A DOLLAR CAST COMPARISON OF SOVIET AND US DEFENSE ACTIVITIES, 1965-1975

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001100010002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 78
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 1, 1976
• Content Type: IR

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Secret
ARMY, DIA and USAF review(s) completed.
Intelligence Report
A Dollar Cost Comparison of Soviet and
US Defense Activities, 1965-1975
Secret
SR 76-10165
July 1976
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ObS-~
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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A Dollar Cost Comparison of Soviet and US
Defense Activities, 1965-1975
Key Findings
The reader is cautioned that the dollar cost
estimates presented in this report must be
viewed in terms of various limitations, adjust-
ments, reliability factors, and conceptual
problems which are explained in the "Note to
the Reader" on pages 3 and 4.
Total Defense Programs
The estimated dollar costs of Soviet defense programs in 1975 are some $114
billion (1974 prices), more than 40 percent higher than US authorizations.
If the costs of personnel retirement programs are removed from both
sides, the 1975 figure for the Soviets exceeds the US total by nearly 50
percent.
If all costs for military personnel are subtracted from both sides, esti-
mated dollar costs for Soviet defense programs are more than 25 percent
higher than comparable US authorizations in 1975.
For the 1965-1975 period as a whole, the total dollar costs of Soviet programs
are roughly equal to US authorizations. They exceed those of the US for every year
of the seventies, however, and average 20 percent higher for 1970-1975.
- The estimated dollar costs of Soviet programs (in constant dollars) grow
at an average annual rate of about 3 percent over the period.
- US defense authorizations (in constant dollars) decline after 1968 and
from 1973 onward are lower than they were in 1965.
Resource Category Comparisons
For 1975, estimated dollar costs of Soviet programs exceed US defense authori-
zations in all three major resource categories-investment, operating, and RDT&E
(research, development, testing, and evaluation).
In investment, the figure for Soviet forces, almost $35 billion, exceeds
that for the US by nearly 85 percent.
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Estimated dollar costs for operating the Soviet forces in 1975 are more
than $65 billion, almost 25 percent higher than comparable US authori-
zations. In the area of personnel, the larger component of operating
costs, the estimate for Soviet programs exceeds US authorizations by
more than 70 percent, reflecting the larger Soviet manpower base.
In RDT&E, dollar costs of Soviet programs are about two-thirds higher
in 1975.
The trends in the distribution of US authorizations and estimated dollar costs
of Soviet programs among the resource categories over the 1965-1975 period are
quite different. The proportions are relatively stable for the Soviet forces. The US
authorizations, however, shift considerably, with the proportion for investment and
RDT&E declining from more than 40 percent of the total in 1965 to about
one-third in 1975.
Military Mission Comparisons
Strategic Attack Forces. Estimated dollar costs of Soviet intercontinental
attack programs, excluding RDT&E, exceed US authorizations in every year begin-
ning in 1966 and-at $8.5 billion-are more than twice the US level in 1975.
Dollar costs of Soviet ICBM programs are more than four times US
authorizations over the period 1965-1975 as a whole and almost seven
times the US level in 1975, reflecting the new wave of ICBM deploy-
ments.
Dollar costs of Soviet SLBM programs exceed US SLBM authorizations
beginning in 1968 and are 30 percent greater in 1975.
US intercontinental bomber authorizations amount to about five times
the dollar costs of Soviet intercontinental bomber programs over the
period as a whole.
The Soviet Union maintains a large peripheral strategic attack force for which
the US has no direct counterpart. The estimated dollar costs for this mission in 1975
are $3.8 billion-about half those for intercontinental attack.
Strategic Defense Programs. The USSR has traditionally maintained much
larger strategic defense forces than the US. For 1975, the estimated dollar costs of
Soviet strategic defense programs are $6 billion, some nine times the level of US
authorizations. For the period 1965-1975 as a whole, the Soviet level is four times
greater.
General Purpose Forces. The estimated dollar costs of Soviet general purpose
forces increase continuously over the 1965-1975 period, passing the level of US
authorizations in 1970. In 1975 they are $30.7 billion, exceeding US authorizations
by 70 percent.
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The military establishments of the Soviet Union and the US are difficult to
compare because they differ considerably in missions, structure, and characteristics.
The common denominator used here for comparative sizing is dollar cost. The
approach is to estimate how much it wquld cost in dollars to reproduce individual
Soviet military programs in the US, and then to compare these estimates year by
year with US Department of Defense authorizations for similar programs. Such an
approach can provide a general appreciation of the overall sizes of the defense
programs in the two countries. The dollar cost data also provide a means for
aggregating dissimilar elements of each country's military programs into comparable
categories and thus can reveal trends and relationships between the two defense
establishments that are difficult to discern and measure in other ways.
Limitations. The reader is cautioned, however, that any conclusions drawn
from this analysis must be tempered by an appreciation of what it does not do:
- It cannot be used alone to draw inferences about the relative military
effectiveness or capabilities of US and Soviet forces. Other data, such as
the size and technical characteristics of the forces, doctrine and tactical
concepts, morale, and command and control capabilities, must also be
considered for such judgments.
- It does not measure actual Soviet defense expenditures or their burden
on the Soviet economy. These questions are addressed by different
analytical techniques yielding estimates of the ruble costs of Soviet
military programs.*
US Data. The basis for the US financial data presented is the Total Obligational
Authority (TOA) series in The Five-Year Defense Program issued by the Department
of Defense in January 1976. The US authorization data have been converted to
constant prices and have been adjusted to achieve accounting coverage comparable
with the dollar estimates made for the USSR. The US figures in this report,
therefore, do not match actual budget authorizations or appropriations. The major
accounting adjustments are as follows:
- Nonpersonnel authorizations for military aid and civil defense are ex-
cluded.
- Nonpersonnel authorizations for military research, development, testing,
and evaluation (RDT&E) are aggregated into one account.
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) authoriza-
tions related to nuclear weapons and naval reactors are included.
Price Base. The dollar data presented here are expressed in average calendar
year 1974 US resource prices. A constant price base is used so that changes in
monetary levels from year to year reflect changes in forces and programs rather than
the effects of inflation. The US authorization data are for fiscal years, whereas the
dollar cost data for the Soviet forces are for calendar years.
10121, Estimated Soviet Defense Spending in Rub/es, 1970-1975, May 1976
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Reliability. The estimates presented in this report should be viewed as having a
margin of error which, for some items, could be substantial. Our confidence is
highest in the aggregate totals but is considerably less at lower levels of aggregation.
Moreover, the reliability of our dollar cost estimates varies from category to
category, depending on the reliability of our estimates of the size and characteristics
of Soviet military forces and on the accuracy of the cost factors applied to that base.
We place our greatest confidence in the investment category-procuring equip-
ment and constructing facilities-which makes up about 30 percent of total esti-
mated dollar costs of Soviet defense programs in 1975. Our information on the
deployment levels of major units and weapon systems is good, and our confidence in
the dollar costs applied to these major elements is reasonably high.
Manpower costs, comprising more than 40 percent of the total estimated dollar
costs of Soviet programs in 1975, represent the largest and most reliable component
in the operating category. For other operating costs, however, neither the quantity
nor the quality of information is as good as that for data about the weapons and
manpower in the forces. Estimates of these operating costs, some 15 percent of the
1975 total, are based principally on US analogy, adjusted when possible to reflect
differences in US and Soviet operating practices.
The estimated dollar costs for Soviet RDT&E programs should be regarded as
significantly less reliable than those for either investment or operating. There is
considerable uncertainty about the basic data, most of which come from Soviet
publications. There are, moreover, serious difficulties both in the estimation of the
distribution of Soviet RDT&E costs between the military and civilian sectors and in
the conversion of these estimates from rubles to dollars.
On balance, our best judgment is that the overall dollar cost estimate for Soviet
defense programs is unlikely to be in error by more than about 15 percent. This
judgment, while informed, is nonetheless subjective and not the result of statistical
measurement.
Comparisons. The reader should bear these uncertainties in mind when con-
sidering the dollar cost comparisons made in this paper. Because of the problems of
comparing such disparate activities, the limitations of the Soviet data, and the
organization of the US data, these comparisons should not be considered precise
measurements. This is particularly true in areas where the difference between US
and Soviet levels is estimated to be small or where the comparisons are made at a
low level of aggregation.
The Index Number Problem. Finally, dollar cost calculations tend to overstate
Soviet programs relative to the US because of a basic measurement problem
common to all international economic comparisons and known to economists as the
index number problem. If Soviet decisionmakers were confronted with the US dollar
price structure that is used for our dollar cost analysis, rather than the ruble prices
they in fact have to pay, they undoubtedly would choose a different and cheaper (in
dollar terms) mix of manpower and equipment inputs. While it is not possible to
quantify the degree of overstatement that this consideration introduces, it is clearly
not large enough to alter the basic conclusion that the Soviet military program
overall is currently significantly larger than that of the US.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
July 1976
25X1A
25X1A
This report presents the latest estimates of the
dollar costs of Soviet defense programs and compares
them with US defense authorizations. The dollar cost
data for Soviet programs reflect the cost of reproducing
those programs in the US, using US cost factors and pay
rates.
The Soviets, however, would view the distribution
of their total defense effort quite differently from the
way it is shown in this report. Neither the system of
accounts nor the structuring of expenditures by mili-
tary mission is the same for the Soviet Ministry of
Defense and the US Department of Defense. Most impor-
tantly, the price structures in the two countries are
substantially different. The Soviet view, of course,
would influence program choices in the USSR. (See
"Note to the Reader" on the preceding pages.)
This report compares data for Soviet and US pro-
grams for the period 1965 through 1975, and it provides
a detailed supplement to the unclassified study issued
in February of this year entitled A DoZZar Comparison
of Soviet and US Defense Activities, 1965-1975 (SR 76-
10053). It supersedes a study issued in December 1974
entitled Soviet Spending for Defense: A DoZZar Cost
Comparison of Soviet and US Defense Activity (SR IR
74-7), which covered the period 1964 through 1974.
Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome.
They may be directed tol of the Programs Analysis
Division, Office of Strategic Research, Iextension
or
A Dollar Cost Comparison of Soviet
and US Defense Activities, 1965-1975
25X1
25X1A
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The report contains three major sections and four
annexes. The first section summarizes the overall
trends in US and Soviet defense programs as measured
in dollars. The second compares them by resource
categories--investment, operating, and RDT&E. The
third section discusses the cost data and trends
according to the major military missions--interconti-
nental and peripheral attack, strategic defense, and
general purpose forces--and includes under a separate
entity called "command, support, and other" all data
for forces and programs which cannot be related di-
rectly to a combat mission.
Annex A examines US and Soviet production data for
selected military weapon systems, showing the emphasis
each country has placed on its various military pro-
grams over time. An explanation of the methodology
used to cost Soviet programs and to structure the
cost estimates to achieve comparability with US author-
izations follows in Annex B. Annex C discusses changes
that have occurred since the last paper (SR IR 74-7)
in the data base that underlies these figures. Statis-
tical details on the costs of programs and forces are
contained in Annex D.
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Page
Total Defense Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Military Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Manpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Resource Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
RDT&E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Military Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Intercontinental Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Strategic Peripheral Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Strategic Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
General Purpose Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Command, Support, and Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Annex A: Production Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Annex B: Costing Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Annex C: Revisions in the Data Base . . . . . . . . . . 59
Annex D: Statistical Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
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Figure 1. Total US and Soviet Defense
Programs, 1965-1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Figure 2. Distribution by Resource Category of US
and Soviet Defense Programs, 1965-1975 . . . . . . . . 12
Figure 3. US and Estimated Soviet Active Military
Manpower, 1965-1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Figure 4. US and Soviet Military
Investment, 1965-1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Figure 5. Operating Costs for US and Soviet
Forces, 1965-1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Figure 6. Total US and Soviet Intercontinental
Attack Programs, 1965-1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Figure 7. Elements of US and Soviet Inter-
continental Attack Programs, 1965-1975 . . . . . . . . . 26
Figure 8. Total US and Soviet Strategic
Defense Programs, 1965-1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Figure 9. Elements of US and Soviet Strategic
Defense Programs, 1965-1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Figure 10. Total US and Soviet General
Purpose Forces Programs, 1965-1975 . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Figure 11. Elements of US and Soviet General
Purpose Forces Programs, 1965-1975 . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Figure 12. US and Soviet "Command, Support,
and Other" Defense Programs, 1965-1975 . . . . . . . . . 42
Figure 13. US and Estimated Soviet. Production
of Selected Weapons Systems for the 1965-1974
Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
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TOTAL US and SOVIET DEFENSE PROGRAMS, 1965-1975
A Comparison of US Authorizations and
Estimated Dollar Costs of the Soviet Programs If
Duplicated in the US
us
USSR
NOTE: The dollar figures for the USSR are estimates of what the Soviet forces and programs would cost if developed, purchased,and operated in the US. For
operational forces the figures are obtained by directly costing individual Soviet forces and programs. The estimated dollar costs of Soviet ROTH
are derived in the aggregate using a less certain methodology and should be viewed only as rough measures. For this reason they are shown
separate from the dollar costs of operational forces. The US defense expenditure series is based on Total Obligational Authority (TOA) data from The
five-Year Defense Program,January 1976(Department of Defense). The US data are in fiscal year terms and the estimated dollar costs of Soviet
programs are in calendar year terms.
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Total Defense Programs
For 1975 the estimated total dollar cost of Soviet
defense programs, about $114 billion expressed in 1974
prices, is more than 40 percent higher than the US
total defense authorization of $80 billion. If the
costs of pensions for retired personnel are excluded
from both sides, the dollar cost for Soviet programs
is 50 percent greater than that for the US programs.
For the 1965-1975 period as a whole, the total dollar
costs of the Soviet programs are roughly equal to
cumulative US authorizations; in the seventies, how-
ever, the Soviet total exceeds that of the US by 20
percent. (See Figure 1.)
The trend shown in the dollar costs of Soviet de-
fense programs is one of continuous growth, averaging
about 3 percent a year--from an estimated $85 billion
in 1965 to $114 billion in 1975. This growth trend
for the period is evident in nearly all major compo-
nents of the Soviet defense establishment.
Quite a different picture is seen for the US, how-
ever. Despite increases in the current dollar costs
of US defense programs, defense authorizations ex-
pressed in constant dollar terms decline continuously
after the peak of 1968, and from 1973 on are below the
1965 level.
For 1975, estimated dollar costs of Soviet pro-
grams exceed US defense authorizations in all three
major resource categories: in investment, the cate-
gory in which we have the highest confidence, they
are nearly 85 percent greater than the US figure; in
operating costs, nearly 25 percent greater; and in
RDT&E, about two-thirds higher. This contrasts with
the Vietnam-era peak US spending year of 1968, for
which US authorizations exceed estimated dollar costs
of Soviet programs in all three categories by 15 to
25 percent.
For the period 1965-1975 as a whole, the composi-
tion of the dollar costs for the two countries is
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FIGURE 2
DISTRIBUTION by RESOURCE CATEGORY of
US and SOVIET DEFENSE PROGRAMS, 1965-1975
A Percentage Comparison of US Authorizations and
Estimated Dollar Costs of the Soviet Programs if
Duplicated in the US
PERCENT
L RDT&E
0 I I I I I I I I I 1 1
1965 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
PERCENT
70 r
OPERATING
0 L I I I I I I I I I 1 I
1965 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
25
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similar: about 60 percent for operating, 30 percent
for investment, and 10 percent for RDT&E. The dis-
tribution for Soviet programs shows little change
throughout the period. (See Figure 2.) The US share
for investment and RDT&E, however, declines from more
than 40 percent of.the total in 1965 to about one-
third. in 1975.
Military Missions
For 1975, estimated dollar costs of Soviet programs
exceed US authorizations for all major military missions.
The estimated dollar costs of Soviet intercontinental
attack programs are more than twice US authorizations.
For general purpose forces they are 70 percent greater,
and in the area of strategic defense they are more
than nine times the US level.
Over the 1965-1975 period, the bulk of total costs
for both countries falls under what is labeled "command,
support, and other"--about 45 percent of estimated
Soviet dollar costs and almost 60 percent of US autho-
rizations. The largest combat mission--the general
purpose forces--comprises about one-fourth of the total
for both countries. The remainder is spread among the
strategic forces missions and RDT&E.
The distribution of dollar costs among the major
Soviet missions does not change appreciably over the
period. There are moderate increases in the portion
of the total devoted to intercontinental attack and
small decreases in that for strategic defense and
peripheral attack. "Command, support, and other"
declines from about 50 to 45 percent of total esti-
mated costs. The absolute level of dollar costs for
all missions, however, is higher at the end of the
period than at the beginning.
For the US, the proportion of authorizations for
the various missions also is relatively unchanged
over the period, although the share of authorizations
for the strategic forces missions decreases slightly
while the "command, support, and other" portion varies
between less than 55 and more than 60 percent. In
absolute terms, US authorizations in 1975 are lower
for all combat missions and RDT&E than in 1965.
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"Command, support, and other" is at approximately the
same level as it was in 1965.
Manpower
The Soviets have historically maintained a large
military force and given it a broader range of respon-
sibilities than that of the military force in the US.
Predictably, then, the estimated level of Soviet mili-
tary manpower exceeds that of the US throughout the
period 1965 to 1975. (See Figure 3.) The trend over
the period for the Soviets is one of gradual but con-
tinuous growth--a total increase of about one million
men, most of it in the ground forces. US active mili-
tary manpower peaks in the late sixties and declines in
every year thereafter, to a 1975 total lower than that
of 1965. The Soviet military manpower total of 4.8 mil-
lion in 1975 includes several categories of personnel
for which the US has no counterparts and which do not
FIGURE 3
US and ESTIMATED SOVIET
ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER, 1965-1975
MILLION MEN (midyear)
5 it-
L I I I I I 1 I I I I 1
1965 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
NOTE: The manpower totals for the USSR include border guards, internal security troops. and
railroad and construction troops. for which the US Armed Forces have no counterpart.
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have a strictly military function. These include the
border guards, internal security troops, and railroad
and construction troops. If these are removed from
the Soviet military manpower calculations, the total
is just over 4 million--still nearly twice US military
manpower in 1975.
Effect of Manpower Costs. In estimating the dollar
costs of Soviet military manpower, the pay rates for the
US all-volunteer force have been used for the entire
1965-1975 period. Because of the high level of Soviet
military manpower, this results in large dollar costs
for military manpower, which in 1975 are more than 70
percent higher than US authorizations. The estimated
dollar costs of the overall Soviet defense effort are
still higher than US authorizations from 1972 on if
the effect of those pay rates is removed.
-- If all costs for military personnel are sub-
tracted from both sides, total estimated dollar
costs for Soviet defense programs are more than
25 percent higher than total US authorizations
in 1975.
-- If the cost of Soviet military manpower is
calculated at prevolunteer 1970 US pay rates
(converted to 1974 dollars), total estimated
costs for the Soviet programs are one-third
greater than 1975 US authorizations. Under
this calculation, the dollar costs for Soviet
military manpower still exceed US military
manpower authorizations by about 45 percent.
Impact of Pension Costs. The Soviet and US mili-
tary pension systems differ considerably in structure
and in their dollar costs. The estimated dollar cost
of Soviet pensions is a very small share of total
dollar costs and remains relatively constant over the
period 1965-1975. US military retirement programs
are broader in coverage and since about 1970 have
been growing at an accelerating rate. Between 1969
and 1975 the share of US authorizations devoted to
retirement more than doubled and for 1975 constitutes
more than 5 percent of the total.
If these retirement costs are subtracted from the
totals for both countries, the effect is insignificant
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until the late sixties. From 1970 onward, eliminating
retirement costs has the effect of increasing in each
year the proportion by which the dollar cost of Soviet
defense programs exceeds that of the US. In 1975, if
pension costs are subtracted from the totals for both
countries, the Soviet total becomes nearly 50 percent
higher than US defense authorizations--as opposed to
about 40 percent higher when these costs are included.
Resource Categories
The comparisons of estimated dollar costs for
Soviet defense programs and US defense authorizations
are presented in this section by resource category--
investment, operating, and RDT&E.
-- The investment category covers the dollar
costs of programs to modernize or expand
forces through the procurement of equipment,
including major spare parts, and construc-
tion of facilities.
-- Operating costs are those associated with
maintaining current forces, including personnel
costs.
-- Dollar costs for RDT&E are those for programs
devoted to exploring new technologies, devel-
oping advanced weapon systems, and improving
existing systems.
For 1975, the estimated dollar costs of Soviet
investment programs are nearly $35 billion, almost
85 percent greater than US authorizations for invest-
ment. Weapon system procurement is the driving com-
ponent for both countries, accounting for about 90
percent of the investment totals for each throughout
the 1965-1975 period. (See Figure 4.)
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US and SOVIET MILITARY INVESTMENT, 1965-1975
A Comparison of US Authorizations and
Estimated Dollar Costs of the Soviet Programs if
Duplicated in the US
1965 66 67 68 69
CUMULATIVE 1965-1975
US
USSR
1 334 (calendar yrs.)
I
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The estimated total costs of Soviet investment
for the entire period are less than 10 percent greater
than US authorizations, but for the last five years are
more than 40 percent greater. Soviet investment pro-
grams between 1965 and 1975 reflect an increase of 22
divisions in the ground forces and the acquisition of
almost 90 major naval surface combatant ships, over 50
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs),
over 2,700 ICBMs, almost 300 heavy and medium bomber-
type aircraft, and more than 6,250 fighter aircraft.*
The estimated dollar costs of Soviet investment
generally grow throughout the 1965-1975 period, sur-
passing US authorizations in 1970. They continue at
levels higher than those of the US through 1975, dipping
only slightly in 1971 and 1972 during a hiatus in stra-
tegic weapon deployment. Estimated dollar costs of
Soviet investment programs rise by almost $9 billion
from 1965 to 1975, an average increase of 3 percent a
year. This 10-year rise takes on particular signifi-
cance when viewed as the continuation of an active
military investment program already under way in 1965,
including the procurement of the SA-2 surface-to-air
missile (SAM) and SS-7 ICBM, as well as a new genera-
tion of weapon systems such as the SS-9 and SS-11
ICBMs.
US authorizations for investment during this period
reach their peak in 1966 and fall by 1975 to about $19
billion, less than half the 1966 level. US forces
underwent a general reduction after the Southeast Asia
involvement. By 1975 the US intercontinental bomber
force and the number of major surface combatant ships
in the US Navy were about half their 1965 levels.
Strategic defense interceptors were about one-third
and total active manpower about three-quarters of
their 1965 levels. As a share of the total, US in-
vestment declines from more than a third of total
authorizations in 1966 to less than a quarter in 1975.
On the other hand, the estimated dollar cost of Soviet
investment remains at about 30 percent of the total
throughout the period.
* For a more detailed discussion of Soviet production of weapons,
see Annex A.
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Operating
Personnel costs--including those associated with
pay and benefits to military retirees as well as active
and reserve personnel--make up the major portion of
this resource category. The remaining portion covers
the operation and maintenance (O&M) of the military
forces. (See Figure 5.)
For 1975, the total estimated dollar cost of
operating Soviet defense programs is $65 billion, al-
most 25 percent greater than comparable US authoriza-
tions. For the 1965-1975 period as a whole, estimated
operating costs for the Soviets are less than 5 per-
cent higher than US authorizations, but are more than
10 percent greater for the seventies.
Estimated dollar costs for operating Soviet forces
increase by more than one quarter between 1965 and
1975. They constitute a nearly constant 60 percent
of the defense costs, reflecting an increase in man-
power as well as the increasing technological sophis-
tication of the forces.
After peaking in 1969, US authorizations for
operating fall by almost one-fourth through 1975.
US operating authorizations account for almost two-
thirds of the total in 1975.
Dollar cost estimates for Soviet military personnel
show sustained growth between 1965 and 1975. Through
1969, US personnel authorizations rise, reflecting the
involvement in Southeast Asia, but they decline by 1975
to approximately 5 percent below the 1965 level. Esti-
mated dollar costs for Soviet personnel account for
almost three-quarters of operating costs for the period
as a whole, while US personnel authorizations account
for just over half. Estimated dollar costs for Soviet
personnel account for a larger portion of operating
costs because the Soviet forces are more manpower in-
tensive.
Contrary to trends in the other resource categories,
US authorizations for O&M are larger every year than
the estimated cost of Soviet programs. In the sixties
this is largely a result of the involvement in South-
east Asia. There also is a difference in operating
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OPERATING COSTS for US and SOVIET FORCES, 1965-1975
A Comparison of US Authorizations and
Estimated Dollar Costs of the Soviet Programs if
Duplicated in the US
1965 66 67 68 69
CUMULATIVE 1965-1975
US' 647 (fiscal yrs.)
USSR IBM
660 (calendar yrs.)
25
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concepts that has an effect throughout the period--in
general, the US tends to operate its equipment more
than the Soviets, while the Soviets use more simulation
in training. US authorizations for O&M in 1975 are al-
most 40 percent greater than comparable estimated dollar
costs for the Soviets.
The dollar costs of Soviet military RDT&E are
estimated in the aggregate and include RDT&E programs
for military uses of nuclear energy. These costs grow
throughout the 1965-1975 period and exceed comparable
US authorizations by increasing amounts in the seventies.
To achieve comparability, the US data include all Depart-
ment of Defense authorizations for RDT&E and defense-
related RDT&E authorizations of the Energy Research and
Development Administration (ERDA).
Estimates of dollar costs for Soviet RDT&E pro-
grams are based on analysis of published Soviet data
and are considerably less certain than any other body
of data in this report (see Annex B).
Our understanding of the level of activity in
Soviet RDT&E programs is, in fact, much better than
our ability to estimate their dollar costs. In general,
the Soviet level is high relative to that of the US.
This is especially true in the area of strategic
offensive systems. For instance, during the period
covered by this report there was observable development
activity by the Soviets on seven entirely new ICBMs and
two new SLBMs, as well as several modifications to de-
ployed strategic missile systems. The US, during the
same period, developed two modifications to the Minute-
man ICBM, a new version of the Polaris SLBM, and the
new Poseidon SLBM. Thus, in spite of the uncertainties
associated with our cost estimates in this area, we are
confident that the ZeveZ of Soviet military RDT&E
activity is high, and that the long-term trend is one
of growth.
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Military Missions
In this section the investment and operating data
for the US and USSR are separated and discussed accord-
ing to combat mission--intercontinental attack, periph-
eral attack, strategic defense, and general purpose
forces. This is not the way the Soviets themselves
organize their military missions, nor does it represent
the way they would view the allocation of their re-
sources for defense. Mission data are organized along
the lines of the Department of Defense Five-Year Defense
Program, the basic source for the US data. The purpose
of this categorization is to present the estimated
dollar costs of Soviet programs in a format that per-
mits comparison by categories often used in US defense
analysis.
Only combat units and operational defense units
are included in the force missions (see Annex B).
All costs for command and support activities involving
force missions are aggregated under "command, support,
and other." "Other" costs include those for reserve,
retired, and civilian personnel; costs of nuclear
weapons;* and all costs (except RDT&E) which, because
of present data limitations, cannot be ascribed to
other missions.
Intercontinental Attack
This mission includes the strategic weapon systems
and manpower which are designated for an intercontinen-
tal attack role. Cumulatively over the 1965-1975 period,
the Soviet intercontinental attack forces account for
about 7 percent of total estimated dollar costs of
Soviet defense programs. Only the strategic defense
and peripheral attack missions represent smaller per-
centages of the Soviet total in dollar terms.
Land-based ICBM systems, ballistic missile sub-
marines for intercontinental attack, and intercontinen-
tal bombers are the components of the intercontinental
* Nuclear weapons costs cannot be allocated among the combat
missions because the US data are based on ERDA authorizations
which are not broken down into weapon categories.
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attack mission. For 1975, ICBM programs generate al-
most two-thirds of the estimated dollar costs for this
mission, and missile submarine programs account for
about 30 percent.
At $8.5 billion, the estimated dollar cost of
programs allotted to the Soviet intercontinental attack
mission in 1975 is more than twice the authorization
for comparable US programs. Measured in dollar terms,
Soviet ICBM programs are nearly seven times the level
of US programs in 1975. The estimated dollar costs of
Soviet ballistic missile submarine programs for inter-
continental attack are 30 percent higher than US autho-
rizations. On the other hand, US authorizations for
intercontinental bomber programs are about three times
the estimated dollar cost of the comparable Soviet
programs. (See Figure 6.)
Over the period as a whole, estimated
dollar
costs
for Soviet intercontinental attack forces
amount
to
one and one-half times US authorizations.
This
is
primarily the result of heavy Soviet investment
in
both ballistic missile submarines and land-based
ICBMs
during the period, while much US investment in compa-
rable programs occurred prior to 1965. Also, the larger
size of Soviet missiles and shorter production runs
caused by the multiplicity of systems have contributed
to making the estimated dollar costs of Soviet ICBM pro-
grams higher than those of comparable US programs.
The estimate of Soviet forces reflects two periods of
major ICBM deployment: that for the SS-9, SS-11, and
SS-13 missiles in the late sixties and early seventies,
and the current heavy investment in the new, MIRVed
ICBMs--the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19.
Estimated dollar costs for Soviet ballistic mis-
sile submarine programs show an upward trend through
the decade and reflect the procurement of submarines
and missiles for the entire Y class fleet and, be-
ginning in the seventies, for the D class. No new
heavy bombers have been added to the Soviet force over
the period (Backfire costs are included in peripheral
attack).
US intercontinental attack authorizations are
somewhat lower in 1975 than in 1965. Costs associated
with US bombers decreased as use of the bomber fleet in
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FIGURE 6
TOTAL US and SOVIET
INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK PROGRAMS, 1965-1975
A Comparison of US Authorizations and
Estimated Dollar Costs of the Soviet Programs if
Duplicated in the US
BILLION 1974 DOLLARS
15t-
TOTAL
CUMULATIVE 1965-1975
US 3;79 (fiscal yrs.)
USSR (calendar yrs.)
BILLION 1974 DOLLARS
5.3
1.0
(18'/0)
2.6a
(4 %)
24%)
1.8
(37%)
1.9
(23%)
k ICBMs
11
2.0
(48%)
2.8
(319/6)
1965 1970 1975
'Because of rounding components may not add to the totals shown. 569614 5-16 CIA
24
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Southeast Asia was discontinued* and FB-111 production
was completed. Authorizations for ballistic missile sub-
marines rose over the period. The last Polaris SSBN was
completed, Polaris and then Poseidon missile costs were
incurred, and the first Trident authorizations appeared
in 1973. US land-based intercontinental ballistic mis-
sile costs during the 1965-1975 period were largely
those associated with upgrading the Minuteman force.
ICBMs. The estimated dollar cost of Soviet land-
based ICBM programs in 1975 is about $5.4 billion, as
compared with about $0.8 billion in US authorizations
for ICBMs. Estimated dollar costs of Soviet ICBM
programs over the entire 1965-1975 period are almost
four and one-half times US authorizations for ICBMs.
During the period the Soviets began to deploy the
SS-9, SS-11, and SS-13, and estimated dollar costs--
which peak in 1967 at about $6.5 billion--reflect
this buildup occurring between 1966 and 1971. These
programs were completed by 1972, when estimated dollar
costs for Soviet ICBMs drop. In 1973, early efforts
for the new generation of ICBMs--the SS-17, SS-18,
and SS-19--cause an upturn in estimated dollar costs
which continues through the rest of the period. (See
Figure 7.)
On the other hand, by 1965 the US had already
deployed its large liquid-fueled Atlas and Titan mis-
siles, and deployment of its smaller, solid-fueled
Minuteman was rapidly being completed. US authoriza-
tions, which remain relatively steady at close to
$1 billion after 1965, reflect the upgrading of the
Minuteman force and operating costs.
Ballistic Missile Submarines for Intercontinental
Attack. This element includes all US ballistic missile
submarine systems and the Soviet ballistic missile
submarines which have an intercontinental attack role.
Soviet ballistic missile submarines which have a
peripheral attack function are included in the stra-
tegic peripheral mission. For both countries, non-
strategic or attack submarines are included with
general purpose naval forces.
* The Department of Defense includes all costs of US heavy
bomber operations in this mission.
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ELEMENTS of US and SOVIET
INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK PROGRAMS, 1965-1975
A Comparison of US Authorizations and
Estimated Dollar Costs of the Soviet Programs If
Duplicated in the US
CUMULATIVE 1965-1975
US 12 (fiscal yrs.)
USSR 54 (calendar yrs.)
BILLION 1974 DOLLARS
7r
BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE
LAUNCH TUBES
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
CUMULATIVE 1965-1975
US 16 (fiscal yrs.)
USSR 11C (calendar yrs)
Soviet Bombers
IL
US
USSR 5 (calendar yrs.)
TOTAL LAUNCH TUBES (midyear)
700
25
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At $2.6 billion, the estimated dollar costs of Soviet
ballistic missile submarine programs for 1975 are 30 per-
cent higher than US authorizations. For the entire 1965-
1975 period, the estimated dollar costs for Soviet pro-
grams exceed those of the US by about 20 percent.
Rising dollar costs for Soviet programs between
1965 and 1969 are caused by production of the Y class
submarine with the SS-N-6 missile. In the early
seventies another upward trend begins, reflecting the
D class program with its longer range missile, the
SS-N-8.
The US, in contrast, completed production of its
Polaris ballistic missile submarine force in the early
sixties. Operating expenditures and costs associated
with the upgrading of the Polaris system and the shift
from Polaris to Poseidon missiles determine the trend
through 1972, with expenditures for the Trident pro-
gram beginning in 1973.
Intercontinental Bombers. This category includes
the heavy bomber systems and other aircraft which have
an intercontinental attack role as their primary mis-
sion. Costs of heavy bomber operations are included
here even though the operations may have been non-
strategic in nature--for example, the use of the US
bomber fleet in Southeast Asia. Estimated dollar
costs of the Soviet Badger, Blinder, and Backfire
strategic bombers are included under strategic periph-
eral attack.*
In 1975, the estimated dollar costs of Soviet inter-
continental bomber programs are about one-third as large
as authorizations for US heavy bombers. Over the 1965-
1975 period, estimated costs for Soviet programs are
about one-fifth of US authorizations for comparable
programs.
* All intelligence agencies except DIA, Air Force, and Army believe
it unlikely that the Backfire bomber will be specifically assigned
to intercontinental attack missions. DIA and Army believe that it
is premature to judge Soviet intentions for future employment of
the Backfire force, and Air Force believes that some portion of the
force would be used for missions against the continental US. See
NIE 11-3/8-75, Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack Through
the Mid-1980s, 17 November 1975.
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The relatively low level of estimated dollar costs
for the Soviet intercontinental bomber program reflect
the static nature of the force. As no new heavy bomb-
ers are procured over the 1965-1975 period, only operat-
ing costs of the existing Bear and Bison bomber fleet
are incurred.
Costs associated with US bombers decreased as use
of the bomber fleet in Southeast Asia ceased, production
of the FB-111 was completed, the B-58 was phased out,
and some older B-52s were retired. US bomber authoriza-
tions remain at a level more than three times the
estimated dollar costs of the Soviet program, reflecting
the larger size of the US force, heavier US operating
and training schedules, and the B-52 modernization
program.
Strategic Peripheral Attack
Included in peripheral attack are the Soviet forces--
MRBMs, IRBMs, medium bombers, and some ballistic missile
submarines--whose mission is largely confined to
attacking targets along the periphery of the USSR.*
The US has no direct counterpart to this peripheral
attack mission.**
In 1975 total estimated dollar costs for this mis-
sion are $3.8 billion, about 45 percent of the inter-
continental attack effort (this relationship is true
for the period 1965-1975 as a whole). The estimated
dollar costs of Soviet peripheral attack programs rise
somewhat after 1971 as a result of the procurement of
the Backfire bomber and the SS-X-20 IRBM program. This
upward trend follows a period of decline during the
latter half of the sixties, when there is relatively
little investment in new peripheral attack systems
and operating costs dominate the total.
* A portion of the G and H class ballistic missile submarine force
was assigned intercontinental attack missions until the early
seventies, and the dollar costs associated with these submarines
are included in the intercontinental mission until that time.
** US forward-based attack aircraft are included in the tactical
air portion of the general purpose force mission.
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Land-based missiles and peripheral bombers account
for nearly all the dollar costs during the period. The
SS-4 MRBM, whose deployment reached its peak in 1965
with some 600 launchers, has substantial dollar operat-
ing costs. Dollar costs of operating over 600 medium
bombers are another significant part of the peripheral
attack total. Dollar costs for the G and H class bal-
listic missile submarines--which are largely for operat-
ing but also include costs for conversion and procure-
ment of SLBMs--constitute a relatively modest share of
peripheral attack.
Strategic Defense
The strategic defense mission includes all US and
Soviet elements assigned the role of defense against
strategic air or missile attack. It does not include
those systems whose purpose is to provide protection
in a tactical role; these are accounted for within
the general purpose mission.
The Soviet surface-to-air missile element accounts
for about 40 percent of total estimated dollar costs
for strategic defense in 1975. Interceptors account for
more than 30 percent, control and warning for over 20 per-
cent, and the ABM program for about 5 percent.
US and Soviet strategic defense programs exhibit
considerably different patterns during the 1965-1975
period. (See Figure 8.) Cumulatively, estimated
dollar costs for Soviet strategic defense are about
6 percent of total estimated costs for all defense
programs. This contrasts with US authorizations for
strategic defense, which are less than 2 percent of
the total. In 1975, estimated dollar costs for Soviet
programs are $6 billion, nine times the level of US
authorizations, although for the period as a whole
they are only about four times as great.
The estimated dollar costs of Soviet forces show
a change in allocation over the period, with both sur-
face-to-air missile and control and warning costs
gradually accounting for more of the total, while
interceptor programs decline. The ABM effort continues
to account for only a small portion of the total.
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TOTAL US and SOVIET
STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS, 1965-1975
A Comparison of US Authorizations and
Estimated Dollar Costs of the Soviet Programs If
Duplicated in the US
BILLION 1974 DOLLARS
1965 66 67 68 69
CUMULATIVE 1965-1975
US 17 (fiscal yrs.)
USSR 1 67 (calendar yrs.)
1.1
(20%)
2.0
(46%)
05(29%)
1.7
(30%)
14
1.1
(16%)
2.8
(42%)
2.6
(38%)
1965
'Because of rounding components may not add to the totals shown.
Less than
0.1 (6%)
0.1 (160/)
1.4 ;
(24%)
1.9
(32%)
Control &
Warning
2.4
(40%)
25
30
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A marked increase in estimated dollar costs for
Soviet strategic defense in the late sixties reflects
the deployment of new SAM and interceptor systems.
Authorizations for US strategic defense programs,
with the exception of the ABM program, generally de-
cline from 1965 to 1975. The high levels of authoriza-
tions for ABM in 1969 and 1971 are largely responsible
for the higher totals in those years, but after 1971
there is a decrease in all US strategic defense pro-
grams. By 1975, US authorizations drop to about 25
percent of those for the peak year of 1971.
SAMs. This element includes only strategic defense
SAMs. Tactical SAM systems are accounted for in the
ground forces element of the general purpose forces
mission.
Estimated dollar cost trends for Soviet strategic
defense SAM systems during the 1965-1975 period reflect
an intensive effort by the Soviets to improve both low-
altitude and long-range defense capabilities against
US bomber-attack. Dollar costs for SAM systems rise
sharply after 1967 and remain high through the rest of
the period. High dollar costs for operation and main-
tenance of the SAM network, coupled with continuing
SA-3 and SA-5 deployment and the modernization and
improvement of other systems, are responsible for
keeping the level high through 1975. (See Figure 9.)
The US SAM programs are markedly different from
those of the Soviets--both in magnitude and in trend--
reflecting the differing bomber threats perceived by
the two nations. Cumulatively, over the 1965-1975
period, estimated dollar costs for Soviet SAM systems
are 12 times the level of US authorizations for SAMs.
US authorizations exhibit a steady decline throughout
the period, and by 1975 the dollar costs of the Soviet
SAM programs are more than 20 times the US level.
Interceptor Aircraft. Only strategic defense
interceptor aircraft are included in this category.
Aircraft of similar types assigned to a tactical role
are included in the tactical air forces element of the
general purpose forces mission.
Estimated dollar costs of Soviet interceptor pro-
grams are $1.9 billion in 1975, about one-third of the
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FIGURE 9
ELEMENTS of US and SOVIET
STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS, 1965-1975
A Comparison of US Authorizations and
Estimated Dollar Costs of the Soviet Programs if
Duplicated in the US
BILLION 1974 DOLLARS
4 r
3
2
1965 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
CUMULATIVE 1965-1975
US 2 (fiscal yrs.)
USSR
BILLION 1974 DOLLARS
1965 66 67 68
CUMULATIVE 1965-1975
US 3 (fiscal yrs.)
USSR
BILLION 1974 DOLLARS
CUMULATIVE 1965-1975
US 5 (fiscal yrs.)
USSR (calendar yrs.)
25
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total for the strategic defense mission and almost 13
times the comparable US authorizations. Over the 1965-
1975 period, the dollar costs for Soviet interceptor
programs are about $26.6 billion, more than eight times
the US total. Estimated dollar costs for Soviet inter-
ceptors decline after 1969, reflecting a decrease in
the interceptor inventory, with more aircraft being
phased out of the active force than added to it. An
upturn in the late sixties and immediately following
is due almost entirely to the procurement of the SU-15
Flagon, the MIG-25 Foxbat, and, to a lesser extent,
the TU-128 Fiddler aircraft. As the assimilation of
new aircraft into active units is completed, estimated
dollar costs for the element decrease, as they in-
creasingly reflect operating costs more than procure-
ment of new aircraft.
US authorizations for interceptor forces decline
throughout the period as a result of a deemphasis of
active military interceptor programs and a shift of
responsibility for the operations of most of these
forces to the reserve and air national guard. In
1975 the active US interceptor force is about one-
fifth its 1965 level; of the total 1975 force, how-
ever, two-thirds of the aircraft are in reserve and
guard units. Under Department of Defense accounting
procedures, the personnel costs associated with these
units are included under "command, support, and other"
along with all other reserve and guard costs. How-
ever, the units stand alert and their aircraft are
operational.
ABM. This element includes not only personnel and
equipment located at ABM sites, but also early warning
radar systems directly related to ballistic missile
defense. Other early warning systems, including
satellites which support strategic defense systems,
are accounted for within the control and warning
element.
In the late sixties the Soviets began deploying an
ABM system around Moscow using technology which lagged
that of the US. Only 64 launchers were deployed with
the system, although evidence at the time indicated
that more had been planned. The US undertook develop-
ment of a system using advanced technology. The higher
level of dollar costs for the US ABM system relative
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to that of the Soviets in the late sixties and early
seventies largely reflects the technological difference
between the US and Soviet ABM systems.
ABM defenses are the only element under strategic
defense for which US authorizations over the period
as a whole exceed estimated Soviet dollar costs. Cumu-
latively, over the 1965-1975 period, US ABM authoriza-
tions are nearly twice the estimated dollar costs for
Soviet ABM defenses, and account for almost one-third
of total US authorizations for strategic defense.
Dollar costs for Soviet ABM programs during the
period, on the other hand, account for less than 5
percent of estimated dollar costs for strategic de-
fense. Estimated dollar costs for the Soviet ABM
program remain relatively steady after the mid-sixties.
There is a slight lull in activity after 1971, but
early-stage procurement for additional early warning
and regional acquisition and tracking radars, which
are expected to become operational in the late seventies,
causes a slight increase in estimated dollar costs in
1974 and 1975.
US ABM authorizations rise rapidly to a peak in
1971 due to the construction of sites at Malmstrom
and Grand Forks. After 1971 the site at Malmstrom
was canceled and activity at Grand Forks declined as
the site neared completion. US ABM authorizations
for 1974 and 1975 are lower than estimated dollar
costs for Soviet ABM programs for the first time
since 1967.
Control & Warning. The control and warning ele-
ment includes personnel, radars, and communications
equipment associated with the early warning, detection,
and tracking of an enemy air attack and the regional
coordination of strategic defense forces.
In 1975, at about $1.4 billion, the estimated
dollar cost for Soviet control and warning amounts to
about 25 percent of strategic defense and is nearly
four times US authorizations. Over the 1965-1975
period as a whole, however, the Soviet level is about
twice that of US authorizations for control and warn-
ing.
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Estimated dollar costs for Soviet control and
warning rise steadily after the late sixties with the
expansion and improvement of the extensive air sur-
veillance radar and air defense communications network.
Included in this expansion was the addition of an
over-the-horizon radar system.
US authorizations for control and warning exhibit
a general decline through the period. An increase in
the early seventies is related primarily to the ad-
dition of an over-the-horizon detection system.
General Purpose Forces
The general purpose mission includes the ground
forces, tactical air forces, and those naval forces
that do not have a strategic or peripheral attack
mission. This mission accounts for a greater portion
of dollar costs than any other combat mission, and
throughout the 1965-1975 period comprises for both
sides roughly one-fourth of the total.
In 1975, the estimated dollar costs of $30.7 billion
for Soviet general purpose forces exceed the US level
by slightly more than 70 percent. For the seventies
as a whole these costs are 40 percent greater than US
authorizations. The estimate of dollar costs of Soviet
general purpose forces increases continuously from 1965
through 1975 at an average annual rate of just over 3
percent. The US level grows rapidly during the Vietnam
involvement, then declines, and by 1971 is lower than at
the beginning of the period. (See Figure 10.)
Within the general purpose forces mission, nearly
60 percent of the total Soviet programs measured in
dollars for the 1965-1975 period is for ground forces,
25 percent for naval general purpose forces, and 15
percent for tactical air forces. Of US authorizations
for the period, 40 percent is for tactical air forces,
35 percent for ground forces, and 25 percent for naval
general purpose forces.
Ground Forces. The ground forces element for which
costs are estimated includes the Soviet ground troops,
naval infantry brigades, coastal defense forces, and
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TOTAL US and SOVIET
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES PROGRAMS, 1965-1975
A Comparison of US Authorizations and
Estimated Dollar Costs of the Soviet Programs if
Duplicated in the US
BILLION 1974 DOLLARS
35 r-
TOTAL
1965 66 67 68 69 70
CUMULATIVE 1965-1975
us
USSR
270 (fiscal yrs.)
292 (calendar yrs.)
BY ELEMENT*
BILLION 1974 DOLLARS
22.4
1965
'Because of rounding components may not add to the totals shown.
Jos
r%)
Ground
Forces
5.7
(32%)
7.2
Naval
(23%)
Forces
43 s
Tactical
(1)
Air Forces
25
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helicopters assigned to Soviet ground forces. The
equivalent US figure comprises the US Army and Marine
Corps and their equipment except tactical fixed-wing
aircraft.
The estimated Soviet dollar costs are about 20
percent greater than US authorizations for the period
1965-1969, nearly three times as great for the period
1970-1975 and more than three times as much for 1975.
The dollar costs of the Soviet ground forces rise
throughout the 1965-1975 period with an average annual
increase of about 5 percent. The bulk of the increase
is caused by the growth in manpower, with military per-
sonnel accounting for more than half of the total. Other
increases reflect the procurement of new ground forces
weapon systems such as new armored personnel carriers
and several new tactical surface-to-air missile systems.
An overall increase in the size of Soviet ground divi-
sions plus the forming of new divisions, many to rein-
force the Chinese border, during the period created
a requirement for additional equipment and personnel.
(See Figure 11.)
US ground forces authorizations during the period
fluctuate widely because of the effect of the Vietnam
involvement. For example, in 1966 and 1967 US autho-
rizations are only slightly less than estimated dollar
costs for the Soviet forces, while in 1971 US authori-
zations decline to about 35 percent of estimated dollar
costs of Soviet forces.
Tactical Air Forces. These forces include land-
and sea-based fixed-wing aircraft that are assigned
a combat support role. The Soviets currently have
well over 4,000 fixed-wing aircraft in their tactical
forces. Of these, almost 45 percent are assigned to
units with a primary air defense mission. Another 40
percent are assigned to units which have a primary
ground attack mission. The remainder of the force con-
sists of reconnaissance and other support aircraft. In
accordance with US definitions, US Navy aircraft carriers
and their attack aircraft are included in the tactical
air forces; the Soviets have no counterpart to these
forces. US attack aircraft based in Europe are also
included in this category.
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ELEMENTS of US and SOVIET
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES PROGRAMS, 1965-1975
A Comparison of US Authorizations and
Estimated Dollar Costs of the Soviet Programs if
Duplicated in the US
BILLION 1974 DOLLARS
CUMULATIVE 1965-1975
US 92 (fiscal yrs.)
USSR 1174 (calendar yrs.)
BILLION 1974 DOLLARS
20 r
MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANT SHIPS (midyear)
-1 400
CUMULATIVE 1965-1975
US 70 (fiscal yrs.)
USSR 76 (calendar yrs.)
BILLION 1974 DOLLARS
20 r
I TACTICAL AIR FORCES
CUMULATIVE 1965-1975
US 1' 107 (fiscal yrs.)
USSR _ : _.-__,._,!- (calendar yrs.)
FIXED-WING COMBAT AIRCRAFT (midyear)
-1 8,000
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The 1975 estimated dollar costs of Soviet tactical
air forces are some 60 percent higher than in 1968,
when they begin to increase following a period of
decline. The 1975 figure of $4.7 billion, however,
still amounts to only 70 percent of total US authoriza-
tions for this mission. The increase from 1970 on
results from the introduction of several new aircraft,
including the SU-17 Fitter B and C, MIG-23 Flogger,
MIG-25 Foxbat, and, more recently, the SU-19 Fencer.
Despite the retirement of older aircraft, the
Soviet tactical air force shows some growth throughout
the period, and operating costs rise even faster as
the proportion of more complex and sophisticated air-
craft rises. The Soviets also are developing a variety
of new air weapons, including improved air-to-air
missiles, tactical air-to-surface missiles, and new
types of bombs.
US authorizations for tactical air forces during
the period 1965-1975 mirror the Vietnam involvement.
They peak at $14.3 billion in 1967, drop thereafter,
and are less than half that level in 1975. The de-
crease primarily reflects a decline in new aircraft
procurement--by 1974 the number of new aircraft pro-
cured annually was about half the pre-Vietnam level.
General Purpose Naval Forces. The general purpose
naval forces include all major and minor surface com-
batants, attack submarines, antisubmarine warfare (ASW)
aircraft carriers and aircraft, land-based naval air
forces, and amphibious warfare ships. Under Department
of Defense accounting procedures, all ballistic missile
submarines are included in the strategic attack cate-
gory. US attack aircraft carriers and their attack
aircraft are included in the tactical air forces cate-
gory. Support ships, including underway replenishment
ships, are included in the "command, support, and
other" category.
In both the USSR and the US the dollar costs of
the general purpose naval forces represent slightly
more than 5 percent of total defense costs throughout
the 1965-1975 period. Estimated dollar costs for
Soviet programs in 1975 are $7.2 billion, about one-
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fourth greater than US authorizations.* Cumulatively
over the period, dollar costs for Soviet general pur-
pose naval programs are close to 10 percent greater
than US outlays, and exceed the US level in every
year except 1972 and 1974.
In the late sixties, the Moskva class guided mis-
sile helicopter ships and a number of guided missile
cruisers and frigates entered the Soviet force. Lead-
ing programs among the major surface combatants during
the seventies include the Kara and Kresta II guided-
missile cruisers and Krivak guided-missile destroyer.
The first Soviet ASW carrier, the Kiev, was completed
in 1975. Production of C and V class submarines--both
the original and improved versions--were the principal
general purpose attack submarine programs in the
seventies.
In the Soviet naval air force, which accounts for
about one-fourth of the total estimated dollar costs
of the general purpose naval forces, the introduction
of the Backfire bomber accounts for most of the recent
increase in costs. The vertical and short take-off
and landing aircraft carried aboard the Kiev also
contribute to the increase.
US authorizations for general purpose naval forces
do not vary appreciably over the 1965-1975 period,
averaging about $6.4 billion per year, with authoriza-
tions dropping to $5.7 billion in 1975. The major US
authorizations during the period are for frigates,
destroyers, amphibious assault ships, and nuclear-
powered attack submarines and cruisers.
* Comparison of the estimated dollar costs of Soviet naval ship
procurement with comparable US authorizations is more difficult
than for other programs. Because shipbuilding programs usually
extend over long periods, adjustments are often made over time
in the allocation of funds for shipbuilding and conversion (SCN).
Thus, the US authorization data for SCN have a less direct relation-
ship to actual outlays than US data for other programs.
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Command, Support, and Other
All organizational entities not included in the
individual force missions are covered under "command,
support, and other," which also includes costs for
other functions such as civilian pay, reserve and re-
tired manpower, procurement and storage of nuclear
weapons, and any programs which because of present
data limitations cannot be assigned to specific
missions. Not included are RDT&E programs, which
were discussed earlier in the section on resource
categories.
"Command, support, and other" represents the
largest part of total defense costs in dollars for
both the US and the USSR, largely because of the
inclusion of programs which cannot be specifically
allocated to combat missions. In 1975, these programs
account for more than 45 percent of total estimated
dollar costs of Soviet defense and over 60 percent of
US authorizations.
For both countries, trends in dollar costs for
this category parallel those of the combat missions.
Whereas the dollar costs for Soviet programs rise
steadily--at a rate of 2 percent a year--over the
1965-1975 period, US authorizations decline appreciably
after the Vietnam peak in the late sixties. The Soviet
level exceeds that of the US for the first time in 1974,
and in 1975 is 5 percent greater. (See Figure 12.)
Soviet "command, support, and other" programs as
measured in dollars have grown with Soviet efforts to
modernize forces and improve military capabilities.
For example, during the period the Soviets have intro-
duced new types of heavy transport aircraft into mili-
tary Transport Aviation, have added considerable
numbers of support helicopters, and have increased the
personnel and facilities necessary to operate these
aircraft.
The Soviets have also undertaken several major
programs to upgrade their command and control capa-
bilities, particularly for multiforce operations.
These programs include construction of several hundred
bunkered command and control facilities, more than a
threefold increase in the number of buried communica-
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FIGURE 12
US and SOVIET
"COMMAND, SUPPORT, and OTHER" DEFENSE PROGRAMS, 1965-1975
A Comparison of US Authorizations and
Estimated Dollar Costs of the Soviet Programs if
Duplicated in the US
BILLION 1974 DOLLARS
Note: Includes costs of command and support functions for the military forces; costs of pay
and benefits for retired and civilian personnel; costs of nuclear weapons; and all costs (except
those for RDT&E) which, because of present data limitations, cannot be assigned for both the
US and the USSR to combat missions.
1965 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
CUMULATIVE 1965-1975
us
USSR
B (fiscal yrs.)
I 52r (calendar yrs.)
25
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tions antennas, formation of new mobile signal units,
and initial deployment of a force-wide airborne command
post system.
Service support functions such as nonmilitary
education programs, medical care for dependents, and
commissaries also fall under this general heading be-
cause they
are
not easily broken out for comparative
purposes.
Such
activities tend to involve large numbers
of people
(and
thus are expensive in dollar terms) but
contribute
only
indirectly to military capabilities.
The magnitude of such activities in the Soviet forces
is difficult to estimate, and our confidence in the
estimates for support forces is therefore less than
for the combat forces.
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FIGURE 13
US and ESTIMATED SOVIET PRODUCTION of
SELECTED WEAPONS SYSTEMS for the 1965-1974 PERIOD
'Soviet procurement of naval combatants in terms of tonnage is estimated to be
about 40 percent greater than that of the US for the 1965-1974 period.
AIRCRAFT
7,500 r-
LAND ARMS
60,000 -
Interceptors and
Tactical Fighter Aircraft
(excluding helicopters)
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Production Data
Comparing US and Soviet production of military
weapon systems is useful in relating the size of each
country's military programs over time. This informa-
tion, taken with other measures, can increase our
understanding of Soviet defense programs. These pro-
duction comparisons, however, cannot be used by them-
selves as measures of capability. No net assessment
of US and Soviet programs can be drawn exclusively
from these data and none is intended.
Production comparisons can complement dollar cost
comparisons, but caution must be exercised in relating
the two bodies of data. Production and estimated dollar
costs for Soviet forces are more closely related than
are those for the US. This is because estimates of
military production are the basis for the detailed
estimate of the dollar costs of Soviet military pro-
grams. The US defense costs presented in this paper,
on the other hand, represent not outlays, but total
obligational authority (TOA), which is not as directly
related to the actual production of weapon systems.
The following comparisons of production for US and
Soviet military weapon programs and systems are far
from comprehensive. An attempt has been made, however,
to address those systems which were most prominent and
dynamic. The production data discussed in this Annex
represent only the production of weapon systems by the
US and the USSR for the direct use of their own mili-
tary forces. Production for RDT&E and for military
aid to other countries has been excluded. Finally,
the production data described here are limited to the
period 1965-1974, because 1975 US data for such a com-
parison were not available when this report was in
preparation.
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Missiles
The Soviets produced about 50 percent more missiles
than the US over the 1965-1974 period. This section
describes the major programs within this category.
ICBMs. The Soviets produced about 2,700 inter-
continental ballistic missiles during 1965-1974, almost
twice US ICBM production for the period. During the
late sixties, the Soviets were building up their sizable
SS-9 and SS-11 forces and introducing a small force of
SS-13s. While these programs were under way, estimated
Soviet production of ICBMs averaged between 350 and 400
missiles per year. In the early seventies, production
dropped sharply as deployment of the SS-9 and SS-13
ended, but rose again near the end of the period with
the introduction of new-generation ICBMs.
The US, on the other hand, was nearing the com-
pletion of its planned ICBM deployment by the begin-
ning of the period. Although the US deployed no new
ICBM launchers after 1967, more than 1,400 missiles
were produced for deployment during the period as the
US upgraded the Minuteman system.
MR/IRBMs. In addition to their ICBM forces the
Soviets maintain an extensive force of medium- and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The US cur-
rently has no counterpart for these weapons. Since
there was virtually no new deployment of MR/IRBM
systems during the 1965-1974 period, their production
dropped from about 100 each year at the beginning of
the period to only a few each year by the late sixties.
There was a marked increase in 1973 and 1974, however,
as the SS-X-20 IRBM neared deployment, and by 1974 the
annual level of production had again reached 100.
SLBMs. Total production of submarine-launched
ballistic missiles is estimated to have been roughly
comparable in the US and the USSR during the 1965-1974
period, although the patterns of production were con-
siderably different. Estimated annual Soviet SLBM
production, driven largely by the introduction of the
SS-N-6, rose steadily from just over 20 in 1967 to
over 200 in 1971. At that time, production of the
SS-N-6 began to decline, although the decrease was
largely offset by the introduction of an improved
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SLBM system with a considerably longer range, the
SS-N-8. Production remained relatively steady at
about 200 per year from 1971 to 1973, then declined
slightly in 1974.
The pattern of US SLBM production is a function
of the two major programs under way during the 1965-
1974 period. Production of the Polaris, which marked
the early part of the period, was essentially com-
pleted in 1968. The Poseidon system entered produc-
tion in 1971 and, though down somewhat in 1974, aver-
aged more than 100 missiles a year for the seventies.
ASMs. US production of air-to-surface missiles
during the 1965-1974 period is about three times that
estimated for the Soviets. The highest US rates
occurred in the late sixties, reflecting the heavy
use of ASMs in Vietnam. The level dropped sharply
from more than 7,000 in 1968 to less than 500 in 1971
and 1972, but increased again by 1974 to about 4,500
with the introduction of the short-range attack mis-
sile (SRAM) and Maverick.
Soviet production of ASMs rose steadily from just
over 500 at the beginning of the period to almost 3,000
in 1974. Emphasis in the seventies has been on new
tactical air-to-surface missile systems, the AS-7,
AS-8, AS-X-9, and AS-10.
SAMs. Estimated Soviet production of surface-to-
air missiles is slightly less than four times that of
the US during 1965-1974. Annual production of SAMs
for the Soviets has steadily increased from about
4,000 in 1965 to almost 25,000 in 1974. In recent
years, added emphasis has been placed on tactical
SAMs, notably the SA-7 and SA-9, and they are the
largest contributors to the high levels of production
in the mid-seventies.
SAMs for strategic defense, which accounted for
more than 75 percent of total Soviet SAM production
in 1965, made up just over 15 percent of the total in
1974.
The US has also emphasized tactical SAM systems.
This is reflected in the production of the Redeye and
Chaparral missiles, which exceeded 11,000 in 1969 and
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totaled over 35,000 for the period. Unlike the Soviets,
however, the US has not devoted much attention to its
strategic SAM systems, and production of these missiles
virtually ended in 1970.
ASW Missiles. US production of missiles for anti-
submarine warfare--over 7,000--is four times that
estimated for the Soviets during the period.
US production of ASW missiles, the ASROC and SUBROC,
reached over 1,700 in 1967 but declined thereafter, and
by 1973 had ended entirely. The pattern of Soviet pro-
duction of ASW missiles is the opposite of the US; Soviet
production began in 1967 and increased each year to
nearly 500 annually in 1974.
Aircraft
Comparison of US and Soviet aircraft production is
especially difficult because of the extensive qualita-
tive differences in the aircraft produced by each
country. In the body of this report, dollar cost com-
parisons are based on the role or mission of the air-
craft for consistency with the other mission comparisons.
Given the characteristics of US and Soviet aircraft,
comparisons of production are more appropriately based
on similarity of operational capabilities. Some of
the comparisons drawn here, therefore, are on a basis
slightly different from that used earlier in this
report.
Heavy and Medium Bombers. The Soviets produced
nearly 300 heavy and medium bomber-type aircraft
(including reconnaissance and support models) during
the 1965-1974 period. At the beginning of the period,
they were producing the Blinder at an estimated rate
of between 30 and 40 a year. Blinder production de-
clined sharply in 1969 and ended in 1970. Between 10
and 15 reconnaissance and ASW variants of the Bear
bomber were produced from 1965 through 1970. Subse-
quently, production gradually declined and ended
entirely in 1974. Annual production of the Backfire,
which began in 1971, has steadily increased to about
20 per year. The Backfire is the only bomber cur-
rently being produced by the Soviets.
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The only US aircraft in this category produced
during this period was the FB-111, with fewer than 80
produced between 1968 and 1971.
Fighters and Tactical Attack Aircraft. In this
category, US and Soviet aircraft production was nearly
equal at about 6,000 during the 1965-1974 period.
There has been a change in both countries, however,
in the types of aircraft produced. During the sixties,
the Soviets concentrated on producing aircraft designed
for a specific mission, introducing several new inter-
ceptors--including the Flagon, Fiddler, and Firebar--to
enhance their air defense capabilities. During the
seventies, they began to produce more multipurpose
aircraft. They brought out the Flogger and the later
variants of the Fishbed--the J, K, and L--which have
both interceptor and ground attack roles.
For the US the trend was exactly the reverse.
Large numbers of the F-4 multipurpose fighter were
produced during the sixties, but beginning in the
seventies the production of aircraft designed for
a specific role, such as the F-14 all-weather high-
performance interceptor, became more predominant.
Helicopters. Annual Soviet production of heli-
copters rose steadily from less than 100 in 1965 to
more than 900 in 1974. The increase has been caused
primarily by high production levels for the Hip,
running between 500 and 600 per year near the end of
the period.
Once again, the trend for US production is the
reverse of that estimated for the Soviets. US pro-
duction of helicopters, as with the fighters and
attack aircraft, strongly reflects the requirements
of the Vietnam conflict. Annual production reached
a peak of over 2,500 in 1968 but declined rapidly in
subsequent years, and by 1974 had fallen to below
300. Despite the decreasing trend, however, US pro-
duction of helicopters over the 1965-1974 period was
more than four times that estimated for the Soviets.
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Land Arms
Because of the limitations of the data available at
this time, comparison of US and Soviet production of
land arms is limited to tanks and armored personnel car-
riers (APCs). Of the slightly more than 60,000 armored
vehicles delivered in the USSR between 1965 and 1974,
almost half were tanks. There were nearly 25,000 US
armored vehicles produced, of which just over 5,000
were tanks.
Tanks. The Soviets produced more than five and
one-half times as many tanks as the US during the
period. Most of the Soviet deliveries were medium
tanks (approximately 40 tons)--the T-55 with a 100mm
gun, T-62 with a 115mm smoothbore gun, and T-72 with
a large-caliber, smoothbore weapon. On the US side,
most of the deliveries were the 16-ton Sheridan M551
armored reconnaissance vehicle with a 152mm gun, and
the 52-ton M60A1 tank with a 105mm gun.
Armored Personnel Carriers. At nearly 32,000,
Soviet deliveries of APCs exceeded US deliveries by
almost 70 percent. Among the Soviet programs were the
BTR-50 and BTR-60 series, which carry about a squad of
infantry troops; BRDM wheeled amphibious armored recon-
naissance vehicles, which carry four to five troops;
and BMP tracked amphibious armored infantry combat
vehicles, which carry a squad. The US programs were
dominated by deliveries of the 11-ton tracked M113
vehicle, which can carry about a squad of troops.
Naval Combatant Ships
Both the US and the Soviet Union had active naval
shipbuilding programs during the period. In both
countries, new surface combatants, submarines, and
amphibious warfare and support ships were added to
the fleets. This section discusses highlights of US
and Soviet programs which contribute most directly to
naval warfare capabilities.
In total, the US built about 160 surface combatant
ships* and submarines between 1965 and 1974, while the
* Includes major and minor surface combatants and assualt heli-
copter carriers but excludes amphibious warfare ships--other than
assault helicopter carriers--and some 60 Coast Guard cutters and
patrol craft.
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Soviets built about 690. The US combatant ship pro-
duction amounted to some 800,000 tons; Soviet produc-
tion was about 1,100,000 tons.
Surface Combatants.* The US added two new attack
carriers during the period, and built four helicopter-
carrying amphibious assault ships. The Soviets have
no equivalent for either of these ship types. The
Soviets built two Moskva class ASW helicopter ships
in the late sixties and in 1975 completed the first
iev class ASW carrier, which has a complement of
ixed-wing V/STOL aircraft.
The Soviets built 14 guided-missile cruisers dur-
ing the 1965-1974 period--three of the Kara class,
four of the Kresta I, and seven of the Kresta II. US
guided-missile cruiser programs during the same period
consisted of eight ships of the conventionally powered
Belknap class, and one ship each of the nuclear-powered
Truxtun and California classes.
Only the USSR added destroyers to its deployed
forces during the period. Fifteen ships of the Kashin
class and 10 of the Krivak class were built. The
Soviets had two active frigate programs--Petya and
Mirka--with total production of 42 ships. The US had
three programs--the Knox, Garcia, and Brooke classes--
totaling 61 ships.
The Soviets added nine Nanuchka class guided-missile
patrol gunboats, 22 Grisha class guided-missile escorts,
nearly 50 Osa class guided-missile boats, and a number
of other minor combatants to their inventory. Seventeen
patrol gunboats and 10 fast patrol boats were added to
US naval forces during the period.
Attack Submarines. During the period, the USSR
built 88 attack submarines--47 of which were nuclear
powered. The USSR pursued both nuclear and diesel
submarine programs, but the US built only nuclear
submarines. The E-II, C, and V nuclear classes and
the F and T diesel classes accounted for most of the
attack submarines produced in the USSR. The US built
43 nuclear-powered attack submarines, all of the Permit
and Sturgeon classes.
* A new system of ship classifications which was adopted by the
US Navy in 1975 in order to bring the designators for US and
foreign warships into closer agreement is used in this section.
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Ballistic Missile Submarines. The USSR built more
than three times as many nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarines as the US. During the period 1965-
1974 the Soviets completed 43 submarines of the Y and
D classes (9 more were completed in 1975). The 12
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines of the
Benjamin Franklin class accounted for the US deliveries.
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Annex B
Costing Methodology
Definition of Dollar Estimates
Estimated dollar costs of the Soviet defense effort
are estimates of what it would cost the US to purchase
the same military equipment and supplies, pay the same
number of people, carry on the same types of RDT&E, and
pursue the same operations and maintenance programs as
the Soviets. Conceptually, the Soviet defense program
in this context can be considered as an alternative US
defense program.
Constant and Current Prices
The dollar cost data presented in this report are
expressed in terms of average 1974 US resource prices,
including 1974 military payments. A constant price
base is used so that all changes in spending from
year to year reflect changes in the forces and programs
themselves, rather than price changes resulting from
inflationary forces. For tracing the size of the de-
fense effort over time, or for analyzing the real shifts
of resources within that effort, a constant price series
is the appropriate measure. Dollar costs expressed in
current prices show trends that are quite different. A
current price series would reflect, for example, the in-
crease in US military pay authorizations related to the
transition to the all-volunteer army, as well as the
marked inflation that has affected the US economy.
Estimating the Dollar Costs of Soviet Programs
The dollar costs of Soviet defense activity are
developed for the most part on the basis of a detailed
identification and listing of Soviet forces. The force
components so listed are multiplied by estimates of
what they would cost in the US in dollars. The results
are then aggregated both by military mission and by
resource category.
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The reliability of the estimates depends on the
precision and accuracy of our estimate of the Soviet
programs and of the cost factors applied to that data
base. The data base on forces and weapons reflects
the combined collection and analytical efforts of the
intelligence community. Available intelligence infor-
mation has made it possible to develop a detailed in-
ventory of the numbers and kinds of weapons and units
that make up the Soviet armed forces. This extensive
data base includes information on such items as
physical and performance characteristics of Soviet
weapons and equipment and their production; deployment
levels of Soviet strategic attack, strategic defense,
and general purpose forces; and the manning require-
ments for these forces as well as for all command and
support activities. (See also the "Note to the Reader"
on page 4 under the heading "Reliability.")
Investment. Investment costs are those for pro-
curement of equipment and spare parts and for con-
struction of facilities. While the specific technique
varies according to the information available, the
procurement costs of most weapons--aircraft, missiles,
and ships--are derived through the use of cost esti-
mating relationships (CERs). These CERs--equations
which relate US weapon characteristics (for example,
weight, thrust, or speed) to costs--are applied to
Soviet weapon characteristics
The lack of necessary data on some systems makes
it impossible to use either of the two approaches de-
scribed above. In these cases, direct analogy--using
the cost of similar US equipment--or some other gross
approximation of cost, such as estimating total cost
as a function of total weight, is used. Some ammuni-
tion items, for example, are costed using these less
refined methods.
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Construction cost estimates are based on a good
knowledge of Soviet construction practices and ruble
construction costs. These estimated costs are trans-
formed into dollars by the use of a ruble-to-dollar
ratio based on the cost of similar construction in
the US.
Operating. Operating costs are the sum of per-
sonnel costs--pay, subsistence and other allowances--
and operations and maintenance (O&M) costs. O&M costs
include those which support the functioning of the
defense establishment, and cover such diverse items
as fuel consumption and maintenance of facilities.
Dollar costs for Soviet military personnel are
estimated by applying US factors for pay and allow-
ances to estimates of Soviet military manpower.
Average factors are derived for each US service by
dividing total pay and allowances for each service
by total manpower in that service. The appropriate
factor is then applied to the manpower estimated for
each Soviet military unit.
Some O&M cost estimates are based on US analogy.
The costs of overhauls for land arms, for example,
are related to the original procurement costs of the
equipment, using percentage factors based on US ex-
perience. Adjustments are made, however, to reflect
Soviet operating rates when they are known to differ
from US practices. The cost of petroleum, oils, and
lubricants (POL) is based on estimated Soviet con-
sumption rates for each weapon system. For example,
the estimated fuel consumption rate of a particular
model of aircraft is applied to the average number of
flying hours for that type of aircraft. The resulting
quantities of POL are then costed at US prices. In
general, the information on operating rates is not as
complete in quantity or quality as the physical data--
manpower and equipment--on the forces.
Facility maintenance costs are based on the assumed
life of the facility and are a function of the cost of
constructing it. US and Soviet experience is believed
to be similar in this area.
RDT&E. The direct costing approach described above
is not used to estimate the dollar cost of Soviet mili-
55
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tary RDT&E because the type of data needed for direct
costing of observed programs is not available. In-
stead, published Soviet statistical data and descrip-
tive material about scientific activities are used as
a basis for estimating military RDT&E and space activ-
ities in rubles. The dollar costs of these activities
are obtained by converting the ruble estimate into
dollars with a ruble-to-dollar ratio. The estimate
corresponds in coverage to the categories of US RDT&E
activity funded by the Department of Defense and the
defense-related portion of the Energy Research and
Development Administration (ERDA) research program.
For several reasons, the estimated dollar costs
presented for Soviet RDT&E should be regarded as less
reliable than the dollar costs estimated for invest-
ment and operating. First, because the basic informa-
tion comes from Soviet publications, there is an ele-
ment of uncertainty about its reliability and about
our understanding of it. Second, the distribution of
Soviet RDT&E expenditures between military and civil
applications continues to be a difficult problem.
Finally, the conversion from rubles to dollars pre-
sents a number of theoretical complexities as well as
practical problems.
Organization of the US and Soviet Data
The US authorizations data presented in this re-
port were developed from the Department of Defense
Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP), the US Budget, and
related DoD expenditure data. Nonpersonnel authoriza-
tions for military aid and civil defense have been
excluded from the US data, and defense-related ERDA
authorizations have been included. For comparability,
the US and Soviet data bases were adjusted into a
common data format that is in close accord with the
FYDP accounting system. Because of the problems of
comparing such disparate activities, the limitations
of the Soviet data, and the organization of US data,
these comparisons should not be considered as precise
measurements. This is particularly true in areas where
the difference between US and Soviet levels is estimated
to be smaller or where the comparisons are made at a
low level of aggregation.
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Only combat and operational defense units are in-
cluded in the force missions--intercontinental attack,
peripheral attack, strategic defense, and general pur-
pose forces. A combat unit is defined as a military
unit that would actively engage in combat. The same
criteria apply to an item of materiel designated for
use in combat. Motorized rifle divisions, bomber units,
and naval surface combatant ships are examples of
combat units in these terms. Operational defense
units are military units and equipment assigned warn-
ing, direction, or other functions. Reconnaissance
units, early warning radar sites, combat engineer
battalions, and electronic warfare units are typical
operational defense units.
All entities not accounted for within the force
missions (except RDT&E) are aggregated in the mission
called "command, support, and other." This procedure
eliminates the problem of allocating the cost of a
supply unit (a supply depot, for example) or command
unit to more than one element or mission. "Other"
costs included in this mission are costs of reserve,
retired, and civilian personnel; costs of nuclear
weapons; and all costs which because of present data
limitations cannot be assigned, for either country,
to other missions.
This report also presents comparisons of US and
Soviet defense efforts on a resource category basis.
These data were structured in accordance with current
FYDP and budget resource accounting definitions.
Because resource accounting definitions have varied
over time, adjustments were required to achieve con-
formity of resource category definitions throughout
the period of analysis.
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The data on Soviet defense expenditures presented
in this study differ from those presented in its
predecessor Soviet Spending for Defense: A DoZZar Cost
Comparison of Soviet and US Defense Activity (SR IR
74-7), December 1974. The revisions made each year
in the estimates of dollar costs of Soviet defense
programs are attributable to three sources:
-- changes in the assessments of the size, com-
position, and technical characteristics of
forces and programs,
-- changes in the estimates of the costs of the
weapon systems and programs,
-- a change in the price base used to express
the series.
Roughly half of the difference between this series
and that of the earlier report occurs because of changes
in our estimate of forces and programs, coupled with
estimates of the dollar costs of utilities and premili-
tary training--activities not covered explicitly in the
past. About a third of the difference results from
the change in the dollar price base--from 1973 to
1974 dollars--and the remainder from improvements in
our estimates of the dollar costs of Soviet programs.
The US data used in these comparisons differ from
those in the earlier report primarily because they are
now expressed in 1974 prices. In addition, the January
1976 edition of The Five-Year Defense Program was used,
providing data for the recent years which had been
preliminary in the edition used for the earlier report.
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Statistical Data
The financial data in this Annex are based on a
detailed single-valued statement of the Soviet forces
which was specified solely for costing purposes. Key
elements of the forces used for costing are shown in
summary form in Tables 11 and 12.
Figures for all programs are expressed in constant
1974 resource prices. Figures for the USSR are for
calendar years and those for the US are for fiscal
years.
The estimated dollar costs do not include costs
for Soviet civil space programs.
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1. Estimated Costs of Soviet Defense Programs if Duplicated
in the US, By Mission, 1965-1975
2. US Defense Authorizations, By Mission, 1965-1975
3. Estimated Costs of Soviet Intercontinental and Peripheral
Attack Programs if Duplicated in the US, By Element, 1965-
1975
4. US Strategic Attack Authorizations, By Element, 1965-1975
5. Estimated Costs of Soviet Strategic Defense Programs if
Duplicated in the US, By Element, 1965-1975
6. US Strategic Defense Authorizations, By Element, 1965-1975
7. Estimated Costs of Soviet General Purpose Forces if
Duplicated in the US, By Element, 1965-1975
8. US General Purpose Force Authorizations, By Element, 1965-
1975
9. Estimated Costs of Soviet Defense Programs if Duplicated
in the US, By Resource Category, 1965-1975
10. US Defense Authorizations, By Resource Category, 1965-1975
11. Deployment of Major Soviet Strategic Weapon Systems,
Midyear 1965-1975
12. Numbers of Soviet Ground Force Units and Selected Items
of Equipment for General Purpose Forces, Midyear 1965-1975
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Table 1
Estimated Costs of Soviet Defense Programs
if Duplicated in the US, By Mission
1965-1975
Billion 1974 Dollars
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Strategic
intercontinental attack
4.1
6.7
7.7
7.5
8.0
8.0
6.9
6.4
7.0
7.8
8.5
Strategic
peripheral attack
3.8
3.5
3.3
3.1
2.8
2.7
2.7
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.8
Strategic defense
5.5
5.5
5.7
6.2
6.9
6.8
6.6
6.2
5.9
6.0
6.0
General purpose
forces
22.4
23.2
23.7
25.0
25.2
26.4
27.7
28.7
29.5
29.7
30.7
m
c7
w
m
Command, support,
and other
42.3
42.7
44.3
45.9
46.5
47.6
48.4
49.2
50.5
50.8
51.8
Total
85.0
89.0
92.5
96.1
98.4
101.1
102.6
104.6
108.0
110.5
114.5
These estimated dollar costs are designed to indicate the general size of the Soviet forces and programs by showing
what they would cost if purchased and operated in the US. The costs shown for the major force missions and for
"command, support, and other" include costs for personnel, other operating costs, procurement of hardware, and con-
struction of facilities. Estimated dollar costs for military RDT&E have been aggregated and are included in the
RDT&E mission (excluding military personnel costs). All costs for civil space, nonpersonnel military assistance
programs, and civil defense activities have been excluded. Costs for strategic intercontinental and peripheral
attack, strategic defense, and general purpose forces include only those costs associated with combat or direct
offensive and defensive combat support units. Those costs not associated with combat or direct combat support units
(except RDT&E) have been aggregated within "command, support, and other." This mission also includes all costs for
nuclear weapons and for civilian, reserve, and retired personnel as well as costs which, because of present data
limitations, cannot be assigned for both countries to other missions.
Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
Data are expressed in calendar year terms.
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Table 2
US Defense Authorizations, By Mission
1965-1975
Billion 1974 Dollars
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Strategic attack a
5.3
5.0
4.5
5.3
6.0
4.2
4.3
4.6
4.7
4.2
4.2
Strategic defense
1.7
1.5
1.5
1.6
2.0
1.7
2.6
1.9
1.1
0.7
0.7
General purpose forces
20.5
31.5
33.5
32.1
29.4
24.1
20.1
20.3
19.7
20.4
18.0
N
RDT&E
10.0
10.4
10.5
10.3
10.5
9.6
8.8
8.9
9.1
8.6
8.2
m
C)
m
rn
Command, support,
and other
49.1
57.5
61.9
64.1
63.9
61.4
55.8
53.5
51.7
50.0
49.2
Total
86.6
105.8
111.9
113.3
111.8
101.0
91.6
89.3
86.3
83.9
80.3
The authorizations shown are developed from appropriate editions of DoD's The Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP), the
Budget of the United States, and related data. To achieve as high a degree of comparability as possible, US program
data have been reaggregated and converted to constant calendar 1974 dollars.
Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
a. Because the US has no force with an assigned mission comparable to the Soviet strategic peripheral attack mission,
US authorizations for strategic attack are more comparable in coverage to the dollar estimates for Soviet strategic
intercontinental attack forces.
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A. I q
Table 3
Estimated Costs of Soviet Intercontinental
and Peripheral Attack Programs if
in the US, By Element
Duplicated
1965-1975
Billion 1974 Dollars
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Strategic
Intercontinental Attack:
ICBMs
3.4
5.7
6.5
5.5
5.6
5.7
4.3
3.5
4.0
4.7
5.4
Submarines
0.3
0.6
0.8
1.5
2.0
1.9
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.7
2.6
Bombers
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
Total
4.1
6.7
7.7
7.5
8.0
8.0
6.9
6.4
7.b
7.8
8.5
cn
n a,
Cn
Strategic
Peripheral Attack:
MR/IRBMs
2.2
2.0
1.9
1.7
1.6
1.6
1.5
1.5
1.8
2.1
2.4
Submarines
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.2
Bombers
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.3
1.1
1.0
1.1
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.3
Total
3.8
3.5
3.3
3.1
2.8
2.7
2.7
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.8
These estimated dollar costs are designed to indicate the general size of the Soviet strategic intercontinental and
peripheral attack forces by showing what they would cost if purchased and operated in the US. The estimated
costs shown include costs for military personnel, other operating costs, procurement of hardware (excluding nuclear
warheads), and construction of facilities for long-range attack weapon systems. No RDT&E costs are included. The
US has no force with an assigned mission comparable to the Soviet strategic peripheral attack mission. For this
reason, the intercontinental and peripheral attack missions have not been totaled together to obtain a single
dollar cost estimate for strategic attack.
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Table 4
US Strategic Attack Authorizations
1965-1975
Billion 1974 Dollars
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
ICBMs
1.8
1.2
1.2
1.0
1.1
1.0
1.0
1.2
1.0
0.9
0.8
Submarines
1.0
0.9
0.9
1.5
1.7
1.6
1.6
1.4
1.9
1.8
2.0
U)
Bombers
2.6
2.9
2.5
2.9
3.2
1.7
1.7
2.0
1.8
1.5
1.4
m
C)
M
m
p)
rn
Total
5.3
5.0
4.5
5.3
6.0
4.2
4.3
4.6
4.7
4.2
4.2
The authorizations shown are developed from appropriate editions of DoD's The Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP). To
achieve as high a degree of comparability as possible, US program data have been reaggregated and converted to con-
stant calendar 1974 dollars. The US has no force with a mission comparable to the Soviet strategic peripheral
attack mission.
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L I y
Table 5
Estimated Costs of Soviet Strategic Defense
Programs if Duplicated in the US, By Element
1965-1975
m
C-) 0)
m
Billion 1974 Dollars
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
SAMsa
1.7
1.7
1.8
2.3
2.6
2.6
2.4
2.5
2.4
2.4
2.4
Interceptors b
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
3.0
2.8
2.7
2.2
1.9
2.0
1.9
Control & warning ?
1.1
1.1
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.3
1.4
1.4
ABM
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.3
These estimated dollar costs are designed to indicate the general size of the Soviet strategic defense forces by showing
what they would cost if purchased and operated in the US. The estimated costs shown include costs for military
personnel, other operating costs, procurement of hardware (excluding nuclear warheads), and construction of facilities
for systems assigned to the defense of the USSR against air, missile, and space attack, except the antisubmarine
warfare forces, which are included in general purpose naval forces. This mission encompasses the regional control and
warning network and all SAMs, ABMs, antisatellite systems, and aircraft assigned to PVO Strany (the Soviet Air
Defense Forces). No RDT&E costs are included.
a. Strategic defense SAM systems only.
b. Strategic defense aircraft only.
c. Activities associated with the early warning, detection, and tracking of an enemy air attack and the
regional coordination of strategic defense forces.
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Table 6
US Strategic Defense Authorizations, By Element
1965-1975
Billion 1974 Dollars
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
SAMsa
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
Interceptors b
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
Control & warning c
0.8
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.7
0.5
0.3
0.4
ABM
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.4
0.8
0.7
1.7
0.9
0.4
0.2
0.0d
N
0
Total
1.7
1.5
1.5
1.6
2.0
1.7
2.6
1.9
1.1
0.7
0.7
0)
m
The authorizations shown are developed from appropriate editions of DoD's The Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP). To
achieve as high a degree of comparability as possible, US program data have been reaggregated and converted to con-
stant calendar 1974 dollars.
a. Strategic defense SAM systems only.
b. Strategic defense aircraft only.
c. Activities associated with the early warning, detection, and tracking of an enemy air attack and the regional
coordination of strategic defense forces.
d. US authorizations for ABM in 1975 are negligible at this level of rounding.
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Table 7
Estimated Costs of Soviet General Purpose
Forces if Duplicated in the US, By Element
1965-1975
Billion 1974 Dollars
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Ground forces
11.8
12.8
13.2
15.1
15.3
15.8
16.9
17.5
18.2
18.4
18.8
Naval forces a
6.9
7.1
7.3
7.0
7.0
6.7
6.7
6.7
6.6
6.6
7.2
Tactical air forcesb
3.6
3.3
3.2
2.9
2.9
3.8
4.1
4.5
4.7
4.6
4.7
Total
22.4
23.2
23.7
25.0
25.2
26.4
27.7
28.7
29.5
29.7
30.7
These estimated dollar costs are designed to indicate the general size of Soviet general purpose forces by showing what
they would cost if purchased and operated in the US. These estimated dollar costs include costs for military
personnel, other operating costs, procurement of hardware (excluding nuclear warheads), and construction of
facilities for systems assigned to Soviet general purpose forces. No RDT&E costs are included.
Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
Data are expressed in calendar years.
a. These costs are for surface combatants, naval aircraft, and general purpose submarines. The estimated dollar
costs for ballistic missile submarines are included within the strategic intercontinental or peripheral attack
missions.
b. These costs are for fixed-wing aircraft that are assigned a tactical combat support role. ASW aircraft and ASW
carrier costs are allocated to the general purpose naval forces in accordance with the US DoD fiscal guidance
category allocation.
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Table 8
US General Purpose Force Authorizations, By Element
1965-1975
Billion 1974 Dollars
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Ground forces
6.5
12.0
12.1
13.6
12.4
8.3
6.1
5.0
5.0
5.9
5.6
Naval forces a
6.4
6.9
7.1
5.9
5.4
6.3
6.2
7.1
6.3
6.6
5.7
Tactical air forces b
7.7
12.6
14.3
12.5
11.6
9.4
7.8
8.3
8.4
7.8
6.7
Total
20.5
31.5
33.5
32.1
29.4
24.1
20.1
20.3
19.7
20.4
18.0
The authorizations shown are developed from appropriate editions of DoD's The Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP). To
achieve as high a degree of comparability as possible, US program data have been reaggregated and converted to con-
stant calendar 1974 dollars.
a. These authorizations are for surface combatants, aircraft, and general purpose submarines. Authorizations
for attack carriers and their aircraft are considered as part of tactical air forces authorizations. Authorizations
for ballistic missile submarines are included in the strategic attack mission authorizations.
b. These authorizations are for land- and sea-based fixed-wing aircraft that are assigned a tactical combat support
role. In accordance with DoD's fiscal guidance category structure, authorizations related to attack carriers
are included in tactical air forces authorizations. ASW carrier and ASW aircraft authorizations are included
in general purpose naval forces.
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Table 9
Estimated Costs of Soviet Defense Programs
if Duplicated in the US, By Resource Category
1965-1975
Billion 1974 Dollars
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Procurement
24.1
25.7
26.7
27.0
27.7
28.2
27.9
28.2
29.6
30.7
32.9
Facilities
1.8
2.6
2.8
2.7
2.9
2.9
2.4
2.0
1.9
1.7
1.8
Operating
52.2
53.4
55.2
58.0
58.8
60.4
61.9
63.4
64.7
65.4
66.2
m
Active & reserve
military
35.9
36.6
37.7
40.2
40.6
41.7
42.7
43.4
44.3
44.7
45.3
Retired military
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.8
1.9
2.0
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.2
2.3
m
Operations &
maintenance
14.7
15.1
15.7
16.1
16.3
16.7
17.1
17.9
18.3
18.4
18.6
Total
85.0
89.0
92.5
96.1
98.4
101.1
102.6
104.6
108.0
110.5
114.5
These estimated dollar costs are designed to indicate the general size and overall trends in Soviet defense programs by
showing what they would cost if purchased and operated in the US. They do not represent precise resource allocations
as the Soviets would see them. To achieve as high a degree of comparability as possible, adjustments have been made
to the basic data available for both the US and USSR. All estimated costs for RDT&E activities (excluding military
personnel pay and allowances) associated with military programs have been aggregated and are included under RDT&E.
All costs for nuclear weapons (excluding RDT&E) have been accounted for in procurement. All costs for civil space,
nonpersonnel military assistance programs, and civil defense programs have been excluded.
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Table 10
US Defense Authorizations, By Resource Category
1965-1975
Billion 1974 Dollars
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
RDT&E
10.0
10.4
10.5
10.3
10.5
9.6
8.8
8.9
9.1
8.6
8.2
Investment
26.0
39.4
37.6
36.0
32.5
26.7
23.5
24.3
23.1
21.9
18.9
Procurement
23.7
34.8
35.6
33.1
30.7
25.1
21.6
22.3
20.9
19.6
16.9
Facilities
2.3
4.6
2.0
2.9
1.9
1.7
1.9
1.9
2.2
2.3
1.9
Operating
50.6
56.0
63.8
67.0
68.7
64.7
59.3
56.1
54.2
53.5
53.2
Personnel
29.2
30.9
34.3
35.9
36.5
35.6
33.5
30.8
29.2
28.1
27.6
m
Active & reserve
military
26.8
28.4
31.4
32.8
33.0
31.9
29.4
26.4
24.6
23.2
22.4
2
m
Retired military
2.3
2.5
2.8
3.1
3.4
3.7
4.0
4.3
4.6
4.9
5.
-i
Operations &
maintenance
21.4
25.1
29.6
31.1
32.3
29.1
25.8
25.3
25.0
25.4
25.6
Total
86.6
105.8
111.9
113.3
111.8
101.0
91.6
89.3
86.3
83.9
80.3
The authorizations shown were developed by amalgamating data from DoD's The Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP), the Budget
of the United States, and related data. To achieve as high a degree of comparability as possible, adjustments have
been made to the basic data available for both the US and USSR, and both are in terms of calendar year 1974 dollars.
All authorizations for RDT&E activities (excluding military personnel pay and allowances associated with military
programs) have been aggregated and are included under RDT&E. Defense-related ERDA authorizations for RDT&E are also
included in RDT&E. All other defense related ERDA authorizations have been accounted for in procurement. All authori-
zations for civil space, military assistance, and civil defense programs have been excluded.
Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
Data are in total obligational authority terms for fiscal years.
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Strategic
intercontinental attack:
ICBM launchersa
Ballistic missile
submarines
Ballistic missile
submarine launch tubes
LRA heavy bombers
and tankers
Strategic
peripheral attack:
MRBM and IRBM launchersa
Ballistic missile
submarines
Ballistic missile
submarine launch tubes
LRA medium bombers
and tankers
SAM launchers
Interceptors
ABM launchers
Table 11
Deployment of Major Soviet Strategic Weapon Systems
Midyear 1965-1975
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
224
239
514
796
1,018
1,291
1,489
1,527
1,461
1,393
1,385
18
18
18
19
24
30
38
35b
44
48
48b
54
54
54
70
150
259
387
443
573
621
700
205
200
200
200
195
195
195
195
195
195
195
709
693
677
673
653
633
594
587
583
583
583
19
19
19
18
17
15
15
23b
23
21
28b
51
51
51
48
46
42
42
66
67
63
85
800
760
740
735
730
725
710
675
675
650
665
8,430
8,460
8,550
8,820
9,100
9,460
9,820
9,950
9,840
9,660
9,620
3,785
3,610
3,450
3,355
3,370
3,310
3,205
3,075
2,820
2,655
2,620
--
--
--
24
43
-64
64
64
64
64
64
These single-valued estimates have been developed for costing purposes and are consistent with the appropriate National
Intelligence Estimates. Although they fall within the ranges of likely alternative force structures-presented in the
National Intelligence Estimates, they do not necessarily match any particular force.
a. Does not include systems under construction, being dismantled, or off line for conversion or retrofit.
b. Reflects transfer of ballistic missile submarines from intercontinental to peripheral attack.
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U)
m
m A
m
Ground forces:
Combat ready divisionsa
Reduced strength
divisionsb
Developing divisions'
Cadre divisionsd
Total divisions
Aircraft
Major surface
combatants e
Minor surface
combatants e
General purposee
submarines
Tactical aircraftf
Table 12
Numbers of Soviet Ground Force Units and
Selected Items of Equipment for General Purpose Forces
Midyear 1965-1975
1965
1966
1967 1968 1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
34
34
34 55 48
48
49
51
53
57
62
56
56
56 42 49
52
56
57
58
55
53
2
8
15 16 15
13
8
3
54
52
52 47 51
51
52
54
54
55
53
146
150
157 160 163
164
165
165
165
167
168
755
790
800 865 905
958
998
1,005
1,030
1,051
1,070
207
215
229 235 242
247
250
257
255
259
249
1,627
1,639
1,628 1,578 1,530
1,522
1,493
1,402
1,335
1,291
1,283
350
347
353 355 361
348
336
342
351
352
355
3,195
3,335
3,460 3,585 3,810
3,955
4,035
4,150
4,285
4,300
4,360
These single-valued estimates have been developed for costing purposes from the appropriate National Intelligence Esti-
mates. Although they fall within the ranges of likely alternative force structures presented in the National Intelligence
Estimates, they do not necessarily match any particular force.
a. Divisions at or near full manpower and equipment strength. No mobilization planned or required.
b. Divisions that are 50 to 75 percent manned (two-thirds of company-level units active), missing some armored personnel
carriers and substantial numbers of general purpose trucks and other equipment.
c. The category of developing divisions was used during the buildup of forces along the Sino-Soviet border. It referred
to those units that were between cadre and reduced-strength status but in which available equipment was concentrated in
one or two maneuver units to provide some immediate combat capability.
d. Divisions that are 10 to 30 percent manned (one-third of company-level units active), missing substantial numbers
of armored personnel carriers, general purpose trucks, and other equipment.
e. Includes ships in reserve.
f. Tactical aircraft total does not include the YAK-27 Mangrove. To achieve comparability with US accounting, cost
data for this aircraft, configured exclusively for reconnaissance, are carried under "command, support, and other."
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 STATINTL Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001100010002-3
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 ATIN
MEMORANDUM FOR: Principal Deputy, Assistant
Secretary Defense (Intelligence/
Director, Defense Intelligence)
This report provides a detailed
classified supplement to the unclassified
study issued in February of this year
entitled A DoZZar Comparison of Soviet
and US Defense Activities, 1965-1975
(SR 76-10053). The comparisons presented
here were derived from the same data base
used in the February study, the only
difference being the detail in which they
are presented in this report.
STATINTL
Acting Director
Strategic Research
Date 2 9 JUL 1976
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