CIA LEBANESE EVACUATION TASK FORCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001800080035-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 30, 2001
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: June 25, 1976
• Content Type: MFR

Approved For ReleaseS2R0'~-/1~/(~ TCIA-RDP83M00171R001800080035-3
IC 76-2331
25 June 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
25X1A FROM:
SUBJECT: CIA Lebanese Evacuation Task Force
1. The following is a brief account of how the recent CIA Lebanese
Evacuation Task Force functioned in,the main. It is based on my discus-
sions with the Chief of the Task Force, and several
of its members.
2. The Task Force, composed of representatives?from OCI, OSR, OER,
DDO,and the Operations Center, was in operation a little over 48 hours--
from noon Friday, June 18 until about 1400 Sunday, June 20. During
that time it issued a total of 7 Situation Reports--one about every
eight hours. A hard copy version was prepared for the DCI and internal
agency elements and was also LDXd to the White House Situation Room.
A cable version (the same text) was sent at Immediate (sometimes
Flash) precedence to consumers--including certain embassies and military
commands--as well as the Intelligence Community.
3. The Task Force area is located directly under the CIA Operations
Center which acts as the principal communications center for the Task
Force. All crisis-related electrical and hard copy material received
in the Ops Center is immediately tubed down to the Task Force. The
Task Force has direct-line secure phone communications with the White
House, the CIA Operations Center and other operations and intelligence
centers i n the 4Jashi ngton area.
4. No problems were encountered with the flow of intelligence
information into the Task Force. Arrangements were made to have all
crisis-related CIA/DDO reporting forwarded directly to the Task Force
before being distributed to the DDO watch officer. Likewise, at the end.
of each shift, the CIA/DDO representative serving with the State Task
Force Group was debriefed by the CIA Task Force before reporting to his
parent element. A number of ~JOIWON conferences were initiated by the CIA
Ops Center to circulate and obtain additional information on activities
relating to the situation.
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5. Some difficulty was experienced in obtaining operational data.
JCS Ops Orders were not addressed to CIA and attempts to correct the.
problem, despite assurances from NMCC, were not successful. Consequently,
when the Ops Orders were received at State the DD0 representative there.
had to resend them to the Task Force. The DDO representative at State
also frequently phoned EXDIS/NODIS information into the Task Force but
there was apparently some delay in the actual delivery of this material
to CIA.
6? Mr. Bush participated personally in the Task Force's operations
from 0200 to 0500 on Sunday, 2 0 June. He maintained frequent phone
contact with State, Defense and White House officials and kept the
Task Force informed of political and operational actions and decisions.
Later, I~r. Kissinger called to thank CIA for "its assistance and
fine spirit of cooperation."
7. Vince Heyman, Chief of the CIA Operations Center, is preparing 25X
~ detailed report on the Task Force's operation and will provide a copy 25X1A
to the IC Staff.
25X
25X1A
Distribution:
Original - D/DCI/IC via D/OPEI
1 - IC Regi stry
1 - PAID Subject
1 - PAID Chrono
DCI~IC/PAID/ n x6501 (6/25/76)
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