(Sanitized) REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 3, 1977
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
IC 77-2421
3 February 1977
STATINTL MEMORANDUM FOR:
STA I NTL FROM :
STA I NTL SUBJECT:
STATINTL
STATINTL
E--:::::::]under their contract to support our examination of
DI. The report is useful, if flawed. The report:
- - supports our premise that there is a need for
Director of Performance Evaluation
and Improvement
Production Assessment and Improvement
Division
I Attached is the report submitted yesterday by
improved definition of the DIA mission;
lends additional external validity to our efforts;
increases our confidence that we are on the right
track in our suggestions;
correctly, in many cases, identifies key issues.
It is flawed to the extent that it:
is a reflection of some points of personal bias of
the consultant team;
reflects the views of DIA held by a small, perhaps
not representative, sample of capital DIA users--
although they are certainly prominent/recognized
users;
denies opportunity to assess validity of views and
their source because of the contractor's adamant
refusal to synopsize each interview; and
identifies more problems than it addresses--maybe
that's what consultants are for.
DIA and 0S[p`"5RLiq$ & @c.002/07/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
2. I am persuaded that there is little, if anythi
that the consultants can do to support the part of our
that addresses the DIA problem. I intend, however,
ask them to review and comment on our first draft. I
have been assured that they haven't spent all of the $25K
that was in the contract. I will get today a more accurate
accounting of expenditures and will decide whether we regain
the unspent balance or ask them to do something else for us.
3. If they should do something more, it should be
oriented toward our potential future efforts. It might be
useful to us for them to suggest criteria and methods for
"empirical" mission analyses, to review the data we have
collected in our DIA effort and recommend improvements or
other types of data that would be required for such efforts
in the future.
4. If you wish to discuss the attached report further,
I am at your service.
STATINTL
STAT
NTL
At achtent
Report
STATINTL
Distribution:
Original - Addressee (w/att.)
1 - IC Registry (w/att.)
I PAID Subject (w/att )
I _. PAID Chrono (w/o att.) D
/fn x4445 (2/3/77)
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
 Ff4 God
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
BACKGROUND
STATINTL In December, 1976, the IC staff asked a team consisting of
STATINTL
to provide assistance in
their assessment of a Manpower Utilization Study prepared by the Defense
Intelligence Agency in the light of Congressional concern with the size of
DIA.
in the weeks since then, the team has:
a interviewed a number of senior civilian and military
.officials, past and present, with diverse experience
and relationships with Defense intelligence (Appendix B);
? scanned the Manpower Utilization Study of DIA and the
results of IC staff requests for supplementary informa-
tion;
? reviewed some past studies of DIA's mission and per-
formance and related documentation in the IC staff files.
After several discussions with the IC staff, the IC staff concluded that
the team would not review the record of Congressional concerns or interview
pertinent Congressional staff, interview members of the DIA other than
those in the Office of the Director, or attempt to assess the extent to
which DIA activities duplicate those of the Service intelligence units.
These limits are important and must be kept clearly in mind in judging the
views expressed herein. This summary statement of what we found provides
part of the basis for further consideration of DIA manpower requirements.
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 :]CIA-RDP83M00l71 R001200010001-3
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
CONCLUSIONS
1. The Manpower Utilization Study provides a "Fsnapshot" of how hard and
efficiently DIA personnel work at the jobs to which they are assigned.
The study does not question whether the jobs are necessary under the
officially interpreted mission of the Agency, or whether that inter-
pretation validly reflects national security needs. This fault is not
due entirely to weaknesses in the skills or motivation of those who
planned the study. For whatever reasons, the failure to address the
primary questions of the relationships of jobs to Defense intelligence
missions and of missions to national security decision-making needs
makes the study fundamentally uninformative about the manpower DIA
should have. In the absence of consensus on the DIA mission and its
value, the study fails to support current manpower allocations or any
other specific allocation of personnel to DIA.
2. Answers to questions about how many people an agency requires depend
on clarity about the mission of the Agency and the value of that mission.
To see if there was clarity on the first score, we turned to two major
formal statements of DIA missions and associated functions. As the quotes
below make clear, the basic charter statements for DIA do not provide
a clear basis for judging the adequacy of resources allocated to DIA or
understanding the extent of its responsibilities.
"IV. MISSION
The mission of the DIA is to satisfy, or to ensure the
satisfaction of, the foreign intelligence requirements
of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
DoD components and other authorized recipients, and to
provide the military intelligence contribution to
national intelligence."
Approved For Release 2002/07/06 2CTA-RDP83M00171 R001.200010001-3
 ,Approved For F1elease 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
The Director, DIA shall be the senior substantive
intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense.
Under his direction and control, DIA shall:
A. Produce or ensure, through tasking and coordina-
tion, the production of foreign intelligence
required to fulfill the DIA mission; this function
specifically includes the maintenance of a strong
DoD Scientific and Technical intelligence program.
For the purposes of this paragraph production
includes the evaluation, correlation, analysis,
interpretation and presentation of foreign intel-
ligence.
B. As separate and distinct responsibilities, (1) pro-
vide intelligence and intelligence staff support to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with their
requirements and established procedures; and
(2) ensure that adequate, timely and reliable intel-
ligence is available to the Unified and Specified
Commands."
. . etc.
DIAM 49-1 of may 1, 1975, states:
"MISSION
To satisfy the intelligence requirements of the Secretary of
Defense, the JCS, and major components of the United States
Intelligence Board (USIB) either:
By use of internal resources;
Through the management, control, and coordination
of the intelligence functions of other DoD agencies;
or
Through cooperation with other intelligence organiza-
tions.
To execute all approved plans, programs, policies, and procedures
for those Department of Defense (DoD) general intelligence
functions and activities for which DIA has management responsi-
bility.
To review and coordinate intelligence functions of the`Mi.litary
Departments and supervise plans, programs, and policies for
functions not assigned to the DIA."
Mission statements which define the role of DIA merely in terms of satis-
fying the unspecified needs of a variety of users Having quite different
responsibilities and interests are, in our opinion, the most glaring example
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 :3 CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
of the problem facing the IC staff in atternptinl Lo evaluate resource
needs and responsible officials in the Department of Defense concerned
with the appropriateness and efficiency of Defense intelligence insti-
tutions and programs..
3. The need to define a proper role for DIA in the context of the Depart-
ment of Defense and the national intelligence community seems obvious
given two facts. The current activities of DIA are not the product of
a rational design, but rather of numerous, piecemeal compromises between
civilian and military bureaucracies since the establishment of the Agency
in 1961. The result, validly or not, has led to widely-held and firmly
believed perceptions. that DIA is deficient in numerous ways. Whatever
their soundness, the prevalence of the perceptions noted below poses a
major challenge to Defense and IC staff officials with intelligence
management responsibilities.
Oft-Repeated Perceptions of DIA
(Our purpose in listing the following items is
our agreement or disagreement with the accuracy
but merely to reflect widely held views. Their
is less important than the fact that the Agency
a light by nearly all individuals
commissions and panels which have
effort in recent years.)
not to indicate
of the statements,
truth 'or falsity
is viewed in such
interviewed as well as those
? Individual staff members of DIA are often good resources for
intelligence users.
ar DIA has "improved" in recent years.
r The reference handbooks issued by DIA are useful.
? The Military Attache System is useful.
? Little original analytical effort as an institution or through
formal process, and lack of focus on comparative analysis.
? Overestimates threat. .as a means of supporting Services, JCS,
or DoD budgets or procurements.
- 4 _
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
"Poor performance for me -- perhaps because serving others well."
? Fragmented direction, mission, tasks, focus, etc.
? Duplication among Services and between Services and DIA of
Estimative and Analytical efforts.
? Poor quality of both military and civilian personnel and an
unattractive career choice.
? Lack of clout because it doesn't have budgeting and resource
? Inadequate quality control of Services' production and collection
More concerned with intra-community relations than user-community
? DIA lacks information and perspective on U.S. present
and planned forces posture and weapons capabilities.
4. The interviews do reveal relative consensus on the set of intelligence
needs -- for analyses and descriptions, management, and support functions --
pertinent to the office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the united and specified commands. Accord-
ingly, there is an obvious starting point to begin the substantial task
of determining appropriate organization and resource level for serving
the needs of these national security participants.
A. Analysis and Production Demands
? For the effective conduct of military operations, demands for
reams of factual. details on enemy and allied military forces,
military/industrial facilities, and particular geographic
sites, and for a system of access to get the user what he
needs when he needs it.
- 5 -
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
? For crisis Communications, Command, and Control, demands for
prompt and selective readouts including indications and warning,
attack assessment, and adversary intentions.
6 For force planning, weapons systems procurement, long-range
strategy formulation, and readiness/mobilization base develop-
ment, demands for alternative possibilities for future national
security environments, long-run goals of potential regimes of
world order, and the economic and technological capabilities
of those regimes.
? For effective and responsible participation in national policy
formulation as required bylaw, e.g., on arms control treaties,
Law of the Sea treaty alternatives, demands for a wealth of
information ranging across politics, economics, military and
scientific matters bearing on the consequences of possible U.S.
actions.
B. Management Responsibilities
? Informed resource allocation and procurement decisions for col-
lections systems and production organizations.
? Efficient tasking of production organizations to insure that
demands noted above arc met in a timely and efficient fashion
and auditing and evaluation to provide quality control over
products of the intelligence system.
? Responsive targeting and use of collection systems to help meet
Approved For Release 2002/07/036CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
? Effective participation in the management- of National Col-
lection Systems and the formulation of the consolidated
budget for the Intelligence Community.
? Oversight to insure restraint in intelligence collection
and covert activities compatible with the rule of law and
democratic tradition.
C. Support Functions
? Communications, security, information retrieval to carry
out the management responsibilities and provide the products
as outlined previously.
5. In our view, the searching examination of Defense intelligence which
must precede evaluation of DIA manpower requirements can only be under-
taken through the initiative of the DCI and Secretary of Defense. The
IC staff can play a constructive role by lending its weight to the time-
liness of such an initiative, providing appropriate information and
assistance based on its experience and studies, and encouraging
Department of Defense activities by the transmission of a provocative
discussion paper on Department of Defense intelligence needs and
resource appraisals. We sketch such a paper in Appendix A.
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 :7CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
 APPENDIX A -- A DRAFT PAPKR
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
IXJD INTELLIGENCE NEEDS AND THEIR MANAGP:MI,N'I' IMPLICATIONS
CONTEXT.
The Department of Defense is both collector and user of intelligence.
Some of its collection responsibilities have evolved historically from
the roles of the three services in seeking information necessary for
fighting wars; others have been imposed by Congress and the White House,
as in the case of national surveillance systems. However, the Secretary
of Defense, OSD, and JCS as users of intelligence also rely on the CIA as
well as DoD agencies.
There is a great deal of agreement about the sorts of intelligence informa-
tion that different parts of the Department of Defense need under different
situations of war and peace to carry out their responsibilities. There is
very little agreement about the extent to which that information must he
produced within the Department of Defense and, more specifically, about the
extent to which it needs to be produced within the intelligence parts of
the Department of Defense and, even more specifically, about the extent to
which its production can or should be left to the military services or DIA.
Moreover, there needs to be a better understanding of the difference between
access to factual intelligence data and the control of in-house analytic
staffs to provide intelligence and analyses appropriate to the decision-
making responsibilities of the various components of DoD.
To a large extent, the size and performance of current DoD intelligence
activities are the residue of piecemeal evolution and compromise among the
military and civilian components of DoD, the CIA, the Congress, and past
Presidents. In the words of Brer Rabbit, "She just growed."
Approved For Release 2002/07/0. pIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
Until recently, this hodge-podge system probably served the needs of the
community of Defense intelligence users acceptably, if not brilliantly
or efficiently. However, the world, the nation, the government, and
much of the DoD have changed more rapidly than the DOD-intelligence
system has been able to evolve.
Our national security policy-makers are not so exclusively concerned with
the Soviet military threat, even within a strictly military or strictly
Soviet context. The costs and foreign policy implications of competing pro-
posals for strategic and tactical force structures have broadened enormously
the scope of analysis needed to compare alternative forces structures and
their command and control in the light of alternative policies and external
reaction to those policies all around the world. Moreover, our national
security concerns today range from changes in Chinese and African leadership,
to economic pressures exerted by Mid-east shieks, to longer-range issues of
proliferation, terrorism, technology transfer, and the intellectual and moral
leadership of the world community. Arms limitation is today as much a
responsibility of DoD as military strength. The analysis 'of context
has become at least as important as the analysis of factual data generated
by classical or modern intelligence collection systems. The distinction
between "war" and "peace" has given way to an intractably large spectrum
of "crisis" states of varying duration.
The Secretary of Defense, his OSD staff components, and the JCS must be
better prepared to participate in governmental, national, and international.
debate on this broader view of national security. In our view, this requires
a systematic review of the entire DoD structure for collection, analysis,
and access to intelligence. Moreover, we do not think that past approaches
of manpower studies, cost-effectiveness, or listing information needs will
provide an adequate basis for the restructuring of Defense intelligence
that ne rtw Fonfcd to build, maintain,
and facilitate the use of large collections of relatively factual
information, what organizational arrangement provides the stronggcst
incentives to the Intelligence Community to circulate the informa-
tion, and what incentives will exist for that agency to collect
information that will be most useful in a marginal comparative
analysis of U.S. vs. Adversary Forces in alternative scenarios?
s What are the advantages and disadvantages of major alternative
Defense intelligence organizations, e.g.,
- an enlarged DIA, which incorporates all Service intel-
ligence activities and, perhaps, NSA?
- a smaller DIA, which is primarily concerned with
supporting Net Assessment and providing a "research
librarian" function to help other elements of OSD and
JCS get intelligence data they need for their independent
use?
- Eliminate DIA and assign analytic functions to ASDI and
data base functions to the Services?
? If one believes that scientific and technological intelligence gains
value when it is integrated with positive R&D actions on the part of
the U.S., what organizational structure is most likely to produce
joint work between the U.S. Defense R&D community and Intelligence
S&T analysts?
o is it desirable to re-establish a formal J-2 staff within the Joint
Staff and/or to combine that function with the J-3?
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
A-6
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
POSSIBLE ISSUES
1. The defense intelligence services have not attracted enough insightful,
broad-gauged, or wise leaders, nor have they been seen by younger
professionals as desirable career paths for achieving such status --
and it shows.
2. Unless and until the National Security Act of 1947 is substantially
changed, there will be two fundamentally different. kinds of intelligence
users at the highest level of the Department, requiring two quite dif-
ferent kinds of analysis of intelligence data.
a. Those who have responsibilities for the conduct of war or limited
military force deployments. This includes the Secretary of
Defense, U&S Commanders, the JCS, and by extension the President.
b. Those who have responsibilities to advise the Secretary of Defense
on planning future force posture, budgets, command, control, and
communications system design, and intelligence collection system
design. This includes the DPA&E, DTACCS, ASDI, ASD/ISA, DDRE, JCS,
Service Chiefs and Secretaries, DepSecDef and SecDef.
3. Information for both categories of. users is collected by CIA, NSA,
Service intelligence agencies, DIA, and national surveillance resources.
All users of intelligence maintain some in-house capability for analysis
and cross-checking of the information they need. In essence, the entire
national security community draws on the same sources.
Approved For Release 2002/07/03n-dlA-RDP83M00171 R001200010001-3
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
4. For a variety of reasons, the CTA has more incentives and holds a
relative advantage over DIA in providing objective assessments of all.
but the most narrowly technical military capabilities of other nations.
5. The Department of Defense has more natural incentives and more capability
to analyze relative strengths and weaknesses of U.S. and foreign military
forces under a variety of assumptions.
6. It may be that the most valuable function for intelligence analysis
within DoD (for both categories of users) would be the "duel" and
si.de-by-side comparison of alternative Red and Blue weapons and
force elements.
7. If the Secretary of Defense wants alternative estimates, he should not
have a filter like DIA between him and the military services. He has
not felt the need for this with regard to international security
affairs, manpower and reserve affairs, research, development, test
and evaluation, installations and logistics, and therefore he could
rely on a single Assistant Secretary for both Intelligence and C3,
instead of dealing separately with ASDI, DTACCS, and DIA.
8. Those components of the JCS and OSD with tasking authority in intel-
ligence should have control over the budgets of those intelligence
units which they have the authority to task.
9. For planning purposes, particularly in view of current budgetary
priorities in DoD intelligence collection, planning for intelligence
and communications budgets and programs should be reviewed as a
package within the OSD.
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 ' tA-RDP83M00171 R001200010001-3
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
10. Just because 80% of the intelligence budget is presented to Congress
under DoD, don't assume that the value of intelligence to the country
i.s associated with DoD to a similar extent. Those DoD dollars going to
National Collection Systems should be viewed as national intelligence
resources, rather than DoD intelligence resources, and alternatives to
present arrangements for management of those national collection resources
should be considered. In particular, the Secretary of Defense and the
President should consider declassification of the title and basic
functions for which "National Collection Systems" is a euphemism.
11. With regard to DIA, the argument that you need a bureaucratic organiza-
tion in order to get information from other bureaucratic organizations
is a poor basis for resource expenditures. If OSD and JCS need a large
DIA because otherwise they cannot secure information available in
other parts of the Intelligence Community, then the implication is that
direct corrective action should be taken.
12. Most users of DIA value the informal contacts they have built up over
the years within DIA to serve as sophisticated research librarians guid-
ing them to various types of information here and there in DoD. Very
little of the formal DIA estimation of enemy force size, performance,
or capability is considered very useful.
13. Therefore, the only key function of DIA that would he missed by most
of the national security community is not the "analysis" but the "tele-
phone switchboard" service DIA provides. With some modifications, this
applies to the JCS and Secretary of Defense in their need for war-
fighting and real-time crisis intelligence, especially if the JCS were
to re-institute the J-2 staff function.
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 :ACA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
The rapid-fire demands for intelligence-related information in "crisis"
situations and to bolster annual budget requests have resulted in
excessive attention by the President and Secretary of Defense over the
past decade to whatever outputs are available from current collection
systems, to the exclusion of longer-range planning of intelligence
collection system design and resource allocation based on high-quality
analysis of what such users might find more useful in the future.
As a result, the national policy authorities have grown very
dependent upon and give excessive autonomy to intelligence col-
lectors.
15. It is much easier to generate factual intelligence and non-situational
interpretations thereof about things that you already know a lot about,
and very hard to generate intelligence tasking for those things that
you don't know very much about. Therefore, we tend to produce a
lot of technical trivia which turns out to be not particularly use-
ful, either to the CINCs or the JCS in time of crisis or war, or
to the policy analysts in planning future force structure. Antici-
patory intelligence suffers without special incentives and protected
resources.
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 CIA-RDP83M00171 ROO1200010001-3
 Approved For Release 20029I-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3
LIST OF IN'tT'-,RVT EWIEES
John Boling
Robert Ellsworth
Eugene Fubini
Adm. Noel Gayler
RADM D.P. Harvey
VADM B.R. Inman
Glenn Kent
Gerald King
Thomas Latimer
Andrew Marshall
John B. Martin
James Poor
Eberhardt Rechtin
R. Silverstein
Lt.Gen. William Y. Smith
Leonard Sullivan
James Wade
John Walsh
Howard Yudkin
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200010001-3