RESCUE OF MAYAGUEZ AND ITS CREW (INTELLIGENCE POST MORTEM) (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001800150006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 20, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

JLIIY 1973 rDITillN
6t--A FPMH 141 (:.'tl $OI.11!.?, " ...
UNITED STATES GOVT NMI
Approved F leas
l einoran
FROM : DIO/SEA
DATE: 20 May 1975
SUBJECT: Rescue of MAYAGUEZ and Its Crew (Intelligence Post Mortem) (U)
1. (U) Enclosure 1 has gone to the White House MINUS TABS D,
E, and F in response to the 18 May Presidential memorandum to
the DCI (Enclosure 2). The text in paragraphs 5 and 6 of
Enclosur. 1 (pages 2 and 3) has been modified accordingly.
2. (S) Two criticisms first-
--- Page 1, Paragraph 1: NSA's instructions to its field
elements were prolific, but its substantive coverage of the
MAYAGUEZ was not. CIA has been notified.
can find no NSA report quoting the IBC as stating they intended to
seize. ships operatic n their "territorial waters."
-- Tab A, first paragraph: DI has searched its records and
3. (S) You will note that Tabs E and F of enclosure 1 bear
on the Intelligence Community's "alerting problem" and events
in the Gulf of Thailand prior to the seizure of MAYAGUEZ.
--- In Tab E, General Wilson views the performance of
various operations/intelligence centers (DoD among them --
paragraph 5, page 3) with a jaundiced eye. Iie suggests that
the centers themselves, the NOIWON, and the alerting of
Principals in time of crisis be improved (paragraph 8, pages
4-5). You are, of course, aware of the close ADIN-DDO'relations hip.
*NSC Review Completed for Pg 22, para 1 & Pgs 23
THRU 29*
incident. Much of his statistical data, however, are suspect.
Fifteen of the 17 vessels he cites as having been fired on or
detained were fishing vessels or their equivalent.. Three of
his eight .incidents (those on 4 Nay) probably involved the same
--- In Tab F, General Wilson's thesis is that Intelligence
should have been more alert to the possibility of a NAYAGUIZ-type
ship; three more involved fishing vessels; and only. two (the
first and last) involved merchant ships, one of which was
evidently detained.
DIA & DOS review(s) completed.
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4. (S) Tabs D, E, and F, however, explain Mr. Colby's interest
in expanding the time frame of the President's request for an
intelligence post mortem so that it will include events of a
week to 10 days before MAYAGUEZ. In this regard, I have told
NIO/SSEA (tactfully but firmly) that this agency is opposed
to going beyond the parameters of the President's request and
that the DIA response will be so tailored. The ball is now
in CIA's court.
5. (U) As you know, the 22 May USIB meeting will take up the
MAYAGUEZ affair. My understanding is that the discussions will
focus on the issues raised by General Wilson in Tabs E and F.
DI is now preparing a talking paper for you which will deal
with them.
6. (U) DI-6, which took the lead in preparing the response to
subparagraph b of the Presidential memorandum, is now working
on subparagraphs a and c. I will continue to collaborate.
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2 Enclosures a/s
Copy to DI
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20 May 19 7 5
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Gerald R. Ford
The President of the United States
SUBJECT The Rescue of the SS Mayaguez and Its Crew
1. The attached is in response to your..memorandum of
3.8 May 1975 requesting the instructions; verbal or written,
issued by the intelligence community during the Mayaguez
incident.
2. The responses to the other requests in your me o-
randum will be forwarded by close of business Friday, 23 May.
w. E. Colby
T
T01:1 SEC111E
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*
I:escue of the SS Mayaguez and Its Crew
The following memorandum covers the instructions,
verbal or written, which were issued by the inteZZi-
gence community during the time of the Mayaguez incident.
The Nati_onal Secur_i vv Ag'ancy (NSA) NSA was prolific
hoth in coverage and instructions to field components during
tag affair. < uez aTab A contains a listing of all instruc-
-~.l~c I' ~,zxy 4.i_oix s forwarded to NSA field. elements prior to and during the
mays guez incident.
2. The_ Defense Intelligence Agency (D-CA). During the
period of the Mayaguez incident, DIA relied primarily on secure
telephone contacts for issuing instructions and making requests,
both within the Washington intelligence community and to various
fie l_d components. 'da'b B contains a log of DIA activities relating
to the Mayaguez affair.
3. Bureau of Tntell.ic ^n.c_. and Research, Department of
tae (INR). Although I ,R did not issue any specific instructions
to the field for coverage of the capture of the Mayaguez and
.'Y2.1,S7};O1' f%iC7~um was prepared by the Central I-rlteZZigence Agency,
the Defence 7;'2tel ~i genC e Agency the national Security Agency,
y 3-ate
annd i he ill eau of' ~7?. e I l iget?C' a d liesea:.'ch, Department of .
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Dns thereto, the various policy desks 7ithin the Depart-
t did put all overseas embassies on alert to report reactions
to developmelits relating to the Mayaguez incident.
5. The Director of Central Intellige.n.ce {DCI} .
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In addition
to coordinating the activity of the Intelligence Community during
the course of the Mayaguez affair, the DCI levied two tasks on
the Intelligence Com-=nity Staff: (a) to determine how intelli-
gence procedures relating to the handling of CRITIC messages
could be improved; and (b) why intelligence on earlier seizures
of vessels had not. been forthcoming in time to alert other ships
planning to transit near Cambodia. Tab D contains extracts from
the DCI's morning meetings with his key staff personnel on these
matters. The responses of the Inte=lligence Coy-ununity Staff to
these two requests appear at Tab E and Tab' F.
6. In addition, the National Intelligence Officer for
South and Southeast Asia, acting for the DCI, was in constant
Approved Fo
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-s of
z tie
~= iepszon comznun l cation w
i,1, el ligonce community to ensure that eac h agency provided
coverage- of the Mayaguez affair.
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 12 May (AM) Asked Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center
(NOSIC) for list of all ships enroute to or scheduled,
for Cambodian port of Kompong Sore (Sihanoukville).
Specific info was to include shi pname, flag, voyage
departure, current location, and cargo, if known.
-qJ Ji IJ V U L res~~aacT rirP~I~
"NOW
ayac;uez IncidenL
Description
Asked NOSIC for list of all ships with 24 hours
steaming time of Gulf of Thailand.
Asked NOSIC for description and dispositions on
Cambodian merchant fleet.
TELECOM'; to Subic Bay, Philippines requesting
debriefing of any refugee with knowledge of Poulo
Wai Islands.
TELECOM; to U-Tapao Refugee Cent.--r for any infor-
mation concerning Poulo Wad islands.
TELECOM to NSA re NSA tasking for 25X1A
dedicated coverage of KC comn:s activity in off
shore area.
TELECON to NOSIC _ecuesting
info ?lc tion on crew,
io e port, last port of call
and destination of Mayaguez.
DIA INDICOM request to CINCPAC for information on
nationality status of Poulo W'ai Islands.
Msg USDAO Eankok r eques-tt.ing info on events of
the seizure of Panamanian ship on 7 May.
Poulo Wai photo research initiated to identify
available aerial photography.
121400 EDT DIA (DC) Memo to Joint econnais-.ance C nter (JRC)
requesting urgent requirement for photo coverage
Poulo ;,7ai. Provided general officer represented
to O 'SDEP S Conference in ;? ,ICC .
121544 EDT DIA/J3 me ssac;e tc C! NNCi?i~C, roqucsriing continuous
P-3 coverage of northern Gulf o!_ Siam iita-!'--iple
RF-4C rocce f t.ic hts of Pinuom PCnh, S ha noukvilie
and P}oulo ''al, and U-~27R coverage of Poulo'7ai..
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1.21708 EDT DT _T1 (I)r,) 1 e tia~je to Pr.':,CO''i, SAC a_. d ?Stratec,ic
Reconnaissance Center (SZC) providing ?o tailed
op; ration z?"~ e guidance.
13 May (AM) DIA IND.:CO"I to CI NCPA.C ?- urgent request from
Cambodian re ;,gees re:! a -sing to Kaoh Tang Island.
13 i`'ic!y (r: ") TELECO?'N to NOSIC requesting information on number
r
and s7lr 1us of Cambodian ate chars ~leeU.
TEL,'CO'' to S,: .te De - i questin any 1.n o:" ion
on ri. 'as b oa = C reporting that the Mayaguez will
be r i_e se after "US apologie and return of Kh?"i'mea
Irc _. '`_ tt t er f L_,~..n to Th ' .~..a'?'"~..
INDICOM to CINOPPAC for info on NC combat strength,
and a}:?r!S, 1:,-p_ c."fit number U-~.. F,.Lc.I?C! s Any info
avaiI.;ayb 4_Y from 'pilot ddebriefi nC...
130710 EDT D_li1 C-oncurr &' with :1 for utilization of
OL S1PI TOR-C_? (U-2 ,R) as airborne relay for U.S.
forces communications .
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(-32000 CDT FBIS instructed to emphasize Cambodian coverage
regarding Mayaguez incident. -
131807 EDT D (DC) msg to ARrCOS/CINCPAC concurs in CINCPACs
r:_ -u tlnended delivery procedures for expediting
p;-.:--)co mate-~ ials 'Co Washington.
140054 EDT
140200 EDT
1404-'O EDT
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Coordinated potential. targets for possible T3-52
sLLriLames In Cambod -4 a.
The D.! in o:rmed tha u the NIC for So.wt and Southeast
had .I. C-1, Vii;b.ifie'd
that was }L.rlot?l,eci.ge~~.b.i c of .:aoli Tang Island.
lie were request ed. .:o do te_rr.iine if secure
?L.3 4 ~. t 1 ' b ' ' C, I It
C O`i 11 ij_ .olds c, o'?-1 i C: G.s ~~
cz 1i .i1F j_' h" 111 so rce
' se-'C -i. (1`s e~JJrJ.ef
_ a of C_a 17.. es .t. _. ?.s f C7C C~` L .
` hen se-cure C r, :;L'.li.I -: t ions
not be established
we decided, based on a re_vie:?i o t" preliminary
I.T11O. t1 a- the tiOi, 7.Y_'~:+,-'.~ C; knoyirlg"a.lal1:1ty
rt' ~.I t IO~..., 1> fOl i?ler ].}' 1`T d.}T1.r Tii4 i_ r r?'x I?!] d resides in
1111 i Pp:!
the Hycirogr aphic Office of Defense YMM !ppa ng ~1` enc .
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 'MOR i\NDUM OR Director of Central Intel. -ice
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i , of
SUBJECT: Report C), Community I!ancll.'I -t
Maya gucz Inc i dent
1 , I convened a meeting toclay of operations/watch officers (or
their representatives) from CU.., the. White House Situation s oom,
hIS_A, the State Department, and DIA. Much of the conversation at
that meeling confirmed information conveyed to you last night. in a
preliminary memorandum on the same subject. The conversation
also helped to crystalize, our own thinking about the alerting pro alem,
in general, and we offer you some conclusions and recommendations
in para. 8 of this paper.
?l.'x~e: Problem cif Del. ,
2. The principal immediate proble-m seems to be: Why weren`t
the principals concerned notified of the contents of the initial CRITIC
. 1-Le ops cexT,er?
messages within '~n 15 or so minutes of ?t:hese messages in. FI
The first three messages arrived between 0512 and 0526 EDT_ You
were notified at 0630; Secretary Schlesinger learned of the messages
some time bet%veen 0700 and 0730; General Scowcrofi:"at 0730; the
President around 0800 (courtesy of and Secretary
Kissinger some time after his regular morning stawf me.:ti.ng had begs rl
at . 0 8 0 0 .
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i.11 the initial C.C:.ITICs was in~.lclec}tz i e, t~1 ~i .Cu Ali r data was ecl.c:cl
be axe principals could be properly bri :fed; ~ ) a belief that the.
US would be unable to relict in-macdia~el}T, at }.cast With fm: cc, and
that therefore time was not of the e sence* r c P) re fat Cl to this, -
a colzViction that pxinci?als should not be awakened at home ;t, say,
000, /hen they could "ju-st as.well" be informed upon their
0530 or 6
arrival at the office at, say, 0700 or 0730.
Of lk> As fa 1 as we can tell, none of the principals v;' ere initially
y ' L of
on a~
upset c ~Ot.t xCCE3l.'V].n4; Lh~ X:c'.L~i S ZVl"l~.i'1 tl:lf:yT ClicL, ~,`.'lttC1L% E.