INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R000800100001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS
[ 1 3
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INTRODUCTION
The Intelligence Community Staff has been working on proposals
to improve intelligence support to the national decision makers in times
of crisis and to make overall improvements in intelligence products.
Our first priority was to study intelligence support in crisis
situations. We presented a briefing on this subject in July to the
DCI, the Deputy Directors of CIA, the White House Situation Room, DIA,
NSA, INR, and the NMCC. With their cooperation we began tests of a
secure voice conferencing net which still is underway.
Today, we will present the background of our proposal for
a family of national intelligence products, an abbreviated version of
the July briefing on crisis support, and our proposal for the national
intelligence products.
The DCI wants to keep the USIB apprised of the IC efforts in
this field and to take advantage of any views you may have. A copy of
the briefing will be sent to each of you by the USIB Secretariat.
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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFl'' RECOMMENDATIONS FOR T-JE
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS'`
(VUGRAPH #1)
This briefing was prepared as an Intelligence Community Staff
recommendation to the DCI for the development of a family of national
intelligence products. Mr. Colby h(--ard it and requested that it be
presented to the USIB for comment.
The product family is designed to provide the national consiLmer
with better intelligence support than he receives today. The briefing
necessarily includes an outline of they IC Staff's concept of the role of
the National Intelligence Officers in national intelligence production
At the outset, we emphasize that the recommended package of
national intelligence products is not one which must be accepted in its
totality or not at all. In fact, should these national products be
interviews, the most significant conclusions we reached were these
(VUGRAPH #9)
No single family of intelligence products will meet the needs
of all national consumers as their individual requirements significa,tly
differ.
(Flip #1 - VL'GRAPH #9)
Second, product evaluation is a very subjective art. Concur ler
views concerning any specific product constantly change as consuvf r
interests change.
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(Flip #2 - VUGRAPH #9)
For these reasons, we concluded that whatever products we reconirrend
should be as flexible as possible so that they could respond to the
changing needs of consumers with a variety of interests. We found
scheduled products to be less responsive to changing consumer needs
than ad hoc products
(Flip #3 - VUGRAPH #9)
and therefore concluded that scheduled production should be kept to
a minimum.
(Flip #4 - VUGRAPH #9)
Next, we found that there was a greater degree of consensus among
consumers concerning their crisis intelligence product requirement i
than in the area of non-crisis intelligence production.
(Flip #5 - VU(--jRAPH #9)
Finally, we noted a reluctance by consumers, regardless of their
criticisms of products, to recommend elimination of any product.
Understandably, they desire to see the "better" product first before
losing the current product regardless of its weak points.
While recognizing that our data base was limited, we werE a )le
to identify a consensus of the criticisms of current intelligence
production. These criticisms were based upon the consumers'
reaction to these products.
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4t. s IC
(VUGRAPH /i 10)
(Vugraph lists a variety of scheduled daily, weekly, and
monthly products of CIA, DLA, NSA, and INR.)
This is only a partial list of the products which find their way to the
consumer's desk. (PAUSE)
(VUGRAPH *11)
The first criticism which the consumers made is that very ,ew
of these products represent coordinated national intelligence. Instead,
they represent the views of a single agency.
(Line #1 VUGRAPH #11)
This criticism leads directly to the next one--that intelligerce
,products are frequently overlapping and redundant. Consumers note
they will often read an item on the same subject in as many as thre
competing intelligence products. The users' analytical effort is
complicated by such problems as a single event being covered by
different production agencies on different days -- or a single event
being reported upon in different ways as separate agencies emphasize
different aspects of the same problem.
(Line #2 VUGRAPH #11)
Another criticism made by national consumers is their opin on
that they received inadequate service during crisis situations. During
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the Indo-Pak War in 171, to cite but one example, users stated tna
there was too much emphasis on factual reporting while there was too
little emphasis on the analytical and estimative products which the%,
desired.
In cases where the community had coordinated its produc ti,>n,
users commented that in the interests of accommodating the disna:-?ate
views of several intelligence agencies
(Line #3 VUGRAPH #11)
conclusions and estimates were not always clear. The consumers stated
a preference for having conflicting views clearly exposed rather t~lan
subsumed in hedged and muffled judgments.
With these consensus criticisms in mind, we formulated
objectives for a national intelligence product system.
(VUGRAPH #12)
First, the products should be focused on the national coast mer.
Second, recognizing the limited time which this audience has avaiable,
the number of products should be limited. Third, the products normally
should reflect community judgments. Fourth, factual reporting ii
these products should be limited to a degree consistent with clarity
while at the same time analytical reporting should be emphasized.
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Next, where the community is in disagreement, conflicting judgmeirts
should be highlighted. Finally, to insure that products are meeting
consumer needs, consumers should be involved in production procedures.
Earlier we noted that there were no established mechanise).,, or
SOPs for the production of national intelligence during periods of crisis.
This required us to consider what management procedures ;could
be needed to alleviate this problem, and led us to an examination of the
role of the National Intelligence Offi,. ers (NIOs).
From the various agency responses to the DCI memorandunn
on the subject of NIOs, there appear to be two basic visualizations Of
what role they should have:
(VUGRAPH #13)
One view of the NIO is as the DCI's special adviser and means of
interface with the consumer, but having only a limited role in prixli_ction.
A contrasting view sees the NIO as having a major role in
production, down in the trenches, stimulating the community's production
efforts in the name of the DCI. In developing our study we conclude d that
the latter view is the more valuable one for the NIO.
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All this is by way of background. It tells you where we stariec
and what we learned en route to formulating our recommendation.,;.
The balance of our remarks address the proposed family of national
intelligence products.
(VUGRAP3 #14)
These products fall into two categories -- those driven b) au
ongoing or anticipated crisis and those designed to inform the naAienai
consumer of world-wide events in a non-crisis atmosphere. Our
approach to the crisis problem will now be covered by
PRODUCTS FOR NATIONAL CRISIS AND TENSION SITUATIUNbb
(VUGRAPH #15)
(Crisis and tension situations ? System ? Communications
Products)
During the past nine month,-, several study proposals hati e
addressed the problem of improving the flow of intelligence durin
crisis and tension situations. These studies have raised several
problems including:
(VUGRAPH 016)
Issues in Current/ Crisis Situations
1. Communications problt ms between producers and
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2. Intelligence Community lacks information on
US military and deplomatic activities which
might cause foreign reactions.
3. Flow of intelligence products to top-level
consumers:
Timeliness
Lack of Community-wide summaries
Insufficient analytic intelligence
The NSCIC has asked the DCI to make recommendations.
The following presentation is in response to that request.
(VUGRAPH #17)
(APPROACH: Instead of creating new organizations--
take advantage of existing organizations by adding netted
conference communications)
The main thrust of this proposal is to take maximum
advantage of the national security organizational structure as it
now exists. This structure is outlined as follows:
(VUGRAPH #18)
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Across the horizontal axis is a spectrum of potential warning,
time increments for various types of situations ranging from a cris. s
measured in minutes or a few hours
to the energy "crisis" which creeps up over years
of time. It can be seen from the figure that we are adequately
organized for the long term situations (on the right) but there is a
gap in organization for the crisis or tension situations (left side).
The WSAG has no substructure to support it. It is this gap we
propose to fill in a manner outlined in the following way.
(VUGRAP)-I #19)
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There is a major investment in the ,urrent watch offices
of the national agencies and departments charged with diplomatic,
military and intelligence operations. In almost any crisis situation
one or more of those watch offices are the first in the Washington
area to be informed. This proposal simply takes advantage of that
fact and suggests that these watch offices rye connected by a secure
voice conferencing network.
1TJTTh7is net would be activated on the first
indication of a crisis, or potential crisis, and be the basis of the
National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers Net (NOIWON).
It will be noted on the diagram that the NP'CC is included to insure
the inclusion of US military operations which might have generates
a foreign response.
The next step upwards to fill the gap is the National Operaton
and Intelligence Analysts Net (NOIAN).
I This
net comes into being either during a crisis (after NOIWON notification)
or in tension situations which have not yet reached crisis proportions.
The selection of analysts in this net woul o be dictated by the type
and location of the crisis. Fortunately, the NOIAN member organizations
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(including representation of the J-3) are organized along geographic
lines. Thus a conference of specialists on a given crisis area can
be quickly assembled either by remote conferencing or, if time allows,
face to face. Remote conferencing in this case would use secure voice
plus some visual capability such as text editing.
One advantage of these networks is that they would provide
a substructure for support to national decision making in short-term
crisis periods. This would balance the substructure which already
exists to support longer term decision making. These networks also
provide for operational as well as intelligence inputs into the early
stages of crisis decision making. This proposal does not require
any new facilities or additional manpower and modular improvements
can be tested and implemented without major reorganization decisions.
Concerning the products which would be produced by the
NOIWON/NOIAN system, this chart illustrates when they would be
produced and what would be their purpose.
(VUGRAPH #20)
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Under this proposal the NOIWON and NOIAN nets
will not produce products for the national consumer on
a periodic basis but only when events dictate.
An illustrative example might be helpful.
Should a crisis suddenly break, the NOIWON net would
be activated and National Watch Officers Bulletins
would be produced which would have these characteristics:
(VUGRAPH #21)
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It will be noted that under CONTENT, unknown and/or
ambiguous information is identified with the hope that i,-1
disseminating the WOB some part of the structure will have
the information available and respond.
The second product is the National Analysts Summary.
This, as its title implies, would serve the purpose of
taking the information provided by the bulletins and adding
analysis whenever feasible. The basic characteristics
of this product would be:
(VUGRAPII #22)
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Here again feedback is requested regarding the plans
or decisions contemplated.
It is significant to note that National Analysts
Summaries do not have to be triggered by a crisis situation.
In a non-crisis situation the NOIAN can issue a NAS whenever
the level of tension demands it.
(VUGRAP.H 23),
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The third crisis product i the Special National
Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) which remains the same except
for minor modifications. The intent of this product is to
provide the national level policy maker with an estimate of
the situation sufficiently definitive that it can serve a~,
a basis for formulating a plan of action or establishing
reasoning for non-action.
You will note that the modified SNIE also has a
feedback mechanism. Every crisis is unique and requirement!-,
cannot always be anticipated. The feedback procedure serve,
as a means of adjusting requirements as the situation unfolds.
We considered how often Bulletins and Summaries would
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The National Watch Officers Bulletin is proposed
as a format based on interrogatives arranged to generate
a simple English sentence. It is designed to force the
watch officers to answer each interrogative from the infor-
mation available to them. The inability to fill a space
clearly identifies missing or ambiguous information. rhis
identification serves the needs of decision makers, analys c,s ,
and collectors. It also assists in preventing someone from
overlooking the importance of missing information while they
are under stress.
(The final example shows how the Bulletin format
can be used as a direct query for additional information
(VUGRAPH #24)
(VUGRAPH #25)
(VUGRAPH #26)
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In summary, the NOIWON/NOIAN system provides
increased responsiveness by the intelligence community
to national consumer needs. We conclude the following:
CONCLUS IONS
NOIWON-NOIAN CONFERENCING SYSTEM
PROVIDES A CONVERGENCE OF OPERA-
TIONAL, DIPLOMATIC AND INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION DURING CURRENT/CRISIS
SITUATIONS.
THE REPORTING SYSTEM ENCOURAGES
QUICK FEEDBACK FROM THE CONSUMER
AS TO HIS INTELLIGENCE NEEDS
PARTICULARLY IN UNPREDICTABLE
SITUATIONS.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS ARE
CREATED TO PROVIDE COMMUNITY SUMMARIES
AND ANALYSIS WITH CLEARLY STATED AGREE-
MENT AND DISSENT.
The NOIWON is currently being tested for communication
reliability, conferencing procedures and Bulletin creation
procedures.
(VUGRAPH 27)
(Lists National Watch Officer Bulletin,
National Analysts Summary, and Special National
Intelligence Estimate)
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We believe these three national intelligence
products will satisfy the need of the national decision
makers and their staffs for crisis intelligence support.
They do two important things--provide national intelligence
products geared to a crisis situation where none exists
today--and provide machinery permitting the community to
move into a crisis situation in an orderly manner.
will discuss the other elements
of our proposed family of national intelligence products.
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Let us now talk about the non-crisis situations and the national
consumers' requirements. The consumers have expressed requirements
for intelligence on topics such as those listed here.
(VUGRAPH #28)
(Non-crisis national intelligence products on
geographic regions, strategic weapons, general
purpose forces, economics, S&T, terrorism,
and drug trafficking)
In response, a wide range of daily, weekly, monthly, and
ad hoc products are now produced, most of them on an uncoordina-ed
basis. They usually represent the views of a single agency and receive
wide distribution among national consumers. We do not question tie
utility of these as agency or departmental products on these subjects.
We simply use them as illustrations of the absence of national ireligence
products integrating the best efforts of the entire community.
(VUGRAPH #29)
(National Intelligence Daily)
(Provide daily national intelligence on world-wide
range of topics, written for national consumer;
emphasis on community effort and dissenting views;
produced by production elements, published with
CIA facilities)
We propose that a National Intelligence Daily be developed as
a true community product. The CI13 is sometimes called a national
product because State/INR and DIA are consulted on its articles. There
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is usually no more than casual assent to the CIA originated article;,
and seldom is there dissent. We recommend that the National
Intelligence Daily be developed in such a way so as to permit all
production elements to originate articles and participate actively it
the coordination process. This process may involve incorporating a
dissenting view in the product.
(VUGRAPH #30)
We also propose that a National Intelligence Weekly be published
to summarize significant world-wide developments for the national
consumer. The Weekly would emphasize non-crisis oriented inte11 igence.
However, summaries of crisis situations in abbreviated form woullt not
be excluded.
The Weekly would contain items originated by all intellig(?nc e
agencies within a single national publication. It would allow agencies
with views differing from those of the DCI on any issue to have their
views provided to national consumers in a national publication. And
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it would provide an opportunity for the community to summarize th-
available information on a particular subject.
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We see the Weekly being produced by the existing production
organizations with the National Intelligence Officers assisting ir
identification of topics and the coordination of articles and (-J-A'S
facilities being used for publication.
National Intelligence Estimates of the type now produced would
continue as a part of the national product family.
With the exception of the National Intelligence Daily, the
National Intelligence Weekly and the NIEs, we do not recomrnenc tie
scheduled production of any national intelligence products.
(VUGRAPH #31)
Before reaching this decision we considered producinf vari'-us
daily, weekly and monthly publications on a scheduled basis. However,
in the last analysis we rejected the concept of increasing the number
of scheduled national intelligence products, because scheduled prod;ic_tion
tends to have a life of its own and products tend to outlive their unetulness.
(VUGRAPII #32)
In place of scheduled production, we propose that the 17C1
expand his use of the National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum
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for purposes of ad hoc production. These could be initiated by the
NIOs, who are in the best position to know the needs of the consurn r:
or by USIB principals who could recommend an item to the DCI for
production as a NIAM.
The NIAM would utilize the resources of the entire com.m in ty
in support of the consumer, unlike the separate DIA, INR, ONE anc
OCI estimates and memorandums.
NLAMs may resolve some other problems. One of these is
assuring that the right consumer gets the right product. Today,
consumers are sometimes denied intelligence due to the fact that flit
information they need is contained within a highly classified multi -
subject product. On the other hand, the single-subject NIAMs car
be sent to only those people who need the intelligence, avoiding
unnecessary disclosure.
(VUGRAPH #33)
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Here are a few examples of the types of subjects which the
NIAMs might address. They are neither in competition with nor
substitutes for NIEs or SNIEs.
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We visualize that NIEs will be produced under the guidance (4
the appropriate NIO and with support from all production elements.
(V UGRAI'H #34)
Finally, there is the question of the NSSM response. We
believe the NIO should coordinate the intelligence inputs to NSSM
responses and that he will see to it that the response is prepared in
the form of one of the products we have already outlined--the NIk:,
SNIE, NIAM, or Analysts Summary.
(VUGRAPH #35)
Let us illustrate how these n;ttional intelligence products could
have been used in the Chilean crisis in September.
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n summary then, these are ttte
national intelligence products
(VUGRAPII #37)
(Proposed Products: National Watch Officers Bulletin (N-40B
National Analysts Summary (NAS), Special National Intelli-
gence Estimate (SNIE), National Intelligence Daily (NID),
National Intelligence Weekly (NIW), National Intelligence
Analytical Memorandum (NIAM), National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE))'
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that we recommend be established or modified to meet the needs cf
the national consumer. The blue indicates non-crisis products and
red indicates crisis-driven products. We are aware that these
recommendations for new products and new production procedures
may not engender universal joy. However, the criticisms of the
products currently produced on an uncoordinated basis by the community
are believed to be valid and improvement in the community's resp >nsive-
ness is required. But more important, this list of "new" natioral
intelligence products isn't that new. Of all these products, only the
National Intelligence Daily and Wee1Cl~ would be new scheduled prcducts.
The NIE, SNIE and NIAM already exist. The Bulletins and Sumnz ry
would be the only new nonscheduled products.
Throughout this briefing we have concentrated upon the question--
"What national-level intelligence products are needed to meet the Leeds
of the national consumer ?". -- There is a related question, and that is,
"What products currently being produced will no longer be needed if
this family of national intelligence products is accepted?". Given the
existence of the proposed family of national products the producer ti
should review these publications
(VUGRAPH #38)
CIA CIB
DIA Intelligence Summary
NSA SIGINT Summary
OSR Memoranda
OCI Memoranda
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OER Memoranda
ONE Memoranda
DIA Intelligence Bulletin
CIA Developments in Indochina
CIA Soviet Developments
DIA Analyst Exchange
CIA Scientific Intelligence Digest
INR Soviet Foreign Policy Highlights
to determine if they have consumers for these departmental products.
We do not recommend that these products be eliminated at this tirn-. --
There are many consumers of intelligence other than the national
consumers who need to be served. As an example, we noted that -"-/4ths
of the readership of DIA's Intelligence Summary, as indicated by the
distribution list, does not fall within the category of national consu hers.
It is for the individual producer to determine the necessity of expending
resources to meet their departmental needs for intelligence.
In general, we hope that superior products will drive out Less
superior ones. We believe that the new family of national intelli4Ye?re
products will make some of these single agency products unnecessary.
However, we recommend that the new products demonstrate their
superiority first and that review then be made of the necessity fo-- E,11
these single agency intelligence products.
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Since the actual role of the NIOs has not been officially
delineated, we made some assumptions as to how the NIO would
fit into the production picture for national intelligence products. Even
if the NIO has a role considerably different from that we envisaged,
we consider this family of national products to be a valid package and
responsive to the needs of our national consumers.
A copy of this briefing will be provided to you for later review
and use by your staffs.
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