TRW PILOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT INTERVIEW PROGRAM
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP83M00171R001800070008-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 30, 2001
Sequence Number:
8
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 7, 1976
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
A111 1D7i EDIT ON Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001800070008-4
..'.jA FPMR (41 CFRI 1A1.1 ,
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Merzorandum
U-0031/DIN-1
0 : OSD(I) Mr. Henderson DATE: 7 Apr 1976
25X1A
ROM DIA Declassification/Release Instru
on File
UBJECT: TRW Pilot Crisis Management Interview Program
to The TRW Crisis Management Interviews Program has
considerable value from the standpoint that it represents
the perception of military commanders concerning crisis
management shortcomings. Unfortunately it tends to be far
too general in approach, presents a diversity of views
rather than a consensus and is almost totally lacking in
recommendations. The opportunity to examine in detail the
strengths and weaknesses of crisis management systems
which served these commanders during specific crises was
bypassed in favor a a "fireside chat" approach covering
30 years of U.S. history. The result in an interesting,
broad, philosophical confirmation that the concerns of the
I&W community about its inability to provide clear, timely,
accurate, convincing, irrefutable warning with a complete
set of options and the likely reactions thereto is shared
by operational commanders. Even though the problem is how
to correct the deficiencies rather than how to codify their
existence, the summary page does provide a handy list of
deficiencies against which the WWMCCS and NMIC architecture
can be played to seek areas of potential solutions. It
might also be advantageous to compare the utility and
effectiveness of the current I&W reporting vehicles to the
major deficiencies list. At the very least the study supports
our concerns and underscores the need for dedicated secure
communications.
20 The continuation of this effort utilizing past commanders
has limited utility other than to reinforce the deficiency
list already established. On the other hand, the interview
method if applied to current leadership and current manage-
ment practices is strongly endorsed. 'It--should be further
expanded by incorporating within the interview team intelli-
gence representatives thoroughly familiar with current
ILLEGIB publications and watch center capabilities. Such a structure
would be educational for both sides of the house, permit
BQp"o
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Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001800070008-4
immediate correction of minor deficiencies, and initiate
action on major problems at a high enough level to drive
corrective action. The NIO, DIOs or the consumer review
group could undertake such an effort. Since they all have
general consumer interface responsibilities now, the
lacking ingredient seems to be a fixed reporting schedule.
Chief/Operat/ons support
Directorate for Intelligence
2
Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001800070008-4