INFORMAL COMMENTS ON ICS STUDIES ON SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION DURING AN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION DURING AN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001800040010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2003
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: September 18, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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18 September 1974
25X1A
Product Review Division
Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT Informal Comments on ICS Studies on Signal
Intelligence Production During an Inter-
national Crisis and Photographic Intelligence
Production During an International Crisis
1. Thank you for the opportunity to comment once again on
these draft studies, which reflect the results of extensive 25X16
efforts to pinpoint means by which the Intelligence Commu
nity's performance during times of crisis could be improved.
We expect that a number of points contained in the studies
may well lead to a lively discussion around the USIB table,
where parochial interests sometimes have a tendency to
appear paramount. The following paragraphs highlight
several areas (noted in our comments on earlier drafts)
which, perforce, may surface again at USIB.
2. A theme common to both papers is the recommendation
that an NSA and an NPIC liaison officer serve TDY with
"whatever de facto crisis task force is'established under
the DCI's auspices." In our view, this is an improvement
of the earlier versions which called for automatically
assigning a liaison officer to the DCI to assist the NIO
involved, but we believe neither is really required. In
the case of NSA, points of contact for the NIOs have already
been established while in the photographic field, similar
arrangements could also be arranged with NPIC. The addition
of two personnel during a time of crisis, we believe, would
complicate rather than simplify recently instituted, extant
systems. NSA and DDS&T may raise these points at USIB.
25X1
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3. In our view, the greatest utility of a liaison
officer from NSA and NPIC would be in his location at his
parent agency where he would be available to respond to
queries or requests for action from either a crisis task
force or the NIO involved. This system has worked extremely
well, thus far, with the NSA assigned contact points for the
NIOs. In numerous cases, the NSA contact's substantive and
organizational knowledge has enabled him to check out a
problem with all the appropriate components of NSA and to
respond very quickly in a manner which would not have been
possible had the contact been away from Fort Meade. A
similar arrangement with NPIC and/or COMIREX should lead to
equal responsiveness in the photographic field.
4. In the field of SIGINT specifically, production
elements may raise objections to the thrust for expanded
interpretive (vice analytical in earlier versions) reporting
by NSA -- particularly during a crisis when SIGINT volume
increases. This would appear to be the time for all hands
to turn to and move the traffic, adding appropriate comments
but without making "extensive interpretation" which is so
time-consuming. The valid point in the study that NSA
analysts have valuable expertise to offer can be, in our
judgment, best capitalized on by brief NSA comments as
opposed to detailed interpretive (read analytical) efforts
on their part which would impinge on their time to process
and summarize the take during the crisis.
5. The proposal that NSA should cease dissemination
of field reporting to the production agencies when the volume
of SIGINT becomes excessive during a crisis strikes us as
another area in which there will be considerable USIB
discussion. Virtually all production analysts prefer to
receive the basic reporting -- not summarized versions --
on which they will make their own judgments. A reduction
of direct field reporting based on specific priority guidance
would be much more palatable to the production agencies
than its elimination and replacement with NSA prepraed
summaries alone. The recommendation that all-source analysts
be better trained in SIGINT matters should help alleviate
the SIGINT "bottom of the in-box" syndrome.
25X1A
George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
P f3i 7T
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