TREATY MONITORING STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R000800240001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 31, 1979
• Content Type: MF

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31 August 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
FROM: Special Assistant
SUBJECT: Treaty Monitoring Study
1.1 study on Treaty monitoring is, as stated,
an uncoordinated "think' piece for internal use only.
2. However, based upon the number of disagreements with several
premises by NFAC (opposite page), I recommend that, after your perusa'i,
a coordinated NFAC, CT, RMS paper be prepared prior to discussion at
an IC breakfast.
3. Specifically, I recommend:
Your comments on paper
an
Announcement at the next IC breakfast Tthat ask
IC Staff/Agency study is under way.
appropriate program managers (CIA/State/NSA/
NRO/DIA) to undertake and complete a similar
but independent study by 31 October 1979.
On that date studies are to be inter-circulated.
~on discussion
In-depth,
Retreat edicated
November. at
IC
an
STAT
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August 29, 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
Deputy o e for Resource Management
SUBJECT: Treaty Monitoring Study (U)
1. Action Requested: That you review the attached study on the
resource implications of SALT III and provide.any comments you have so
that we can use them to guide the corn letion of similar efforts on MBF=R.
CTBT and ASAT resource implications.
2. Background: Following the Q conference, RMS was
requested to conduct an exploratory study of the resource implications of
possible arms control treaties. An examination of SALT III, MBFR, CT13T.
and ASAT will include the following:
-- possible treaty provisions
-- nature of treaty monitoring tasks
-- description of current/future monitoring
capabilities
-- resource management implications.
At this time the SALT III portion is in first draft form, and the other
treaty sections are approaching this stage. This study was already
under way when you asked at the staff meeting on 15 August for NFAC,
RMS, and CTS to focus our thinking on potential SALT III verification
issues. (C)
3. Staff Comments: This study has drawn upon the existing ef-
forts of other agencies (ACDA, State, CIA, DIA, etc.). However, the
issues raised here do not reflect a coor;iinated position because at present
the paper is felt to be essentially a "think" piece for your considera-
tion and only for internal use. Other agencies are just beginning
to organize SALT III study groups, so this RMS analysis should be
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SUBJECT: Treaty Monitoring Study (U)
considered an early input to more intensive examination of SALT
III's intelligence implications. Once we receive and take account of
your comments, we are prepared to circulate the paper to CT and NFAC,
at least, and possibly (if you so choose) to those who attend the
Community breakfast so that we can discuss the subject. At this time.
three aspects of the problem appear to warrant further study by the
Intelligence Community:
-- How will SALT affect tasking management?
-- What kind of cooperative measures will be required
to monitor certain new weapons systems?
-- How important are near-term collection investment
decisions to the overall strategic and arms control-
related intelligence missions?
It is the RMS view that the answers to these questions should be addressed
by the entire Community since their judgments are needed about intelligence
requirements before resource implications can be accurately drawn. In
the case of investment decisions on future ELINT, IR, and FIS collection
capabilities, they are likely to be made without too much attention to
SALT III. This is probably correct, since an agreement will not change
strategic intelligence requirements drastically, nor should they uni-
laterally drive critical investment decisions. In addition, it is to
be expected that inclusion of TNF will raise the question of intelligenc-
sharing and verification procedures within the Alliance. This issue ?s
not addressed here, since it involves political considerations, and oche'
agencies will be primarily responsible for this planning. (S)
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SUBJECT: Treaty Monitoring Study
Distribution:
Copy 1 - Addressee w/cy 1
2 - DDCI w/cy 2
3 - ER w/cy 3
4 - D/DCI/RM w/cy 4
5 - RMS Registry w/cy 5
6 - PAO w/cy 6
7 - PBO w/cy 7
8 - PGO Subj w/cy 8
9 - PGO Chrono w/cy 9
DCI/RMS/PGO (28 August 197
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SALT III
MONITORING STUDY
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TOP SECRET
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report is limited to assessing likely effects of a post-1985
SALT III agreement on Intelligence Community resources. A conceivable
treaty base case has been postulated which assumes further numerical,
reductions in SALT II limitations and modifications in qualitative
constraints on mobile missiles, new ICBMs, and cruise missiles. The
case also includes a framework for limiting modern long-range theater
nuclear forces (TNF) in SALT III. The exact details of the treaty
are necessarily speculative, but under any circumstances the Intelli-
gence Community will be expected to monitor major Soviet strategic
developments. (C)
In this regard, monitoring tasks associated with a future SALT
accord comprise only one part of our total strategic military intelli-
gence operations. Hence, it does not appear that SALT will, or neces-
sarily should, drive Comm *t investment decisions on our post-1985
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collection capabilities.
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In summary, then, this report identifies three issues which should
be given greater attention by the Community:
1. Projected Soviet strategic developments will require greater
U.S. intelligence monitoring. It is not clear, however,
that SALT per se is a major factor in expanding these intelli-
gence requirements. There are non-SALT-limited strategic
developments which will demand greater attention, and Soviet
CCD practices could very well pose a greater strain on in-
telligence resources than SALT itself.
2. Several near-term investment decisions will affect our
overall collection capabilities in the ost-1985 period.
Decisions on FIS collection, 25X1
and future ELINI assets w i l l be important, but SALT monitoring
will not necessarily be a primary factor in the selection -
of specific investment options. There may well be a tendency
for system proponents to argue for particular capabilities
in terms of SALT monitoring needs, but it should be borne
In mind that arms control requirements are a derivative
of our overall strategic intelligence mission.
3. Enhanced access to Soviet strategic developments will require
an increasing expansion of "cooperative measures" within
the SALT context. While we cannot rely totally on any
mechanisms which the Soviets could later violate, these
cooperative measures can enhance the effectiveness of progranme'a
U.S. intelligence assets. The Intelligence Community should
be investigating the design of cooperative measures involving
deployment modes, data base exchanges, and non-interference
provisions for NTM. This exercise will interact with the ne-
gotiations themselves but are intended to support policymakers
eventual judgments about a future treaty's verifiability as
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RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS
VERIFICATION IMPLICATIONS
With or without a SALT III agreement, the spectrum of strategic
intelligence requirements will continue to grow and necessitate
some reallocation of Intelligence Community resources. However, a
third generation arms control agreement will set in motion two
trends which will have some implications for the management of
intelligence assets. (C)
First, such a U.S.-Soviet treaty will make it politically
necessary for the U.S. to have high level confidence that any militarily
significant violations by the Soviet Union can be detected and effec-
tively neutralized. Depending upon the type of Soviet system and the threat
it poses, timely detection [night vary from months to years; accordingly,
U.S. intelligence assets will have to be aligned to give adequate con-
sideration of any treaty breakout potential. (U)
Second, SALT III will of necessity have to incorporate (indeed
broaden) the current practice of using cooperative measures to enhance
NTM. Given the nature of newer strategic weapons, special measures
designed to guarantee both their verifiability and survivability will
have to be built into the treaty. At the same time, such steps will
partially temper increased verification needs and, at a minimum,
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CONCLUSIONS
Three major findings can be drawn from the preceding analysis.
First, intelligence requirements will grow in the 1980s as more
sophisticated Soviet strategic and theater nuclear weapons are deployed
and concealment practices are expanded. However, treaty monitoring
responsibilities per se will not expand the list of strategic intelligence
targets; rather, they will demand more and better quality coverage
of those new targets which are SALT-related. Because of the political
need to verify treaties with high-confidence, more collection tasking
and processing will be directed at important strategic installations,
which may affect the overall resource management process. (S)
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