TENTATIVE WORK PROGRAM FOR CRISIS INTELLIGENCE AND PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT BRANCH (OCTOBER 76 - A PRIL 77)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R002100030002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 8, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

R Lease 2001/11/08: Cld h-9? mZ7.bTY STAFF
8 October 1976
0 NOTE FOR: All PAID Staffers
? SUBJECT: Tentative Work Program far CIPIB
25X1A
Attached is food for thought, iiscus-
A
sion for next week's meeting at
INFORMATION
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Tentative Work Program for Crisis Intelligence
and Product Improvement Branch
(October 76 - April 77)
New efforts:
Define-the ICS' (Crisis Intelligence Branch's) role in
Warning and Crisis
What are its functions/responsibilities in a
crisis?
Staff - Monitoring (during) and reviewing (after)?
or
Line - Tasking and coordinating?
What is its relationship to:
DCI's "Crisis Coordinator?"
Special Assistant for Warning and Crisis?
Military Commands?
Lower level consumers?
-- What support should it provide to DCI/IC in his
responsibility to "monitor functions of the
Strategic Warning process?" (DCID 1/5)
-- How does it "improve product?"
? Develop new, improved analytical methods for IFW analysis,
e.g., foreign behavior pattern recognition; integrated
intelligence analysis to detect cumulative changes over
periods of time; display and presentation of analyses
and forecasts; more precise system for expressing
uncertainty and probability in reporting.
? Develop new procedures for reporting/systems which
support warning process (e.g., CONTEXT, National
Sitrep, etc.)
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? Promote wider dissemination/understanding of warning
and crisis related procedures, systems, concepts:
-- Get wide distribution made of CRITIC Handbook to
CIA, State and other USG field elements.
Educate USG to importance of CRITIC system and
other warning related doctrine--work into training
programs for attaches, agents, embassy officers,
FBIS field personnel, etc.
-- Encourage visits between ops center personnel (IC
and non-IC); help to develop an ops center officer
training program
? Visit military commands plus other field elements (CIA
stations, major SIGINT elements, etc.) to:
-- inform on IC systems, procedures, national-level
policies related to warning/crisis
-- get understanding of intel operations and activities
supporting command and value of departmental and
national intelligence in satisfying command needs
discuss, help solve any problems related to Intel
support, e.g., compartmentation, communications,
J2/J3 relations, etc.
? Develop systems, procedures for tasking and coordinating
IC collection and analysis during crises, e.g., for new
technical collection system becoming operational this
fall:
-- How are requirements to be developed and levied"
How will priorities be determined?
-- How will analysts use and report data?
Continuing efforts:
? Host semiannual (?) ops center conferences:
-- Next one in December at FPA on "National Nervous
System Directory?"
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-- Invite wider participation--Intelligence and non-
Intelligence Community; field commands?
? Revise and monitor, ensure compliance with all existing
procedural directives (e.g., CRITIC Handbook, DCID ?T ,
Alert Memoranda, Strategic Warning Notices, NOIWON,
etc.) which support warning process.
? Define DCI's role in warning, crisis and wartime:
-- To establish clear and formally recognized contrcl
over IC collection and production
- To provide for continued intelligence support to
national authorities during all periods from
crisis to war.
? Conduct post mortems and prepare mini-reviews of
reporting and functioning of IC during crises and other
special situations (see discussion attached):
-- When?--self-initiated or only upon request?
-- Who?--Crisis Branch? PEB? Both? Task Force?
-- Where--PAID?--Special Task Force area? New
building?
? Participate in semiannual NSC review?
? Promote closer producer/user interface and greater flow
of policy/operational information to improve warning
analysis:
Get State to provide NODIS/EXDIS cables to IC on
regular basis. National Sitrep a start.
Get J3 to provide military operation information
to IC on regular basis.
Get policymaker/operator personally involved in
warning analysis process--make him aware of
benefits
Establish continuing IC dialogue with policymaker'
operators:
Joint conferences
Policymaker/operator guest speaker programs
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The Post-Mortem Question
Post mortems were once PAID's (PRD's) principal product
but are they now a thing of the past? Have we moved into a
new, less controversial era (the NSC review, etc.)? Should
the ICS continue to conduct post mortems and other special
'reviews of IC performance and, if so, should they be limited
to reviewing only the operational aspects of the IC performance
(how well did the system function?) and not the Community's
analytical judgments which always draw heaviest fire?
Points to Consider
Post mortems are the most useful means IC has
developed to identify problems, deficiencies and
corrective actions needed. But easier to fix
systemic/procedural problems than analytical ones.
PMs can also lead to development of new systems,
procedures which help to improve IC eTTiciency and
performance in both crisis and non-crisis periods
(e.g., NOIWON, CONTEXT, CRITIC SOPs Handbook,
etc.).
Time and manpower requirements of PMs are very
high. Past major PMs (Middle East, Cyprus,
Mayaguez) have taken 3-15 people, 2-4 months full
time. Crisis Intelligence Branch (3 people) could
not do alone. Would have to join with PEB (at
expense of other missions) or form special task
force such as done for N,SC review.
PMs very unpopular with IC which is sensitive to
criticism, defensive about mistakes. No PMs
produced or requested since 1975 congressional
leaks and unfavorable publicity. What is DCI and
DCI/IC policy on PMs?
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PMs of questionable long-term benefit. Lessons
learned don't stay learned. (Short "institutional
memory" problem.) Spotty record on follow-up
corrective actions: e.g., poor for Middle East
PM; good for Mayaguez PM. Also, ICS is only
element that took corrective actions. NFIB (USIB)
members traditionally indifferent to PMs. Have
shown no interest in ensuring that IC takes
corrective actions or report on status of effort-.
Lack of space or specific area to perform PMs.
Need access to ops centers for observing IC
operations during crisis. Problem will become
greater when ICS moves.
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