BACKFIRE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R000700330002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 17, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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Copy No.
17 August 1976
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence
Community
USN, PAID
VIA: -Chief, Production Assessment and Improvement
Division
Director of Performance Evaluation and
Improvement
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SUBJECT: BACKFIRE
1. For your information, the following is a summary of
where things stand in the Community regarding the BACKFIRE
question, based on discussions with OWI OSR, Air Force and
DDRF,E analysts, A/NIO/SP and OPBD (ex-CO, FTD).
2. The Sub-tantive Problem
a. A majority of the Community still believes the
BACKFIRE is best suited for a peripheral attack role
and is unlikely to be specifically assigned to inter-
continental missions. The Air Force believes the basic
design of the aircraft indicates the Soviets developed
the BACKFIRE to perform a variety of missions, including
intercontinental attack.
b. While no one disputes the intercontinental
capability of the BACKFIRE (with staging/refueling/one-
way missions as required), there are major uncertainties
about its performance characteristics which result
primarily from insufficient evidence on the aircraft's
lift/drag, velocity, specific fuel consumption, opera-
tional weight empty, and fuel weight. This has caused
significant differences regarding BACKFIRE's estimated
performance. For example, on a high-altitude subsonic,
unrefueled mission, the bomber's combat radius is said
(in NIE 11-3-8-75) to be either 2900 N.M. (DIA, ARMY,
AIR FORCE), 2700 N.M. (CIA), or 2400 N.M. (Navy). CIA
is expected to complete in early September a
reanalysis of their work on this problem which attempts
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to reduce the range of u.'icertainties and will also
reduce their combat radius estimate from'2700 N.M. to
robabl as low as 2000 N.M.
c. These differences in assessbd capabilities
become more meaningful, however, when viewed in the
context of BACKFIRE's threat to the US. And here. it
all depends on the kind of mission selected. On high-
altitude, subsonic range missions--using either the
DIA/Air Force or last year's CIA estimates (5400 vs.
5100 N.M.)--the bomber could cover targets anywhere in
the US and recover in.non-hostile territory such as
Cuba without staging '6.r refueling. CIA's current
reanalysis will have the effect of requiring the bomber
to stage at Anadyr (in the Arctic), fly a high altitude
subsonic range mission, and probably flame-out in CONUS
or over water if it wants to cover all the continental
US without refueling. On subsonic radius missions, if
it is staged but not refueled, the Ai FrAi orce would say
it could strike targets in a large portion of the
western US. With both staging and refueling, the
BACKFIRE could cover virtually all the US on radius
missions, using the Air Force's estimates. Using the
new CIA figures, even with staging and refueling, it
probably could not effect full coverage of the US on a
radius mission; but could on a one-way flight. On
intercontinental missions of all types, tanker support
would of course be required if extended low-altitude
operations were planned.
d. The above debate over BACKFIRE capabilities
should not obscure the salient fact that the Community
still does not have a good handle on just what the
Soviets' intentions are for this aircraft which has
been operational since 1974. (It may be of course that
the Soviets, themselves, have not yet made hard decisions
regarding the aircraft's mission(s).) While there is
agreement that the BACKFIRE is a highly versatile
aircraft capable of carrying out the various jobs of
Soviet Long Range and Naval Aviation, the majority
believes that supersonic dash and low-altitude penetra-
tion of heavily defended areas (e.g., in Europe and the
Middle East) were prime considerations in the aircraft's
?design. However, the Soviets could indeed assi;rn
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r~ C. },TIRE to an intercontinental attack role and--to
support this (Air Force) argument--all BACKFIREs seen
to date have had refueling probes. Moreover, the
options clearly remain open to the Soviets to modify
the bomber to increase significantly its radius and
range capabilities, although there are no signs yet of
any such upgrading. If the BACKFIRE were to have an
intercontinental role, the Soviets would almost certainly
develop a. compatible new tanker support force. But
here again, there is no evidence of a Soviet attempt to
increase their limited tanker capabilities.
3. The Bureaucratic Problem
a. All interested agencies appear to have had.
equal access to all the available intelligence on
BACKFIRE. However, there have been basic differences
of approach to the data between that of the Air Force
and CIA, and their respective contra.:tors.
b. As noted earlier, the CIA sensitivity
analysis should. be published next mont and will
undoubtedly exacerbate the Agency's differences with
the Air Force. In anticipation of this, Gen Keegan bhas
sent a message to Mr. Bush and yourself (copy
blasting what the Air Force has already seen of this
analysis. From the USAF viewpoint, used a selec-
tively limited, highly suspect data base and improper
assumptions in its study, the results of which are too
dependent on analytical sensitivities, unacceptable in
terms of commonly accepted aeronautical engineering
norms, and, hence, inconclusive at best. OWI has
responded to these charges and reaffirmed the validity
of its analysis in a 6 AUG memo to the Director (copy
at Tab B).
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c. ` Given the above, the State Department (INR)
questions whether it is possible to pick a "best"
BACKFIRE mission radius and believes that policy
decisions (e.g.., in relation to SALT) will have to be
made without benefit of an agreed, unambiguous assess-
ment of the bomber's performance.
4. Where do we go from here?
a. A panel of "neutral" experts (from NASA,
Lockheed, etc.) is being convened by DD/SST for an "in-
house" review/critique of the CIA/McAir sensitivity
analysis. This review should be completed by the end
of August.
b. Concurrently, a Community interagency group
(Air Force, Navy, NSA), under the auspices of WSSIC, is
reviewing the CIA and Air Force FTD analyses.
c. In addition, a DOD group of outside specialists,
headed by James Wade (DIR, SALT Task Force), is reviewing
the different analytical methodologies being applied to
the BACKFIRE problem and critically examining their
results. They are expected to report their findings to
the SECDEF in late August.
d. The results of the foregoing are to be presented
to the WSSIC on 7 SEP 76 for resolution in so far as
possible, and subsequent consideration by the NFIB.
e. As to the outcome of all this, the current
best bet is that:
no Community agreement on BACKFIRE performance
will be achieved; however,
the divergencies of opinion will be defined
more precisely.
S. Conclusion.
a. The BACKFIRE controversy is obviously driven
to a significant extent by bureaucratic/political
sensitivities and equities. Nonetheless, It a.ppers
that all the data are "on=the-table" and that the
process of arriving at the best Community viewpoint(s)
on the matter is proceeding satisfactorily.
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b. Moreover, the heart of the intelligence
debate--BACKFIRE performance--is an issue around which
rational men can legitimately disagree. The evidence
is inconclusive, the range of uncertainties is large,
the analytical methodologies involved are exceedingly
complex, and the answers one gets are determined to a
large extent by the assumptions with which one starts.
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Attachments:
As stated
Distribution:
Copy No. I - Addressee
2 -
D/O
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t)
3
IC Registry
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5 -
PAI
D Chrono
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6 -
SD
(w/o att)
7 -
ID
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8 -
HRD
(w/o att
)
DCI/IC/PAID
(8/17/76)
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