NOTE FROM(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001200210008-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 24, 1977
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
24 January 1977
Attached is a rough first draft of our paper
on the national estimates process. Please give
me comments you may have by COB Tuesday,
25 January. Please hold this draft to the
immediate recipients.
C /PAID STATINTL
ACTION
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The essence of the Team B charge against the Intelligence
Community is that it has consistently underestimated the long-run
objectives and intentions of Soviet military policy. The causes of
this failure are, in the eyes of Team B members, endemic to the
intelligence system and procedures that have been operative over the past 25
years. The more important causal factors for the Community's inaccurate
appreciation of Soviet intentions are:
1) concentration on "hard" data and negligible analytic effort
on "soft" data available in documentary and human source reporting;
2) mirror-image appraisals of Soviet actions and goals as reflections
of American values and aspirations;
3) disaggregative assessments of Soviet weapon and force
development programs, precluding an accurate appreciation of the
Soviet ground design for military superiority;
4) unsupported judgments involving net assessments of US and
Soviet forces and the US-Soviet balance;
5) a persistent bias toward benign and soft assessments of
current and projected Soviet strength which appear to be too closely
attuned to US policy initiatives and long-standing goals.
Review of IC Performance
Analysis of "Soft" Data.
The Team B's charge that NIEs "either gloss over in silence
the question of Soviet strategic objectives, or else treat the matter
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in a perfwnctory manner" is not accurate, when the full body of
Community product is considered. In the 1974-75 period alone, there
were at least five national/ departmental estimates or analytical
memoranda which in their entirety addressed relevant "soft data"
issues; and each of the major military estimates specifically addressed
this subject to varying degrees. NIE 11-3/8-74 is particularly strong
in this regard, devoting a full 43 paragraphs to a balanced discussion
of the factors influencing Soviet policy and the question of Soviet strategic
objectives. (Perhaps this explains why the Team B's report essentially
omits any reference to this NIE. ) See attached notes for additional
documentation.
A review of estimates since 1960 shows a very sharp reduction
in attention to soft data during the middle and late 1960s. Prior to
satellite photography, all analyses of Soviet military programs
emphasized the study of Soviet documentary data, media information
and the Soviet technical journals as a way of monitoring Soviet progress
in technology and probable ability to support large and sophisticated
weapons development programs. The Community also allocated
substantial resources to the analysis of SIGINT data on Soviet test
ranges and industrial communications. This effort was curtailed
soon after consistent and improving satellite photography became
the most direct source for answering the critical question of the
1960s--quantifications of the Soviet missile and air defense buildup.
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Unquestionably, hard data analysis replaced soft data analysis during
this period and the scope and emphasis in the estimates reflected
that change. Photography was clearly more useful as a source of
information through the 1960s. In some cases, analysis of soft data
ceased; in other cases, it atTpj?hied and offered little but supporting analysis
for the hard data. However, once the Community developed an accurate
quantitative data base on various Soviet military forces and developmental
programs, the critical intelligence questions returned once more to a
demand for analyses on such qualitative issues as the effectiveness of
the well-equipped Soviet forces and the guiding strategy and doctrine.
Soft data, which earlier by itself had been unable to answer these
questions, when viewed jointly with hard data began to have meaning.
Intelligence reporting and the estimates indicate that the reemphasis
of soft data began about 1971 or 72 and actually began to influence the
estimates in 1973. SALT and MBFR policy issues also brought pressure
for more careful assessments of force effectiveness, but the process
within intelligence analytic components appears to have been well under
way as these issues moved to the fore. Since the early 1970s, both DIA
and CIA have restructured analytic entities to emphasize soft data;
external contracting has also moved in that direction.
Mirror-image Appraisals.
There is a human tendency to find and dwell on the universal aspects
to any subject--technical, political, economic or social--that will affect
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the probabilities for success, delay or failure of any new development.
The intelligence analyst is as guilty of that tendency as anyone else.
When evidence is scarce on the goals, problems, and successes of
foreign governments, the analyst can only reflect and project on the
basis of his own experience or on the basis of his knowledge and under-
standing of the ways that the other side traditionally does things--a
knowledge that is not very precise in the case of Soviet bureaucracy.
As "hard" data became available in the 1960s, it was put together with
the "hard" data of the 1950s that had been supplied by German technicians
repatriated from the USSR. That data clearly indicated a "western"
bias to Soviet weapon developments that did affect the rather accurate
assessments of Soviet achievements and potential through the 1960s.
Studies indicated that the Soviet weapons were based on conservative
technical specifications, proven technology, "German" experience on
missile and aircraft, and considerable difficulty in introducing new
technology. This approach influenced Soviet missile, aircraft,
electronic and naval developments through the 1960s. The Community's
appraisal of Soviet practice, therefore, rather than a mirror-image,
tended to be an accurate appraisal based on hard evidence of Soviet
hardware developments and systems developments and good, early,
knowledge on post-WWII Soviet practice. Until there was clear evidence
of Soviet change, it is unfair to accuse the US analyst of projecting his
own predilections and set of references. If mirror-imaging did obtain
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during this period, it was based on full knowledge of weapons capabilities
and technologic growth in the USSR.
Since 1970, there have been indications of a higher level of
indigenous influences in Soviet weapons developments and, perhaps
more important, our recent analyses of Soviet training and doctrine--
"soft" data--suggest that Soviet concepts of nuclear and conventional
war and their tactical doctrine differs from current thoughts in the
"West. " Military estimates since 1973 document that Soviet change.
For example, NIEs 11-3/8-74 and 75 contain considerable discussion
of Soviet weapons development programs that emphasize R&D, Soviet
MIRV technology, accuracy improvements, and the pursuit of native
technologic advances. There is extensive coverage of "soft" data
pertaining to a variety of subjects related to warfighting capabilities,
strategies, and intentions. Some 43 paragraphs, for example, are
devoted to this subject in the main body of NIE 11-3/8-74. The essence
of this discussion is that there is a clear picture of Soviet military
interest in favor of "superiority" but that the Community is unable to
identify an agreed Soviet definition of superiority or a method of achieving
it. More particularly, the recent estimates portray a distinct impression
that the Soviet perception--the view of the Soviet leadership as to goals
and purpose of the apparent force posture- -is the important imponderable
in assessing Soviet intentions.
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Disaggregative Assessments of Soviet Weapons Programs.
The Team B criticism is valid. Traditionally, the annual series
of estimates did include an NIE 11-4 designed to discuss overall Soviet
policy. This document came to be looked upon as a wrap-up assessment,
based on full knowledge of the more comprehensive estimates on each
of the main military elements. It often was an excellent review of where
the Soviets were heading and what the emphases were. This was so
because the members of the National Estimates Board who developed
the force estimates participated fully in the policy estimates. The NIO
system does not formally maintain that custom, although the NIOs are,
of course, mindful of each other's work that has a direct bearing on
their own. But there is no formal NIO procedure for getting an overall
assessment.
In retrospect, however, even the traditional BNE approach to a
summation of Soviet policy rarely was integrative in the sense of the
B Team criticism. Typically, the 11-4 estimate was the only attempt
at formulating an integrated view. There was discussion of how improve-
ments in strategic defense affected intercontinental forces, or how
peripheral attack systems affected overall Soviet strategic offensive
capability. A systems approach to Soviet military programs was not
essayed. The best that can be said is that the reader of an 11-4 estimate
became aware of an unrelated array of Soviet force improvements.
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The more recent estimates on Soviet military policy and trends
(both NIEs and DIEs) indicate the difficulty of writing a satisfactory 11-4.
Soft data has been interspersed with hard data in a way that conjures up
a series of unresolvable questions on Soviet intentions. There is a
strong conclusion on capabilities and growth, but no clear assessment
of overall military progress relative to apposing US and allied forces.
Perhaps that would require comprehensive net assessments to be
meaningful--a point not mentioned by the B Team--but despite the
validity of the criticism that integrated assessments of Soviet forces
and policies are lacking, it is hard to visualize precisely how such
estimates can be formulated more clearly than they have been unless
soft data becomes less ambiguous and/or comprehensive net assess-
ments become part of a periodic overview of overall Soviet military
status and intentions.
Unsupported Net Assessments.
While this criticism can be validated in a review of Soviet estimates
over the past several years, the change is not always well founded.
Our review indicates that the support for implicit and explicit net
assessments has been good in at least half of the occurrences. A
significant number of cases were poorly supported. Supporting data
for assessments relative to the overall strategic balance was only fair.
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There was a tendency in the early 1970s to become quite liberal in
scattering judgments, often unsupported, in the key judgments of
estimates. The highest incidence probably occurred in NIE 11-3/8-75.
The presence to do so was great for a number of reasons, perhaps the
most important being a demand for simplified statements of the signi-
ficance of a very complex mass of data. It was well recognized within
the Community that such judgments were not completely supported--if
supported at all--but the cry for some assessment of the overall US-
Soviet balance was constant. In part, too, the Intelligence Community
was reluctant to do the detailed studies necessary to fully support the
general assessment of relative strength that was demanded. Having
been forced to give some judgments admittedly on shaky ground, most
components of the Community would support some method of formulating
more explicit analyses of the issues at hand. But such studies cannot
and should not be the responsibility of the Intelligence Community.
IC Bias.
It is difficult to accept the B Team charge of biased analysis and
collusion with policy leadership. (This, incidentally, is a key judgment
of the B Team with no explicit or implicit support in the body of their
report. ) The B Team finds that "on some occasions the drafters of NIEs
display an evident inclination to minimize the Soviet strategic buildup
because of its implications for detente, SAL negotiations, Congressional
sentiments as well as for certain US forces. " While it is true that the
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NIEs over the past several years have contained a number of statements
that minimized the Soviet strategic buildup, there is no clear explanation
as to why those judgments prevailed. Intelligence has always been
ciriticized for being led by the demands of national policy, but it has
'learned from both the "bomber gap" of the 1950s and the "missile gap"
of the 1960s that the worst case estimate of the near term is not always
the proper one. If there were a legitimate criticism of minimizing the
threat, it can be levied on the strategic estimates in the latter half of
the 1960s. The more logical causal explanation, however, is not policy
pressure at the time, but shortsighted concern on the part of the estimaters
with the analysis of the short-term buildup of Soviet forces and when
those forces would reach an assured retaliatory capability, then parity
and, finally, sufficiency. All good concepts in the jargon bf the 1960s,
and each meaningful to the policymakers at the time. But the minimization
of the buildup was always based on a variety of well-assessed factors
which tend to be overlooked. In the case of the Soviet missile buildup,
the analysis relied heavily on the length of the extant deployment pro-
grams, the obsolescence of the missile systems, the probable requirement
for qualitative modifications to the existing forces, and the demands of
competing programs. Who is to say that theee factors would not have
ended the quantitative missile buildup if SALT I had not imposed numerical
ceilings ? The same sorts of program reviews have always affected
intelligence appraisals of all Soviet weapons systems and, by and large,
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the modifying factors have tended to be reflected in eventual Soviet
program figures. The B Team fails to note that the estimates of
aircraft and surface-to-air missile programs were generally on
the mark during the same period in which bias was involved in the
strategic estimates. Yet the methodologies for the estimates were
similar and presumably could have been tempered by similar policy
pressures atthe time.
The B Team is more lenient with its criticism of the estimates
during the 1970s, but there is no clear reason as to why. Presumably,
if the judgment is "correct, " the methodology is faultless. But the
likelihood of policy pressure on the Soviet threat was surely greater
in the mid-1970s than at the close of the 1960s, because admission of
an invigorated Soviet military threat was destined to undermine the
policy of detente--the administrative goal. Yet the estimate changed,
as usual not at the speed demanded by the most apprehensive, but iowly
in response to a rather rigorous review of the evidence. It is difficult
to find a reasonable cause for changing intelligence estimates other
than constant reappraisal of the evidence at hand.
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Findings of Phase I
The first phase of the IC Staff review of national estimates on the
Soviet Union finds that the basic process is sound--the NIO concept,
interagency drafting teams, and the NFIB review and approval process.
Specific questions about the objectives, scope and focus of NIEs do, however,
need further examination. More seriously, the IC Staff finds major defects
in the Community's analytic base supporting Soviet estimates, particularly
in the following areas:
-- The Community's posture for systematically utilizing all
available information on the Soviet Union.
-- Bureaucratic barriers within and outside the Community which
inhibit the dissemination of all available information to analysts
of the Soviet Union.
-- Net assessments of Soviet military capabilities.
1. Objectives, Scope and Focus of NIEs on the Soviet Union
NIEs on the Soviet Union are costly, in terms of Community
manpower, yet there are persistent questions raised by users of intelli-
gence about the relevance and utility of NIEs.' During Phase II, the IC
Staff will evaluate, with the NIOs, other Community elements, and key
users, measures to increase the utility of estimates in three areas--
new formats which better serve the multiple markets for NIEs; alternative
*Reference ICS Semiannual Review, RONI on NIE 11-14-75, Andy Marshall
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approaches to hypotheses and evidence in NIEs; and better definition of
the role of intelligence estimates in relation to the policy process.
a. The Multiple Markets for NIEs. National estimates on the
Soviet Union serve a number of purposes for different audiences or markets.
They provide broad assessments of trends for policymakers, detailed
review of Soviet policies and capabilities for negotiations and force
planners, and the basis for Community inputs to departmental or inter-
agency studies. Another important purpose of NIEs is to provide a
disciplined, systematic means whereby the Community debates intelli-
gence issues about the Soviet Union and develops both agreed statements
and, where appropriate, dissenting positions.
It is difficult, if not impossible, for a single NIE to serve
satisfactorily all of these audiences. During Phase II, the value and costs
of a more market-oriented structure for national estimates on the Soviet
Union will be examined, along the following general lines:
-- A detailed reference library on all aspects of the USSR, to
provide a baseline of agreed intelligence which would be
updated as necessary on the basis of new information.
-- An annual intelligence assessment of all relevant political,
economic, military, technological, and societal trends in
the USSR, keyed to short-term and long-term issues facing
the US Government.
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-- Intelligence inputs to departmental and interagency studies,
focused on the specific issues under study.
b. Evidence, Uncertainty, Hypotheses, and Judgments. The
discussions of evidence and uncertainty currently varies from NIE to
NIE, depending upon the topic. A policy should be developed, in consulta-
tion with users, which sets forth guidelines for discussing evidence and
uncertainty and for providing hypotheses and judgments about future
Soviet behavior which go beyond the sources and methods of intelligence.
These guidelines should recognize that the degree of detail and the nature
of the discussion in an NIE should vary with the purpose and the audience;
thus, they should be keyed to the market-oriented structure for NIEs
discussed above. In developing this policy, the following might, for
example, be considered:
-- Degree of detail in which supporting evidence should be discussed.
-- Footnotes referencing more detailed intelligence analyses.
-- Discussion of the nature and extent of Community uncertainty.
-- Highlighting changes in Community positions and the reasons
for these changes.
-- Discussion of alternative hypotheses for observed facts or
behavior.
-- Development of alternative future courses of Soviet policy
or behavior. (This is done now for strategic force levels
and the technique could be applied more broadly to Soviet
,-.nlintry kina_ 1 3
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-- Identification of political, economic or military weaknesses
in the USSR which might be exploited by the United States in
implementing its own policies.
c. The Role of Intelligence Estimates. A policy statement
is needed which more clearly defines the function of NIEs in the US Govern-
ment policy process and delineates the boundary between policy and intelli-
gence. This policy should stress the responsibility of the Community to
alert policymakers to future problems or challenges to US interests. It
should also stress the need to be relevant to the concerns of the users of
intelligence, while recognizing that the alerting responsibility, insofar
as it may on occasion result in challenges to current policy, is to a
certain extent in tension with the need for relevancy.
A key principle in delineating the boundary between intelligence
and policy is that the content of NIEs should be clearly rooted in intelli-
gence sources and methods. The current Community debate about
whether the Soviets are striving for strategic superiority does not
directly hinge upon intelligence information. Rather, it is a debate
about the interpretation of intelligence and- -implicitly- -about what
courses of action the United States should take in view of the continued
Soviet military buildup. This debate could more constructively be carried
out under the auspices of the NSC, where the costs and benefits of US
policy, force posture and negotiating alternatives could be debated,
taking into account the information, insights and uncertainties of intelli-
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2. Intelligence Community Posture for Utilizing "Soft Data" on
the USSR
Community utilization of so-called "soft data" on the Soviet Union
seems to go in cycles. During the 1950s and early 1960s, national
estimates made extensive use of human sources and published information,
both classified and unclassified. During the 1960s, this practice declined,
presumably because of the great wealth of satellite data which became
available and the major US policy interests in the growth of Soviet
strategic forces. Starting in 1973, there was a clear effort by the
Community to utilize to a greater degree political, economic and
military doctrinal information in the Soviet estimates and their
supporting analyses. For example, there were or are all-source
analyses by the CIA, DIA. and military services of Soviet military
doctrine, naval objectives and policy, limited nuclear war policy,
defense spending, civil defense, research and development, and,
most recently, a new CIA project to research Soviet views on strategic
superiority.
But these efforts for the most part have been reactions to demands
from users critical of intelligence products or to controversies within
the Community. There is no comprehensive base of data on Soviet
affairs, readily accessible to analysts, which supports these Community
studies. There is no comprehensive, integrated Community program
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of research on all aspects of Soviet affairs- -politics, economy,
technology, military capabilities, society, foreign policy. National
estimates are still guided too much by presumptions about what
"reasonable men" are likely to do, not by solid study and understanding
of the factors which actually guide and constrain Soviet foreign policy,
military planning, and actions in crises and war. The Intelligence
Community and the US Government do not comprehend Soviet affairs
anywhere near as well as the Soviet Union understands US affairs.
But the more delicate future balance of US and Soviet power, the more
complex relationship emerging between the two countries, and the
strong prospects for continued superpower competition demand far
better and more comprehensive intelligence on the USSR.
To remedy this situation will require major investments of money
and manpower- -probably over and above the currently programmed
resources--and very likely will require changes or additions to organiza-
tions internal to some of the NFIB agencies. During Phase II, the IC
Staff, with Community elements, will investigate,in greater depth,ongoing
intelligence analyses, production and data bases related to Soviet affairs,
will examine the costs and benefits of alternatives to provide a more
comprehensive and systematic program of intelligence research on the
Soviet Union, and will make resource and organizational recommendations.
Aspects of this problem to be examined include:
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- - Comprehensive, integrated and systematic exploitation of
FBIS, unclassified and classified Soviet literature, defectors,
emigrees and other sources of "soft data" on the Soviet Union,
with the objective of making these data more readily accessible
to intelligence analysts.
-- More comprehensive and timely analysis of all relevant Soviet
military exercises on a routine basis, again with the goal of
making this body of data more readily accessible to analysts.
-- A broader range of basic economic, industrial and technological
studies of the Soviet Union than are now being conducted.
-- Studies of Soviet society and dissent.
-- Analysis of factors influencing Soviet decisionmaking,inn foreign
policy, negotiations, economics, and military force planning.
-- A program to build up and sustain a body of intelligence
production personnel who are expects on the Soviet Union,
both generalists and specialists.
-- Programs to draw upon academic, other government and
private research organizations to complement the efforts
of the Community in the area of Soviet affairs.
3. Barriers Which Inhibit Dissemination of Information
Users of intelligence sometimes complain about what they feel
is excessive compartmentation of intelligence products. There is a
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parallel, and perhaps more serious, problem within the Intelligence
Community--the failure to disseminate available information so it
can be utilized by intelligence analysts in preparing national estimates
and other products. For example, NSA does not routinely disseminate
all processed intercepts (i. e. , those which have been decrypted and
translated), but makes a preliminary screening or analysis to disseminate
only that information deemed important. This is presumably done to
avoid flooding Community lhalysts with unnecessary information, but are
NSA personnel sufficiently aware of all needs of the analysts to make
such a screening? Similarly, it is not clear that CIA/DDO makes
available to Community analysts all information relevant to problems
being researched. The State Department and other non-Community
agencies responsibile for disseminating overseas reports also withhold
information from the Community, sometimes for reasons of sensitivity,
sometimes because they are not fully aware of Community requirements.
The Phase II inquiry will include an examination of such dissemination
problems, including:
-- Detailed documentation of the extent to which these dissemination
problems exist and the reasons therefor.
- - Evaluation of the impact on national estimates and other
intelligence production of these dissemination problems.
- - Recommendations for procedures and guidelines for reducing
problems of disseminating information to and within the
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Community, while avoiding extensive and costly distribution
of marginal information and safeguarding sensitive sources
and methods.
4. Net Assessments. The avowed position of the Community on net
assessments of US and Soviet military capabilities is at variance with
the practice in national estimates. The Community position is that
intelligence should not make net assessments involving judgments on
US military capabilities, but should contribute necessary inputs to net
assessment studies done by DOD or other Government agencies. The
Community practice is, however, to make net judgments an likely outcomes
of US-Soviet military conflict, which do in fact involve judgments about
US forces, sometimes based on interaction analyses, sometimes not.
Actual Community practice regarding net assessments has evolved
under pressure from users for bottom line Community judgments about
Soviet military capabilities, ranging from the effectiveness of single
weapon systems in combat to evaluations of the overall warmaking potential
of the USSR. To retreat from this practice would be untenable and
irresponsible. Instead, there should be a refined statement of Community
policy on net assessments and an effort to improve Community capabilities
to perform its own assessments and to contribute to the net assessments
of users. Recommendations on these matters will be developed during
Phase II.
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-- A refined statement of Community policy should be based
on the following principle: the Community should perform
US-Soviet military interactions analyses to help make
judgments about the effectiveness of Soviet weapons and
forces. The Community should not, ho" ever, make judgments
about what changes or improvements should be programmed
for US military forces.
- - Within the boundaries of a refined policy on net assessments,
the Community should assure that it has the right data bases,
methodologies, organizations and trained analysts to perform
net assessments and interaction analyses.
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