PRM/NSC-10 COMPREHENSIVE NET ASSESSMENT INTERIM REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001200160006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 1, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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NEW
WATICINAL SECURITY COUNCIL
April 7, 1977
*NSC Review Completed*
25X1 TO:
Task Force Chairman
PRM-10
Attached for your information
is a copy of the Interim Report
submitted to the Central Committee
on April 1.
San#el P. 'Huntington
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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI ()
April 1, 1977
FROM: SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON
SUBJECT: PRM/NSC-10 Comprehensive Net Assessment
Interim Report
1. Attached is the Interim Report of the PRM/NSC-10
Comprehensive Net Assessment, which is submitted to you in
your capacity as Chairman of the Special Coordinating Committee.
(Tab I).
2. In accordance with the procedures which you previously
authorized, this report has not been formally cleared with the
interested agencies. An earlier version was, however, informally
discussed at a meeting of the Net Assessment Working Group on
March 29 and benefitted from the comments and criticisms of the
members of the group.
SECRET
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4/1/77
PRM/NSC-10
COMPREHENSIVE NET ASSESSMENT
INTERIM REPORT
I. INTRODU CTION
PRM/NSC-10 directs that a "comprehensive examination be made
of overall U. S. national strategy and capabilities." The net
assessment conducted by the Special Coordinating Committee is
specifically asked to "evaluate the objectives and national strategies
that may be pursued by our principal potential adversaries and
examine the alternative national objectives and strategies appropriate
to the United States. " In keeping with this mandate, the main body
of this Interim Report is designed:
(1) to outline the context of this net assessment and strategic
review;
(2) to elaborate some of the general issues with which the net
assessment is concerned; and
(3) to present some considerations involved in formulating
national strategy.
Attached to the main body of the report are:
(1) a brief summary of the work completed to date (Tab A);
(2) an outline of the organization of the net assessment (Tab B);
(3) the text of PRM/NSC-10 (Tab C);
(4) the text of the Terms of Reference for PRM/NSC-10 (Tab D).
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II. TIIE CONTEXT OF THIS REVIEW
Every eight years the advent of a new Administration provides the
United States with the opportunity to reconsider its national strategy and
goals in relation to those of its potential opponents. The events of the
past eight years -- in the United States, with our opponents, and in the
world at large -- lend a peculiar urgency to the reconsideration this year.
This reconsideration is the latest in a series of efforts to formulate
comprehensive national strategies which include:
-- NSC 68, prepared in 1950, in the wake of the Soviet nuclear
explosion and the Communist conquest of China, which recommended a
major U. S. political economic, and military effort to combat communist
expansion, including a trippling of military expenditures;
-- NSC 162/2, in 1953, in which the Eisenhower Administration
outlined the New Look with its stress on nuclear weapons (strategic and
tactical), massive retaliation, and cut-backs in conventional forces to
insure U. S. ability to maintain an adequate defense for "the long haul;"
-- the Kennedy Administration reassessment of strategy in 1961-62,
which led to a rapid build-up of the ICBM force and a substantial expansion
of U. S. general purpose forces, reflected in the concepts of "flexible response
and "mutual assured destruction;"
-- NSSM 3, in the first year of the Nixon Administration, which,
while not challenging the basic approach of the Kennedy and Johnson
Administration, shifted the planning assumption from a "2 1/2 war" to a
"1 1/2 war" strategy;
-- NSSM 246, in which the Ford Administration, in its last months,
provided useful analysis but no fundamentally new conclusions with respect
to strategy.
The strategic reviews of the last two Administrations focused almost
entirely on military strategy and force posture. Yet the world has changed
greatly since the early 1960s and the strategic assumptions and concepts of
that decade are not necessarily relevant for this one. The times now require
.a broader reconsideration of national strategy, comparable to that undertaken
in NSC 68, involving political, economic, technological, and diplomatic
factors as well as military ones, and a new effort to define our overall
national goals in relation to our potential opponents.
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This reformulation of US strategy thus proceeds in the context of many
constraining parameters that were largely absent during the Cold War
of the 1950s and 1960s:
(1) The relationship with our potential adversaries is now not
simply competitive but also in part cooperative.
(2) The concerns of U. S. foreign policy are now more diverse
and complex, involving not simply issues of security vis-a-vis the "Soviet
threat," but also questions of North-South relations, finance, trade and
investment, nuclear proliferation and arms sales, global resources, and
human rights.
(3) The relative capabilities of the U. S. compared to those of other
states -- allies and neutrals, as well as adversaries -- have declined
significantly from the days of overwhelming U. S. predominance in the
1940s and 1950s.
(4) The domestic claims on public resources are far greater,
absolutely and proportionately, than they were before the mid-1960s.
Now, as in the past, the central threat to U. S. national security comes
from the Soviet Union. Aspects of that threat, however, have changed.
In the 1940s and 1950s, the Soviet Union was seen as the center of a
hemispheric bloc reaching from the Elbe to the Mekong and also as the
center of a global network of communist parties dependent upon Moscow
for direction and support. Since this early postwar period, significant
changes have occurred in the distribution of power and in the alignments
of power. The Sino-Soviet split has seriously weakened the Soviet alliance
system. In part as a result of this, Soviet leadership of the worldwide
communist movement is no longer unchallenged. For the United States,
China remains in one sense a potential opponent, but in another sense
parallel interests have made it almost a de facto ally. China's low
capabilities, however, limit its role in either respect. The broader
diffusion of power is reflected in the ability of other countries or groups
of countries to act independently on the world scene. In most cases, such
as in the Group of 77, these blocs may raise significant questions of
economic policy, but thus far they have lacked the coherence and the
resources directly to challenge American security interests. The
growing western dependence on imported oil, particularly from the Middle
East, has, however, increased the vulnerability of the U. S. and its principal
allies to potential adversaries, such as.OAPEC, which on one occasion
demonstrated that they did have the coherence and the resources to impose
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significant costs on the U. S. and its allies. In addition, recurring
secondary threats, such as terrorism, have arisen. Nonetheless,
the central but not exclusive focus for this reconsideration of strategy,
as for its precedessors, must be U. S. relations with the Soviet Union.
Significant changes have taken place in those relations in the past decade.
On the one hand, a relaxation in the tension which characterized that
relationship in the 1950s and 1960s has made it possible to discuss and,
in some cases, reach understandings with the Soviet Union on matters of
mutual concern, among which the SALT agreements are clearly of central
importance. On the other hand, the past eight years have also seen the
steady growth of Soviet military power. Since the mid-1960s the USSR has
moved from a position of marked inferiority in nuclear capabilities to one
of rough equivalence with the United States. Depending on the outcome of
SALT negotiations and American decisions on strategy and procurement,
the Soviets have the potential to increase and improve their nuclear forces
to the point where they could exceed the quantity, quality, and net destruc-
tive power of American forces. Whether or not such a measure of superiority
could be exploited usefully in war or in diplomatic confrontation is debatable;
equally uncertain -- and more significant -- is whether the Soviets, our
allies, other nations, and ourselves will believe that it could be so exploited.
In recent years, the Soviet Union has also strengthened, modernized, and
enhanced the readiness of its forces in Eastern Europe. At the same time,
it dramatically increased its deployments in the Far East and, in effect,
prepared for its own "Z-war" contingency. The Soviet navy has matured
from a weak coastal defense force into a modern global maritime power,
increasingly capable of threatening U. S. and allied sealines, challenging
U. S. naval forces in the Mediterranean, and gradually achieving the
capability to project military power abroad.
These changes in the Soviet-American military relationship come at a
time of major new uncertainties in international political alignments.
Significant changes could occur in the European'balance, given the potential
impact of Eurocommunism, of political unrest in Portugal, Spain or post-
Tito Yugoslavia, and of the difficultues in forming effective governing
majorities in democratic states. Africa faces the challenge of several
new self-styled Marxist-Leninist regimes, the threat of racial conflict
in Southern Africa, and the appearance of secessionist, revolutionary,
and interventionist forces. Regional conflicts continue in much of Africa,
the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia,. and trends toward political
fragmentation exist throughout the world. These instabilities could
provide new opportunities for influence for a stronger Soviet Union. Yet
the Soviet leadership also faces major domestic constraints -- persistent
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economic problems, nationality discontent, and shifting demographic
trends, which should limit both their ability to exploit their increased
strength, and their inclination to become directly involved in new,
costly foreign adventures.
III. MAJOR ISSUES IN THE NET ASSESSMENT
In accordance with the Terms of Reference, the overall net assessment
will be broken down into a number of regional and topical net assessments.
Cutting across these efforts, however, are a number of general issues
which the overall assessment, as well as the regional and topical assess-
ments, must consider.. Five of these issues are identified here.
1. The Balance of Influence. As indicated above, the strength and
the reach of Soviet power have increased significantly. To what extent
does this increase in the resources of power lead to expanded political
influence? The net assessment will consider:
(1) Trends in the expansion and contraction in Soviet and
American influence abroad and the costs and benefits of these changes to
both the USSR and the U. S.
(2) Regional priorities and targets. What is the relation
between U. S. commitment or neglect and the Soviet propensity to enter
a region? In which regions is the USSR likely to make the greatest gains
and to suffer the greatest losses?
(3) The probable extent, timing, and strength of Soviet
expansion. Is the threat greatest in the long or short term? Is there
likely to be a period of "maximum danger" or a period of "maximum
opportunity" in the next five to ten years?
(4) Factors that could cause the contraction of Soviet influence.
Will Soviet presence provoke a backlash in the areas that they penetrate?
What impact would alternative U. S. responses have?
(5) Ways in which Soviet military power determines or
facilitates their involvement and influence abroad.
(6) Competing Soviet interests such as the stake in detente
or non-military economic goals. How might these constrain Soviet
expansive tendencies?
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2. National Psychology and Frames of Reference. Soviet leaders
do not necessarily perceive international conflict, negotiation, and acconz-
modation in the same way as Western leaders. Both Marxist-Leninist
ideology and the historic Russian legacy influence the thinking of Soviet
policy makers. These influences contrast markedly with traditional
liberal democratic ways of looking at the world. They have implications
which affect, among other things, the prospects of success in negotiations.
Relevant issues include:
(1) Soviet doctrine for nuclear and conventional war. How
far do their categories of analysis and mea-sures of significance correspond
with those of the U. S. and its allies?
(2) Soviet perception of the strategic balance, Western posture
and intentions, and judgments of the trends. How can we influence these?
In what respects are their concepts determined by the conflict with China?
(3) Soviet views of the role of force in current and future
circumstances, their understanding of the concepts of "parity" and
"superiority, " and the value they place on them. How do their concepts
compare with those of American leaders?
(4) Soviet views on the distinction between "internal affairs"
and international relations.
(5) The adequacy of our evidence on Soviet attitudes. How
well do we know what they think, and what are the consequences of uncertainty .
(6) Conditions under which the use of force, or the threat
to use force -- at nuclear, conventional, and diplomatic levels -- will
become more.or less appealing to the USSR's leadership.
3. Potential Threats. The growth in Soviet power poses increased
military threats to the U. S. and its allies in the event of war, could raise
problems for the stability of deterrence, and provides a firmer basis on
which the USSR could attempt to exert political leverage in a diplomatic
crisis. In addition, there are economic threats, such as might stem from
dependence on imported oil. Among the most salient threats are:
(1) Strategic attack. The central threat. depends on the present
strategic balance, actual and perceived changes in the balance, and pros-
pects for change in Soviet and American nuclear doctrine. What is the
significance, both to the U. S. and USSR, of asymmetries in force structure?
What responses would the USSR probably make to alternative U. S. postures'?
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(2) Political uses of strategic forces in diplomatic confronta-
tions. In what ways and in what types of crises might the Soviets attempt
to exact leverage from nuclear capabilities or threats?
(3) Military and political uses of conventional forces, in the
context of strategic parity, in regions where the USSR or the PRC can
deploy substantial conventional power either directly or through proxies.
(4) Covert operations. What is their scale and effectiveness?
Where are the Soviets likely to be most active?
(5) Economic threats. To what extent will the U. S. and its
allies be vulnerable to acts of "economic warfare, " such as resource
embargoes, boycotts, debt leverage?
4. Regional Goals and Global Competition. The U. S. has a global
interest in the balance of power with the Soviet Union. It also has other
interests specific to countries and regions, such as political stability,
economic development, and amicable diplomatic relations. In different
regions these two sets of interests may either be complementary, con-
tradictory, or unrelated. To assess the interaction of these aims on
general strategies and specific policies, the regional net assessments
consider:
(1) Which local goals are caused by global competition with
the USSR; which need to be modified by global strategic considerations;
which are irrelevant to US-Soviet competition?
.(2) In which regions and in what dimensions -- political,
military, economic, and diplomatic -- is it more and less important to
counter Soviet influence?
(3) The impact of specific U. S. policies such as those on
human rights, arms transfers, and nuclear proliferation on the Soviet-
American interaction at the regional level.
(4) Costs and benefits with respect to the global balance of
alternative American options for involvement in regional conflicts. For
example, what are the costs and benefits of U. S. alignment with one side
(blacks in Southern Africa); diplomatic involvement with both sides (Middle
East); military supply to neither side (South Asia), one side (Zaire v. Angola),
or both sides (Greece-Turkey and Middle East)?
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5. Consequences of Increasing Interaction. As the cooperative
element in ITS-USSR relations has become more significant in recent years,
it is particularly important to assess the extent to which increased economic
interaction may be desirable, and the ways in which it would affect the
competitive aspects of American-Soviet relations. Trade, credits, and
technology transfer are salient issues. Topical net assessments address
the following questions, among others:
(1) Overall costs and benefits, short,and long term, of
increased interaction. Will more transactions reduce conflict and aggres-
siveness, or sell the Soviets the rope with which to hang us, or have no
effect at all? How would greater interdependence affect the Soviet system?
Should the U. S. government encourage, subsidize, ignore, or. discourage
certain types of interchange?
(2) Types of exchanges most and least advantage.ous to the
U. S. Which transactions have highly uncertain outcomes; how predictable
are the results of increased trade? Which areas of exchange should, in
these terms, be expanded or contracted?
(3) Criteria for evaluating changes of policy, especially in
regard to issues such as computer technology, food sales, and production
licensing and investment in the USSR or Eastern Europe.
(4) Mechanisms for control. How effective are current ones
such as COCOM? Are additional mechanisms needed?
.(5) How should the U. S. government deal with the private
sector in regard to issues such as general or selective export policies and
banking and credit policy controls?
6. Transformation of alliances. Major changes appear to be under-
way in the East-West alliance systems. Issues of relevance for the future
are:
(1) What are the trends in the transformation of Soviet and
American alliances and the costs and benefits of these for relative Soviet
and American power?
(2) What impact do these changes have on Soviet and American
war-fighting capabilities, especially a conflict limited to Central Europe?
(3) Which Soviet strategies might lead to the accelerated
loosening of Western alliances? What would be the risks/benefits of a
parallel American effort in Eastern Europe?
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(4) Which factors, domestic or international, might lead
to a tightening of alliances in the West as well as the East?
(5) How would broadened alliance membership or changes
in the central alliance institutions affect the central US-Soviet relationship?
(6) To what extent will conflicting economic interests and
nationalist demands within both alliances affect their cohesiveness for
security purposes?
IV. REQUIREMENTS FOR NATIONAL STRATEGY
The fundamental purposes of the United States are spelled out in the
Declaration of the Independence and in the Preamble to the Constitution.
A basic national strategy delineates the ways of realizing those purposes
in the face of foreign threats and hostility. It would be premature at this
point to present specific strategies before the task force analyses that
should underpin them have been completed. Any realistic national strategy,
however, must consider how to mix the following elements of policy:
1. Cooperation and Competition. A national strategy must set
forth the extent to which the United States will attempt to achieve its
objectives through cooperative arrangements (for example, arms control,
increased trade) with its potential adversaries, and to what extent it will
adopt a competitive posture (weapons buildup, trade restrictions).
2. Power and Values. National security requires maintenance of
a balance of power, but national purpose requires the promotion of
American values. A national strategy must provide an effective combination
of both these considerations.
3. Military, Economic, and Political Instruments. A national
strategy should provide for varying emphases on these three instruments.
4. Structure and Flexibility. A national strategy requires a general
framework to provide structure and coherence, but it should also allow policy
to evolve in phases and permit flexible adaptation to new contingencies.
5. 'Self-Reliance and Cooperation with Allies. Certain goals require
strong unilateral commitments and capabilities, and others require multi-
lateral undertakings and collective efforts with our allies. A national
strategy must encompass both of these needs.
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March 28, 1977
PRM/NSC-i0
COMPREHENSIVE NET ASSESSMENT
SUMMARY OF WORK TO DATE
1. The Presidential Review Memorandum itself was prepared,
circulated among the interested agencies, revised, and approved by
the President on February 18th. Terms of Reference was drafted,
circulated, revised, and approved by the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs on March 10.
2. A Net Assessment Group was created composed of senior
officials from the interested agencies. This group met on March 11th
and discussed the major cross-cutting substantive issues which will be
considered in the context of the net assessment.
3. A Net Assessment Working Group was created, which at its
three meetings on March 15, 22 and 29, considered the overall organization
and procedures of the assessment, task force terms of reference, and the
draft interim report.
4. Eleven regional and topical task forces have been organized
as follows:
(1)
Europe
(7) Strategic nuclear policy and
(2)
Middle East
forces
(3)
South Asia
(8) Technology
(4)
Africa
(9) Economic strategy and capabiliti.
(5)
East Asia
(10) Intelligence (including covert
(6)
Western Hemisphere
action)
(11) Political institutions, leadership
and national psychology
Chairmen and associate chairmen have been appointed, and the membership
constituted of individuals nominated by the interested agencies. All the
task forces have formulated terms of reference to guide them in the prepara-
tion of their reports clue May 15th. In almost all cases, work has started
on the drafting of the papers which will be included in these reports.
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5. A four-person central staff at the NSC has been created to
direct and coordinate the activities of the net assessment and to draft
the overall report. Thirteen other members of the NSC staff are
participating in the assessment in one capacity or another.
6. Extensive discussions and consultations have been held with
officials in State, Defense, the intelligence community, and elsewhere.
on the substantive issues and methodologies to be employed in the net
assessment. The DOD Office of Net Assessment has been particularly
helpful in this connection.
7. Efforts have been made to maintain close liaison with the
Military Force Posture portion of the PRM/NSG-l0 review. Several
people are involved in both aspects of the review, and persons connected
with the net assessment have taken advantage of the opportunity to sit in
on meetings of Force Posture groups.
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