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December 15, 2016
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September 5, 2003
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October 2, 1973
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DIAIS 231.Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83MOO171ROO 2 OCTOBER 1973 QQ AS OF: 0500 EDT (0900Z) No Foreign Dissem No Dissem Abroad '13 DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY This Document Contains Special Intelligence Material 315745 DOS and DIA review(s) completed. EXCLUDED E ROM GDS PER DOD DINECTIVE 5200.17 (M-2) TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300030011-8 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83M00l71 R002300030011-8 The Intelligence Summary is produced by the Defense I.ntelli- gence -"Agency to serve the needs of the Department of Defense for appropriate current intelligence. It is furnished to non-Defense Department agencies for information only. Inter- pretations of ante li_gence information in this publication reps:-esent preliminary vyew.., which are subject, to modification on the basis of further information and more complete analysis. Certain items may be designated specifically for limited dis- tribution. Others not hearing release restrictive markings may be provided to eligible recipients by authorized DOD releasing agencies and intelligence components of the USIB. The releasing authority is responsible that items so provid conform to a specific need-to-know, of the recipient and are accordance with security and disclosure regulations. DIA Instruction No. 50-4 is applicable concerning release to contractors of any item in this publication. The tit individual articles contained herein have the same cl .ion as the article. This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 1-8, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety interest of the United States or for the benefit of any eign government to the detriment of the United States. THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES. It is to be seen only by United States personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE i fo)r1"mation; its security must be maintained in accordance with SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS. Published by the Deputy Director for Intelligence Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83M00l71 R002300030011-8 lease 2003/1 Approved For ReTOP SEC/ f lWfifkl 71 R002300030011-8 SUMMARY 25X1 DIA OFFICIAL_ Captain, USN Senior Duty Officer CAMBODIA Khmer Communist troops continue their attacks south of Phnom Penh and are increasing pressure on Route 5. LATIN AMERICA Terrorists in three major southern Latin 3 American countries may be forced under- ground. ARGENTINA Juan Peron's attack on Marxism may lead 4 to increased violence. FRANCE French nuclear strategy has become one 5 of flexible response very close to that of NATO, but Paris continues to reject a major role for conventional forces in a protracted conflict. BRIEFS 25X1 DIA Bolivia, Argentina, Cuba, Cuba- 7-10 Republic of China, Greece, Republic of Vietnam, and USSR. 2 Oct 73 DIA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY DIAIS 231-73 Approved For Releatr3,Vpf 1fR"WR1A1 R002300030011-8 Approved For ReITaQR0& jQ BI'A MA 71 R002300030011-8 ENEMY EXPANDS CONTROL ON ROUTE 5 Territory under enemy control or vacated o ces government p5 fo wi hdraw fi om two to rtrons: acrd orate a trd- mpon + p ' h i 'a Rt Dj-' aCo rl teratt ckrrg gov me t A; fo ce stalls Approved For ReITof OWL K C l - 0A71 R002300030011-8 Approved For ReleaTO &R R B&bA1 R002300030011-8 KHMER COMMUNIST TROOPS CONTINUE THEIR ATTACKS SOUTH OF PHNOM PENH AND ARE INCREASING PRESSURE ON ROUTE 5. Enemy forces continue to attack government positions in the Route 2-3 corridor south of Phnom Penh. Government troops manning two small positions one on Route 201 and another on Route 2 to the east -- have been forced to withdraw. A third position lo- cated at the junction of Routes 201 and 3 is isolated; however. the enemy is still being held south of the Prek Thnaot River. A counterattacking government force remained in contact with the enemy all day yesterday but made no progress in reaching its objective and remains about a mile north of Route 201. West of Phnom Penh, government troops report little progress in their efforts to re-establish security along Route 4 west of Kompong Speu. Mean- while, north of the capital on Route 5, government troops have been forced to withdraw from the two northernmost perimeter positions at Sala Lek Pram on the southern end of the enemy-controlled section of the road. The enemy now controls about seven miles (11 kilometers) of the highway, and his troops are attacking within one-half mile of Sala Lek Pram's command post. Tuk Laak, at the northern end of the enemy-occupied section of Route 5 received a heavy indirect fire attack yesterday. Increased enemy pressure on both ends of the insurgent-controlled section of Route 5 indicates his intention of ex- panding the occupied area to the maximum extent possible in the face of no viable government opposition. (Continued) 2 Oct 73 DIA Intelligence Summary Page 1 Approved For RelealO&ONF1ER EJ 4I R Wd1*1 R002300030011-8 Approved For RelgpoF0(9E MBTA M1 A171R002300030011-8 At Kompong Cham, friendly forces are continuing to extend the government-controlled area despite minor Khmer Communist attacks by fire and ground probes. Government operations resulted in an expansion of the city's defensive perimeter by 400 meters to the north and 700 meters to the southwest yesterday. (SECRET XGDS-2) PREPARED BY: Southeast Asia Division (DI-6) SOURCES: DAO Phnom Penh DAMSREP 011130Z (S) and 020241Z (C) Oct 73 LATEST INFO: 0200 EDT 2 Oct 73 2 Oct 73 DIA Intelligence Summary Page 2 Approved For Relearb0~'Q RI4-R%(RX1 R002300030011-8 Approved For ReIgi@ 1P00gff -t g9q71R002300030011-8 LATIN AMERICA TERRORISTS IN THREE MAJOR SOUTHERN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES HAVE LOST THEIR ADVAN- TAGE AND MAY BE FACED WITH GOING UNDER- GROUND AGAINST INCREASED SECURITY. With the fall of the Allende government in Chile, Juan Peron's hardened stance against leftist elements in Argentina, and the Uruguayan Government's measures against the Tupamaros last year, the terrorist move- ment in southern Latin America is without a haven and lacks successful models to encourage it. Terror- ists, who had hoped to reorganize and seek respite in Argentina, have probably been shocked by Peron's statements against leftists. Bolivian insurgents had hoped to move their base from Chile to Argentina. The Tupamaros, who had a working network in Chile, had also hoped to obtain a secure base there as well. However, the Argentine People's Revolutionary Army, with whom the Tupamaros had a relationship, has been banned and will be fighting for its own existence. Simi- larly, the now orphaned Chilean leftists will be pre- vented from using Argentina as a base. Many of the groups are looking to Peru for some measure of support, but the Velasco government has noted that surround- ing countries are hostile to socialists and is not likely to act as a haven for leftist movements despite the wishes of some parties within the coun- try. The new atmosphere may cause the leftist insurg- ent movement to become more fragmented. However, the groups could seek to cooperate in a united move- ment, but past attempts have been doomed by differing outlooks and ideologies. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/ CONTROLLED DISSEM XGDS-2) PREPARED BY: Western Area Division (DI-5 25X1~ 25X1 LATEST INFO: 30 Sep 73 2 Oct 73 DIA Intelligence Summary Page 3 Approved For Re1gh&R05U@R EQJA I JJk171 R002300030011-8 Approved For Re'fW 2CSE1 EJ1AJM&]%*171R002300030011-8 JUAN PERON'S ATTACK ON MARXISM MAY LEAD TO INCREASED VIOLENCE. Saying that last week's assassination of labor leader Jose Rucci was "the last straw," Peron has an- nounced a frontal attack on Argentine Marxist groups. The President-elect said that he must have total con- trol of the situation for his inauguration on 12 Octo- ber. Although primarily directed at the Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP), which has been charged with the murder, leftist factions in the Peronist movement are also expected to be targets in the offensive. Internecine warfare between these elements may have been the cause of recent deaths in Argentina. Sources within the army fear increased violence since the ERP and some Peronist groups are capable of fighting against government repression. Nevertheless, the military hope to remain clear of the fighting and allow the police and special government commandos to handle the job. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM XGDS-2) PREPARED BY: Western Area Division (DI-5) SOURCES: LATEST INFO: 29 Sep 73 2 Oct 73 DIA Intelligence Summary Page 4 Approved For RelsreyoOQv ( 171 R002300030011-8 SE L3 A CR C l _ffflJM 25X1A Approved For RerJ 0gLP1MEg1AJ3RfJ)R9g171R002300030011-8 FRANCE FRENCH NUCLEAR STRATEGY HAS EVOLVED INTO ONE OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE VERY CLOSE TO THAT OF NATO. HOWEVER, PARIS CONTINUES TO REJECT A MAJOR ROLE FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN A PROTRACTED CONFLICT AND WILL IMPLEMENT POLICY ON A NATIONAL RATHER THAN A NATO BASIS. President Pompidou, in his 27 September press conference, pointed out that a flexible response is part of France's deterrent policy. He referred to multiple-delivery means now available -- sea-launched IRBMs, strategic bombers, and tactical nuclear weapons -- but Pompidou reportedly favors sea-launched missiles due to their relative invulnerability. Paris recently announced that a third group of nine IRBM silos will be built in southeastern France. The country also has 36 MIRAGE strategic bombers and two POLARIS-type submarines, with three more to be built. Tactical fighters are being equipped with nuclear weapons at two bases and a tactical nuclear missile is to become operational in 1974. Another source has said that French nuclear strat- egy during an attack could include demonstrative use of nuclear weapons and the employment of tactical nu- clear weapons to test Soviet intentions prior to the use of strategic forces. In the French view, a major Euro- pean war would likely escalate rapidly to a nuclear conflict and conventional forces would have little de- terrent value. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM XGDS-2) PREPARED BY: Western Area Division (DI-5) SOURCES: Emb Paris 5458 28 Sep 73 (S) and 5599 29 Sep 73 (U) DIA Analysis (S/NFD) LATEST INFO: 29 Sep 73 2 Oct 73 DIA Intelligence Summary Page 5 Approved For Re1F0 f2(REtIR2E'f1AAM R0A171R002300030011-8 Approved For RdMP 2 ETI FIJRA0171 R002300030011-8 CZECHOSLOVAKIA DIA 25X1 25X'D IA It is currently estimated that the Soviets may have ADMs, although this has not been confirmed. If they do, they are probably in the How-25X1DIA ever the USSR would not likely give Czechoslovakia ADMs outright, but would keep them under their control until released for use by the Soviet Government. ADMs would be highly effective along the Czechoslovak-West German border due to the mountainous terrain. (TOP SECRET II 25X1 PREPARED BY: Soviet-Warsaw Pact Area Division (DI-3) LATEST INFO: 29 Sep 73 2 Oct 73 DIA Intelligence Summary 25X1 DIA Page 6 Approved For Ret 20,qEt 2E 1A@ If KC,4171 R002300030011-8 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300030011-8 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300030011-8 Approved For Rele5F 0:8L19RErf FiIM P,A71R002300030011-8 BRIEFS BOLIVIA: Recent events may have introduced another crack in the fragile unity of the National Revolu- tionary Movement (MNR) and Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB) coalition backing President Banzer. He appar- ently used the 23 September disclosure of a leftist antigovernment plot as an excuse to move against the potentially troublesome labor element prior to public announcement of an austerity program. The leader of the MNR, a basically labor-oriented organization, re- portedly believed the government's allegations at first and promised Banzer strong backing. However, his later doubts resulted in only a weak statement of support. This move reportedly irritated the FSB and may have introduced a new strain in the coalition. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM XGDS-2) Western Area Division (DI-5) SOURCE: (S/NFD) 25X1A ARGENTINA: Army Chief Lt Gen Raul Carcagno's request for the dismissal of US and French Army missions has been taken under advisement by the Defense Ministry. Defense Minister Robledo said that a decision would be reached this week. The government has been des- cribing the proposal as a sincere effort to discontinue the groups because they are no longer needed, but politics remains the most likely reason. Carcagno boasted during last month's Conference of American Armies in Venezuela that the US military mission would be sent out of Argentina. The Peron government ap- pears to be in a quandary over how to handle the re- quest without insulting the general or damaging rela- tions with the US. (CONFIDENTIAL GDS-31 Dec 79) Western Area Division (DI-5) SOURCES: 2 Oct 73 DIA Intelligence Summary Page 7 Approved For Reler c : --& M ll?QOA71 R002300030011-8 25X1 Approved For Re1ea3/5E1:2RR"1R1A1R002300030011-8 CUBA: Two OSA-I-class large gu ded missile patrol boats were to arrive in the Havana area yesterday, doubling Cub edly expected only four OSAs, but more may be delivered as newer classes of patrol craft take their place in the Cabanas HAVANA inventory of this type unit. Two Soviet tugs towed them o o from the Baltic. The others were delivered in the same fashion in January 1972. The new OSAs will be assigned to the guided-missile patrol boat flotilla at Cabanas and will probably become operational in two or three months. Cuba has 18 KOMAR-class small guided- missile patrol boats in addi- tion to the OSAs -- all are equipped with the SS-N-2/STYX antiship missile. Cuba report- Soviet inventory and Cuba's KOMARs become unserviceable. Western Area Division (DI-5) SOURCES: CUBA-PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA: For the fourth time since April, Cuba has harassed Chinese-controlled ships in Cuban ports. On 22 September, the departure of a Chinese-chartered freighter was delayed by an extensive search. Other incidents have involved con- fiscation of crew clothing and ships' stores. No reason for these actions have been noted, but Havana may be demonstrating its loyalties in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Cuba has become .a primary proponent of the Soviet system as evidenced by Castro's speech at the nonaligned conference last month. This latest inci- dent may also be in reaction to a recent Chinese propaganda effort warning of the rising Soviet threat in the Caribbean through naval deployments to Cuba. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM XGDS-2) Western Area Division (DI-5) 25X1 2 Oct 73 DIA Intelligence Summary Page 8 Approved For RelearT3/06"(7R002300030011-8 Approved For ReI " P003f UR FA-U (9j 71 R002300030011-8 GREECE: President Papadopoulos appointed historian-politician Spyros Markezinis Prime Minister yesterday and charged him with forming a new Cabinet to be sworn in on 8 October. One source said that the present Cabinet had al- ready resigned, but a government announcement indicated that in- cumbent ministers would do so on the 6th. Postponement of the resignation was publicly attributed to absence of the Alternate Min- ister of Foreign Affairs, who is attending the opening of the UN session. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM GDS-31 Dec 79) Western Area Division (DI-5 25X1A DIA Intelligence Summary 25X1 DIA Page 9 Approved For Releyfq POO ff -" CA71 R002300030011-8 25X1 DIA Approved For Reie~~j2gP/Mt.fItRII~0171R002300030011-8 REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM: A major engagement in Military Region 3, which began on 28 September,has raged for three days on a rubber plantation 12 miles (19 kilo- meters) southeast of Tay Ninh City. A two-battalion government force conducting sweep operations in the area on the 28th, made contact with reported elements of the 101st NVA Regiment, Sub Region 1, and a local force battalion. Some 183 enemy soldiers were re- portedly killed, while ARVN forces suffered nine killed, 124 wounded and 297 missing. The engagement took place within the area of operation of the 101st NVA Regiment, and there is no evidence that the communists have initiated an offensive to obtain more territory. Apparently, this attack was an enemy attempt to protect what it considered to be its territory from the ARVN force moving into the area. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM GDS-31 Dec 79) Southeast Asia Division (DI-6) SOURCE: DAO Saigon Telecon 0400 EDT 2 Oct 73 (C) and DIA Analysis (C/NFD) 2 Oct 73 DIA Intelligence Summary Page 10 Approved For Release 003/I QL22 EC1A- :P li W 71 R002300030011-8 Appro,Yar?6$49 ?9&3/10/22: CIA-RDP83M00171 R002300030011-8 DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OSD/DDR&E OSD/GEN COUNSEL O SD/AT SD&D SD OSD/SATSD&DSD (2) OSD/SALT SUP GP OASD/ISA (2) OASD/PA OASD/I (3) OASD/SA OASD/I&L OASD/COMPTROLLER OASD/LA JCS/CHAIRMAN JCS/DIRECTOR JCS/SECRETARY JCS/CHAM STAFF GP JCS/J-3 (10) JCS/J-4 JCS/J-5 JCS/J-6 JCS/DOCSA JCS/SAGA JCS/JRC JCS/ASCAN ACSI/US ARMY (40) COMNAVINTCOM (27) CMC (2) ACNSC AFCS SSO/USAF (31) 25X1A AFIS/INR (2) AFRPL TFWC AU 12TH AF NSC (10) CIA (115) STATE DEPT (29) NSA (14) NSA REP DEFENSE FBI (2) PFIAB WHITE HOUSE SIT RM (3) GMAIC OMB NASA US SECRET SERVICE NIC (7) NPIC (5) ANMCC NEACP CINCONAD (2) 20TH CONAD REGION 21ST CONAD REGION 23D CONAD REGION 25TH CONAD REGION 26TH CONAD REGION CINCSAC (5) 2D AF CINCAL CINCLANT (2) CINCREDCOM CINCPAC (2) CINCUSARPAC (2) CINCPACFLT CINCPACAF (2) TAC MAC FTD (3) AFSC ARPA DCA DCPA DEF NUCLEAR AGCY 3428 TTING SQ-DSIATP DIA (79) Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300030011-8 TOP S E C'PToved For Release 2003/10/22: CIA-RDP83M00171 R002300030011-8 No Foreign Dissem This Document Contains Special Intelligence Material TOP SECRET EXCLUDED FROM GDS PER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.17 (M-2) Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300030011-8