DIA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY 2 OCTOBER 1973

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R002300030011-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 2, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

DIAIS 231.Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83MOO171ROO
2 OCTOBER 1973 QQ AS OF: 0500 EDT (0900Z) No Foreign Dissem
No Dissem Abroad
'13
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY
This Document Contains Special Intelligence Material
315745
DOS and DIA review(s) completed.
EXCLUDED E ROM GDS PER
DOD DINECTIVE 5200.17 (M-2)
TOP SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83M00l71 R002300030011-8
The Intelligence Summary is produced by the Defense I.ntelli-
gence -"Agency to serve the needs of the Department of Defense
for appropriate current intelligence. It is furnished to
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Certain items may be designated specifically for limited dis-
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.ion as the article.
This document contains classified information affecting the
national security of the United States within the meaning of
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798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation
of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as
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THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN SPECIAL
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It is to be seen only by United States personnel especially
indoctrinated and authorized to receive SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE
i fo)r1"mation; its security must be maintained in accordance
with SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.
Published by the Deputy Director for Intelligence
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SUMMARY
25X1 DIA
OFFICIAL_
Captain, USN
Senior Duty Officer
CAMBODIA Khmer Communist troops continue their
attacks south of Phnom Penh and are
increasing pressure on Route 5.
LATIN AMERICA Terrorists in three major southern Latin 3
American countries may be forced under-
ground.
ARGENTINA Juan Peron's attack on Marxism may lead 4
to increased violence.
FRANCE French nuclear strategy has become one 5
of flexible response very close to that
of NATO, but Paris continues to reject
a major role for conventional forces in
a protracted conflict.
BRIEFS
25X1 DIA
Bolivia, Argentina, Cuba, Cuba- 7-10
Republic of China, Greece,
Republic of Vietnam, and USSR.
2 Oct 73 DIA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY DIAIS 231-73
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ENEMY EXPANDS CONTROL ON ROUTE 5
Territory under enemy
control or vacated
o ces government p5 fo wi hdraw fi om
two to rtrons: acrd orate
a trd-
mpon + p ' h i 'a
Rt Dj-'
aCo rl
teratt ckrrg gov me
t A; fo ce stalls
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KHMER COMMUNIST TROOPS CONTINUE THEIR
ATTACKS SOUTH OF PHNOM PENH AND ARE
INCREASING PRESSURE ON ROUTE 5.
Enemy forces continue to attack government
positions in the Route 2-3 corridor south of Phnom
Penh. Government troops manning two small positions one on Route 201 and another on Route 2 to the east --
have been forced to withdraw. A third position lo-
cated at the junction of Routes 201 and 3 is isolated;
however. the enemy is still being held south of the
Prek Thnaot River. A counterattacking government
force remained in contact with the enemy all day
yesterday but made no progress in reaching its objective
and remains about a mile north of Route 201.
West of Phnom Penh, government troops report
little progress in their efforts to re-establish
security along Route 4 west of Kompong Speu. Mean-
while, north of the capital on Route 5, government
troops have been forced to withdraw from the two
northernmost perimeter positions at Sala Lek Pram
on the southern end of the enemy-controlled section
of the road. The enemy now controls about seven miles
(11 kilometers) of the highway, and his troops are
attacking within one-half mile of Sala Lek Pram's
command post. Tuk Laak, at the northern end of the
enemy-occupied section of Route 5 received a heavy
indirect fire attack yesterday. Increased enemy
pressure on both ends of the insurgent-controlled
section of Route 5 indicates his intention of ex-
panding the occupied area to the maximum extent
possible in the face of no viable government
opposition.
(Continued)
2 Oct 73 DIA Intelligence Summary
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At Kompong Cham, friendly forces are continuing
to extend the government-controlled area despite
minor Khmer Communist attacks by fire and ground
probes. Government operations resulted in an expansion
of the city's defensive perimeter by 400 meters to
the north and 700 meters to the southwest yesterday.
(SECRET XGDS-2)
PREPARED BY: Southeast Asia Division (DI-6)
SOURCES: DAO Phnom Penh DAMSREP 011130Z (S) and
020241Z (C) Oct 73
LATEST INFO: 0200 EDT 2 Oct 73
2 Oct 73 DIA Intelligence Summary Page 2
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LATIN AMERICA
TERRORISTS IN THREE MAJOR SOUTHERN LATIN
AMERICAN COUNTRIES HAVE LOST THEIR ADVAN-
TAGE AND MAY BE FACED WITH GOING UNDER-
GROUND AGAINST INCREASED SECURITY.
With the fall of the Allende government in Chile,
Juan Peron's hardened stance against leftist elements
in Argentina, and the Uruguayan Government's measures
against the Tupamaros last year, the terrorist move-
ment in southern Latin America is without a haven
and lacks successful models to encourage it. Terror-
ists, who had hoped to reorganize and seek respite
in Argentina, have probably been shocked by Peron's
statements against leftists.
Bolivian insurgents had hoped to move their
base from Chile to Argentina. The Tupamaros, who
had a working network in Chile, had also hoped to
obtain a secure base there as well. However, the
Argentine People's Revolutionary Army, with whom
the Tupamaros had a relationship, has been banned
and will be fighting for its own existence. Simi-
larly, the now orphaned Chilean leftists will be pre-
vented from using Argentina as a base. Many of the
groups are looking to Peru for some measure of support,
but the Velasco government has noted that surround-
ing countries are hostile to socialists and is not
likely to act as a haven for leftist movements
despite the wishes of some parties within the coun-
try.
The new atmosphere may cause the leftist insurg-
ent movement to become more fragmented. However,
the groups could seek to cooperate in a united move-
ment, but past attempts have been doomed by differing
outlooks and ideologies. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/
CONTROLLED DISSEM XGDS-2)
PREPARED BY: Western Area Division (DI-5
25X1~
25X1
LATEST INFO: 30 Sep 73
2 Oct 73 DIA Intelligence Summary Page 3
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JUAN PERON'S ATTACK ON MARXISM MAY LEAD
TO INCREASED VIOLENCE.
Saying that last week's assassination of labor
leader Jose Rucci was "the last straw," Peron has an-
nounced a frontal attack on Argentine Marxist groups.
The President-elect said that he must have total con-
trol of the situation for his inauguration on 12 Octo-
ber.
Although primarily directed at the Peoples
Revolutionary Army (ERP), which has been charged with
the murder, leftist factions in the Peronist movement
are also expected to be targets in the offensive.
Internecine warfare between these elements may have
been the cause of recent deaths in Argentina.
Sources within the army fear increased violence
since the ERP and some Peronist groups are capable of
fighting against government repression. Nevertheless,
the military hope to remain clear of the fighting and
allow the police and special government commandos to
handle the job. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM XGDS-2)
PREPARED BY: Western Area Division (DI-5)
SOURCES:
LATEST INFO: 29 Sep 73
2 Oct 73 DIA Intelligence Summary
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FRANCE
FRENCH NUCLEAR STRATEGY HAS EVOLVED INTO
ONE OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE VERY CLOSE TO
THAT OF NATO. HOWEVER, PARIS CONTINUES
TO REJECT A MAJOR ROLE FOR CONVENTIONAL
FORCES IN A PROTRACTED CONFLICT AND WILL
IMPLEMENT POLICY ON A NATIONAL RATHER
THAN A NATO BASIS.
President Pompidou, in his 27 September press
conference, pointed out that a flexible response is
part of France's deterrent policy. He referred to
multiple-delivery means now available -- sea-launched
IRBMs, strategic bombers, and tactical nuclear weapons --
but Pompidou reportedly favors sea-launched missiles
due to their relative invulnerability. Paris recently
announced that a third group of nine IRBM silos will be
built in southeastern France. The country also has 36
MIRAGE strategic bombers and two POLARIS-type submarines,
with three more to be built. Tactical fighters are
being equipped with nuclear weapons at two bases and a
tactical nuclear missile is to become operational in
1974.
Another source has said that French nuclear strat-
egy during an attack could include demonstrative use
of nuclear weapons and the employment of tactical nu-
clear weapons to test Soviet intentions prior to the use
of strategic forces. In the French view, a major Euro-
pean war would likely escalate rapidly to a nuclear
conflict and conventional forces would have little de-
terrent value. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM XGDS-2)
PREPARED BY: Western Area Division (DI-5)
SOURCES: Emb Paris 5458 28 Sep 73 (S) and
5599 29 Sep 73 (U)
DIA Analysis (S/NFD)
LATEST INFO: 29 Sep 73
2 Oct 73 DIA Intelligence Summary
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA
DIA
25X1
25X'D IA
It is currently estimated that the Soviets may have
ADMs, although this has not been confirmed. If they do,
they are probably in the How-25X1DIA
ever the USSR would not likely give Czechoslovakia ADMs
outright, but would keep them under their control until
released for use by the Soviet Government. ADMs would
be highly effective along the Czechoslovak-West German
border due to the mountainous terrain. (TOP SECRET II 25X1
PREPARED BY: Soviet-Warsaw Pact Area
Division (DI-3)
LATEST INFO: 29 Sep 73
2 Oct 73 DIA Intelligence Summary
25X1 DIA
Page 6
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BRIEFS
BOLIVIA: Recent events may have introduced another
crack in the fragile unity of the National Revolu-
tionary Movement (MNR) and Bolivian Socialist Falange
(FSB) coalition backing President Banzer. He appar-
ently used the 23 September disclosure of a leftist
antigovernment plot as an excuse to move against the
potentially troublesome labor element prior to public
announcement of an austerity program. The leader of
the MNR, a basically labor-oriented organization, re-
portedly believed the government's allegations at
first and promised Banzer strong backing. However,
his later doubts resulted in only a weak statement
of support. This move reportedly irritated the FSB
and may have introduced a new strain in the coalition.
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM XGDS-2)
Western Area Division (DI-5)
SOURCE:
(S/NFD) 25X1A
ARGENTINA: Army Chief Lt Gen Raul Carcagno's request
for the dismissal of US and French Army missions has
been taken under advisement by the Defense Ministry.
Defense Minister Robledo said that a decision would
be reached this week. The government has been des-
cribing the proposal as a sincere effort to discontinue
the groups because they are no longer needed, but
politics remains the most likely reason. Carcagno
boasted during last month's Conference of American
Armies in Venezuela that the US military mission would
be sent out of Argentina. The Peron government ap-
pears to be in a quandary over how to handle the re-
quest without insulting the general or damaging rela-
tions with the US. (CONFIDENTIAL GDS-31 Dec 79)
Western Area Division (DI-5)
SOURCES:
2 Oct 73 DIA Intelligence Summary Page 7
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CUBA: Two OSA-I-class large
gu ded missile patrol boats
were to arrive in the Havana
area yesterday, doubling Cub
edly expected only four OSAs, but more may be delivered
as newer classes of patrol craft take their place in the
Cabanas HAVANA inventory of this type unit.
Two Soviet tugs towed them
o o from the Baltic. The others
were delivered in the same
fashion in January 1972. The
new OSAs will be assigned to
the guided-missile patrol boat
flotilla at Cabanas and will
probably become operational in
two or three months. Cuba has
18 KOMAR-class small guided-
missile patrol boats in addi-
tion to the OSAs -- all are
equipped with the SS-N-2/STYX
antiship missile. Cuba report-
Soviet inventory and Cuba's KOMARs become unserviceable.
Western Area Division (DI-5)
SOURCES:
CUBA-PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA: For the fourth time
since April, Cuba has harassed Chinese-controlled
ships in Cuban ports. On 22 September, the departure
of a Chinese-chartered freighter was delayed by an
extensive search. Other incidents have involved con-
fiscation of crew clothing and ships' stores. No
reason for these actions have been noted, but Havana
may be demonstrating its loyalties in the Sino-Soviet
dispute. Cuba has become .a primary proponent of the
Soviet system as evidenced by Castro's speech at the
nonaligned conference last month. This latest inci-
dent may also be in reaction to a recent Chinese
propaganda effort warning of the rising Soviet threat
in the Caribbean through naval deployments to Cuba.
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM XGDS-2)
Western Area Division (DI-5)
25X1
2 Oct 73 DIA Intelligence Summary Page 8
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GREECE: President Papadopoulos
appointed historian-politician
Spyros Markezinis Prime Minister
yesterday and charged him with
forming a new Cabinet to be sworn
in on 8 October. One source said
that the present Cabinet had al-
ready resigned, but a government
announcement indicated that in-
cumbent ministers would do so on
the 6th. Postponement of the
resignation was publicly attributed
to absence of the Alternate Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs, who is
attending the opening of the UN
session. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN
DISSEM GDS-31 Dec 79)
Western Area Division (DI-5
25X1A
DIA Intelligence Summary
25X1 DIA
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REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM: A major engagement in Military
Region 3, which began on 28 September,has raged for
three days on a rubber plantation 12 miles (19 kilo-
meters) southeast of Tay Ninh City. A two-battalion
government force conducting sweep operations in the
area on the 28th, made contact with reported elements
of the 101st NVA Regiment, Sub Region 1, and a local
force battalion. Some 183 enemy soldiers were re-
portedly killed, while ARVN forces suffered nine
killed, 124 wounded and 297 missing. The engagement
took place within the area of operation of the 101st
NVA Regiment, and there is no evidence that the
communists have initiated an offensive to obtain more
territory. Apparently, this attack was an enemy attempt
to protect what it considered to be its territory from
the ARVN force moving into the area. (CONFIDENTIAL NO
FOREIGN DISSEM GDS-31 Dec 79)
Southeast Asia Division (DI-6)
SOURCE: DAO Saigon Telecon 0400 EDT 2 Oct 73 (C) and
DIA Analysis (C/NFD)
2 Oct 73 DIA Intelligence Summary Page 10
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DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OSD/DDR&E
OSD/GEN COUNSEL
O SD/AT SD&D SD
OSD/SATSD&DSD (2)
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OASD/PA
OASD/I (3)
OASD/SA
OASD/I&L
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OASD/LA
JCS/CHAIRMAN
JCS/DIRECTOR
JCS/SECRETARY
JCS/CHAM STAFF GP
JCS/J-3 (10)
JCS/J-4
JCS/J-5
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JCS/DOCSA
JCS/SAGA
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ACSI/US ARMY (40)
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CMC (2)
ACNSC
AFCS
SSO/USAF (31)
25X1A
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AU
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CIA (115)
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DIA (79)
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No Foreign Dissem
This Document Contains Special Intelligence Material
TOP SECRET
EXCLUDED FROM GDS PER
DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.17 (M-2)
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300030011-8