THE B TEAM REPORT ON SOVIET OBJECTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001200210003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 18, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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18 February 1977 25X1
MEMORANDUM FOR:I lirector, OPEI
, Acting Chie , PAID
FROM: A/D/DCI/IC
SUBJECT: The B Team Report on 6ovietr Objectives
1. Reference is the PAID memorandum of 14 November, subject as above,
requesting comments.
2. For openers, I have two personal positions:
a. Not only because of the controversy and interest generated
by the Team A/Team B project, but also because I consider the topic is
most important, I strongly believe that a NIE on "Soviet Grand Strategy"
(however titled) should have first priority in our national estimates effort.
b. Had I been involved in the project, I would have signed hhe
Team B report. (The fact that the Air Force footnotes to which the Team B
referred favorably were mostly ones I wrote suggests this is not a new
position for me.)
3. I concede the Team B paper is not as documented as I would have
liked, but that may be primarily a factor of the limited time the
participants had to devote to the project. Some of the participants may not
be generally viewed as scholars, but for my book Tom Wolf stands close to
the top of the list among Soviet scholars.
4. I fully agree with the comment (page 2 of the PAID paper) that the
Team B report is "a disturbing portrayal of the intelligence record,one
that calls for careful review and corrective action by all members of the
Intelligence Community."
5. I have no editorial changes to propose to the 11-page draft provided
me, but I consider the memorandum is incomplete. It should go to the
D/DCI/IC with a concluding section that addresses "What is to be done."
6. This final section, in my view, should recommend that the DCI
form a task group and charge it to develop a scholarly analysis of
"Soviet Grand Strategy." Where there are diffeeences in interpretation and
alternative conclusions,these should be clearly spelled out.
7. Leadership of this task group and early completion of the task
probably will be more time consuming than either the NIO/Strategic Programs
or the NIO/USSR would be able to devote . Inclusion of outside scholars
probably will be a must.
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8. I note the PAID memorandum states there has been little demand in the
past for analysis in depth of Soviet objectives, but in view of bbe
interest which has been evidenced in the results of the Team A/Team B
effort this can hardly be said to be true now.
9. If the INTELLIGENCE Community does not feel up to taking on this
kind of a task after 30 years of post-World War II focus on the USSR
something is basically wrong. What is nedded is a landmark analysis which
will clearly indicate what we know, what we think, and what we can only
conjecture about. Such a study would be the basis for follow-on research 25X1
and focused collection.
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP83M00171 R001200210003-8