TRW PILOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT INTERVIEW PROGRAM

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP83M00171R001800070008-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 30, 2001
Sequence Number: 
8
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 7, 1976
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP83M00171R001800070008-4.pdf85.09 KB
Body: 
A111 1D7i EDIT ON Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001800070008-4 ..'.jA FPMR (41 CFRI 1A1.1 , UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Merzorandum U-0031/DIN-1 0 : OSD(I) Mr. Henderson DATE: 7 Apr 1976 25X1A ROM DIA Declassification/Release Instru on File UBJECT: TRW Pilot Crisis Management Interview Program to The TRW Crisis Management Interviews Program has considerable value from the standpoint that it represents the perception of military commanders concerning crisis management shortcomings. Unfortunately it tends to be far too general in approach, presents a diversity of views rather than a consensus and is almost totally lacking in recommendations. The opportunity to examine in detail the strengths and weaknesses of crisis management systems which served these commanders during specific crises was bypassed in favor a a "fireside chat" approach covering 30 years of U.S. history. The result in an interesting, broad, philosophical confirmation that the concerns of the I&W community about its inability to provide clear, timely, accurate, convincing, irrefutable warning with a complete set of options and the likely reactions thereto is shared by operational commanders. Even though the problem is how to correct the deficiencies rather than how to codify their existence, the summary page does provide a handy list of deficiencies against which the WWMCCS and NMIC architecture can be played to seek areas of potential solutions. It might also be advantageous to compare the utility and effectiveness of the current I&W reporting vehicles to the major deficiencies list. At the very least the study supports our concerns and underscores the need for dedicated secure communications. 20 The continuation of this effort utilizing past commanders has limited utility other than to reinforce the deficiency list already established. On the other hand, the interview method if applied to current leadership and current manage- ment practices is strongly endorsed. 'It--should be further expanded by incorporating within the interview team intelli- gence representatives thoroughly familiar with current ILLEGIB publications and watch center capabilities. Such a structure would be educational for both sides of the house, permit BQp"o ?S e gap J0 u ar y /09 : t~eA ayro DP 3 001~s1 I Q01800070008-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001800070008-4 immediate correction of minor deficiencies, and initiate action on major problems at a high enough level to drive corrective action. The NIO, DIOs or the consumer review group could undertake such an effort. Since they all have general consumer interface responsibilities now, the lacking ingredient seems to be a fixed reporting schedule. Chief/Operat/ons support Directorate for Intelligence 2 Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001800070008-4