DIA DOCUMENT: 'NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT POST-MORTEM'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001200070005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 18, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: DDCI
DIA Document: "Nati
Post-Mortem"
ntelligence Situation Report
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1. You requested a summary of the attached package. C
2. The package includes subject DIA document; the eight SITREPS L
prepared during the Panmunjom crisis; and several memorandums by CIA
officers who participated in the Korean Task Force. The purpose in
assembling these documents in one batch seems to have been to indicate
the problems which arose during the convening of the first National
Intelligence Task Force. Of these, the most important appear to have
been the following:
a. The State Department did not participate in the
Task Force and did not release LIMDIS and EXDIS traffic to
it. Therefore, the Task Force was unaware of any political
negotiations which might have affected developments, and. could
not benefit from any INR Korean expertise.
b. Similarly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not provide
the Task Force with military operational information, which
limited the Task Force's ability to produce estimative
intelligence on the consequences of planned future actions.
c. Participating agencies had their own Task Forces as
well as representatives on the National Task Force. Therefore,
Korean expertise was stretched too thin.
d. The physical setup was poor. Comments on this subject
generally referred to overcrowding and poor communications.
c. (Suggested only by one CIA analyst.) There seemed to
be some confusion over the production role of Task Force members.
Were they to draft the SITREPS themselves, or serve as "funnels"
for contributions prepared in their home offices?
3. No doubt there has already been some discussion on this topic, but
just in case, may I suggest that there should be some further inter-Agency
consideration of national SITREP management before our next crisis.
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE1AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUBJECT: National Intelligence Situation Report Post-Mortem (U)
The subject report is attached for your information.
1 Enclosure .iajor General, USAF
Post Mortem Yice Director fa Production
(TSCW) 1 cy
Director, National Security Agency
)Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Community
cc:
Deputy Secretary of Defense Ellsworth
Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence
Directorate for Operations (J-3)
Director, Joint Staff
Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
Assistant Director to Director of
Defense Intelligence for Indications
and Warning/IRA
Civilian Assistant to Deputy Secretary of
Defense
Defense Intelligence Officer (Korea)
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POST MORTEM ON THE OPERATION OF THE
FIRST NISR TASK FORCE
References: (a) DCI Memo dated 19 August 1976, subject
"Task Force on National Intelligence
Situation Reports"
(b) Procedures for the Production of a National
Intelligence Situation Report (Attachment to
(NFIB-D-28.7/1)
(c) DCI Memo dated 7 September 1976, subject:
"Task Force on National Intelligence
Situation Reports".
1. On 19 August, the DCI by reference (a) established the
first National Intelligence Situation Report (NISR) Task Force.
Its purpose was to produce an all-source community-coordinated
situation report, as outlined by reference (b), on the crisis
which had developed in Korea. Considering that the nature of
this crisis was preponderantly military, DIA was designated
executive agent. A Task Force was quickly formed and operated
around-the-clock during the peak of the crisis, then-tapered
off to once-daily sessions as the crisis subsided. The Tar'
Force issued a total of eight SITREPS (copies at Enclosure (1))
betweeniN a-d?30 August. It then halted production because
the crisis had stabilized and was formally terminated by
reference (c) on 7 September. This post-mortem will provide
=,a brief chronology of the salient developments of the Task
Force's experience, offer our views of its accomplishments
and problems, and suggest directions that future NISR develop-
ments might take.
CHRONOLOGY
August 1976 (all times are EDT)
172150 - Two Americans Officers are slain in Korea DMZ
Joint Security Area by North Koreans.
191212 - DCI Memo establishing NISR Task Force arrives NMIC.
DIA designated Executive Agent.
191300- DIA invited State/INR, CIA, NSA, and IC Staff
191400 to participate in Task Force.
191600 - Initial meeting of participants held at NMIC.
Attending were:
OPR/SAS, CIA
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r. Robert Baraz, State/INR
IC Staff
LtGen Samuel Wilson, Director, DIA
VP, DIA
DIA
DIA
DIA
Plus Other DIA Staff me ers.
General Wilson reported to the group that he had just
discussed the matter of J-3 involvement in the NISR with
members of the Operations Directorate. Gen wilson stated
that the Operations input would be limited in the preparation
of the NISR for this particular incident to "after-the-fact"
reports of operations. No operational plans or sets of
options would be included in the NISR although these would
be released to the Task Group members for their eyes only.
J-3 reservations were basically those which had been outlined
in'a 1 June memo from DIA to IC Staff, on this 25X1A
subject. A copy of that memo is at Enc osure (2).
191800- The NISR Task Force convened in the working space
assigned it by DIA. The room was equipped with
a grey phone, autosevocom, a secure intercom to
the Alert Center and General office, 25X1A
plus a number of black, non-secure phone lines.
It provided adequate wc:king space and was located
about 100 feet from the NMIC Alert Center. A
printer was activated to relay message traffic
from the JCS Communications Center to the Task
Group via the DIA Alert Center.
191800- Task Group considered administrative details and
192100 coordination procedures. NSA rep stated he would
coordinate for his agency. CIA rep stated he
would LDX drafts to Langley Headquarters for
coordination whenever possible. State/INR would
coordinate after normal duty hours through their
Ops Center, if an analyst was available. Otherwise,
no coordination would be provided -- basically the
same arrangement they operate with respect to
publication of the National Intelligence Daily.
192200- State Ops Center, WHSR and CIA Ops Center called
to assure they had phone numbers of Task Force.
Memo was issued with appropriate phone numbers
and names of task groups personnel.
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192130 - State Rep secures.
192200 - Task Group commences writing first report.
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200130 -.Coordination copies sent to CIA, State/INR, CIA'
coordinates; no reply from State.
releases first SitRep.
200230 - Advance copies LDXed to WHSR, CIA, State/INR and
NSA. CIA will. publish SITREP verbatim in NID.
200430 - Hard copies printed and distributed.
200600 - Checked with WHSR, CIA Rep in NMCC, State Ops
200630 Center to assure hard copies had arrived. WHSR and
CIA had received. State had not received but
indicated the LDX copy would suffice for their
purposes.
200800 - Relief personnel begin arriving:
DIA: for
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TTor
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State/INR: No representation
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NOTE: These were the major Task Force participants throughout
the operation.:,. Reliefs were handled individually by each
agency, "twelve-on and twelve-off" initially, and thereafter
oriented to accommodate the production schedule.
200925 - NIO for Korea calls for Ops data for DCI.
200955 - CIA calls. DCI wants info on road blocks. Mr.
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put in touch with DIA Rep
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on t e NMCC Crisis Action Team.
201000 - Obtained Air Force deployment data from Air Force
Ops.
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201017 - Jim Fazio, WHSR, calls. Very interested in
Soviet/PRC reaction. Provided latest available
information.
201025 - Mr. Ralph Searret, State/INR, advises that Mr.
Richmond Finch would report to the Task Force
as State Rep.
201100 - No State message traffic -- EXDIS, LIMDIS --
being received.
201100 - General asks for Task Force status report.
Told that Ops data flow from J-3 was lacking.
General Oconfers with Crisis Action Team in
NMCC. Cooperation improves.
201125 - Mr. Robert Baraz, State/INR, advises no analysts
will be provided to Task Force, nor will input
be made to SITREP. Stated that he had not received
draft of initial' S I TREP .
201240 - Dick Finch State/INR, advises by phone that he is
at NMCC - not NMIC -- and will remain there to work
with NMCC Crisis Action Team, vice original under-
standing that he would work with NISR Task Group.
201400 - Second SITREP published.
201500 - Designated a "runner" to keep NISR Task Force
advised-of information being received by DIA Task
Force located about 1100 feet away.
201500- Volume of information flow is high. Readily apparent
201800 to-all that counterpart Task Forces at CIA, State,
and DIA are receiving data more quickly and more
reliably than NISR Task Force.
201000 - UNC work party tree cutting operation underway.
r
201951 - CINCUNC reports operation complete.
202100 - Gen il advises that a SITREP should be published
as o 202400, after which the Task Force can remain
on-call until 0100 Monday morning. Meantime, DIA 25X1A
would maintain an intelligence watch.
202400 - The third SITREP is released by
for Korea.
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NOTE: Task Force operations after this point were largely
routine.
Subsequent SITREPS were published at 0500 23 Aug, 1200
24 Aug, 0900 25 Aug, 1000 26 Aug, and 1200 27 Aug. From
publication of the last SITREP on through to its formal
termination on 9 September - as well as all previous times
when the group was not in session -- participating agencies
were relied on to maintain an intelligence watch.
Accomplishments
- It "broke the ice", proved that a NISR is possible and
that a community Task Group can work harmoniously and
effectively under crisis conditions.
. - It established the precedent that future crises will be
accompanied by a NISR.
It managed to involve the military operators and State
Department -- even though the depth of their involvement was
not what we had hoped.
- We gained valuable experience with procedural and
operating aspects of a NISR task gJ,,r,~:up.
- We produced a SITREP which came closer to providing that
desired "BIG PICTURE" than anything we have done to date. It
was a high quality product, well received by its readership.
Problems
4. Predictably, the Task Force experienced its share of
problems, as evidenced in the chronology above:
- The Task Group was not well situated in the pattern of
information flow. Data was somewhat tardy, occasionally
missing altogether. It was readily apparent that the NISR Task
Group was an unfamiliar node in the communication system.
The State Department did not participate to the extent
we would have liked. No state representatives served on the
Task Group, other than briefly during the initial meeting.
They mounted no effort to feed information to the Task Group.
Despite repeated requests, EXDIS and LIMDIS traffic was not
disseminated to the Task Force. Indeed, on one occasion, they 25X1
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,refused to allow the Task Force to include information in
the SITREP which had already been released to the press.
No single point-of-contact was made consistently available
for liaison with the Task Force. Coordination of the draft
SITREPs with State was difficult because there was usually
no specialist available to supply the coordination, especially
after the actual tree-cutting operation was performed and
State's own Task Force was terminated.
- Involvement of military operators was limited. No
operators were assigned to serve with the Task Group. Ground
(rules of the Task Group excluded publication of military plans
or options being considered. Perhaps even more important,
the information which had originally been expected of the
operators, i.e., eyes only planning data for the Task Group
but not for publication, never materialized. Getting
information from the NMCC Crisis Action Team was physically
'difficult. The working level officers had obviously not
been briefed on the existence of the NISR Task Group or its
function, and therefore felt no obligation to provide it
data. We should note that improvement was made, however;
during the latter few days of the operation, J-3 assigned
points of contact to work with the Task Force. These officers
were cooperative and helpful.
Recommendations
5. Many of the problems encountered by the Task Force were
"due to the "first-time" aspects of the operation. These can
be resolved by applying certain procedural adjustments, such
as:
- Using NOIWON to notify participating agencies that a Task
Force is being convened, who the executive agent is, and what
modalities have been arranged. This should save some time and
adrenalin. Indeed, it raises the whole question of what
applications could be made of certain systems like CONTEXT or
NOIAN.
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- Adjusting our respective agency crisis management plans
to accommodate the NIRS Task Force. Adequate physical spaces,
communications and clerical support, maps, photos, badges,
pencils, etc., could all be arranged now rather than the moment
of crisis when much more important considerations demand
attention. DIA, for example, will modify its modernization
plans to accommodate the kind of task force requirements that 25X1
became evident during this first episode.
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6. Certain of these matters, however, will depend on the
answers to more fundamental questions, e.g., what are the
bounds of the NISR Task Force's analytical responsibilities?
Certain elements expected it to perform original analysis but
that appears neither desirable or possible. There are too
few people involved to handle the torrent of information
that a crisis usually generates. Moreover, each of the
Community members maintained their own Task Force, so it
would be duplicative to do what these elements are already
in operation to do. I perceive the NISR Task Force as a
synthesizing group, drawing on and coordinating the work of
its member agencies. Some clarification of mission --
regardless of what it is -- should be made in the basic
documentation covering operation of the NISR Task Group.
That is key to arranging the proper support for the Task
Group.
7. Certainly the most fundamental problem that the first
NISR Task Group experienced had to do with the role accorded
the State Department and the Joint Staff. As we had anticipated
during the formulation stages of the NISR, both State and the
Joint Staff proved extremely reluctant to release information
into intelligence channels which they regard as their legitimate
preserve -- information which heretofore has been available
only to the President or his designated representatives. Their
concerns are deeply rooted in the institutional nature of each
organization and the arguments they present for not sharing
such "privileged" information are compelling indeed. In light
of that, I perceive there are two basic courses of action open
to us;
a. We can accept the essential bounds imposed on the scope
of the NISR by the military operations and Department of State
during this, first NISR episode, i.e., we confine it to intelli-
gence and after-the-fact operational and diplomatic reporting,
or
b. We stand by our original concept of producing a single
~SITREP'which will "provide its readership with all intelligence
and operational information bearing on the problem at hand,
including sensitive intelligence information and information
concerning US diplomatic initiatives and military activities."
(Quoted from Reference (c), "Procedures for the Production of
a National Intelligence Situation Report".) To effect this 25X1A
course of action, an NSC directive is necessary.
2 Enclosures
See page 8
Major Gei;eral, USAF..
Ywo Director for Production
2?6A~
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TOP SECRET
NOFORN
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
SITUATION REPORT
Prepared by DIA as Executive Agent for the
Director of Central Intelligence with the
participation of CIA, NSA and State/INR.
KOREA
I ~brw
COPY OF 186 COPIES
Classified by TK-1
Exempt From General Declassification
Schedule Of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 1 Et 2
Declassify On Impossible To Determine
National Security Information
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
20 AUGUST 1976
0200 HOURS
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#`(-76
1 ,~L o2e@-EDT
20 August 1976
National Intelligence Situation Report
K 0 R E A
Summary
Military forces in Korea are on alert following the incident at
Panmunjom in which two US servicemen were killed. North Korean
military units were detected assuming an advanced state of readiness as
early as one hour after US and South Korean forces were placed n-DEFCON
3. Politically, Pyongyang appears to be acting with caution while
seeking to portray itself as the victim of aggressive US designs. Little
international reaction has been noted, and communist countries appear to
be awaiting US response.
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Mi l.i tary Situation
Both the North Korean armed for.cos and the US forces in Korea went
to increased alert status on 1.9 August\following the incident at Panmunjom 25X+1
the previous day in which two US officers were killed. US forces were
UI11C JCVeii
hours later, Pyongyang publicly announced that all militarized units
had been ordered by the North Korean Suprcrrie Command to "enter a state of
combat readiness." The radio broadcast cciced the August 18 encounter and
the increased "combat readiness" posture of the US as provocations.
Prior to the August 18 incident, North Korean military activity appeared
to be following seasonal norms. All services engaged in routine training
and operations during the past several months.
Since the alert, there has been no indication of major ground force
The 426,000-man Nort Korean 25X1
Army (NKA);remains concentrate-w.ith one tank and some 14 infantry divisions
along thedemilitarized zone Z)' Much of Pyongyang's armor and artillery
assets are also located in the-forward area. These forces are backed by a
variety of other combat units situated along both coasts. Pyongyang also 25X1
maintains sizable commando-type forces capable of conducting specialized
missions south of the DMZ.
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Naval units apparently are also on alert, but no unusual unit movements
have been observed.
been alerted accordin to Pyongyang's announcement,
While the 1.8 million paramilitary orce
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At this time it appears that Pyongyang's alert is in reaction to a
similar US move and apparent concern that the US micht retaliate for the
August 18 incident. Although highly unusual, the alert has been overt and
well-publicized, enforcing the conclusion that it is a reactive measure.
QThere are as yet no suggestions that Pyongyang plans to conduct a preemptive
strike against the south or is preparing for a full-scale invasion. Some
repositioning and reinforcement of forward ground units and increased air
and naval preparations against air attack can be expected if the alert
continues.
On August 19, the US Department of Defense announced that one squadron
of F-4 fighters and a squadron of F-111 attack aircraft has been ordered
to reinforce US forces in Korea. These forces will join the some 42,000
US forces already in Korea, including an infantry and air division. South
Korean forces have also been placed on DEFCON 3.
Political Situation
Following its alert announcement yesterday, Pyongyang appears to be
acting with caution while seeking to portray itself as the victim of
aggressive US designs.
The North Koreans agreed to attend the August 19 meeting of the Military
Armistice Committee and, while engaging in their customary polemics, did
not disrupt the proceedings. In a move to document their version of the
violent incident on August 18, the communists produced photographs purporting
to prove that some of their men had been injured by UN Command personnel.
Pyongyang has remained silent on the slaying of the two US officers, acknow-
ledging only that there were injuries on both sides.
In public statements on the incident Pyongyang has.sought mainly to
call attention to heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula. However,
there have been no threats--or any of President Kim II-song's bombastic
pledges--to respond with a "revolutionary war" designed to drive the US
from Korea.
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Pyongyang's unprecedented public announcement of its military alert
is essentially a political move designed in part to underscore its contention
that the presence of US forces in Korea is endangering stability on the
peninsula. The North Korean report contended that Pyongyang's alert was
in reaction to the US alert.
International Considerations
South Korea's ruling and opposition parties denounced the incident
yesterday. The South Korean press and Korean contacts 25X1
in Seoul seem concerned that the US may not react with equa e snow
of strength. President Pak, however, has reacted calmly. In a recent
conversation with a senior US officer, he noted that the situation was
sufficiently grave to warrant more than a verbal protest, but recommended
against the use of force.
We have not detected any unusual movement by units of the Soviet Pacific
Fleet toward Korean waters.
There has been no Soviet press reaction to the incident of August 18,
and none is likely until the extent of US respons^ is known. The Soviets,
in any case will probably give verbal support to the North Koreans while
trying to avoid any direct involvement.
Peking has not ?het commented on the incident at Panmunjom. The direct
involvement of US troops in the August 18 incident may have led Peking to
proceed more cautiously than usual. In early August, for example, only a
day after North and South Korean troops exchanged fire across the DMZ, the
Chinese replayed Pyongyang's official statement.
A US letter detailing recent North Korean aggressive actions was 25X1A
delivered to the President of the UN Security Council on August 19 and will
be circulated today to member nations.
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Major General, USAF
Vice Director for Production
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TOP SECRET NISR 2-76
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NRTIC AL
INTELLIGENCE
SITUATION REPORT
Prepared by DIA as Executive Agent for the
Director of Central Intelligence with the
participation of CIA, NSA and State/I N R.
It7c
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KOREA
20 AUGUST 1976
1400 HOURS
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1400 EDT
20 August 1976
National Intelligence Situation Report
K 0 R E A
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Military Situation
North Korean military units continue their high state of alert.
Since the issuance of the 19 August "combat readiness" directive by
the North Korean Supreme Command, ground units are on "standby" readiness
throughout the country. Increased truck traffic has been observed in
the forward area, but such activity can be expected in view of the
increased alert posture.
The Provincial arty
is not a high-level dire( -LIVE probably
an indication of activity country-wide and in keeping with readiness
developments already noted.
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The tactical air standdown continues for the second day with some
fighters and bombers maintaining strip alert. According to.a Pyongyang
radio broadcast, today is North Korean Air Force day, and this force
is on "combat alert."
tion of North Korea
Weather conditions over North Korea remain
remain so for the next two to three days.
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Summary
There has been little change in the situation in Korea over the
past 12 hours and there have been no new North Korean provocations.
North Korean forces remain in a,high state of readiness and are expected
to maintain this posture in anticipation of a possible US-Republic of
Korea military response to the Joint Security Area incident. Pyongyang
continues to display caution in the political arena and international,
reaction has been along expected lines.
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s upgraded defense posture.
poor and are expected to
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Renewed calls for war preparations continue. The most recent
occurred today when Pyongyang issued a statement decrying the move-
ment of US aircraft to South Korea. Thus far, the US has deployed
a total of 18 F-4s and four RF-4s to Osan and 20'F-llls to Taegu.
The aircraft arrived at the bases at 190546 EDT and 200455 EDT August,
respectively.
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International Considerations
The South Korean Government has not formulated any plans to respond
to the incident, but will monitor the situation as it develops. Blue
House officials believe the North Koreans made several strategic mistakes
that can be used to good advantage. Media interviews with the man on the
street in Seoul show that they perceive a renewed threat from the North
and people have united solidly behind the Pak government.
Peking has not commented directly on he military measures taken by
both sides, but the commentary stopped short, however, of promising
Pyongyang all-out support. Comments from several other communist capitals
have sided with North Korea. A Hong Kong newspaper has provided the first
Chinese reaction. It predictably accused the US and South Korea of pro-
voking the incident to provide a pretext'for US failure to implement the
North Korean-backed UN General Assembly Resolution on Korea.
The nonaligned summit passed the North Korean resolution condemning
"imperialist maneuvers for aggression against Korea." However, it was
not a complete triumph for the North as at least 15 nations voiced objections
to the resolution.
There still has been no Soviet press comment on the situation, and no
unusual Soviet or Chinese military moves have been detected.
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A Singapore Straits Times editorial stated that both sides are
always spoiling for a fight but notes that the stern words of President
Ford and Secretary Kissinger should be backed up'by credible action to
deter further unwarranted provocation. The editorial cautioned, however,
against US/Republic of Korea rash countermeasures.
Political Situation
No Peoples Republic of China representatives attended the 19 August
Military Armistice Compound meeting, and surprisingly, there were no
North Korean guards with the North Korean delegation at the meeting.
The meeting of the South-North Red Cross Societies was held at Panmunjom
on the 20th, and again neither North Korean guards nor reporters were
present. In summary, Pyongyang is still acting cautiously while seeking
to portray itself as the victim of US aggression.
Assessment
Although our evidence is limited, we believe that Pyongyang has
continued to follow a course that contains much bluster but is essentially
defensive. Their options, however, remain open and they could act at any
time.
equival
seen no signs that North Korea plans either a preemptive strike against
the South or a full-scale invasion. In addition, 'e note that North
Korea propaganda still eschews rhetoric that would indicate Pyongyang
wants war. Even in their limited contacts with South Koreans -- at the
18th working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Societies at
Panmunjom on 20 Aug-st -- North Korean representatives played relatively
low-key roles. We would, of course, expect recent US military deployments
to have had at least some dampening effect on North Korean propensities
toward provocations as would the restraint so far shown by the USSR and
China. In summary, North Korea's advanced military alert, which has
spread tochesmall-unit level, still appears to us to be primarily
precautionary rather than in expectation of major military action.
Major General, USAF
Vice Director for Production
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 A rov d For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200070005-3 NISR 3-76
TOP SECREgT 20 AUGUST 1976
NOFORN 1400-2400 Hours
SITUATION REPORT
TIO L
INTELLIGENCE
Prepared by DIA as Executive Agent for the
Director of Central Intelligence'with the
participation of CIA, NSA and State/INR.
KOREA
)8gk
COPY OF 188 COPIES
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lassified by TK . 1
`? . Exempt From General Declassification
Sr.hee:jitie Of Executive Order 11652
Fxernphnn Category 1 FY 2
D(:ciassify On Impossible To Determine
National Security Information
Unauthorized Dsdosure Subject to Crim,n-)l Sanctions
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#3-76
2400 EDT
20 August 1976
National Intelligence Situation Report
K 0 R E A
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Summary
A UN Command task force has cut down the
tree in the Joint Security Area, the focus of
the August 18 incident involving the killing
of two US officers. North Korean personnel
made no attempt to stop the tree removal,
although they lodged a written protest over
the operation. No significant North Korean
military reactions have been noted.
Military Situation
At 1800 EDT August 20, a UN Command work
party of 38 US and 60 South Korean personnel
entered the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom
to cut down the tree at the site where North
Korean personnel had. two days earlier killed
two US officers. Some 20 North Korean soldiers
were in the immediate area but did not interfere.
Another 50 or so watched from across a nearby
bridge. The work party cut down the tree and
removed two illegal North Korean barriers.
The operation was completed,'and the work party
cleared the Joint Security Area in about one and
one-half hours. No US backup forces had to be
committed.
As the operation concluded, the North Koreans
passed a message through Military Armistice
Commission channels demanding that the "reckless
provocation" cease and that all troops be
removed from the area. The UN Command responded
that the tree had been cut down and the work
party had left the scene. Subsequently, the
North Koreans requested a meeting of the two
principal Military Armistice Commission members.
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This meeting, which convened at 2245 EDT
August 20, was the scene of a conciliatory
North Korean statement to the effect that
the August 18 incident was "regrettable."
The North Korean spokesmen promised that
his side "will never provoke first."
The North Korean armed forces remain
in ?a high state of readiness, but no sig-
nificant military movements have been detected.
The standdown of fighters and bombers has
entered its third day, but international civil
flights continue. A number of aircraft remain
on strip alert. A North Korean press article
commenting on Air Force Day, August 20,
stated that the air force was in "full combat
posture."
North Korean air defense units tracked
US F-4 fighters and B-52 bombers operating
over South Korea. At 1729 EDT, tracking of
incoming B-52s was noted, and it continued
intermittently throughout the ;i"'-ssion. There
has been no further evidence of any North
Korean military reaction to the movement of
US forces to South Korea, nor has there been
any military reaction to the free cutting
operation.
About two hours after the removal of the
tree, a helicopter carrying the task force
commander was hit by small-arms fire while
airborne about 1,000 meters east of Panmunjom.
One round struck the tail rotor pylon; there.
were no casualities, and no fire was exchanged.
We do not consider this significant or even
necessarily related to the task force operation.
Such incidents happen routinely when the North
Koreans believe our aircraft approach too
close to their positions.
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 Approved For Gr"p oer-
US Collection Operations
US intelligence collection operations
targeted against North Korea for the next
several days are designed to accomplish
these objectives:
Surveillance of the DMZ to detect
and determine the nature of any
activities in. violation of the
protocols;
Timely warning of any intent by
North Korea to initiate limited
or full-scale hostilities; and
An understanding of military and
political developments in Pyongyang,
Peking, and other centers of diplo-
matic activities.
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Assessment
The UN Command actions in the wake of the
August 18 North Korean attack on US and ROK
personnel in the Joint Security Area, as well
as the rapidity of the various US military
deployments to the Korean area, should give
Pyongyang pause. Our response, for example,
must have convinced North Korea that it risked
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an unwarranted military escalation. It would
thus be reasonable for the North Koreans to
reassess briefly both their position and that
of their adversaries.
Pyongyang's basic policy stance will,
however, probably remain unchanged.' It is
committed to finding a way to rupture US-ROK
security ties and will?put much effort into
portraying the US as the prime instigator of
instability on the Korean Peninsula.
Pongyang doubtless perceives that it will
have a number of good opportunities toward
this end in coming months, e.g., during the
US election campaign and the UN debate on
Korea this fall. We would expect, therefore,
that North Korea will continue to stage
provocations from which it expects extra -t
political and diplomatic mileage.
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Release Authority
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Major General,
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NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
SITUATION REPORT
pt"
Prepared by D I A as Executive Agent for the
Director of Central Intelligence with the
participation of CIA, NSA and State/INR.
KOREA
4ai NUt.Ub f 1 `, {b
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OPY OF 188 COPIES
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1);.(r(E..r,u)wr)Ordrr 11h52
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4-76
0500 EDT
23 August 1976
National Intelligence Situation Report
K 0 R E A
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Summary
There has been no North Korean military reaction to
the tree-cutting operation and, although still on alert,
there are signs that the armed forces are returning to a
more normal status.
A private message to the US from Kim Il-sung indicates
his desire to defuse the current crisis. South Korean
leaders appear satisfied with the demonstration of US
firmness, but want Washington to maintain pressure on the
North, including retention in the region of the US military
force augmentation.
At this point, the North Koreans may feel that they
have achieved some political gains by dramatizing to the
world the issue of the US military presence in Korea.
However, this has been at the price of a public backdown
in the confrontation. In this regard, Pyongyang will
probably calculate with increased care before undertaking
any new military provocations.
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Military Situation
There has been no North Korean military reaction to
the tree-clearinr operation. The North Korean armed
forces remain on increased readiness posture, but there
are signs that the regular forces are returning to a
more normal status. The air force has resumed limited
flight activity and 25X1
Nevertheless, an August 22
press article stated that armed forces "are in full combat
readiness." The alert publicly announced by Pyongyang
on August 19 will probably remain in effect until North
Korea is convinced that the threat of military action by
the US and its South Korean ally has abated. For propaganda
purposes, Pyongyang may continue to maintain a "paper alert"
long after the armed forces have resumed routine operations.
We still see no indication in North Korean activity of
hostile intent, nor have we detected any significant military
movement. No Soviet or PRC military reaction to the situation
has been noted. 25X1
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The air force standdown' which began on August 18
25
ended on August 22.
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again noted active on the 23rd.
Botn North Korean and PRC radars tracked US B-52s
and-accompanying fighters on their second and third days
of training flights over South Korea.
Since the resumption of North Korean flight activity,
us, e al r orc e
appears to be easing its alert posture.
Although naval units continue
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% , returned to normal.
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The North Korean ground forces remain on increased
alert, but routine training activity has been observed
by units in at least one of the forward Army Corps. Also,
in a domestic broadcast, Pyongyang urged North Korean
military personnel to "make full preparations to cope
with war." At the same time the broadcast talked of
pushing ahead with socialist construction and intensifying
the economic drive. These sentiments suggest that
Pyongyang does not wish to overly disrupt the economy
during this tense per"iod.
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Allied Forces remain on increased alert. Joint
Security Area operations have assumed a more normal
posture, and the incremental phasedown of the tree-cutting
operation is underway. B-52s, accompanied by US and
South Korean fighters, conducted training missions over
the South Korean landmass on August 21, 22 and 2'3. The
F-4 and F-111 aircraft, which deployed to South Korea on
August 19 and 20, respectively, remain there. The carrier
MIDWAY task group arrived on station in the vicinity of
the southern approaches to the Korea Strait at 1500 EDT
on August 22.
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Po2''itical Situation
The most significant North Korean political response
since the August 21 tree-clearing operation is the delivery,
three and a half hours later at Panmunjom, of a private
message from President Kim Il-sung to the United Nations
Commander. The message was conveyed orally and privately
by the senior North Korean representative on the Military
Armistice Commission to his UN Command counterpart.
This is the official English record of their conversation:
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 'FOP SECRET
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BEGIN QUOTE:
KPA First Statement: I have been instructed by
the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army
to`convey his message to the Commander-in-Chief
of the United Nations Command side. Quotation:
It was a good thing that no big incident occurred
at Panmunjom for a long period. However, it is
regretful that an incident occurred in the Joint
Security Area, Panmunjom, this time. An effort
must be made so that such incidents may not recur
in the future. For this purpose both sides should
make efforts. We urge your side to prevent the
provocation. Our side will never provoke first,
but take self-defensive measures only when
provocation occurs. This is our consistent stand.
End of Quotation. I hope that you convey this
message to your side's Commander-in-Chief at the
quickest possible time.
UNC First Statement: The Supreme Commander KPA
message to Commander-in-Chief, United Nations
Command, will be delivered by me to CINCUNC in
accordance with your desires.
KPA Second Statement: I have one th--i 1ig to add.
This morning your side again'committed provocation
by bringing hundreds of completely armed personnel
in the JSA without any advance notification.
Such incidents on your part might cause such
one that occurred on the 18th. I strongly demand
that your side commit no such provocations.
UNC`Second Statement: May I have a copy of *the
Supreme Commander's message to CINCUNC?
KPA Third Statement: At present I have no copy.
I now await your reply to my last statement.
ri'()P SECii Eri,
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UNCThird Statement: Today I met with you
at your request only to receive your Supreme
Commander's message to CINCUNC. I have nothing
further to discuss at this time. If you have
any other subjects to discuss, we may do so,at
a future meeting.
?KPA Fourth Statement: I would like to. state
once more clearly, that the provocation which
you committed this morning is a serious one
which might cause a serious consequences.
Therefore, I hope that you seriously consider
this and take responsible measures so that such
provocations may not recur. I propose to con-
clude our meeting.
UNC Fourth Statement: I agree to your proposal
to conclude the meeting at this time.
END QUOTE.
Kim I1-sung's message, terming the events of
Aug-List 18 (when two US officers were killed) "regretful"
is an effort on his part to defuse the current military ten-
sion. Kim's failure to provide a written statement may be
an attempt to avoid losing prestige among Koreans by
appearing to have backed down in the confrontation.
In their press and radio commentaries, for example, the
North Koreans are expressing themselves in characteristically
vigorous language, though with notable restraint in the use
of threats.
South Korean leaders have expressed general satisfaction
with the firmness. of the US military response to the August 18
killings. There is particular appreciation of the US effort
to coordinate plans with ROK authorities and to involve
ROK forces in a meaningful way.
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On the other hand, top South Korean leaders have
formally expressed to US officials in Seoul a concern
that the US might be tempted, in light of Kim Il-sung's
admittedly conciliatory statement, to let the North off
too easily.
The South Koreans advocated
maintenance of the augmented US force in South Korea until
such objectives are achieved.
The South Koreans are disturbed by other implications
of the Kim Il-sung message, including the absence of any
South Korean officer at the August 21 meeting. Seoul has
persistent concerns about anything resembling direct US-
North Korean negotiations on political matters.
Assessment
At this point in the current crisis, the North Koreans
may see more gains than losses for themselves. They have
succeeded in dramatizing to the world the issue of the UN
military presence in Korea. They are setting the stage
for an intensified diplomatic campaign to win support for
their anti-US resolution at the fall session of the UN
General Assembly. Pyongyang may also feel that it has
opened up new possibilities for direct talks with the US
on such quasi-political matters as improved security
arrangements at Panmunjom.
On the other hand, the North Koreans have been compelled
to back d--own publicly on the matter at issue, apparently
intimidated by the military forces so rapidly brought to
bear. Nor can Pyongyang be happy with the lack of inter-
national enthusiasm for its cause during the recent crisis.
The USSR and China offered only feeble replays of North
Korean statements and no significant support. Other communist
and left-leaning nations with few exceptions, offered only
brief and bland commentary.
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The outlook at this point is for a continuation
uf North Korea's diplomatic offensive against the US
military presence in Korea. It is likely, however, that
Pyongyang will calculate with increased care before
undertaking any new military r
forces in the rpninn
e ease u
- 7 L::::]
ajor Genera , USAF
Vice Director for Production
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SECRET
E
gyT~L
7 El. LU 2
F
Prepared by DIA as Executive Agent for the
Director of Central intelligence with the
participation of CIA, NSA and State/INR.
KOREA
NISR 5-76
24 AUGUST 101-11f-3
1200 Hours
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COPY 16
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 5-76
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24 August 1976
National Intelligence Situation Report
2541
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Summary
. No hostile North Korean military reactions have been
noted to the August 21 tree cutting operation. North Korean
military forces generally remain in a high state of readiness,
but additional elements are moving toward a more routine
posture. The Military Armistice Commission is scheduled to
meet August 25 at 1600 Korea time (0300 EDT).
Military Situation
Few indications of heightened North Korean military activity
have been noted since the last Situation Report. 25X1
Generally, however,
North Korean units are returning to more routine activity.
Training, inspections, and routine patrols are being resumed
by various elements.
US intelligence collection operations continue at an
'advanced pace.
The '~N Command called for a full Military Armistice
Commission meeting today to seek assurances that the safey
of UN Command personnel in the Joint Security Area will be
preserved and that the freedom of activity guaranteed to both
sides will be respected. The North Koreans, in a routine
move, proposed that the meeting be deferred until August 25
at 0300 EDT. Commander in Chief, UN Command, has accepted
that proposal.
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No significant international reaction to the Korean
situation has been noted. Most foreign media coverage remains
factual and low key. Neither Peking nor Moscow has issued
more than pro forma statements.
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Lease imrnoriry I
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Major General, USAF
Vice Director for Production
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 NISR G-76
, ,Afproved For Release 2004/06/29 CIA-RDP83M00171 R001200070005-3
SECR. 25 AUGUST 1976
0900 Flours
No1:ORN
NPL
Prepared by DIA as Executi;'----' Agent for the
Director of Central Intelligence with the
participation of CIA, NSA and State/I N R.
KOREA
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Copy I e
G05879
m%M0.jCl>tssifrcu by t)OD Dir S-52)0.17 (M-2)
C xe mpt f turn General UL,,- iass,ficat ion
Schedule Of CxecuUve Under I. [U52
E.xern!d m n Category 2
r)cUas dy Upon Notif,calmii By The
Ong,netor
? N.uron.il Soocurity Intorri it on
U[1ZM1hori,ud Oi Iotiurc' Sri pct to Cnin inJI S,Inct,onS
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 Approved For Release 2004/06/29: C
SECRET
6-76
'0900 EDT
25 August 1976
National Intelligence Situation Report
K O R E A
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summary
North Korean Armed Forces generally remain in an advanced
alert posture. No major elements have redeployed, however,
and some units within all three services have shown signs of
returning to more normal activity. North Korean actions at
the Military Armistice Commission meeting this morning were
generally restrained and indicated an interest in pursuing
discussion of the issue of personnel security in the Joint
Security Area. In the near term, North Korea will probably
continue to attempt to defuse the current crisis.
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Military Situation
North Korean Armed Forces enerall remain in an ddvanceu
readiness condition. 25X1
North Korean radars are tracking the US s Y- 25X1
ing over South Korea. Occasional 25X1
ontinue to be noted in North Korean Army activity.
There are, however, signs that the alert is being _elaxed.
Units of all services are resuming more normal operations.
"%a
rean Units
are continuing to con uc ercises
with no unusual deployments noted on either coast.
UN Command forces remain in DEFCON 3. The additional two
tactical fighter squadrons--the F-4 squadron at Kunsan and
the F-111 squadron at Taegu--deployed to Korea in the wake
of the August 18 incident remain there. The MIDWAY and her
accompanying surface combatants are operating in the Korean
Strait, and B-52D training sorties continue to overfly South
Korea at a rate of one cell of three aircraft per day. US
intelligence collection operations also continue at an advanced
pace.
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LNv 0 .1. J 111114 U 114 ?~~~..~--~-v-+~ j ~--1 -----
few tactical movements have been noted in the DMZ area. North
o be normal with only sporadic
naval activity appears t
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Political Situation
At the scheduled meeting of the Military Armistice Com-
mission this morning (1600 Korean time on 25 August), the
North Koreans proposed complete separation of the security
personnel of the two sides as one way to avoid further violent
incidents in the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom. Specific-
ally, they suggested that guard posts of the two parties be
set up only on their respective sides of the military de-
marcation line as it runs through the Joint Security Area.
North Korean press and radio commentary suggested that
separation be enforced even in the conference hall at the
site. The commentaries argued in restrained language for
the "reasonableness" of the Northern proposal which, in
effect, substantially modifies the agreed 1953 ground rules
of the Military Armistice Commission.
At the same time, however, the North Korean senior rep-
resentative at the Military Armistice Commission meeting
evaded direct comment on the UN representative's demand
that Pyongyang ensure the safety of UN Command personnel
at Panmunjom and punish those responsible for the 18 August
murders. I
Meanwhile, a South Korean news ~.ervice has characterized
the North Korean posture these past few days as a virtual
"capitulation."
Assessment
Our best.judrtient is that the North Korean Armed Forces
are not preparing any major military response to US actions.
Since the August 18 incident at Panmunmom, North Korean
actions have been primarily cautious and defensive in nature
and have