TREND ANALYSIS OF 'SOFT DATA' 1974-1975

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001200210001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1975
• Content Type: STUDY

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. TREND ANALYSIS OF "SOFT DATA" 1974-1975
PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS/COMMENTS
Team B's criticisms about our use of "soft data"
are particularly valid from the standpoint that the Community
produces no document which annually addresses Soviet "grand
strategy." Most of the principal NIEs assess aspects of
Soviet military capabilities which, in the main, are based
on hard data, and have generally tended to understate Soviet
strategic goals and underestimate their weapons system
deployments. Moreover, NIE participants may indeed be
faulted for "mirror-imaging" (but there seems no way to
understand precisely what damage has been done thereby,
as no one in the West can define the extent to which Soviet
strategic policy and force developments are in fact deter-
mined by the Soviet "grand strategy"/military doctrine we
are accused of misinterpreting by "mirror-imaging").
Finally, Team B may be right in asserting that we do not
pay sufficient, systematic, integrated analytical attention
to the full stream of soft data emanating from the Soviet
Union or otherwise collected. But, such an assertion
.can not be proved by merely reading the Estimates themselves.
More research on this point is needed.
J- On the other hand] the Team B's charge that NIEs
"either gloss over in silence the question of Soviet strategic
objectives, or else treat the matter in a perfunctory manner"
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IUD" J""W"IL
is not accurate, when the full body of Community product
is;considered. In the 1974-75 period alone, there were
at least ci-ve national/departmental estimates' or analytical
memoranda which in their entirety addressed relevant
"soft data" issues; and each of the major military estimates
specifically addressed this subject to varying degrees.
NIE 11-3/8-74 is particularly strong in this regard, devoting
a full 43 paragraphs to a balanced discussion of the factors
influencing Soviet policy and the question of Soviet strategic
objectives. (Perhaps this explains why the Team B's report
essentially omits any reference to this NIE.) See attached
notes for additional documentation.
- As a related point, I fail to see how the Community
can rightfully be charged with "misinterpreting" the large
body of soft data on Soviet strategic concepts when this
data is clearly open to various interpretations.
-- Finally, Team B argues that the.pfoper intellec-
tual methodology in treating Soviet matters is to start from
a general, coherent view of Soviet "grand strategy" and work
back to the specific hard evidence which supports such a
view. The IC, on the other hand, works from the specific to
the general in its estimating process. This, in my view,.is
the sounder approach.
SPECIFIC POINTS
-- Does hard data on weapons systems unduly influence
the conclusions of interagency products on the Soviet military.
threat? The operative word here is "unduly" and there is no
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way to answer this one, unless we could pick-the brains
of each?~*participant in any particular product's development
and'bounce this against all soft and hard data available
to the group (and to the Community). The conventional
wisdom is that we are slaves to technology. And there is
some truth to this, particularly during the decade 1963-73.
But, we're getting better and isn't that what counts? For
example, NIE 11-3/8-75 states:
"If the USSR's forces develop according to our
best. estimates, Soviet leaders can expect to achieve
some gains relative to the US during the next ten years
even though their forces will fall far'short of giving
them a near.retaliation-free first-strike capability.
We have projected Force 1 as the most likely Soviet
program under a SALT TWO agreement on the basis of
current evidence and past Soviet practices. It repre-
sents a vigorous, highly competitive Soviet effort to
maintain and improve offensive and defensive forces
and is generally consistent with previously observed
Soviet activities. We can interpret many aspects of
the Soviet strategic force developments which underlie
our Force 1 projection as a prudent response to the
present strategic situation. Silo hardening, MIRVing,
mobile ICBM development, and even R&D on rapidly
deployable ABM systems can be explained in terms of
Soviet security needs, including needs to hedge against
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potential US force improvements and the failure
of the SALT process. Some other aspects of what
we see--especially the growing threat to the
Minuteman force from large numbers of more accurate,
high-yield ICBM warheads,.and the vigor of Soviet
research and development in strategic systems---can
be interpreted as motivated by a determination to
achieve important strategic advantages,:aver the US.."
What fault can be found with this methodology and- these
conclusions?
-- Do the utility and judgments of interagency products
suffer from a narrow definition of the "strategic threat"
(i.e., equating strategic threat to "strategic nuclear
forces")? I doubt that the utility to users of f 11-3/8,
11-14 or 11-15 suffers because of the limited fog of
each. What is lacking is a regular vehicle to tie them
all together within the 11-4 framework.
The defensive, as contrasted with offensive, nature
of Soviet military forces. Team B says this is a false
dichotomy and they're right. They go on to say we emphasize
the "defensive" na.ture too much. Team A says Pipes goes
too far the other way. The truth lies in between.
The deterrent purposes of Soviet forces, as distinct
from the war-waging or war-winning purposes of these forces.
Again, a false dichotomy says Team B, which, as they accurately
point out, we have been slow to recognize. Prior to about
1975 we can probably be faulted for insufficient attention
to the more sinister p44Itposes ,u of Soviet force developments.
S~ 3-
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NIE 11-15-74 struck me as being particularly culpable
in this regard, But, again, we're getting better. More
recent estimates/memoranda are replete with references to
the.war-fighting/war-winning underpinnings of force devel-
opment.
Quantitative and qualitative goals for Soviet forces,
relative to those of the-US and the West (inferiority? parity?
superiority?) The attached documentation gives a feel for
how this was treated during 1974-75.
-- The thesis that the Soviets will be satisfied with
parity and that the arms race will decelerate when the Soviets
achieve parity. Not particularly germane to the 1974-75 time
frame, although 11-3/8-74 says "we doubt that the Soviets
have firmly settled on acceptance of strategic parity or have
decided to seek clear-cut strategic superiority" (with
Service dissent).
-- The extent to which Soviet military programs proceed
from internal USSR purposes, as contrasted with being reactions
to US military programs. See the attached notes. Estimates
during 1974-75 have recognized that both forces come into play.
No one in the West can define their comparative impact with
any degree of precision.
Soviet views on the feasibility of military superiority.
Here's one area where a concerted "content analysis" approach
to soft data could probably pay off.
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The weight to be given to Soviet speeches, news
art.cl'es, and other open (non-secret) declarations as indicators
of Soviet intentions, in contrast.'. with the view that these
declarations are made for domestic political ~grpoS and are
not to be relied upon as indicators of intentions.
Believe the following passage from 11-3/8-75 accurately
describes the Community's overall approach to this problem:
"There remains the question of the USSR,'s long-
term objectives for its forces for intercontinental
conflict and how they relate to, other long-term mili-
tary and political goals. Our understanding of this
subject is far from complete. US perceptions of Soviet
strategic objectives and future force structure are
particularly sensitive to'misinformation. We do not
know how Soviet leaders describe, in private deliberations,
their overall military objectives or'.the goals for
their strategic nuclear forces. We know what they say
publicly, in negotiations and discussions with certain
Western officials and other contacts, and--occasionally--
in forums to which they probably believe we have no
access. It is a' matter of interpretation, however,
whether the statements implying. goals. of strategic
superiority which are often made by lesser officials
are mainly reflections of pervasive ideological prin-
ciple or also represent practical objectives which the
Soviet leaders expect to achieve. We base our judgments
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about the Soviet leaders' objectives for inter-
'.con;.nental forces over the next few years on a
combination of these Soviet statements and writings,
the past and present military development and
deployment activities which we observe, and our
appreciation of the challenges, opportunities, and
constraints operating on them, as summarized earlier
an this chapter. "(P.'o)
Sounds good, doesn't it?
Finally, on the subject of the extent to which NIEs
document their "soft data" judgments, let me quote from
an article in the Fall 1964 issue of Studie's in Intelligence:
"It is true that the judgments of an NIE
float in the empyrean and impress with their apparently
unrooted boldness. It is also true, however, that the
writers of those sentences approach them with prayer
and fasting, and work them out in fiery give and take,
often over long periods of time, in working groups
which can test to their heart's content the background
of information and fact that underlies each agency's
opinion. If sometimes our NIEs approach being a -
little too empyrean, so do the. problems that our
superiors and world affairs force us to examine."
TOP S C EI
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NIE 11-3/8-75 (Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict
Through the Mid-1980s) (17Nov75)
KEY JUDGMENTS
--.NIE?devotes over two pages of an eight plus page
section to "Soviet Objectives."' States that "our judgments
about the strategic objectives of the Soviet leaders are based
on what they say (in public and sometimes in, private), on what
we observe of their programs, and on our appreciation of
the internal and external forces operating on them in the
present period of risky opportunities" (pp.2-3). No
reference to any specific "soft data;" no mention of Soviet
rejection of "mutual assured destruction" concepts.
-- Concludes that the "scope and vigor of (their strategic)
programs ... raise the elusive question of whether the Soviet
leaders embrace as an objective some form of strategic nuclear
superiority over the U.S." (p.5). (Note that the NIE argues
from the "hard" evidence back to the "soft" objectives not
vice versa.)
--Argues that only if they achieve very rapid technological
advance,'combined with a large Soviet force build-up in the
absence of SALT II agreement, could the USSR achieve "capa-
bilities that might be perceived as giving it more strategic
power to back up its policies than that available to the U.S."
(p.9). Postulated as "the most threatening but unlikely"
circumstance::.
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SUMMARY SECTION
-- NIE devotes almost five pages.(out of 26 pages of
text) to "soft" data issues--USSR's. Current Strategic Situation;
Factors. Influencing Soviet Strategic Policy; and Long-Term
Soviet Objectives for Intercontinental Nuclear Forces.
Frequent references to statements/doctrine/writings (includ-
ing Soviet rejection of mutual assured destruction concepts);
no specific "soft" data cited.
-- Raises the "elusive question" of "how seriously, if
at all, they're -prsuing" strategic superiority (p.11).
-- They "appear to maintain an ideological faith" that
the West is declining vis-a-vis the USSR; but are probably
uncertain about US resolve (DOD dissent) (p.13).
-- NIE says "we don't believe they presently think
they'll achieve superiority by 1985"(Air Force dissent)
(p.18).
-- At several points the NIE pictures the Soviets as
conservative, prudent military planners who make worst-case
assumptions and develop their forces therefrom (i.e., reactive
vice active; defensive vice offensive tone) (cf pp.48-49).
-- NIE's concluding discussion of the Likely Strategic
Environment Through 1985 includes .a balanced appraisal of....
those Soviet activities that can be explained as prudent
Soviet responses to the changing environment and those
that have more sinister interpretations:
2
S 9 i3 w! a.
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urn ~rfi
"We have projected Force l as the most likely
M W.' .
Soviet program under a SALT TWO agreement on the basis
.,of current evidence and past Soviet practices. It
represents a vigorous, highly competitive Soviet
effort to maintain and improve offensive and defensive
forces and is generally consistent with previously
observed Soviet activities. We can interpret many
aspects of the Soviet strategic force developments
which underlie our Force 1 projection as a prudent
response to the present strategic situation. Silo
hardening, MIRVing, mobile ICBM development, and
even R&D on rapidly deployable ABM systems can be
explained in terms of Soviet security, needs, includ-
ing needs to hedge against potential US force improve-
ments and the failure of the SALT process. Some other
aspects of what we see--especially the growing threat
to the Minuteman force from large numbers of more
accurate, high-yield ICBM warheads, and the vigor of
Soviet research and development in strategic systems--
can be interpreted as motivated by a determination
to achieve important strategic advantages over the US."
VOLUME II - THE ESTIMATE
No significant difference in the use of "soft"
data from that outlined above.
-- The problem is neatly summarized on p.10 as follows:
3
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There remains the question of the USSR's long-
term objectives for its forces for intercontinental
conflict and how they relate to other long-term mili-
tary and political goals. Our understanding of this
subject is far from complete. US perceptions of Soviet
strategic objectives and future force structure are parti-
cularly sensitive to misinformation,. We do not know
how Soviet leaders describe, in private deliberations,
their overall military objectives or the goals for their
strategic nuclear forces. We know what they say pub-
licly, in negotiations and discussions with certain
Western officials and other contacts, and--occasionally--
in forums to which they probably believe we have no
access. It is a matter of interpretation, however,
whether the statements implying goals of strategic
superiority which are often made by lesser officials
are mainly reflections of pervasive ideological prin-
ciple or also represent practical objectives which the
Soviet leaders expect to achieve. We base our
judgments about the Soviet leaders' objectives for inter-
continental forces over the next few years on a com-
bination of these Soviet statements and writings, the
past and present military development and deployment
activities which we observe, and our.appreciatio.n
of the challenges, opportunities, and constraints
operating on them, as summarized earlier in this chapter.
TO'
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J.M.E. COMMENTS
The'NIE clearly adopts the overall procedure of seeing
what the "hard" data tells us about objectives (reasoning
from the. specific to the general) rather than vice-versa
a la Team B.
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NIB 11-14-75 (Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO) (4Sep75)
?PRI? CIPAL JUDGMENTS
The evidential base for the Principal Judgments appears
to be a balanced blend of Soviet doctrinal writings ("soft")
and exercise/force disposition information ("hard").
-- Reference to classified/unclassified writings
in re Soviet views of nuclear escalation (p.3); "stand-
ing start" war (pp.4 and 5); and use of' CW weapons (p.6).
DISCUSSION SECTION
- Numerous general references throughout to Soviet
doctrine/writings (pp.8, 10, 11, 18, 20, 24, 26, 27, 28,
31, 43ff). No specific sources cited; no indication of the
date of the information; no clear indication of what is actually
doctrine, what is inference based on exercises, what is analyst's
judgment, and where "doctrine" actually equates to "employment
concepts."
- States that "our evidence on Soviet theater war-
fighting concepts during the last few years is mainly from
(p.10) (N.B. NATO is "always the
aggressor" in these exercises, p.26).
J.M.E. COMMENTS
- NIE adequately portrays the dire I&W implications?for
NATO of the Soviets' "prudent planning assumption" that war
might begin from a "standing start."
But, the NIE's overall image of the Soviet threat
is non-sinister insofar as it judges that the USSR's "drive
to maintain. superiority" in NATO/WP conventional forces
TAP !11 1C
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through 1.379 is defensive and reactive in nature and
explained primarily by the fact that the Soviets are
"extremely conservative" military planners (p.43ff).
Moreover, the principal conclusion of the NIE is
that "we believe the Soviets, given this larger view of
the existing (strategic) balance, consider both NATO and
WP to be deterred from initiating war" (p.2).
- The single allusion to a more hawkish view of Soviet
objectives. is buried in the text where the NIE notes that
the dramatic recent increase in the size of WP forces
suggests more ambitious policy options" (p.8).
Finally, critics have claimed that the NIB leaves
the reader with a confusing picture regarding how the Soviets
view the outcome'of a war in Europe they (1) believe their
ground forces offensive would be successful, yet (2) fear
their troops could be stopped by NATO air forces; so they
(3) plan to preemptively attack NATO air facilities; but
(4) don't,presumablyy expect to achieve the surprise necessary
to carry out such an attack].
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Ton .SECRET'
.NIE:11-15-74 (Soviet Naval Policy and Programs) (23Dec74)
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS
-Contains a one paragraph reference to doctrine
regarding Soviets' probable war. scenario (p.2) but no dis-
cussion of overall objectives or citing of specific "soft"
data.
No sweat regarding US SSBN vulnerability over the
next decade (p.4).
- Brief mention of the Soviet decision to use its navy
more extensively out-of-area to support foreign policy objec-
tives (p.6).
- Overall tone is quite non-sinister.
DISCUSSION SECTION
- References to "so.ft" data throughout (pp. 9 ff, 13,
22, 30, 31, 43, 45, 47, 61) including:
- Section on "Soviet Views of the Nature, Course and
Tasks of War with the US" (general references to discussions,
writings and doctrine evincing a "loosening up" in re
inevitability of escalation to general nuclear war; no mention
of their drive for superiority/war-winning forces and rejec-
tion of mutual assured destruction).
- Section on "Peacetime Operations in Soviet Policy."
- Specific references to Gorshkov writings (e.g., need
for a "balanced" navy) (N.B. considerable weight is given
to these writings in Annex F when projecting future Soviet
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naval forces. But the NIE still attaches greater overall
importance to actual Soviet behavior (programs and activities)).
J.M.E. COMMENTS
-,NIE clearly emphasizes the defensive/deterrent purpose
of Soviet naval forces and pictures Soviet leaders as prudent
calculators of risk, desiring not to push the US too hard
(cf, e.g., paras 43, 47, 52, 63 and Annex paras 17 and 20).
lei SEC:
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NIE 1?-3/..$-74 (Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict
Through the Mid-1980s (14Nov74)
KEY JUDGMENTS
Several general references to doctrine (e.g., war-
fighting capabilities are the best deterrent).
- "We believe the Soviet leaders ... see no contradiction
between their current strategic programs and their.'detente
policies."
- "We doubt'that the Soviets have firmly settled on
acceptance of strategic parity or have decided to seek
clear-cut strategic superiority" (but DOD Services dissent:
they're fully' committed to superiority). Estimate Soviet
leaders will be both prudent.and opportun.stic (if US
behavior permits) in their practical policy decisions.
- "Extremely unlikely that during the next ten years
the Soviets will conclude that they can launch an attack
which would prevent devastating US retaliation."
SUMMARY/VOLUME II-THE ESTIMATE
- Contains an extended discussion (43 paragraphs) of
"soft data" questions including numerous general and some
specific references to statements, doctrine, writings.
- Factors Influencing Soviet Strategic Policy (paras
8-34). Discusses detente, SALT, economic considerations,
bureaucratic interests, threat perceptions, strategic
nuclear doctrine, and limited nuclear options:
TOP 2.14111 L", T
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-- "Some. aspects of traditional Soviet ideology
and military doctrine pose serious obstacles to stabilizing
US-Soviet strategic relationships (para 15).
References to Soviet military literature (para 17).
-- Discussion of Soviet strategic nuc doctrine
(paras20-30) "... the thrust has been to assert that victory
could be achieved."
-- "While military writers appear to be unanimously
in favor of 'superiority' we are unable to identify
an agreed Soviet definition of it or a coherent Soviet
approach to achieving it" (pars 23).
-- "We believe that [strategic preemption] is one
of the strategic options that actively influence Soviet
force posture decisions" (para 27).
-- "Soviet thinking on deterrent policy continues to
exhibit traits that occasion anxiety in the U.S."
(para 30). ;
"The Question of Soviet Strategic Objectives"
(paras 35-50) :
- Suggests Politburo is divided on priorities:
detente vs more systems.
Judges they're following a policy of "prag-
matic opportunism."
Includes eight paras on the dissenting Service
view ("we're convinced they're striving for super-
r
iority)
2
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No specific evidence cited A-IYk7NCU IAJ W& SEMOV,
-- Discussion a la the 1975 NIE regarding which force
developments are explained by prudent Soviet responses to
the present strategic situation vs those that could be
interpreted as a drive for strategic superiority.
Four force projections which are dependent on:SAL/ASM
treaties; level of technological achievement; rates, of deploy-
arid.
ment; international situation;,,programmed US forces. (Two of
the projections are quite sombre).
But predicts with confidence that the basis for MAD
will continue to exist thru 1985 (pr4n*a.' ly due to no foreseen
tech breakthrough) (para 63).
N 6 q
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ESTIMATES ON "SOFT DATA" SUBJECTS
NIE?'11.-5-75 (Soviet Assessment of the US) (90ct75)
-- US strengths and weaknesses as they affect both
the international "correlation of forces" and US attitudes
towards USSR in context of detente.
"Balance sheet is changing i
the USSR's favor"
(P.1)?
-- Nucweps balance equates to "rough balance."
They see dimmed. prospects for making detente
"irreversible."
-- Very few specific source data references.
DIEM 5-75 (Objectives in Soviet Strategy) (15Sep7S)
-- General references to statements, writings, etc.
-- Emphasizes the intertwining of polit/eco/military
facets of Soviet :goals. -
-- "It would be hazardous to ignore the strength of
Soviet conviction reflected in [Soviet pronouncements about
the inevitable triumph of socialism] (p. 5) ..:
-- The Soviets "genuinely believe that the balance of
world forces has already moved in their favor.
-- "Particular Soviet goals and policies should be
assessed in light of their actual or potential contribution
to the broader Soviet strategic objectives."
DIE SOV 2-75 (Detente in Soviet Strategy) (25Ju175)
-- Numerous general and specific references to "soft"
data.
TOP . EC E
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-- "It is unlikely that a detailed blueprint for
winning the global contest exists in Moscow" (p.7).
-- "The theme of superiority runs through their con-
tinuousquest for advantages in the nuclear sphere" (p.8).
DIE SOV 4-74 (Soviet Intentions for Fighting Nuclear War
in Europe) (27Aug74)
-- Many references to doctrinal writings (they're
thinking about the concept of limited nuc war); but "perhaps
the strongest evidence that the Soviets do not intend to
engage in a constrained nuc war in Europe is manifest in
their force posture" (p.5).
-- "Soviets will not come close to matching NATO's
capabilities in nuc-capable tactical weap',ns in the fore-
seeable future" (p.8).
NIAM 11-9-74 (Soviet Detente Policy) (23May74)
-- They would like to believe that they need not make
the hard choice between a continuing. strategic arms buildup
and detente, but can puruse both simultaneously.
-- Their objectives probably include an opportunistic
desire to press ahead and achieve a margin of superiority
if they can.-
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OTHER DOD PRODUCTS REVIEWED*
(1)...DIEM 3-75 (Backfire Bomber in Soviet Force Planning
and SALT) (27Jun75)
(2) DIE SOV-7-74 (Implications of Recent Developments in
Soviet Ocean Surveillance and Anti-Ship Missiles) (18Dec74
"These developments bring the Soviets to the
verge of significantly improving their"ability.
to challenge Western naval deployments."
(3) SDIE SOV 6-74 (Soviet Kiev Class Carrier: Role and
Implications) (27Sep74)
Contributes to "Soviet development of improved
capabilities for open-ocean ASW operations." (p.2)
(4) SDIE SOV 5-74 (Soviet Strategic Mobile Missile Devel-
opments and Their Implications for SALT) (19Sep74)
"Probably was undertaken by the Soviets as
a hedge against the uncertainties of SALT II." (p.7)
(5) DIE SOV 3-74 (Soviet Long Range Aviation: Flexible Force
for Future Conflict) (3Jun74)
(6) DIANM 2-74 (Soviet Strategic Counterforce Mission, The
New ICBMs and SALT) (27Nov74)
"Their war-winning and deterrence doctrines
are essentially one." (p.v)
"Thus, the Soviets may now see, after nearly
20 years of effort, tangible progress toward their
war-winning, counterforce goals." (p.v)
Discussion of doctrine incorporated in 11-3/8-74.
TOP S~1
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