CRIME SPECIAL STUDY 80-14 THE USAF TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM AND THE HEROIN SMUGGLING THREAT: MACRO-VULNERABILITY STUDY ( SEVEN CRESCENTS)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001500010014-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 61
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: July 21, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS A I R FORCE O F F I C E O F SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE. DC 20332
REPLY TO
AT Or : Ivc
2 1 JUL_ 1980
su.l c CRIME SPECIAL STUDY 80-14
The USAF Transportation System and the Heroin Smuggling Threat: A
Macro-Vulnerability Study (SEVEN CRESCENTS)
All AFOSI Dists, Dets and RAs (CAT III)
1. Purpose. The purpose of this study is to restate the Southwest Asian
(SWA) heroin threat to the USAF transportation system and to describe
vulnerabilities in the system as they are perceived from a macro-level.
The perspective presented here is a collation of information obtained in
coordination with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. Customs
and other military investigative agencies.
2. INTRODUCTION: Seven Bulldogs. In March 1974, A KC-135, returning from
U-Tapao AB, Thailand, landed at Barksdale AFB, LA, carrying over $222,000
.worth of heroin concealed in a 20-man liferaft. The 63.9 grams of heroin
was 94-98% pure. The AFOSI investigation following this accidental find
eventually focused in on a crew member who was allegedly a heroin user. As
an outgrowth of this investigation, Operation Seven Bull dogs was initiated
by HQ AFOSI to determine whether or not a ring-type narcotics smuggling
activity using USAF aircraft existed. The resultant, extensive
investigative effort and detailed analysis failed to identify any
organized, military heroin trafficking ring operating between Southeast
Asia (SEA) and CONUS. It did, however, identify small groups of USAF
personnel independently trafficking heroin. The operation eventually
resulted in the apprehension of eight major drug dealers and the seizure of
more than $700,000 worth of heroin.
3. Southwest Asian Heroin and the USAF Heroin Problem. Narcotics
intelligence estimates (outlined in Crime Information Reports 80-1 and
80-3) spell out the threat posed by extremely large opium harvests in SWA.
These reports suggest that the resultant availability of heroin to U.S.
Forces stationed in Europe and Southwest Asia approaches and perhaps even
surpasses the availability of Southeast Asian (SEA) heroin to our forces
stationed in SEA during the peak years of the Vietnam conflict. Based on
statistics from all sources, the USAF does not have a serious problem in
terms of number of the individuals involved. For the first quarter of
CY 1980, the USAF drug abuse control program reflected a .2 per 1,000 USAF
members rate for members identified as using opiates through all reporting
vehicles. This figure is down significantly from the. 1.0 rate per 1,000
for CYs 1974 and 1975. This fact notwithstanding, there has been a rise in
the last two quarters in the total number of opiate. abusers identified
through the drug abuse control program in USAFE. In the third quarter of
CY 1979, five USAF associated personnel were so identified in USAFE.
During the fourth quarter., CY 1979, ten persons were identified and by the
end of the first quarter, CY 1980, thirteen more had been identified.
USAF review(s) completed.
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4. BACKGROUND: Two factors drive the SWA heroin threat. The first factor
is the existence of a lucrative market in both Europe and the United States
for this heroin. The second is the belief that huge profits can be made
through exploiting vulnerabilities in the customs system to move this glut
of heroin into these areas.
a. The Market. The USAF transportation system is threatened by the
existence of a lucrative heroin market in Europe and in the CONUS. The
European market for heroin has been saturated with SWA heroin to the extent
that high purity heroin appears to be readily available for a relatively
low price. Conversely, the CONUS market, according to DEA sources, still
suffers from a drought of heroin. Heroin on the CONUS market is of low
purity but sells for a relatively high price. These circumstances exist in
spite of the fact that DEA estimates that 70 percent of the heroin
available on the streets of major U.S. cities is SWA heroin. The
availability of heroin in Europe could open the door to a lucrative U.S.
Forces market there. This, and the demand for heroin in the CONUS, could
stimulate efforts to exploit the USAF transportation system within Europe
and from Europe to the CONUS.
b. Heroin Interests. The three classes of persons likely to attempt
to exploit the transportation system are (1) heroin abusers, (2) heroin
dealers, and (3) heroin traffickers ("dealers" refers to individuals
operating alone and selling to users for profit and "traffickers" refers to
persons seeking to supply other traffickers/dealers). Each of these three
classes is assumed to exist to some degree in the USAF population.
However, the threat to the USAF transportation system posed by these three
interests is further complicated by the variety of populations serviced by
the system. For example, the USAF system transports service members from
all branches of the military and DoD civilians. The system also moves all
APO U.S. Forces mail. Further, this "in-house" threat is multiplied by the
fact that the system could be targeted and exploited by civilian organized
criminal elements.
5. Current Intelligence Threat Estimate. The primary threat to the USAF
transportation system lies in independent smuggling activities by
individuals or small groups directly associated with the USAF (as in "Seven
Bulldogs," supra). However, to date, no incidents of smuggling heroin
through the USAF transportation system have been identified in Europe or in
the CONUS. European and domestic efforts to interdict heroin smuggled
through traditional, civilian methods have not yet forced traffickers to
pursue alternate transportation systems. If organized criminal elements
decide to attempt to smuggle large quantities of SWA heroin to the CONUS
and begin to compete with what are now essentially Turkish and Iranian
traffickers, USAF personnel and the transportation system may be targeted
as an alternative method of moving heroin.
6. Areas of Vulnerability. The USAF transportation system is vulnerable
to smuggling activities in four areas: (1) concealment on USAF
aircraft/vehicles, (2) concealment on the person or in the baggage of
individuals traveling via USAF aircraft/vehicles, (3) concealment in
household goods shipments/cargo and (4) concealment in mail. Each of these
2
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areas is susceptible to a wide variety of smuggling techniques. These
techniques, especially when they involve high-value items which can be
placed in small packages, such as heroin, are limited only by the brashness
and ingenuity of the individuals involved. Appendix C takes a closer look
at these four areas and at some of the smuggling techniques known to have
been used in the past. Each of these areas has built-in "weaknesses" which
can be taken advantage of by individuals or conspirators to move SWA heroin
from one point to a number of other points. Most of these weaknesses are
of such a nature that further regulatory action to overcome them would.
severely restrict the ability of the USAF transportation system to
effectively and efficiently accomplish its mission. Because of this, AFOSI
source coverage and dedicated concern on the part of USAF commanders,
customs inspectors and cargo/passenger processors and other. command
officials will be necessary if an effective deterrent to smuggling
activities is to be created.
7. Summary. There is no intelligence or investigative information which
suggests that the USAF transportation system is currently being used to
smuggle SWA heroin. AFOSI investigative activity within recent months has
confirmed that a few USAF members in USAFE are/have been actively involved
in trafficking heroin to other military members in the vicinity of their
installations. Narcotics intelligence does not forecast a significant drop
in the massive quantities of SWA heroin available for illicit markets in
Europe and the United States. This availability, the disparity of prices
for this heroin between the U.S. and European markets, and continuing
financial problems, resulting from the low salaries of military members,
all could make the monetary attractiveness of involvement in the smuggling
of SWA heroin a serious temptation for USAF personnel who have access to
local drug communities overseas and in the CONUS. Operation Seven Bulldogs
confirmed that similar conditions resulted in small groups of USAF
personnel becoming involved in heroin smuggling activities in the early and
mid seventies. The potential for a resurgence of this activity as a result
of current conditions poses a serious threat to the USAF transportation
system.
8. The information contained in this report is intended for internal USAF
use only. Pertinent portions of the macro-vulnerability study should be
discussed with theater and base level commanders and appropriate USAF
officials at these and MAJCOM levels who are directly responsible for
managing the USAF transportation system. Dissemination of the information
outside of USAF channels should not be made without prior coordination with
the Director of Criminal Investigations, HQ AFOSI.
Appendices
A. USAF Scheduled Air Routes
within USAFE and between CONUS
and USAFE, Jul 80.
B. Known/suspected SWA Heroin
Trafficking Patterns
C. Areas Most Susceptible to
SWA Heroin Smuggling and a
Capsulization of Known Smuggling
Techniques
3
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Appendix A
USAF Scheduled Air Routes within USAFE and between CONUS and USAFE, Jul 80
1. Stable Air Routes are Conducive to Smuggling. The U.S Air Force is
tasked with a variety of missions in Europe and SWA in support of U.S.
interests in those areas. These taskings include transportation support
for all major USAF locations in USAFE. In many cases this means the Air
Force operates the only air service available to and between most of these
locations. The fact that much of the air traffic involved in these
missions fly "established" routes may make them particularly attractive to
potential smugglers. (See Appendix C for more detailed information
concerning this subject.) To unscrupulous air crew members, these routes
mean predictability in the customs inspections given to their personal
baggage, their person and the aircraft in general. To aerial port and
aircraft maintenance personnel with an active interest in the drug trade,
they mean relatively dependable routes and arrival times which could
facilitate conspiracy between them and their co-conspirators at other
locations. These factors also mean specific hiding places and retrieval
schedules can be established well in advance of the targeted mission and
predesignated signalling devices can be used to alert their partners as to
whether the aircraft or cargo contains concealed drugs. As. with the air
crew members, the fact that the specific missions generally fly set
patterns/routes greatly assists the DoD passenger (PAX), who is attempting
to smuggle drugs, in determining in advance what he can expect in the way
of inspections of his baggage and his person. In sum, each of these three
classes of people, aircrew, ground crew and PAX can be aided in a drug
smuggling effort by the relative stability offered in the USAF air
transport mission within USAFE and between USAFE and other areas of the
world serviced by the USAF transportion system.
2. Caveat. The scope of this appendix is necessarily limited. References
to the USAF transportation system are made with the understanding that the
USAF is not the only military carrier that may be flying a given route.
Indeed, many of these same routes are flown on a scheduled or non-scheduled
basis by other military air traffic, both foreign and U.S. (e.g.,US Army
and Navy aircraft as well as the USAF's own SAC and TAC aircraft). In
addition, the "scheduled" routes described herein are subject to change at
anytime and should not be read or relied upon as a fixed schedule. MAC
also flies certain missions in support of U.S. embassies in USAFE and SWA
to include countries where the SWA heroin threat is greatest such as
Pakistan. These flights are not regularly scheduled, are very rare, and
are generated almost exclusively on an as needed basis for personnel
support in those embassies.
3. Current Scheduled Air Routes (Jul 80). While the vast majority of USAF
air traffic in USAFE could not be categorized as "scheduled," still. many
routes and schedules remain relatively constant. Attached are lists of
current, scheduled routes flown by MAC aircraft. The list is broken down
by aircraft type (e.g., C-130, C-141, C-5, and C-9A) and the routes flown
by each type of aircraft each day of the week. Also appended are maps
.depicting the routes these aircraft fly. Some of these will be deleted or
at least changed from time to time, but many are established routes which
will probably continue into the foreseeable future.
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4 Attachments
1. C-141 Routes Broken Down by
Day of the Week
2. C-5 Routes Broken Down by
Day of the Week.
3. C-130 Routes Broken Down by
Day of the Week.
4. C-9A and C-130 Medevac
Routes.
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 A
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A ABA429F
ABA430
ROUTE
Charleston AFB, SC - Prestwick,
Scotland - Mildenhall RAFB, UK
- Charleston AFB, SC
B ABA442 Jedda, Saudi Arabia Ramstein
AB, FRG - Charleston AFB, SC
Jedda, Saudi Arabia -
Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Charleston
AFB, SC
ABA4F3F Dover AFB, DE - Rhein-Main AB,
FRG
ABA4JIF Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB,
FRG - Amman, Jordan
ABA4T2 Incirlik CDI, Turkey -
Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Charleston
AFB, SC
G AQAY417AF Dover AFB, DE - Rhein-Main AB,
FRG.
Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB, FRG
I ANA707F Dover AFB,. DE - Mildenhall
RAFB, UK - Rhein Main AB, FRG -
Torrejon AB, Spain.
J AQA707F Torrejon AB, Spain - Athens,
ANA708 Greece - Incirlik CDI, Turkey -
Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Mildenhall
RAFB, UK
Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Dover
ANA 708 AFB, DE
L AQA708A Rhein Main AB, FRG - Lajes AB,
Azores
M PBA8R3F Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB,
PBA8R4 FRG - Mildenhall RAFB, UK -
Dover AFB, DE
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BEST COPY
Available
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INDEX MISSION
ROUTE
A ABA429F Charleston AFB, SC - Prestwick,
ABA430 Scotland - Mildenhall RAFB, UK
- Charleston AFB, SC
B ABA443 Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB,
FRG - Dhahran, Saudi Arabia -
Jedda, Saudi Arabia
C ABA4F4 Rhein Main, FRG - Charleston
AFB, SC
D ABA4W6 Dhahran, Saudi Arabia -
Ramstein AB, FRG - Charleston
AFB, SC
E ABA747 Norfolk NAS, VA Rota NAS,
.Spain - Bahrain, Bahrain
F ABA759
ABA760
Norfolk NAS, VA - Rota NAS,
Spain - Sigonella, Sicily,
Italy - Naples, Italy - Rota
NAS, Spain - Norfolk NAS, VA
G AJA7V3 Dover AFB, DE - Torrejon AB,
Spain
H AQAY417AF Rhein-Main, FRG - Athens,
Greece- Cigli CDI, Turkey
Ankara, Turkey - Incirlik CDI,
Turkey - Athens, Greece -
Rhein-Main, FRG
I AQA4JIF
Ramstein AB, FRG - Amman, Jordan
J ANA707A Lajes AB, Azores - Mildenhall
RAFB, UK - Rhein Main AB, FRG -
Torrejon AB, Spain
K AQA707F Torrejon AB, Spain - Athens,
ANA708 Greece - Incirlik CDI, Turkey -
Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Mildenhall
RAFB, UK
L ANA708 Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Dover
AFB, DE
Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB,
PBA8R6 FRG - Dover AFB, DE
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INDEX MISSION
A ABA429F Charleston AFB, SC - Prestwick,
ABA430 Scotland - Mildenhall RAFB, UK
- Charleston AFB, SC
B AJA435 Dover AFB, DE - Torrejon AB,
Spain - Athens, Greece
C ABA4F3F Dover AFB, DE - Rhein-Main AB,
FRG
D ABA4J2 Amman, Jordan - Ramstein AB,
FRG - Charleston AFB, SC
E ABA7V1 Torrejon AB, Spain - Pisa,
ABA7V4 Italy - Aviano AB, Italy -
Torrejon AB, Spain
F ABA7V3 Torrejon AB, Spain - Aviano
ABA7V4 AB, Italy - Pisa, Italy -
Torrejon AB, Spain
G AQAY418AF Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Charleston
AFB, SC
H AQAY417F Dover AFB, DE - Rhein-Main AB,
FRG
I ANA708A Torrejon AB, Spain - Athens,
Greece - Rhein-Main AB, FRG
J ANA707F Dover AFB, DE - Mildenhall
RAFB, UK - Rhein Main AB, FRG -
Torrejon AB, Spain
K ANA708 Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Dover
AFB, DE
Lajes AB, Azores - Rhein Main
AKA7F7F AB, FRG (Medevac Aircraft)
Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB, FRG
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INDEX MISSION
ROUTE
A ABA429F Charleston AFB, SC - Prestwick,
ABA430 Scotland - Mildenhall RAFB, UK
- Charleston AFB, SC
Charleston AFB, SC - Mildenhall
ABA432 RAFB, UK - Charleston AFB, SC
ABA436 Athens, Greece - Torrejon AB,
Spain
ABA444 Jedda, Saudi Arabia - Ramstein
AB, FRG - Charleston AFB, SC
ABA4F4 Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Charleston
AFB, SC
ABA748 Bahrain, Bahrain - Athens,
Greece - Rota NAS, Spain -
Norfolk NAS, VA
G ABA751 Rota NAS, Spain - Naples, Italy
ABA752 - Sigonella, Sicily, Italy -
Rota NAS, Spain - Norfolk NAS,
VA
Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB, FRG
I ABA7V4 Torrejon AB, Spain - McGuire
AFB, NJ
J AQAY417F Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Athens,
AQAY418F Greece - Incirlik CDI, Turkey -
Ankara, Turkey Cigli CDI,
Turkey - Athens, Greece -
Rhein-Main AB, FRG.
K ANA707A Lajes AB, Azores - Mildenhall
RAFB, UK - Rhein-Main AB, FRG -
Torrejon AB, Spain
L AQA708A Rhein Main AB, FRG - Lajes AB,
Azores
M AQA707F Torrejon AB, Spain - Athens,
ANA708 Greece - Incirlik CDI, Turkey -
Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Mildenhall
RAFB, UK
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N ALA7F8F Rhein Main AB, FRG - Andrews
AFB, MD. (Medevac Aircraft)
P AQA7R2 Ramstein AB, FRG - McGuire AFB,
NJ
R PBA8R5F Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB,
PBA8R6 FRG - Dover AFB, DE
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 INDEX MISSION
A ABA429F Charleston AFB, SC - Prestwick,
ABA430. Scotland - Mildenhall RAFB, UK
- Charleston AFB, SC
ABA432 RAFB, U.K. - Charleston AFB, SC
C ABA435 Torrejon AB, Spain - Athens,
ABA436 Greece - Ramstein AB, FRG -
Charleston AFB, SC
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ROUTE
Charleston AFB, SC - Mildenhall
D AJA441 Dover AFB, DE - Torrejon AB,
ABA441 Spain - Dhahran, Saudi Arabia -
Jedda, Saudi Arabia
ABA4F3F
ABA7R4
ABAY715
Dover AFB, DE - Rhein-Main AB,
FRG
Ramstein AB, FRG - McGuire AFB,
NJ
Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB, FRG
H AQAY418F Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Charleston
AFB, SC
I AQAY417F Dover AFB, DE - Rhein-Main AB,
FRG
J ANA708A Torrejon AB, Spain - Athens,
Greece - Rhein-Main AB, FRG
K ANA707F Dover AFB, DE - Mildenhall
RAFB, UK - Rhein-Main AB, FRG -
Torrejon AB, Spain
L ANA708 Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Dover
AFB, DE
M AKA7F7F Lajes AB, Azores - Rhein Main
AB, FRG (Medevac Aircraft)
N PBA8R3F Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB, FRG
PBA8R4 - Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Dover
AFB, DE
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 INDEX MISSION ROUTE
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ABA429F Charleston AFB, SC - Prestwick,
ABA430 Scotland - Mildenhall RAFB, UK
- Charleston AFB, SC
ABA431 Charleston AFB, SC - Mildenhall
ABA432 RAFB, UK - Charleston AFB, SC
C ABA4F4 Rhein Main AB, FRG - Charleston
AFB, SC
ABA759 Norfolk NAS, VA - Rota NAS,
ABA760 Spain - Sigonella, Sicily, Italy
- Naples, Italy - Rota NAS,,
Spain - Norfolk NAS, VA
E ABAY716 Ramstein AB, FRG
McGuire AFB, NJ
AQAY417F Rhein Main AB, FRG - Athens,
AQAY418F Greece - Incirlik CDI, Turkey -
Ankara, Turkey - Cigli CDI,
Turkey - Athens, Greece -
Rhein-Main AB, FRG
G AQA708A Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Lajes AB,
Azores
AQA707F Torrejon AB, Spain - Athens,
ANA708 Greece - Incirlik CDI, Turkey-
Rhein-Main AB, FRG -
Mildenhall RAFB, UK
I ANA707A Lajes AB, Azores - Mildenhall
RAFB, UK - Rhein-Main AB,
FRG - Torrejon AB, Spain
J ALA7F8F Rhein Main AB, FRG -
Andrews AFB, MD (Medevac
Aircraft)
PBA8R4 Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB, FRG -
PBA8R3F Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Dover
AFB, DE
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