MULTIPLE ANALYSIS GUIDELINES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R002100210003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 5, 1980
• Content Type: MF

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NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD
NFIB-82.1/3
5 May 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD
FROM . Walter Elder
Secretary
SUBJECT . Multiple Analysis Guidelines
1. The attached draft guidelines have been approved by the Director
of Central Intelligence for circulation for your consideration. (U)
2. Please forward your comments or concurrence to the Secretary, NFIB,
by close of business, 15 May. If we have not heard from you by that date,
or if you have not requested more time for consideration, we shall take it
that you concur in the draft guidelines. (U)
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As Stated
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MULTIPLE ANALYSIS GUIDELINES
1. In discharging my responsibilities as the
President's senior intelligence advisor I, as,previous
Directors of Central Intelligence, encourage the development
of diverse points of view on subjects of importance to the
national security of the United States. I believe this
serves to subject intelligence analysi3 and judgments to
rigorous scrutiny. (U)
2. While it is vital to provide multiple analyses on
significant national issues, I am also sensitive to the need
to concentrate these efforts on only those activities or
issues which require such treatment. I have, therefore,
established the following guidance for multiple analyses of
foreign weapons or space systems and related issues under
the cognizance of the Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence
Committee. (S)
3. Those topics for multiple analyses will meet at
least one of the following criteria:
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- Foreign weapon or space systems which have an
actual or potentially important impact on the
viability of the US strategic deterrent or on the
overall US/USSR strategic balance.
- Foreign systems which could affect the-fundamental
military balance in NATO/Europe or other geographic
areas important to US national interests.
- Foreign systems which are covered by existing arms
control agreements or by ongoing arms control nego-
tiation or preparation for negotiation.
- Certain civil space systems which either have an
important political or economic impact or may have
important military implications. (S)
4. In order to provide further guidance on the types
of systems covered by these definitions, I have divided
foreign weapons and space classes of systems into three
categories or tiers of importance. The top tier systems are
those which unquestionably meet one or more of the above
criteria and, therefore, need multiple analysis to provide
policymakers with as complete a view as possible of their
implications. New or unidentified activities will need
multiple analysis, at least until the activity is fairly
well understood. (S)
5. In the second tier are those systems which do not
clearly meet the above criteria but may require multiple
analysis on a system-by-system basis. Such analyses will
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only be undertaken after a thorough review considering all
of the following factors:
- Current importance of the system based on its
threat potential, its state of development, and
data requirements for US countermeasures.
- Uncertainties or major disagreements regarding the
weapon or space system characteristics, performance,
and mission.
- Consistency with priorities assigned as defined in
Basic US Foreign Intelligence Requirements Categories
and Priorities (Attachment to DCID.1/2). (S)
6. Tier-three systems or issues are those for which no
multiple analyses are required except under extraordinary
circumstances. These systems are those for which one of the
following conditions apply: (1) the country of origin is
listed as category 4 or below in DCID 1/2; (2) the system is
not a .key element of overall military capability; or (3) the
system has been so well defined that no further analysis is
required. (S)
7. In those cases where multiple analyses are
undertaken, the level of duplication must be carefully
considered to avoid any unnecessary redundancy in the
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processing of basic intelligence data.1'2 This means that
NFIB agencies will rely to the maximum extent possible on
existing community processing for first-level reporting;
e.g., NSA for SIGINT, NPIC for PHOTINT, the US Navy for
ACINT, and CIA for HUMINT. This will not preclude any NFIB
agency conducting multiple analyses from access to recorded
technical data and duplication of some processing when the
nature of the intelligence issue makes this a primary
requirement. For example, when an agency believes that an
intercepted signal is the key to an understanding of the
capability of the system, independent processing by that
agency will be permitted. (S)
8. These guidelines are not intended to supplant
existing instructions regarding production of departmental
intelligence. Neither are they intended to disrupt or
circumvent the formal and informal channels of communication
that now exist within the Intelligence Community for the
exchange of analytical views. These interagency mechanism3
include td
1 NSA does not agree with the inclusion of this para-
graph. NSA believes that the Director of NSA must retain
ultimate control of SIGINT materials and should therefore
review, on a case-by-case basis, requests for raw data fron
the S&T community. (S)
2 The Navy also has reservations on portions of this para-
graph. (U)
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the Radar and Optical Working Group (ROWG), and the
various subcommittees. and working groups of WSSIC and the
SIGINT Committee. (S)
Implementation
9. The Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee
(WSSIC) will have the responsibility for overseeing the
provisions of these. guidelines. Their specific responsibili-
ties will include preparation of amplifying criteria for t1e
classes of systems under the established tiers, their
assignment to one of the three tiers, and advising member
agencies as to whether specific weapons intelligence prob-
lems meet these criteria. (U)
10. WSSIC will periodically review all community
analysis efforts on weapons and space analysis to identify
examples of unnecessary duplication of effort. (U)
11. WSSIC will review these quidelines one year from its
date of issuance and advise me on whether changes or modifi-
cations are warranted. (U)
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