AIR-LAND BATTLE PRIMER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001100040003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 65
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 1, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

Views, opinions, and/or findings AIR LAND FORCES APPLIC
contained in this pamphlet are those AGENCY
of the authors and should not be
construed as official Departments LANGLEY AFB - FORT MONROE,
of the Army and Air Force position,
policy, or decision, unless so des- Army and USAF
ignated by offic 1 documentation.
aApproved For Release 2003 MMM6/( jl e> 0171 R001100040003-9
 Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R001100040003-9
This pamphlet presents a broad concept for how U.S. Army and Air Forces
might fight together on a modern battlefield in the not too distant
future. The information and principles presented may appear somewhat
basic; however, the intent is to give the soldier and the airman a funda-
mental understanding of the other's problems and responsibilities along
with some suggested principles for how a joint force may be employed.
Comments by recipients of this document are solicited. Submit comments
to the Air-Land Forces Application (ALFA) Agency at either of these
addresses:
HQ, USA Training and Doctrine HQ USAF Tactical Air Command
Command or ATTN: 4525 CAS/ALFA
ATTN: ATCD-ALFA Langley AFB, VA 23665
Ft Monroe, VA 23651
Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R001100040003-9
 Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP83M00l71 R001100040003-9
INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Setting: Conventional conflict in Europe -- today. The Air-
Land Battle in Europe presents the most formidable threat and the most
demanding challenge for friendly forces in strategy, timing and
effective use of numerically inferior forces.
There may be any number of scenarios for the Air-Land Battle; but,
regardless of the scenario, U.S. Army and Air Force forces must be
prepared to win the opening battle. This in itself is a departure from
the historical U.S. approach to waging war. In the past, we relied on
time to bring industrial might, technology, and military organizational
talent to bear against the enemy. That time is no longer available. We
must plan and train to win now. Once hostilities begin it will be too
late.
1.2 The Stage: The concept for the Air-Land Battle is set on this
stage:
? Central Europe
? 1979-1981 Time Frame
? FM 100-5 and TACM 2-1 Doctrine
? Current Soviet Doctrine
? U.S. Forces Initially Defending
European problem solutions receive priority. They are the difficult ones
and may be applied, for the most part, in other areas of the world. The
discussion is confined to near term problems of conventional conflict.
1.3 U.S. Objective: The U.S. objective for NATO Europe is set forth in
Defense Guidance.
"THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO HELP STOP ANY
ATTACK ON NATO MEMBERS WITH A MINIMUM LOSS OF
TERRITORY, AND TO HELP RESTORE PREWAR BOUNDARIES."
SECDEF GUIDANCE, 22. DEC 77
1.4 Scope:
- The focus is on achieving a Tactical Air (TACAIR) allocation and
ground force application mix to generate combat power against an enemy to
the depth of the battlefield.
Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : &A-RDP83M00171 R001100040003-9
 Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R001100040003-9
- The application of the concept is not limited to any single
scenario.
- This publication does not measure the many variables of the
Air-Land Battle. Further publications -- study and task force reports --
will cover these facets.
1-2
Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R001100040003-9
 Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R001100040003-9
CHAPTER 2
THE AIR-LAND BATTLE DEFINED
2.1 Interdependence: The Army and Air Force are a natural team:
Common Capabilities
? Firepower
? Intelligence
? Air Defense
? Battlefield Logistics
? Electronic Warfare
? C3
Air and land forces are interdependent. Both can deliver firepower
against the enemy. Both can kill tanks. Both can conduct intelligence
gathering, air defense, logistics, electronic warfare (EW) operations,
Command, Control, and Communications (C ), and a myriad of other
functions that comprise the totality of combat power. Neither Service
can fulfill any of those functions completely or by itself. The com-
bination of Army and Air Force capabilities, and their limitations, make
the Services a natural team: It is the sum of that capability -- con-
centrated against an enemy on a major axis of attack -- that forms the
base line for defining the Air-Land Battle.
2.2 Air-Land Battle Requirements: The basic requirements of the Air-
Land Battle, whether offensive or defensive:
Army and Air Force Together Must
? See the battlefield
? Concentrate combat power
? Fight as a team
? Win
- In the defense, Army and Air Force commanders must be able to
see the battlefield to ascertain the location and direction of the main
enemy effort. Both Services have reconnaissance and surveillance systems
capable of making inputs to the overall intelligence and combat infor-
mation needs.
Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R001100040003-9
 Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R001100040003-9
- Once the main thrusts are identified, the commanders must bring
about a winning concentration of force at the critical points.
- Air and land elements must fight as an integrated team to achieve
the needed concentration. As an example, the Air Force will provide close
air support (CAS) to engaged ground forces in those areas where success
of the overall effort is at stake. The Army in turn provides support in
the suppression of enemy air defenses through firepower and electronic
means. Moreover, the Army contributes to effective CAS through its
capabilities for intelligence collection and target designation.
- The remaining factor is self-evident. Winning in the European
context means winning the first -- defensive -- battle with minimum loss
of territory. Winning the defensive battle is a necessary prerequisite
to undertaking the second task under Defense Guidance, i.e., restoring
prewar boundaries.
2.3 Land Combat Operations:
? Offensive
? Defensive
? Retrograde
The requirements to see the battlefield, concentrate combat power, and
fight as a team apply to-all three of the basic land combat operations.
This pamphlet concentrates initially on defensive operations followed by
an example of a counter offensive.' For practical purposes, retrograde
operations resemble many aspects of the defensive and will not be dis-
cussed separately.
2.4 TACAIR Missions:
? Close Air Support
? Air Interdiction
? Counter Air
? Reconnaissance/Surveillance
? Airlift
? Special Operations
The Air-Land Battle is a tactical battle fought against enemy forces along
a major axis of attack; therefore, it is a critical battle. Within the
theater there will be a number of Air-Land 3attles, all critical, and all
competing for limited combat resources -- TACAIR included -- of the theater.
Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R001100040003-9
 Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R001100040003-9
The TACAIR missions which most immediately influence the Air-Land Battle
are Close Air Support against enemy ground forces in contact with
friendly elements, Air Interdiction directed against combat elements in
follow-on echelons, Counter Air against enemy Close Air Support and
attack helicopters, and Reconnaissance and Surveillance for intelligence,
combat information, and target acquisition. Local air superiority is
necessary to enable these missions to take place.
"OUR FIRST JOB IN TACAIR IS TO HELP BLUNT AND STOP
THE ARMORED THRUST. THIS DOESN'T MEAN THAT THE
TOTAL AIR EFFORT WOULD GO TO CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND
BATTLEFIELD INTERDICTION. WE WOULD HAVE TO MAIN-
TAIN LOCALIZED AIR SUPERIORITY''-TO KEEP THE ENEMY
OFF OUR BACKS SO WE COULD OPERATE. THE INTERDICTION
TARGETS I'M TALKING ABOUT AREN'T DEEP IN ENEMY
TERRITORY. THEY ARE THE ONES THAT THREATEN US IN
THE BATTLE AREA, AND ARE RELATED TO OUR JOB OF
DEFENDING NATO TERRITORY." --
GENERAL DAVID C. JONES*
From a broader theater perspective, offensive and defensive counter air
operations will be required to provide security from air attack to our
own ground elements and air bases. -The other missions, tactical airlift
and special air operations, contribute in varying degrees to the success-
ful prosecution of the Air-Land Battle or battles.
? The theater commander apportions TACAIR..
It is the job of the-theater--commander-to apportion available TACAIR
assets to the various air missions. This pamphlet will suggest how that
percentage--of the overall air-effort which has been apportioned--to the
most direct and immediate support for the ground forces might best be
used in the conduct of*the Air-Land Battle.
* Interview with Gen D. C. Jones, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force,
published in Air Force, Sep 75.
Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R001100040003-9
 Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R001100040003-9
CHAPTER 3
THE DEFENSIVE AIR-LAND BATTLE
3.1 Defensive Syllogism: Extending the principle of Army-Air Force
interdependence, the following syllogism illustrates the concept of the
defensive Air-Land Battle.
MAJOR PREMISE: AT POINTS OF MAIN ATTACK, US ARMY
ALONE CANNOT SUCCESSFULLY DEFEND
AGAINST A CERTAIN LEVEL OF PACT
GROUND FORCES.
The Warsaw Pact, with the initiative of the offensive and its.great
ground force strength, is theoretically capable of massing sufficient
force at some point -- or several points -- in Central Europe against
which Allied ground forces cannot successfully defend. There is no
agreed "magic number" for the offense to defense ground force ratio.
However, the defender can win only if the ratio is kept within certain
tolerances. Moreover, it is generally conceded that the Pact is strong
enough to exceed the tolerances at certain points of its choosing.
MINOR PREMISE: TACTICAL AIR FORCES CAN APPLY COMBAT
POWER AGAINST FULL DEPTH OF PACT
GROUND FORCES.
The Air Force can strike advancing Warsaw Pact forces while they are
still beyond the range of Army weapons and can continue to strike Pact
forces in concert with the Ahmy after the ground forces engage. The
flexibility =- the range and speed -- of TACAIR contributes to this
capability.
CONCLUSION: THEREFORE, TACTICAL AIR FORCES MUST
REDUCE PACT GROUND FORCE LEVEL TO
PERMIT SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE
The conclusion satisfies the initial Defense Guidance objective. The
Tactical Air Forces have the capability to reduce the ground force ratio
by attriting, neutralizing, or delaying the attackers. The contribution
of TACAIR may be summarized in terms of an "ideal" and a "minimum" case.
3.2 The Ideal Case:
PRIOR TO MAIN GROUND FORCE ENGAGEMENT -- TACTICAL AIR
FORCES REDUCE PACT GROUND FORCE LEVEL TO A POINT WHERE
THE ARMY ALONE CAN SUCCESSFULLY DEFEND.
This case is ideal for reasons related to relative ease in command and
control and advantages to attack by air. The required Warsaw Pact
Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R001100040003-9
 Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP83M00l71 R001100040003-9
attrition and delay is achieved-prior to major ground force engagement.
As a result, the Army would be able to defeat enemy ground forces at
the FEBA without dependence on TACAIR and its attendant requirement for
close integration. Moreover, the character and depth of Warsaw Pact
target arrays prior.to engagement offer significant advantages to
attacking aircraft. Targets are relatively densely packed in march
column formation and can be identified as hostile simply by location.
There are also disadvantages for attacking aircraft. Any penetration of
hostile airspace necessarily involves more risk than operating near the
FEBA. In addition, as air operations range deeper into enemy airspace,
ground-based electronic defense suppression means become less effective.
3.3 The Minimum Case:
PRIOR TO MAIN GROUND FORCE ENGAGEMENT -- TACTICAL AIR
FORCES REDUCE PACT GROUND FORCE LEVEL TO A POINT WHERE
ARMY AND TACAIR TOGETHER CAN SUCCESSFULLY DEFEND.
The minimum case could be characterized as the least desirable or maximum
risk case. The Pact forces have not been attrited to the required level
prior to engagement of the main ground forces. Therefore, the Tactical
Air Forces and the Army must mass their firepower at the critical points
and times to achieve the combined combat power to halt the enemy
offensive.
3.4 Soviet Offensive Doctrine:
? UNREINFORCED ATTACK FOR TACTICAL SURPRISE
? VIOLENT -- LITTLE OR NO WARNING
? REACT WITH SPEED -- RETAIN INITIATIVE
Increasingly, Soviet offensive doctrine has been tending to favor the
unreinforced attack -- a blitzkrieg-like penetration of many units to
overwhelm the NATO defense. Such penetrations are possible if gaps or
open flanks in the defenses can be found. In the early stages of NATO
preparedness, some penetrations will probably occur. The unreinforced
attack poses formidable problems for the attacker as well as the
defender. It is not easy to plan beforehand and difficult to control
once initiated. Notwithstanding, the Soviets believe that the advantages
of retaining the initiative by reacting with speed and agressive action
offsets the disadvantages inherent in an uncoordinated attack or hasty
planning.
Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP83M00l71 R001100040003-9
 Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R001100040003-9
? BREAKTHROUGH
? NOT FIRST.CHOICE TACTIC
? USED WHEN NO DEFENSIVE GAPS
? WELL PREPARED
? CONCENTRATED
? TWO-PHASED OPERATION
CREATE GAPS FOR EXPLOITATION FORCES
? EXPANDING PENETRATIONS.
When the Soviet commander can find no gaps or flaws in the opponent's
defenses, he adopts the breakthrough tactic to rupture the forward
defenses and permit passage of exploitation-forces. The breakthrough
is not his preferred tactic, but when-required, he devotes meticulous
planning, a high concentration of combat power, and massive artillery
preparation to the effort. -
3.5 Frontal Aviation: In the past fifteen years, Soviet Frontal
Aviation has evolved from a force structured for theater air defense to
one capable of performing the full range. of TACAIR missions. With respect
to the Air-Land Battle, the Most concern is with Frontal Aviation's
capability to conduct counter-air, close air support, and interdiction
operations.
? FRONTAL AVIATION OBJECTIVES--
- DEFEAT NATO TACAIR'
- ELIMINATE NATO NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
- SUPPORT GROUND FORCES
The primary objectives for Frontal Aviation -- in concert with elements
of Long Range Aviation (LRA) and Pact air forces -- are to disrupt and
gain superiority over the NATO air forces and to foreclose NATO's option.
to employ nuclear weapons. Most scenarios envision a multi-wave attack
by Pact air to:
Open corridors through SAM defenses.
Strike air bases, command and control facilities, and nuclear
storage.
3-3
Approved For Release 2003/06/16: CIA-RDP83M00171 R001100040003-9
 Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R001100040003-9
- Strike at deeper targets. Targets beyond range of Frontal
Aviation would be attacked by LRA.
? GROUND ATTACK GROWING IN IMPORTANCE
A further objective -- and one gaining in importance as evidenced by
changing doctrine and new weapon systems ---is ground attack. In a
short-warning situation, Frontal Aviation would concentrate on attack-
ing ground forces which are moving toward defensive positions. In
addition to attacking maneuver units, Frontal Aviation can be expected
to continue suppression attacks on friendly air defense artillery
throughout the battle.
? FRONTAL AVIATION RESOURCES INCLUDE
- Fixed wing
- Helicopters
As with ground forces, NATO TACAIR is outnumbered by its Pact counter-
part. In 1977, there were 3,000 Warsaw Pact tactical aircraft, against
1,700 NATO.' The large numbers of Pact tactical aircraft could maintain
repeated attacks against friendly airfields, tactical nuclear facilities,
and C3, as well as deliver ordnance with good accuracy against friendly
ground forces.
3.6 First Task -- Theater View:
Because of the likelihood of more than one Air-Land Battle, the first task
for the defender from a theater perspective is to see into the enemy side
with sufficient clarity to determine where these critical battles will be
fought. The problem is complex. The Pact has such a preponderance of
Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R001100040003-9
 Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R001100040003-9
force that it will require considerable effort to identify the true major
axes of attack. All-source data -- national and service-owned -- must be
considered in order to permit timely, accurate decision making and con-
centration of friendly forces at the right places. The concentration
must be timely, preferably before hostilities begin.
3.7 Soviet Echelonment -- Corps Sector:
1st ECHELON 2nd ECHELON
DIVISIONS DIVISIONS
15-25
MAIN COVERING
BATTLE x x x FORCE
AREA AREA , Figure 3-2.
APPROX TANK
30 ARMY
-iM MAIN
ATTACK
APPROX- COMBINED- --
80 ARMS
- KM ARMY
SECONDARY
ATTACKS
Shifting focus from theater level to a U.S. Corps.sector faced with one
of the main attacks, there may be two Pact tank or combined arms armies
disposed as shown above.--The-tank-army--conducting the-main.-attack---would---
be .concentrated on a narrow front, in'deep echelon. The-U.S~ Cor.ps in
the defense, two divisions and an armored cavalry regiment, would deploy
a heavy covering force forward of the main battle area (MBA). The
covering force -- a heavily reinforced cavalry regiment spread across
the corps sector -- is no match for the heavier enemy force.
3.8 The Active Defense:
?. COVERING FORCE MISSION
- REVEAL MAIN ATTACK
- GAIN TIME
- DIVEST AIR DEFENSES
- DECEIVE ENEMY
? MAIN BATTLE FORCE MISSION
- DECISIVE BATTLE
- DESTROY ENEMY
Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CSI -RDP83M00171 R001100040003-9
 Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R001100040003-9
The covering force. is strong enough to accomplish four important tasks:
- First, force the enemy into revealing the strength, location, and
general direction of his main attack-or attacks; and force early commit-
ment of his main attack echelons against the covering force.
- Second, gain time so that the corps commander can concentrate his
combat power in the main battle area to meet'the main attack.
Third, divest the enemy of his air defense umbrella, or at least
require the enemy to displace his air defenses before attacking the MBA,
and
- Fourth, deceive the enemy as to the composition and location of
friendly forces, especially those in the MBA.
Behind the covering force lies the area in which the main battle will be
fought. It is the mission of the force in the MBA to engage the enemy
in decisive battle and destroy him. The overall system of defense is
active, with commanders at every level economizing forces in less.
threatened areas to concentrate against the main attack. The concept of
active defense is to Wear down the attacker by confronting him continuously
with strong elements fighting from mutually supporting and successive
battle positions.
3.9 Defensive Operations in the Division Sector:
1st ECHELON 2nd ECHELON
REGIS REGIS
x
E~g
MAIN COVERING
BATTLE FORCE
0-81 DIVISION
KM -
1H f MAIN ih I 12-15
ATTACK
DIVISION
fSECONDARY
30-50 ATTACK
KM DIVISION
3-6
Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R001100040003-9
W M
? SECONDARY
1-7-15- 1 ATTACH-
 Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP83M00l71 R001100040003-9
The situation in the division sector is similar to that at corps level,
on a lesser scale. In the enemy main attack division, regiments are
concentrated on a very narrow front. If the Division Commander is pro-
vided with accurate and timely information from national and service
intelligence sources, the enemy will not find gaps or weakly defended
areas when he reaches the MBA. He will be forced to adopt the break-
through tactic.
NOTE: Warsaw Pact regiments have been selected as the basic
building blocks for illustrating the Red Ground portion of
the concept because the regiment represents a tactical entity
of considerable combat power -- aproximat.e]-y-12-0-armored --
fi ht_ing vehicles. ere is no i to task friendly
strike pilots with identifying` and separating out enemy
regiments on the battlefield. It is the job of intelligence r'te'
and command and control to find the correct targets and
direct si