MEETING ON 22 JANUARY TO DISCUSS RMS SELF-STUDY FOR CONGRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R002100220002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 15, 1981
• Content Type: MF

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DCI/ RM-81-0004
15 January 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: RMS Office Directors and Staff Chiefs
Associate Deputy o a DCI for Resource Management
SUBJECT: Meeting on 22 January to Discuss RMS Self-Study for Congress
1. Attached is a four-part draft for each of you to consider urgfiLUY
y
and be prepared to discuss at a brown bag lunch meeting scheduled from noon
to 2:30 p.m. on Thursday, 22 January.
2. What you have here is a very rough paper that contains far more
information than we intend to actually provide to Congress. Much o art 1,
for exam- e, is important for your background, but is unlikely to be includec
in whatever we provide to the HPSCI.
3. Part II has more of the flavor of what the HPSCI should receive,
although it is not yet clear whether we will have to provide anything in
writing, or if instead we can offer a briefing of the results of our audit.
4. Part III contains a discussion of weaknesses (somewhat disjointed,
largely because this section and some of the others are a cut and paste job
of several authors). The HPSCI has asked us to evaluate our own weaknesses,
thus it is essential that we pay close attention to what is contained in this
section and to what may now be missing.
eft
5. Part IV is a somewhat upbeat overview of the NFIP. It may or may
not have a place in what we provide to the HPSCI.
6. The attached draft is meant to be only a point of departure. As
you read through these sections, you will note that there are portions
missing. We may want to address, for example, the use of external contracto+s,
to look at the subject of management more rigorously, and to talk about the
role of the offices that were not specifically addressed in the current draf-
of Part II. Think of it as an opportunity to make the statement of your
office's activities, that you would like to see included. Feel free to add
to this list as well. I hope on Thursday we can give John our full and frank
opinion of our strengths and weaknesses. This is clearly the central part o'
the process of the internal audit.
WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
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7, Following the meeting on Thursday,. we would like to come away
with an understanding of what each of you believes ought to be included
in whatever we provide to Congress, a clear picture of what each of you
feels are the strengths and weaknesses of RMS and some sense of your
recommendations for the future. A brief outline of your recommendations v
for the future would be helpful for use at the meeting on Thursday. We
intend to stress to them that our self-study, or audit, was a process of
which they are seeing only the results.
8. Let me stress once more that this paper is the product of several
authors, hastily cut and pasted. It is not meant as a finished product,
nor are we meeting to edit it. We decided it was better to use the time
chewing over the subjects among ourselves than investing it in providing
a cleaner draft.
Distribution:
1 - Each Office Dir & Staff Ch
1 - D/DCI/RM
1 - AD/DCI/RM
1 - EO/RMS
1 - RM Registry
AD/DCI
(15 January
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THE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT STAFF:
AN APPRAISAL IN PERSPECTIVE
The ultimate criterion for judging the performance of the Resource Manage-
ment Staff (and all the other elements of the National Foreign Intelligence
Program) is the quality of the intelligence product which the Director of Central
Intelligence provides to the President and the National Security Council. The
production of a National Intelligence Estimate is the formal culmination of all
the disparate activities (collection, processing, dissemination, analysis, and
production) which are dispersed throughout a large and diverse Intelligence
Community. It is a major management task to ensure that the most pressing
national security issues are addressed by the DCI when he acts as the principal
foreign intelligence adviser to the President.
The most important National Intelligence Estimate each year is the assess-
ment of the Soviet strategic capability to wage war against the United States
and its allies. This estimate demands the best in analytical judgment which he
Community can provide. The estimate may depend in critical areas on sophisti:ated
collection techniques (non-technical as well as technical). The activities
which permit the DCI to make the crucial judgments must be adequately financed.
The estimate may be flawed by biased analysis or by misguided collection; it
could even be distorted by misplaced or unavailable budgetary support.
Since 1946, the DCI's basic responsibility to the President has been the
provision of national intelligence. It has taken more than 30 years to confer
on him the authorities he requires to carry out his responsibilities. Unless
he controls the national collection and resource management functions, his
authority is not strong enough to carry out his primary responsibility.
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does not follow that adequate financing and collection will guarantee informed
analysis. It is, however, a matter of concern*M-leer 'the discrete elements of
the Community appear to be operating independently of L each other. This is why
pftV.,&
the operations of the Resource Management Staff area best understood in a
perspective of complementing the roles of the National Foreign Assessment Center
and the Collection Tasking Staff.
Origins of Authority
The National Security Act of 1947 established the authority of the DC1
for the production of national intelligence, espionage, and covert action. The
Central Intelligence Agency was designed as the executive agency to disch.rge
the DCI's national responsibilities. The members of the Intelligence Cormiiunity
were to be "coordinated" by the DCI, to advise the DCI, and to concentrate on
departmental rather than national concerns. CIA was the first among equals in
the Community.
From about 1947 until 1960, there was a national consensus that a clear
and present danger threatened our national security. le Intelligence Community
worked in harmony against an agreed objective, and a set of directives stemming
from the National Security Council and the DCI laid down a rational division of
labor. So long as the consensus obtained, the Congress was content to leave the
conduct of intelligence activities in the hands of the Executive Branch.
During 1961, the national consensus about the role of the United States
in foreign affairs began to come apart. Coincidentally, a current started
flowing which centered on the issue of separating the DCI from the CIA in order
to place him in charge of the Intelligence Communf(Jy, which would include CIA.
As a practical matter, the DCI found that he did not control the requisite
support activities (collection, in particular) which he needed to control to
address the national concerns. In January 1912, president Kennedy directed the
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DCI to act as head of the Community and to delegate the day-to-day direction
of CIA. The DCI was thus assigned an additional responsibility, but no new
authorities to carry it out.
It was evident that authority over the budgets of the Community would give
the DCI genuine control; it was also clear that the heads of the departments and
agencies were not about to grant the DCI such authority. The budget issue was
first faced up to in 1971 in a directive from President Nixon, but it was not
until 1976 that the DCI's role was acknowledged to be more than advisory.
Since the collection systems, for example, resided in other departments and were
budgeted for therein, the DCI's role was limited.
The first "consolidated" National Foreign Intelligence Budget was produced
by a Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI), consisting of the DCI, a member
of the NSC Staff, and a senior Department of Defense official. An Intelligence
Community Staff was established to support the CFI and the DCI in his role as
manager of the Intelligence Community.
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Intelligence Community Management
Under Executive Order 11905, a Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence
Community was established, and the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS) was
formed with a broad charter to oversee the activities of the Intelligence
Community on behalf of the DCI and also, with particular reference to the
budget, on behalf of the CFI.
The ICS had a broad charter which included:
- advice to the DCI on all Intelligence Community matters;
- final. recommendations on NFIP budget issues;
- evaluation of NFIP programs and products;
- implementation of directives throughout the Community;
- vice chairmanship of the National Foreign Intelligence
Board and supervision of the Executive Secretariat;
- overview of all DCI Committees and supervision of
specific committees, to include COMIREX, Human Resources,
Information Handling, Security and SIGINT;
- set requirements and priorities for national production
and collection on behalf of CFI;
- development of planning guidance and the DCI's annual
report;
- evaluate services of common concern;
- provide guidance to the DCI on. national-tactical issues; and
- relate to Congress and OMB on resource issues.
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 CoordinatiOAppgU4ddI*,Re soi2'D iUQTO Y()kERDt>b3I% I7b1 02fi l2 i2d9over the
years, but generally accepted by the conmunity. Budget control cuts across
a new set of boundaries. Not only are departmental authorities seen as threat-
ened, the basic direction of the Community is thought to have been changed.
The Community Perspective
Those elements of the government which have intelligence entities are as
diverse as the ~ entG they serve. Only one (CIA) is not associated with
a specific policy interest. To focus these elements on overriding national
security issues was the basic motive underlying the National Security Act of
1947; the process is still being tested.
comerifully equipped with its own set of requirements, collection needs, analytical
chores, production functions, and budget procedures. The primary task is to
serve the department's head. It is an incidental task to work on national
intelligence activities, except in so far as the national and departmental needs
happen to coincide.
To create a single budget out of the welter of individual needs is a
monumental task. To give it a focus which reflects the DCI's needs rather than
a simple conglomerate of individual needs requires an annual exercise of great
complexity. To project the budget into a dimly-perceived future is at best an
exercise in divination.
Some of the Community still perceives the DCI's new authority as an
intrusion into established keeps, but the benefits of having a national budget
are not completely lost on those who see the intelligence accounts protected
against the forays of outside interests.
The DCI's task is further complicated by a persistent tendency to regard
him merely as head of CIA. However, the principal perception, which is present
throughout production, collection, and resource management, which creates thi
most tension for the DCI is a fundamental split over the nature of the threat
Each of the Community's elements (which range from seven to tens of thour,and )
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facing our country. It is an honest difference which is reflected in national
intelligence estimates. It is tolerable, but it has the major impact on alT
phases of the national intelligence activities.
A Basic Dichotomy
There is little agreement on the nature of the threat to our national
security beyond the fact that there is a threat. The priority objective of the
Intelligence Community to provide warning against military attack has remained
unchanged since 1946. However, when the additional requirements for identi-
fying the non-military threats - be they political, material, or yet to be
identified - are imposed on a constrained Intelligence Community, the require-
ments tend to become infinite while the means of satisfying them appear to
shrink.
Even if the threat were only military, the requirements for intelligence
are levied in such detail that an inadequate response is guaranteed. If tie
task of peace-time intelligence is primarily to prepare for war, then the national
Na.
Ato serve the needs of military commanders
intelligence program should. be constructed
This basic split is apparent in current estimates of the global strategic
balance. There is a broad measure of agreement about the physical nature of
Soviet military power, but the implications of how, where, and when this power
might be applied are not well understood. We are as ignorant of basic Soviet
intentions as we once were about their bombers, missiles, factories, and oil
production.
Not only do we levy insatiable requirements on the strategic military
issues, but we compound our difficulties by extending our stated needs for
information into detailed requirements for military minutiae. Recognizing
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that it is impossible to satisfy the military requirements, we impose a set
of political, economic, and other intelligence requirements which threaten
to swamp the mechanism.
Requirements flow from the high level policymakers and also well up
from the needs of the diverse Intelligence Community. Management of the
Community demands a focus on what is most important. This Qs usually turned
out to be the crisis of the moment, and this inevitably disrupts the steady
vision of those who are trying to see the smaller pieces in a larger focus.
There is an element of strength in the diversity of the Community
which contributes much to the analytical, collection, and budgeting activities.
The capability'of each Community element to focus on particular problems -
tanks, nuclear proliferation, oil production, international finances, for
examples - guarantees that the national view is not made up of abstractions
and theories. 'There is also a vital need to support the kinds of technical
expertise' which exist far below the national level and which enrich our
estimates of great issues.
The problem for the national intelligence process is that it can never
develop the total capability needed to analyze and collect against total require-
ments. The problem for resource management is to adjudicate the reasonable
demands for military, political, economic, and other intelligence in a way
which will best serve the DCI and the President.
The Current National Intelligence Structure
Executive Order 12036 reaffirms the primacy of the National Security
Council to direct the activities of the DCI and the Intelligence Community.
This is no't new. The Executive Order reaffirms the DCI's responsibility
for the production of national intelligence. This is not new.
The Executive Order does provide for three new elements in the national
ahn h ~ i t
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ment of the Intelligence Community and have led to challenges to the DCI's
authority in all phases of the Community's activities.
The following are new:
1. The delegation to'the NSC Policy Review Committee on
Intelligence((PRCI)) of the authority to establish national intel-
ligence requirements and priorities. The DCI, as Chairman of the
PRC(I), has further delegated the staff work to his Deputy for
National Foreign Assessment.
2. The establishment of a collection tasking function to
ensure unified guidance across the three collection disciplines.
The DCI has delegated authority for this function to his Deputy
for Collection Tasking.
3. The location of responsibility and authority with the DCI
for the National Foreign Intelligence Program and budget. The
DCI has delegated authority in this area to his Deputy for
Resource Management.
Some elements of the Community perceive this new management structure
as an intrusive superstructure. For example, the new national requirements
and priorities. have been issued with a notation that these are not the only
requirements which must be satisfied. Thus, the plethora of requirements is
further proliferated, and those which are responsive to departmental needs
are likely to receive priority attention. For example, the distinction
between guiding and tasking collection systems has been hard to grasp, not
to mention the role of collection tasking in human resources intelligence and
non-national systems. For example, the creation of another layer of budget
review is perceived as a device to frustrate the needs of Community components
and to benefit some ill-defined national need. The national need is best under-
stood whApp n ad For F elease zvv6%92 0 aC1A 83M00~
rove or
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Executive Order 12036 was promulgated in January 1978 with new emphasis
on Community management. The new.DCI, Admiral Turner, decided that he needed
a new structure to carry out his responsibilities. The basic outlines of the
new organization were presented to and approved by the Congress.
the
The ICS as such was disestablished, and/term remain current, presumable
as an administrative convenience, only in certain Congressional documents.
The principal functions of the ICS have been dispersed,'but not
abolished. Policy, planning, and evaluation remain inherent in the Intelligence
Community structure, but they are no longer assigned as discrete functions
belonging to any one Community management element to the exclusion of the
other elements. These functions are as interdependent as the three elements
of Community management (NFAC, CTS, RMS).
Intelligence Community policy is set by the DCI in his annual report,
in program guidance, in his goals and objectives, and is an important element
in the volumes of justification material provided to the Congress. Policy
permeates the national intelligence process and serves the DCI better as ar
ingredient rather than a separate, formal exercise.
The ICS developed a total planning structure for the Community which
was not used because it, too, tried to stand separate from the intelligence
process and lacked a substantive base. Planning projections are extremely
hazardous when they attempt to forecast the US role in a rapidly changing
environment. The DCI is better served when planning occurs in a specific
context. For example, what can we predict about the overseas environment
which will dictate the type of collection structure we will be able to main-
tain over the medium-term future?
Evaluation, which was once seen as a discrete function with a central
direction, has also been dispersed. Measures of performance - the product
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and the activities which resulted in the product - vary. An evaluation of
our knowledge and lack of knowledge is an intrinsic part of the production
process. It is an integral part of National Intelligence Estimates. An
outstanding formal exercise in evaluation is the Senior Review Panel's examina-
tion of the issue of
Evaluation of our collection systems, especially the technical ones,
is a day-to-day exercise. The current systems are measured by those who
use the results, and future systems are weighted technically, financially,
and substantively. In view of the great costs of these technical systems
as-compared to all other elements of the intelligence process, a continuing
evaluation by the users, by CTS and'RMS, is a major part'of managing the
Intelligence-Community. This preoccupation with high-cost technology and
the concomitant functions of processing and dissemination is appropriately
a major concern of the Congress.
Evaluation is built into the NFIP process as an integral function.
Evaluation, like analysis, is competitive, and it ensures against unnecessary
duplication as well as against gaps in intelligence coverage.
Partly in response to a genuine concern about growing costs, but more
importantly because of the potential benefits which may accrue to the
Intelligence Community, automatic data processing has long been accorded
a special status in the Intelligence Community. The management of this effort
is a specific ICS function which has been lodged with RMS. The Staff is
charged with seeing to it that ADP is a resource which serves the Community
as a whole.
Finally, the overview of the DCI Committees has been dispersed among
the appropriate Deputf to the DCI, in accordance with their responsibilities
for production, collection, security, and other areas of common concern.
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The perception of a unifi.ea ICS rather than a tripod of senior deputies
and interrelated functions has died hard. An illumination of the performance
of RMS, not in isolation but as a part of the intelligence process, should
shed some light on the roles of planning and evaluation as well as other
aspects of the Intelligence Community management structure. Whatever the
merits of an ICS-type central direction might have been, the accomplishme1t!:
of the present structure are evident and can be weighed against the demands
set forth in the Executive Order.
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In 1978, Executive Order 1.2036 reconfirmed the DCI's responsibility for 25X1
national intelligence production, and it placed him in charge of tasking national
collection systems. I t invested him with "full and exclusive" authority to
develop, approve, and present a National Foreign Intelligence Program and budget
to the President. The budgets produced since that time reflect for the first
time since 1946 an effort to provide direct financial support to the DCI as an
advisor to the President and as executive manager of the Intelligence Community.
This exercise has also proved to be a severe test of the DCI's authorities
and a clear measure of the Resource Management Staff's performance.
G.as~R .-+.~
111w tMaerd". A& budget,.developed in isolation, By its very nature
a.K
program and budget development is a process ofAinfo nation exchange. In
the course of such exchange, differences of opinion--some large, some small--
inevitably emerge. The "full and exclusive" provides the route by
which such differences are resolved in formulating a recommendation to the
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President then the Congress. -ts primary intent was to ensure that the
A
ways in which programs are funded converge. In this sense, full and exclusive
is a very important, but in no way an absolute, authority.
The forced convergence just described carries with it one other implication.
A DCI can exercise his authority and ap rove programs with a lot of supporting
a ' a 4 s-~
informationAor none at all. This 4 information dictates the size
and scope of the staff support he needs. Were resources unlimited and were
there no clamor or competition for them, very little staff support-.
Resources however are quite limited. And the competition for them-is
intense. The DCI--any DCI--must be sure that the, money he requests is^beirGg
.spent wisely. To do this he must weigh and consider the arguments of those
who are in competition for the available resources, all of whom in the worts
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of classic game theorists are involved in an n-person zero sum game
with coalitions allowed--a very complicated situation. The Resource
Management Staff not only provides support to the DCI, but in many
instances tells him when he needs it. It ensures that the information ?.,
MAJL W"4
_ _._`_ on whie* and resource decisions can bo ode. To do this, the
staff manages a process described by the functions set out in E.O. 12036---
consisting of guidance, review, budget development execution monitoring
and evaluation. Each of these functions addressed separately below.
...provide guidance...
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review and evaluate program and budget submissions.,.
I Throughout this process the staff imposes
on itself two disciplinary tenets:
debate is open and clearly documented
-- no change to a program manager's recommendation can be
made arbitrarily,
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Throughout both the program and budget review process provision is
made for appeal.
Program managers-;have sometimes criticized this process as burdensome
and time-consuming. Consider, however, the benefits that have also accrued.
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...develop and present the consolidated NFIP budget to the President...
For the last three years the President has complimented
the DCI on the quality of his budget document. It has been characterized by
0MB to the President as "one of the two best in the Government." The
document represents the culmination of the review and evaluation process
described above, together with the deliberations of the National Foreign
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It is in the preceding two functional areas that the staffs
performance has been emphasized and is the most impressive. Since he
must make the decisions and then defend them to the President, it is
perhaps the DCI's.view of the staff's performance that matters most.
And he has consistently commented favorably on the work the staff has
done.
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There are some flaws. As the pace of activity quickens in both
spring and fall, lateral communication tends to breakdown.. The role
of 0MB is always ambiguous, often elusive. There is a constant worry
about whether they should be included in all deliberations in the interest
of efficiency or held at arms length as an ever present antagonist. Program
managers blow hot and cold. RMS program monitors are greeted with open
arms on some issues and accorded cool receptions on others depending on how
much money is at stake and in what direction they are seen to be leaning.
Studies commissioned to support the process 12-18 months earlier sometimes
turn out to have been misfocused, or the issue takes an unanticipated turn, or
a new proposal is tabled. Inputs counted on as fuel for debate show up late,
are incomplete:-.-or may not turn up at all. None of these "flaws" are
susceptible to easy correction. Their impact is best moderated by a ccnstant
investment in keeping people informed. Such an investment is rarely seen as
producing real returns and is often viewed as turning objective analysts into
program advocates as they become more and more specialized.
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Nrif
The final say about the product of the national intelligence community
and the activities which are designed to produce the best results rests with
the President and his National Security Council. The NFIP is designed to be
a direct response to the NSC's statement of needs for information which
can best be satisfied by intelligence activities. The NFIP overrides
departmental interests. The NFIP is reviewed by the NSC's PRC (Intelligence).
The NFIP has been acknowledged by the President and the Office of Management
and Budget as a responsive, well-constructed program and budget.
The NFIP provides direct-support to the DCI, who in his capacity as
principal foreign intelligence advisor to the President, acts specifically
as the producer and presenter of national estimates; Chairman of the PRC
(Intelligence) which sets requirements and priorities; and as the manager :f
the NFIP and the national aspects of all its elements.
The NFIP, by its nature, considers and presents to the DCI for resolution
programmatic issues by function rather than by organizational residence.
Production cuts across component jurisdiction, and the DCI's guidance to tie
NFIP.,provided an opportunity for the protection and enhancement of initiatives
to improve national production across the board.
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