1 of 2 copies, series
ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545
copy #
~riAY 5 1977
5., -1`-
May
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Admiral Stansfield Turner, US Navy U'S' E:~,i.GYr.:: VS
Director of Central Intelligence By:
Washington, DC 20505 IX ,.ENTI U. CLXXVIII-235-1A
As I mentioned to you a few days ago, I am becoming increasingly concerned
with certain aspects regarding verification of international compliance
with the multilateral.CQmprehensive Test Ban (CTB) under consideration
by the Administration:. Although the PRM 16 review addresses many aspects
of verification, I feel additional consideration by the NFIB is warranted.
The purpose of this letter is to outline my concerns and to recommend two
NFIB actions.
As you will recall, Safeguard (d) of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in
the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater (referred to as the LTBT)
represents one of four conditions imposed by the U.S. Senate to the
ratification of the treaty in August 1963. Its provisions require "The
improvement of our capability, within feasible and practical limits, to
monitor the terms of the treaty, to detect violations, and maintain our
knowledge of Sino-Soviet nuclear activity, capabilities, and achievements."
On 29 February 1964, the Secretary o-F.Defense recommended that "the
monitoring of actions taken in furtherance of Safeguard (d)...is basically
an intelligence function and falls properly as a responsibility of the
United States Intelligence Board. The USIB should coordinate all intellige
activities to maintain Safeguard (d)." The USIB subsequently accepted this
responsibility and approved the recommendation that "the Joint Atomic Energ
Intelligence Committee be designated as the action agency to monitor the
Safeguard (d) problem." The JAEIC prepared, and USIB subsequently approved
national-level intelligence guidance applicable to Safeguard (d). The NFIB
subsequently assumed all USIB responsibilities with respect to Safeguard (d
and approved the most recent Safeguard (d) report in February 1977.
The successful negotiation and implementation of a multilateral CTB would
increase the technical dimension of verification over that required for
monitoring the LTBT in at least three ways. First, whereas the LTBT requir
monitoring only of Soviet and Chinese nuclear tests, a CTB would necessitat
monitoring tests of other nuclear weapon states as well as many non-nuclear
weapon states. Second, a CTB would change the fundamental verification
issue from determining the location of nuclear explosions (atmosphere,
WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED
Extr. FT FROM GENERAL DECLA>,W EXEtiPTI;N CATGp?
Criminal sanctions l; r i 1 ??ef
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INFORMATION Aur0M - tLY DEC[ASSrFr_D- ON IMPDET
 outer space, or underwater vice underground) to determining the nature
of explosions (nuclear vice non-nuclear). Third, the military and
political implication of undetected violations of a CTB (whether by a
NWS or NNWS) might be more significant than for a LTBT.
Verification of a CTB raises two additiona'I issues which are basically
political in nature. First, U.S. statemeni:s concerning possible violations
of the_CTB must be based on information which can be revealed to other
nations without _Jeopardizing sensitive sources and methods and which is
politically acceptable to those nations lacking comparable national
technical means of verification. Second, the assignment of verification
and monitoring responsibilities to U.S. departments and agencies,
especially where in-country activities such as on-site inspection are
included, must be politically acceptable to the foreign governments
involved.
In light of this expanded dimension associated with the verification of
a multilateral CTB, I feel it is essential for the NFIB to undertake an
in-depth review of this. issue at an early date. It would also be useful
for NFIB to address the fundamental intelligence responsibilities the
Community must -assume in support of the international verification of a
CTB. In this regard I would be happy to provide a short background paper
and lead the NFIB discussion. As an outcome I would expect NFIB to
provide guidance to the IC staff and perhaps the JAEIC which would facili-
tate timely action and preparation in support of the Administration's
initiatives in this area.
I would be pleased to discuss these issues with you and with the NFIB at
an appropriate time.
ara 3. Th ller
Senior Intelligence Officer
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Background Information
Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)
The LTBT, signed in 1963, prohibits nuclear weapons
tests ("or any other nuclear explosion") in the atmosphere,
in outer space, under water, or in any other environment
if the explosion would cause radioactive debris to extend
beyond the borders of the state conducting the explosion.
The Treaty is of unlimited duration. More than 100 nations
are parties; but France and the PRC have not signed.
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
The NPT, signed in 1968 and effective in 1970, is
designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and
provide assurances that peaceful nuclear activities of
nonnuclear weapon states (NNWS) not be diverted to making
such weapons. Article V states that potential benefits
from any PNES will be made available to NNWS party to the
Treaty on a nondiscriminating basis. France and the PRC
are not parties.
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT)
The TTBT was signed in 1974 and, with its companion
PNET, is now before the Congress for ratification. The
terms of the Treaty limit all nuclear weapons tests conducted
after 31 March 1976 to less than 150 KT. Weapons tests are
to be conducted at declared sites and held to a minimum.
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A protocol provides for provision of detailed technical
information to aid in teleseisrnic verification. The US
and the Soviet Union have agreed not to take any actions
incompatible with the Treaty pending ratification.
Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful
Purposes (PNET)
The TTBT specifically excluded PNEs, which were to be
covered by a separate, companion treaty. This treaty was
signed on 13 May 1976 and limits individual PNEs to the
150 KT TTBT threshold. Group :PNE explosions are allowed
up to an aggregate yield of 1500 KT, providing no individual
explosion in the group exceeds 150 KT. A detailed protocol
is included which provides for the presence of observers
for group explosions above 150 KT (and by mutual agreement
in the 100-150 KT range) with specific rights to carry out
measurements confirming the yield of each explosion in the
group. Provision is also made for detailed information
exchange on all PNEs.
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+Sr.CIZ~T - GDS i
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NATIONAL st cuRt-y COUNCIL
WAW-4lNc roro, ntc, to340
May il, 1977
MLMO ItA NDUM FOR! Paul .1Na r&ilce '
-
1--rank X?rcns ,
? .
-Reginald ] arthoiouiew
Waiter SLocotrtb"
Ge& Wiiliam *1. Smith
Robert 33o;vie
Goo -,A-1f r4.S0irb1'rd
SU73JECT: .
Draft Pre~iclc,u.tial Directive art CTI3
Nego U ations
Attached, no agreed in ):tst weelcrti SGC venior working
IS it draft PrciniderUo1 cli.rcctivc. cal~cr;rning our initial Positionfor
CTB negotiations with thv Sovich . 'T11o Directive r?ciflccEs irtteLage 1,:
agreement oli n-iort o.E th.~ key iso.ueo ab -axj)raoacd at the meeti-t;, w !t.
the ciccc:i)tion.of the tithing of a cttsoatxon?of tenting.' It is recogniz.,e
that thin issue tivi11 probably rcquive further SCC discussion and over tjal
decloion by tho President.
PIL:,ace provide your corm-ricut:o on Lho biroctive. by rriday, May 13.
ohn M. fMa'rcum
? S1:C,Itr, T - GDS
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1IE:vLOR A1tiDU
? DILAFT -
1'resicl~~ni.iat Directive I NSC
TOz Thc Vice Pra&frl lnt
The Secretary of Sta'te
The Sec rotary of.Do el-ye
A LSSO:-? The Director, !Office of Maizago1 ont and
Budget:.
The Assiataiit'to the President for
National S~cr-icy. Affoirs
The Dire ctor, Office of Science_ and Technolt+::y
Policy
The Wrectox,:Arz>a Control and
Di.earthameni Agency
The Chairnri.an' Joint Chiefs of Staff
-The Director. of Central Intelligence
The Adreiinicstiator, Energy Research and
Developmi?rot Adminietralion
SUBJECTt Negotiations with' the Soviets on Termination of Nuclo i r
Exploxiona r _
1-laving reviewed tho responso to Previdential Review Mernorandum-
NSC-16, I would 1ikc6 to initiate negotiation of a rnultila-terat treaty tc
ban nuclear explosions;. The US delegation for those negotiation' v'i: -
be chaired -by. the Director, Arno Coil-trot. acid Disarmament Agency
with reprenentativee from State, D4tfe'nse, the Energy Research an:]
fevolopTm nt Adrniuietrn.tion,- and other r genciee ao appropriate, un,l?ir
the general supervision.- of the NSC Special Coordinating Committee.
Ae the first stop in these nogotiotions; the US should seek agreement
with the Soviet Union on'the key elern~rnts of n multilateral trc - ty Uir 1
',would embody a COXprohens-iv r, prohibition on nuclear explosions in an
environments. With Soviet concurrence, the United ICtngdoin should
[continued)
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1
NATIONAL SEC'UILITY COUNCIL
May 11, 197 7
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be invited to particip.?ato in thoae2! negotiations as early as fcaailzlc. Nle
US position should include: tho following pointui
The treaty's entry into ford should not require?the adIl(rerce
of France or the People's ?Ropublic Of China.
}
>>
In addition to a Iraup:?Q;tn.o intcxesta" withdrawal clause, tll are
should be 1>rovlaton for a'reviow confuronco with the optic:t
to withdraw from the tre ty:after a period. of *about five ye-t ;s.
Tho treaty.uhould protlibit: n'uclcar w.-ploalotis for peace- LI
pUrpou.en AO Well as fcit? ttucj.ear weapon. teats.
/ on US and Soviet t'errit'ory; and
with regard to verification of the agkeernent, the US position alloil?l
be that the treaty should provid for ntotziioring of compliance Ebro i Ih
national technical flleatlt3 of veti.ticatiou acu 'ment'al by int c?:taLivil:l
exchange of.,teia nie data. In a-Idition, the itti~ ':zl r'S poai:ion a ho' d
inch-dOonsidcratio~3~ri7cacurc~e 'fllicl?inilzo it pflen-Iornt these
provisions, such ail$
??- Installation of unmans ad, tarnpcr-detcTctiilny ecisrrtomelere
..> On-sits inspections at the location of questionable a rennt?, ,
which could be requested by any party. or by a fact-finding
consultative conirnitteo' of treaty Pat'ties'.
jointly announce that each would refrain from conducting any naucle tr
explonfonq during the period of neCotttttiou of this znultilntoral treat r.
The US Delegation should propooo' that once agreement is reached
on key clemcntn of a. multilateral treaty, the USSR, US-and UK
should refer' these olattzenta to ' the Conference of the Corxirnittce cn
Dicarmaniont for negotiation of an appropriate treaty text, and
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