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pved For Release 2007/05107_.: CIA.-~ZDP83M00210R0003q DATE TRANSMITTAL SLIP 26 May 1981 Per our telephone conversation, attached is the magazine that should be filed in the 30 ril 81 briefing file (SSCI mark u~ , f the FY 82 Intelligence Auth i ation Bill, DDCI was the witn ss). FROM: Judy ROOM NO. BUILDING EXTENSION ~~d FdF~fi~l~a~~ 20('~1~~~~`:'~1A-RDP83 n~t~~~nRnnn~znn Approved For Release-2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 ? ~sugge5ted you ~~ AEROFLOT SSCI this mo~nin :,::.? STAT ILLEGIB ? Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 d For Release 2007/05107 : ,~IA~RpP83M00210R000300050004-5 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 publisher LuAnne K. Levens 7t editor Benjamin F. Schemmer managing editor Deborah G. Meyer congressional editor Deborah M. Kyle contributing editors Landow Anthrax Hassan eI Badri Brid et Gail ~,,_ ARMED FORCES ~` ~~~-e~ May 1981 $1.75 ~ INTERNATIONAL Founded in 1863 as The Army and Navy Journal g Justin Galen SITUATION REPORTS Abdul Kasim Mansur Alexander Scott Silver Flash II Congress/Administration R. James Woolsey Senate Approves $2.8-Billion in FY81 Defense Add-Ons; proofreader HASC Recommends Similar Adds ................................. 8 Paul G. Gabelia House Increases Reagan FY82 Budget Targets, circulation manager Senate Expected To Do Same .................................... 10 Nancy J. Biglin Pentagon/Services (202) 296-0450 GAO Backs DLA Action on Second Source circulation assistant Chemical Protective Glove Production ............................. 17 Debra N. Houze Army Chopper Bids Weigh More accounting Than It Does .................................................. 17 Judy L. Jaicks Weapons/Research west coast manager GD Refutes Navy Allegations Barbara L. Currie of Mismanaged Sub Programs .................................... 18 (213) 472-2080 DoD Proceeds With Austere ELF ................................... 18 * yt ~k A Sea-Going M-X ICBM? ......................................... 24 advertising Army Kills "High Priority" IMAAWS ............................... 26 european managing director Paul Singer-Lawrence, All-Ameri- can Media, 54 Burton Court, FEATURES Franklins Row, London SW3, En- gland, Tele: 01-730-3592 european representatives The $150-Billion Misunderstanding .................................... 11 France DoD Mobility Study Asks $18-$31 -Billjon to George Beaumont, Montsam, S.A. Beef Up Airlift, Preposition More Forces ...................... 28 14 rue de Birague, Paris 75004, ....... MAC'S One-Man Airlift to Save Tele: 277-7427 Sweden a Life in Russia 30 ................................................. O. Michael Nager, Sveadress PO US Sealift: Dwindling Resources vs. Box 4085, S1-2704, Skarholmen Rising Need? .................................................... 35 4, Sweden, Tele: 08-710-3700 Aeroflot .......................................................... 38 * ,k, ~. Presidential Courage-and the April 1980 ARMED FORCES JOURNAL Iranian Rescue Mission ........................................... 60 1414 22nd St., NW, Suite 603 Washington, D.C. 20037 Te?ex )No. 892763 STANDING FEATURES Answer back is Sherwood ASH. Classified Advertising ........... 69 Defense Forum .............. 4, 6 ('opyright 19R0 by Army and tiary Journal, Inc. All Consolidated Mess ............. 70 Index to Advertisers ............ 22 rignts reserved. Darts & Laurels ............... 68 People ....................... 67 do part of this periodical may be reproduced or trans- Star Statn$ ................ 68, 69 muted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by an information storage and retrieval system, without prior written consent. THIS MONTH'S COVER illustrates one of the most critical controversial and Issues from 1863 and article reprints available on mi- crofilmfrom l'niversity Microfilm, Ann Arbor, Michigan , timely facets of national security planning today: America's ability to "lift" its aRlccoe. forces to trouble spots around the globe. In this issue, AFJ takes a detailed look Subscription rate: $18.00 one year l'SA; $35.00 one at how ready the nation's airlift and Sealift forces, both military and civilian, year ForeignlAir Maill. second Class postage paid at are to meet those needs. And, at what's on the horizon, including the Air Force's Washington, D.C. and other mailing offices. Armed proposed new C-X airlifter. Forces Journal nss:v o19~-3s9~i Elsewhere, an unprecedented look at Russia's Aeroflot "civil" airline and its Armed Forces Journal, Vol. 118, No. use in military contingencies, intelligence gathering, and revolutionary ferment. 9, Whole No. 5676, May, 1981. Pub- As Memorial Day approaches and this issue comes off the press on the anniversary fished by Army & Navy JOURNAL of last April's rescue mission to free our former hostages from Iran, at a time Inc., in each calendar month. Publica- when we all remember the courage of the eight men who lost their lives at tion office: 1414 22nd St., NW, Wash- Desert One, AFJ looks back to the events surrounding that oft-maligned rescue ington, DC 20037. mission-and the hardest decision Jimmy Carter ever had the courage to make. ^ xY ^ Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 Defense Forum Decision Supporter- or Decision Maker? ^I I have read with interest your com- peting articles on the AV-8B. I believe that Mr. Murray makes a mistake common to many in his profession-he has mistaken the role of the systems analyst with that of the manager. It is his job to provide information which supports decisions, not makes them. There are many factors other than the quantified results of systems analysis that rr~ake up defense complexities of combat when he attempts to dismiss the subjective judgment of a commander as a miscon- ception in the heat of battle. While he is correct that a tank killed 45 mintues Iz~te is still denied to the enemy for to- rriorrow's battle, so too are our ground troops killed by that same tank during that 45 minutes denied to us. Let's rely a little more on the judgment of a proven a~mbat leader and not rush headlong after numerical justification of every decision. Better Alternatives to A~'J's Strategic Initiatives ^ The article in your March issue by Mr. Schemmer, "Strategic Initiatives to Bridge a Budget Chasm Too Big for Dollars Alone to Cure," was an interesting and certainly creative attempt to solve many paradoxes inherent in our present defense posture. 1 believe, however, that many of his so- lutions fail to adequately address military and political realities. The proposal to withdraw the United States Army's 2nd Infantry Division and the 3rd Marine Division from the Western Pacific, and to replace them with a Jap- anese Corps ignores several diplomatic problems. Many Koreans still have un- pleasant memories of occupation by Jap- ar,~ese troops, and are concerned over the possible emergence of a militaristic Japan. Further, Japanese public opinion itself is a fragile thing which has to be prodded slowly to the right through [he process of consensus. When Mr. Schemmer discusses the "United States Marine CorpslNorway Mismatch," he also ignores a major fallacy in his hypothesis by assuming that Marines are unsuited to fight in that area of the world. Not only are all three Marine di- visions training their battalions for winter warfare on a regular basis, but Marines presently participate in Norwegian exer- cises annually. Perhaps the most important argument for a continued Marine contin- gency role in the area is the need to main- tain aforcible entry capability of amphibi- ous assault to counter any Soviet thrust at ?Europe's northern flank. Throughout history, Marines have proven that they can not only fight anywhere in the world, but that they can win. As he discusses his "Gulf Fuel Option," the author correctly highlights the prob- lems of transporting enough refined fuel to conduct mechanized operations in that part of the world. His solution, relying on Kuwait or Saudi Arabia to provide refined petroleum products to United States forces committed to the area, ig- nores the tremendous instability in their presently conservative governments. This may appear to be a less expensive alter- native than building a sufficient airlift ca- pability, but could easily lead to no fuel at all if the political situation changes abruptly. An obvious alternative passed over by Mr. Schemmer is to utilize tankers prepositioned with NTPS shipping to aug- ment airlift requirements. Maj. C. M. Lohman, USMC Dumfries, VA USAF's Rapier Buy ^ Much has happened over the last three years; I am sure you are aware that the United States Air Force is in the process of acquiring Rapier for the defense of its NATO bases in the UK, whilst Rapier continues to defend our own Army and Air Force bases in Germany. You will not therefore be surprised that the system is being considered as a most suitable con- tender to provide low-level air defense for the newly constituted Rapid Deployment Force. I am anxious not to arouse old and un- necessary controversy, but am equally con- cerned that the United States officers with the responsibility of planning the intro- duction of the RDF have accurate facts. Many of these officers read and sometimes contribute to the Journal and hence my concern and this letter to you. If I may refer to the March issue of the Journal, on page 50 you say, "Carter and Brown have asked Congress to buy a non-NATO standard Rapier air defense system...." 1 underline the words non- NATO, as this is not true: Rapier has for some years now formally been declared operational by SACEUR, the only weapon of its type to be so recognized. The Rapier system now being introduced to the United States Air Force is every bit as standard as that employed by the Royal Air Force and the British Army in the operational defense of their NATO bases in Germany. You go on to say, "The Rapier buy is an important political program given England's decision last year to buy Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles and the need to offset some of the cost through a two-way street US purchase of British hardware." The implication that must be drawn from this statement is that if it had not been for the Trident program in the UK, Rapier would not have been ac- quired by the US Air Force. This is simply not true. Rapier was selected by the USAF only after the most painstaking review of the whole problem of air defense for vital bases, and Rapier emerged as the only viable system that could be acquired with a substantiated performance, cost, and de- livery profile. 1 understand that after the decisions were made some very minor ar- rangements on manpower offsets were agreed, but this had nothing to do with the selection of the right equipment to meet the operational requirement. For the record, and as someone who has been involved in the disciplines of air defense over many years, may I make the following observations on the requirement for air defense for the Rapid Deployment Force: ? Air defense at high-, medium- and low- level altitudes is essential; ? By the nature of the logistical limitations imposed, the RDF will be unable to lift and deploy much of the existing air defense equipment, particularly the medium al- titude air defense missile systems. Examination will show that both high and medium altitude cover can only be achieved in this case with aircraft. Further examination (as in the case of the USAF selection of Rapier) will show that Rapier is the only proven system of both capability and logistical profile suit- able for the RDF which is available and can provide adequate low-level antiaircraft defense in an acceptable time-scale and cost. Gordon Banner British Aerospace Hertfordshire, England Bring Back the Battleship! ^ So far, the only objections I have heard to resurrecting the Iowa-class battleships are manpower and vulnerability. The former problem must be solved for the entire Navy. The latter "problem" does not exist. Torpedoes, once the bane of battleships, are less of a problem now, as modern ASW is forcing submarines to adopt standoff weapons such as cruise missiles. Indeed, the new monster Russian submarine is re- portedly designed for cruise missile at- tacks. But cruise missiles are slow and carry a relatively small payload. Large caliber naval shells travel exceedingly fast and carry a large payload. It was precisely to meet this latter threat that the lowa- class was built with 19-inch thick steel armed forces JOURNAL international/May 1981 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 ..~ .~~ ,/tee i ii The off-road king. ~hrYsler's High MohilitY Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle. The Chrysler Expanded Mobility Truck offers lions and keeps all wheels in contact with the a: proven base for the US Army High Mobility driving surface. The Chrysler HMMWV also comes Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle Program withadependableandprovendieselorgasoline (HMMWV). The Chrysler HMMWV sets new high engine...3-speed automatic transmission and 2- sl:andardsfor its class in rugged off-road mobility. speed transfer case... independent front suspen- EXPERIENCE sion...oversized power brakes...and much more! Eased on over 100,000 miles of proven perform- APPLICATION(S) cmce and reliability testing, the Chrysler HMMWV is unsurpassed on rough surfaces, slopes, mud, The Chrysler HMMWV adapts easily for more sand, and snow. specialized applications. Available are Weapon _ REASON and others. v The reasons are full-time four-wheel-drive. , .large, When nature's most severe terrain must becon- low-pressure tires and deep, soft suspension, This quered, the versatile Chrysler HMMWV is the ulti- suspension system absorbs bumps and depres- mate off-road king. l~~dovfng defense into the future. Forty years a proven leader. ?' C H RYS LER ,-,DEFENSE, INC. Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 Deficiencies in Air Worse Than on Ground? ^ AFJ is by far the best all-around pro- fessional reading magazine available for military officers, and I recommend it to all officer students and staff at the Marine Corps Education Center in Quantico. Not to say that Mr. Woolsey's article "Who Will Shoulder The Burden" in the Feb. '81 issue was up to par, however. (t is naive to believe that the "deficiencies of air are more quickly corrected" than for a division or for logistics, that it is easier to keep aviation ready. The lead times for procurement of aircraft and parts and the lead times for training/integrating aircrews/maintenance crews far exceeds any similar problems that I am aware of on the ground side. Perhaps Mr. Woolsey could expand his point if I have missed it. Stick By Your Guns! ^ Regarding the March, 1981 edition of AFJ, specifically the Defense Forum letter "On Character Assassination:" Stick by your guns! The likes of An- derson and Turner deserve it. It is they who do not have the wisdom to extensively correct the record-if indeed the record need be corrected. I continue to enjoy the outstanding work you and your staff are doing. James C. Broadus Controller Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co. Paper Armies Are Nice, BUt .. . ^ I have been in two of our war mo- bilizations, and one does not make good forces from rosters ar warm bodies. At present, the Army can no longer call out 17 divisions of the "inept, ill-trained, and unready" National Guard. In the course of their paper-chasing and force building, bureaucrats have managed to hash a num- ber of [hose and sank them neatly. Each Army division needs a trained division base with its staff and technical units, its DivArty, and time to work as a team. You do not build such a team overnight, as one millionaire learned many years ago on the baseball held. We had a similar experience with our skeleton forces in 1950, and it cost a lot of good troops until we got some field skills re-learned under fire. Paper armies are nice, but real live ones are the only ones with relevance. armed forces JOURNAL international/May 1981 belts. Clearly, vulnerability is not a prob- lem for the Iowas. Further, battleships can be loaded down with a large number of antiaircraft weap- onry. It seems to me that they would add to the fleet's capability without adding to its vulnerability, as well as impressing the hell out of anyone who saw them. ~Nashington, DC 20/20 Foresight for a Change? 11 R. James Woolsey's article, "US Navy I3udget: Ingenuity, Audacity and aTail- Iiooker Spirit" (April AFJ,), challenges the Navy to face up to some "nasty questions" in planning the Reagan Administration's naval expansion. Mr. Woolsey advances some interesting and innovative concepts (the use of space, emphasis on EW, in- creased NBC warfare capabilities, distri- bution of offensive power across more plat- form types, V/STOL, innovation in the application of technology). Subsequent to the preparation of his article, Mr. Woolsey had the opportunity to meet with me and review some of the current work of the Navy's Long-Range Planning Group (established in January, 1980). He found that the types of concepts he supports have been addressed by our group and many are receiving active con- siideration by the Navy leadership. As a case in point, a number of his proposed initiatives were published as long-range pri- orities in the planning and programming guidance issued by the Chief of Naval C-perations earlier this year. Needless to say, Mr. Woolsey was very supportive of the work of the Long-Range Planning Group and would, I believe, agree that we are not suffering from myopia, ".as most naval planners are during salad years." R.Adm. C. R. Larson, USN More On the Bloodiest Battle ^ Re: "The Battle Over the Bloodiest Bat- tle," the battle of the Somme must rank at the top among the great tragedies of modern warfare. John Keegan in his excellent book, The Face of Battle, determined that whereas the German losses on July 1, 1916 totaled 6,000 killed or wounded, the fourteen Brit- ish divisions committed to the assault "had lost about 60,000, of whom 21,000 had been killed, most in the first hour of the attack, perhaps the first minutes." These figures do not include losses suffered by the French who committed 20 divisions to the battle. These statistics are interesting, but pale when compared to the potential for killing in. the hands of today's armies! Only a strong America can prevent the setting of new casualty scores. Brig. Gen. Eugene Bandera, TX Maier, USAR-Ret. Setting the Record Straight, Again! ^ You reported in February that on De- cember 19, at Frank Carlucci's request, I called Cap Weinberger about Bill Van Cleave. You stated that I believe in stra- tegic disarmament. You suggested that I was under consideration for a position at DoD. All three statements are false. 1 have never spoken or written to Sec- retary Weinberger about Bill Van Cleave; neither on December 19 nor on any other date. 1 have never spoken nor written in favor of strategic disarmament and do not believe in it. Finally, 1 made crystal clear to those involved in the transition that I was no[ interested in any position any- where in government, a decisia,~ which remains firm. To set the record straight, I left Wall Street and came to Washington to serve as special civilian assistant to Paul Nitze in 1966 when he was SecNav. Later I served as Deputy Legal Advisor at the Department of State and as legal advisor to the SALT I delegation. I believed then, and do now, that arms control in general and SALT in particular must be consid- ered in the context of our national security policy, the essence of which is secure de- terrence. Finally, in my 15 years in Washington and 10 years in government, including ser- vice as Under Secretary of HUD, I have never seen an Under Secretary as effective as Frank Carlucci, whom I worked with daily when General Counsel of HEW. I believe Frank will prove to be the ablest DepSecDef seen at DoD in years. Editors' Note: We hate to repeat ourselves, but as we noted in March's Defense Fo- rum, on this one we goofed! Concerning the article referred to in Mr. Rhinelander's letter, "Top Level In- fighting for Key Defense Posts," it was never the Journal's intent to endorse the allegations in a memo we quoted and ref- erenced throughout the article, only to highlight the level of tactics sometimes employed in jockeying for high level ap- pointive positions. We appreciate that Mr. Rhinelander set the record straight, and hope he'll accept our apologies. AFJ reserves the right to edit all De- fence Forum letters for clarity and to conform with space constraints. ^ ~r ^ If You Don't Subscribe- You Should! Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000 'I~iis is probably the last place y~ud look to cut ~ ~~ro costs. - Somehow a wiring system never seems to get all the att~=ntion that's paid to other major subsystems in today's aircraft, missiles, surface vehicles, and weapons systems. In fact, many wiring systems look like after-thoughts, thrown together with a lot of different connectors and wire termination methods. There had to be a simpler, more cost-effective way. And Deutsch found it. Introducing the Common Termination System (CTS). A izew concept that uses one method of wire termination to support modern, light-weight, high-performance electrical sy~;tems. The simplicity of the CTS concept provides a wiring solution that reduces tooling, inventory, documentation, and training co:~ts. With increased reliability and shortened turn-around time. The Deutsch Common Termination System. If your engineers areri t specifying CTS on your programs, you may find you're not competitive. And, of course, the system meets or exceeds the requirements of AFLC 8027520. Deutsch Electronic Components Division, Municipal Airport, Banning, California 92220 ? (714) 849-7822 ? TWX 910-332-1361. ~ The best way to make ends meet. ~iyong- y,ing, besides some intermediate sups in neighboring countries where the Soviets maintain an active political interest It is only in the western hemi phere where the Aeroflot network could b~ con- sidered "underdeveloped." Though it is in their strategic interests to expand in the Caribbean and South America, they are restricted to Havana, Mexico City', and Lima. Likely short-term targets f~r ex- pansion are Managua, Panama City Gra- nada, and other politically opportune Ca- ribbean countries. The only regions of the world enied tc~ Aeroflot are the larger portions f the western hemisphere, Australia and ~ New Zealand? and the great Pacific Ocei~n ba- sin. Most conservative and politically an- tagonistic regimes of the western hemi- sphere, including the United State$ and Canada, have denied or severely restricted Aeroflot service on the basis of mi~trust, political leverage, and pure financial infeasibility. Australia and New Zealand have denied Aeroflot service simply be- ca~use they have judged that there w~vould tic; insufficient passenger traffilc on Aeroflot, and that Qantas and Air. New Zealand have no financial gain to >je re- alized in service to Moscow. [t is acknowledged that various (types of intelligence and political activities are conducted by other nations' flag cairriers for their respective governments to (some degree (including the United States), but hardly at the degree and intensity of ~ero- flot and its surrogate airlines in ~oviet client states. Furthermore, even though such activities are pursued by other foreign 1964 {continued} Congo (Brazzaville) fessed nonaligned policy by government 1964-Premier Chou En-tai pays three- day visit to gain support in border d%s- pute with India; Soviets counter with anti-Chinese rhetoric 19b3-196$-Pro-Marxist civilian gov- P(2) ernment in power; Cuban serve as cadre for training Presidential Guard and Peo- plc's Militia-ibis situation produced conflict with the Army until it seized power in 1968 After 1963, Congo has been a base for C/F Communist and radical subversion in (6) Zaire and southern Africa-arms very likely brought in on Aeroflot aircraft 1965 Senegal Soviet interest mainly in acquiring stra- F(1) tegcally located base at Dakar for shorter route to Latin America 1965-1970-PRC heavily involved in F(1) economic assistance and development of railroad to Zambian copper mines Soviets, during'60s, concerned about PRC influence in Tanzania and East Af- rica. Aeroflot base at Dar es Salaam im- portantfor political, intelligence, and strategic purposes 1965-Intense anti-American and anti- P(2) West German disorders due to FRG rec- ognition of Israel Late'SOs-Beginning of Soviet arms F(6) shipments to PLO, much of which was used against Jordan, Israel, and Chris- tians in civic war Although no political/military copse- F('1) quences, Aeroflot. presence ii Tokyo a matter of high prestige and visibility Soviets hope entre to Japan. would pre- sent them with market for IL-62 aircraft Canada. Soviets hope that route to Montreal. F(1) would extend across Canada to give them access to Trans-Pacific route United Aeroflot access to US highly prest- F(1) States gious; symbol of "detente"; hopeful of extending to West Coast and Trans-Pa- cific route. North. Yemen grimed forces JOURNAL international/May 1981 1957-Intense anti-American feelings, C(2) riots over US opposition to Turkish oc- cupation of portion of Cyprus-possible Soviet attempt to exploit anti:-Ameri- canism Late 1966 resumption of civil war with P(2} Egypt (and Soviets) supporting rebels F(4) and. Saudi Arabia supporting govern- ment/royalists Soviet economic aid to North Yemen n- chiding development of strategic port of Nudaydeh Cameroon Mid'S0s to 1970-Communist backed P/C(2) Union of Cameroon People's (UCP) in- surgency {eontenned next page Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 m an h d t 'fic t si 1':967 (continued} 1969 South Yemen July; 1967 tomid-1969-Nigerian civil war; Soviets supply Nigerian govern went with aircraft. and other arms against secessionist Biafra (Eastern Re- gion) Soviet Union and PRC in intense compe- tition dnring'60sfar influence June,1969-Extreme 1Vlarxist wing of NaNanal Liberation Front seizes power in coup; internal' conflict between pro- Moscow and pro-Peking factions, with pro-Moscow faction victorious 1975-South Yemen becomes Commu- nist-dominated Yemen E'eople's Demo- cratic Republic 1970-:Soviet influence increases; mill- taty aid and support. of confrontation with North Yemen and Oman over Dhofar region 1'9b81970-Increasing power of So- viet-supported PLO against monarchy creates "state within.. a state" September 1970-"Black Septem- ber"-Soviet and Syrian backed PLO :attempt coup against monarchy .September 1969-Col. Qaddafi leads. radical coup against monarchy June 1970-US evacuates W heelus Air- base; British evacuate bases in eastern regionat request of Qaddafi Mid'-1970-First order for Soviet tanks negotiated March1972-Libya. signs "technical" .and economical aid agreement with So- viet Union; this agreement probably dis- guises ecret arms deal 1969/70-Intensive North Vietnamese and Communist guerrilla activities in north (Plain. of Jars) results in loss of re- gion to government February,1970-Souvanna calls for re- convening of 1462 Geneva signatories to halt Communist offensive-rejected by Soviet Union. Late 1970-Beginning of Communist offensive which marks final effort to de- feat. royalist and .Neutralist forces 1'970-Height. of communist terrorism in northeast and great concern over North Vietnamese/communist conquest of Laos. and' Cambodia .Soviets support Bangladesh indepen- dence movement in early'70s December, 1971-14-day war of inde- pendence; Soviet Union supports India in war against Pakistan; Soviet support critical to India's alliance with Bangla- desk independence movement Soviet support of Bangladesh (and'. India) has virtually eliminated PRC influence insub-continent C(2) F(3) (4) F(3) f4) P/C(2) (3) (6} P/C {2) CiF(1} g carriers, t ey ono pose a threat to the security interests of the United States or its allies. Aeroflot does pose such a threat. The Aeroflot Threat Potential: Aeroflot as an Adjunct to VTA The greatest and most obvious threat posed by Aeroflot is its personnel and materiel transport capabilities as an ad- junct to the VTA. The seven Aeroflot air- craft types designated as the VTA reserve fleet (AN-12; AN-24; IL-14; IL-62; Tu- 124; IL-76; and AN-22), when combined with VTA assets for both personnel and materiel transport make a significant con- tribution. Tables Five and Six show the Aeroflot contribution, by military trans- port aircraft type, to the potential total lift capabilities for personnel and materiel. In personnel transport, Aeroflot's most sig- nificant contribution is in the long-range aircraft (Tu-124, IL-62, AN-22, and IL- 76). Aeroflot can lift almost as many per- sonnel as VTA over long ranges and about 70% as many over shorter ranges, as shown in Table Eight. In the matter of materiel lift augmen- tation to VTA, except for a significant contribution of the long-range IL-62's limited payload capacity, a more modest contribution is made by the older, long- range AN-22. The most significant materiel transport augmentation is made by the short-range AN-24. These aircraft would be used as "work horses" in combat logistics environments such as Central Eu- rope, Afghanistan, Iran, and the Middle East. The percentage augmentation for short- and long-range materiel transport is also shown in Table Eight. Aeroflot aug- mentation for long-range materiel trans- port (39%) is also significant. These long ranges (up to 4,000 miles) would apply most to African and western hemisphere missions. Addition of the 100 IL-76s mentioned earlier would increase the long-range per- sonnel transport capability by 45% and cargo capacity by over 50% by mid-1982. The AN-22, in service since 1965, has been the mainstay of the VTA because of its versatility in long-range personnel and materiel transport. For example, it is capable of carrying equipment ranging from large amounts of munitions to main battle tanks, missile launchers, and self- propelled artillery. Though it lacks the range and payload capacity of the Ameri- can C-5, the AN-22's rear loading lets it handle large bulk cargo and most Soviet fighting vehicles. In addition to the technical and func- tional capabilities of Aeroflot's reserve fleet, their value is enhanced by immediate to short-term availability of both aircraft and crew/maintenance personnel. Since most crew and key maintenance personnel are members of the Soviet Air Force Re- serve, it would be a relatively simple mat- ter to transfer them to active Air Force status with their aircraft. Moreover, a sig- nificant portion of Aeroflot's personnel and 50 armed forces JOURNAL international/May 1981 Approved Far Release 2007105/07 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 _ Approved For Release 2007/05107: CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 SCIE11lCE0SCOPE U.S. Army forward observer teams operating from armored vehicles will be able to pinpoint targets for laser-homing weapons or conventional weapons by using a modified Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator Designator. The device was developed by Hughes to be mounted on the M113 Fire Support Team (FIST) armored vehicles. It determines the distance to a target based on the length of time for a burst of laser light to reach the target and bounce back. The laser beam also can illuminate the target to provide a bull's-eye for laser-homing weapons. For the first time a weapon delivery system will let pilots of single-seat air- craft find, track, and destroy surface targets day or night while flying at high speed and low altitudes. The system is called LANTIRN (Low Altitude Navigation Targeting Infrared for Night). It would be mounted in a pod outside U.S. Air Force F-16 and A-10 aircraft. LANTIRN includes a forward-looking infrared sen- sor and a terrain-following navigation subsystem for low-level day and night operations. It automatically can recognize targets, "hand off" a target to an infrared-guided Maverick missile, and designate a target with a laser beam for a laser-guided bomb to home on. Hughes, teamed with Martin Marietta, is responsi- ble for the target recognizes and boresight correlator for Maverick hand-off. The LANTIRN program is directed by Aeronautical Systems Division, deputy for reconnaissance/electronics warfare systems at Wright-Patterson AFB. Eight more U.S. Navy guided-missile frigates of the FFG-7 class will carry advanced consoles for displaying data from ship radars and acoustic, TV, and electronic warfare sensors. The Hughes AN/UYA-4 consoles will be part of the Naval Tactical Data System, which links ship sensors, computers, and weapons while detecting, tracking, and evaluating enemy threats. The consoles have more display capability for tactical symbols, operate at higher data rates than ear- lier systems, and are more reliable. The displays are installed on or planned for more than 100 ship and shore installations of the U.S. and its allies. Technicians in the field will be able to make quick fixes on the F/A-18 Hornet strike fighter's radar with the aid of an automatic radar test system. The AN/USM-469 system, which is suitable for U.S. Navy ships and U.S. Marine Corps vans, consists of five and a half bays of test equipment and a single-bay liquid cooler system. It uses production test software to ensure common standards between the factory and the field. One operator position tests the AN/APG-65 radar's transmitter, antenna, and receiver-exciter. A second tests the radar signal processor and radar data processor. A video display shows test results, fault types, locations, and other pertinent data. The test system, like the radar, is built by Hughes under contract to McDonnell Douglas Corporation. A new communications system delivered to the U.S. Navy saves weight and space over previous systems. The Hughes tactical information exchange system (TIES) uses a single set of hardware to accommodate many different digital and voice communications processing. This was made possible by a new frequency translator unit and a programmable signal processor. Previous systems used separate pieces of equipment for amplitude modulation or frequency modulation of voice and data. Creating a new world with electronics r------------------~ i HUGHES I I L__________________J HUGHES AIRCRAFT COMPANY GULVER GITY,CALIFORNIA 90230 -Approved For Release 2007/05107:.CIA-RDP83~1100210R000300050004-5 ' From the prime contractor to the prime. beneficiary: Congratulate ?- ?0o?vv00 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 'axis, America. Cnce again, America is leading the world into space. Rockwell International is prime contractor for the Shuttle orbiter. Also, our Rocketdyne Di~~ision built the main engines. And we assist NASA in the integration of thE~ Space Transportation System. O~,r achievements in space and aircraft development demonstrate the high technology which characterizes all the businesses of Rockwel! International. We join America in saluting NASA, the Columbia crew - John W. Young and Robert L. Crippen -and the 50,000 people in many companies who worked with us to build America's Space Shuttle. Congratulations, America. Through the Shuttle, designed for repeated flights into space, you have built a technology bridge to the benefits of this vast new frontier. It is a uniquely American achievement. Good old American "know-how" is alive and well. Automotive /Aerospace Electronics/Generallndustries Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 147~~ ~.-?(:bile (eorttenued) ,. Benin {formerly Dahomey) September, l9fitl-m-Allende's Mara~ist= backed Popuhtr IInity Cctaliti~ wins 36 % of vote and is confu~med as Presi= dent 1911--Municipal eMctions returnel! Sfl % of vote favoring Allende.. August 1972-Anti-governmen# riots; Army tapes control' Uetober' 1972-Riots over inflation atu economic conditions; Army extendscon trot to include most of country 1973-Allende increases leftist po6ti- Cal/eCOMimIC pOllCleS August, 1973-Continuing labor un- restf severe government crisLs September 12,1473-Military coup,.. Allende overthrown, Aeroflot service to Chile suspended January1972-Strong leftist guerrilla attack on town of San Pablo-Army be- ginscounter-terror campaign.. 't'hroughout 19?2 contintted sporadic guerrilla activities in remote and rural ~i~' There is no known direct orindirect So- viet support for the. insurgents though Soviet materiel may be passed through Cuban contacts August, 1972-President Mareiaspro- claimed "president for hfe"-estab- fishes close contacts with Eastern.En- rope, receives some economic and! military aid 197U-Following earthquake, Soviets give substantial aid utilizing Aeroflot- since then, Soviets have persisted in es- tablisbi~ route to Lima via Havana August, 1973-President'Velasco over- thrown in coup November, 1976-Peres signs purchase agreement with Soviets for 22 aircraft, 200 T-62 tanks and other military equipment April,1978-Moscow reschedules 8?% of payment due in 1980 to extend through 1988 1978-Six AN-26 transport aircraft purchased from Soviet Union.. 19$0-Additional 16 Su-22 fighter air craft purchased from Sorie# Union October1972-Military Revohttionary government under Cal. Kereku seizes power-increased radicalization November,1974-Kereku proclaims -that aMarxist-Leninist course would be followed'. November,1974-People's Republic of Benin proclaimed: Guinea- September, 1974-Independence from Bissau. Portugal-immediately afterwards, close ties established with.. Communist Bloc-small economic aid program from Bloc established C jF(3) (4} '' aircraft are frequently used for troop transport during Russia's routine, semiannual troop ro- tation in Eastern Europe (April 1981 AF.n. This participation by Aeroflot provides crews and maintenance personnel with highly rel- evant practice and training in tactical troop movement procedures. The use of Aeroflot assets in the semi- annual troop rotation program provides yet another potential threat, particularly to un- suspecting neighboring countries. During the troop rotation periods the troop-laden aircraft could easily be directed to seize or occupy a political/military objective from an unwary victim. The efficiency of utilizing Aeroflot assets for such purposes during the rotation period was made evident during the August, 1968 Soviet seizure of Prague's international Aeroflot's Intel! THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT uses the assets and designated routes of Aeroflot for general information and specific intelli- gence gathering is certain, Defense Depart- ment officials say. Periodically, members of Aeroflot's foreign airport ticket agencies and maintenance staffs have been arrested for illegal activities including espionage and at- tempts to gain access to security information through use of local nationals. During 1980, for example, Aeroflot em- ployees in Brussels and Madrid were expelled for undefined "illegal activities" and customs violations. Closer to home, three Cuban airline pilots were arrested last September as sus- pected espionage agents. An FBI agent, Ar- thur F. Nehrbass, of the Miami office, stated that the Cubans were arrested on "informa- tion we developed as an outgrowth of in- vestigations into Cuban intelligence matters." In February of ~ this year, Ricardo Escartin, who was First Secretary of the Cuban Interest Section and who functioned also as Cubana's representative in Washington, was expelled for "enticing illegal trade." The FBI also iden- tified him as an intelligence agent. Another interesting fact emerges from Cubana's operations in the United States. There are currently three Cuban "security agents" permanently residing in Miami os- tensibly assigned to protect Cubana's single weekly chartered flight. DoD authorities who monitor Cubana's activities report these agents "are never to be found, even when the Cubana aircraft is at Miami." This was borne out several weeks ago when an anti- Castro agent attempted to drive a vehicle into a Cubana plane at Miami and none of the Cuban "security agents" were present to protect the aircraft. Aeroflot's extensive network through West- ern Europe permits it to observe all aspects of commercial and, indeed, some important military installations lying along or adjacent to its flight paths. It is not unusual for Aeroflot (or its counterpart surrogates), to veer "ac- cidentally" off its prescribed flight path to overfly troop movements and maneuvers in Western Europe and NATO naval exercises. armed forces JOURNAL international/May 1981 Approved Far Release 2007105!07:CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 airpc rt and other key centers during its take- over of that country. T} e use of Aeroflot aircraft and crews in the ~oviet occupation of Afghanistan, and its utcliz~ction in logistical support for Soviet and surrogate forces in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yc;men are other examples of the value of Aeroflot as an adjunct to the VTA. Aide from the transport aircraft, Aero- flot ,~lso maintains and operates a large fleet of sl ecially designed aircraft used for crop dust~ng and other chemical spraying func- tion.. These aircraft could easily be utilized fort ctic;al employment of chemical and bio- logi~al agents if the Soviets should consider thes., aircraft expendable, since few would likely survive the hazards of a combat environment. ^~^ i e~nce Activities g This practice, however, is not limited to Eu- rope~; the;re are numerous incidents over the past I S years of Aeroflot, Cubana, and other surr gate carriers straying off designated route s tc observe events and places of interest in tl~~e United States. The matter of Communist bloc illegal overflights over restricted areas in the United States caused the US Air Force last summer to is ue the following standing note of concern in a memorandum to all its designated critical inst. Nations: I here are indications that Communist air- lihes have SIGINT [signal intelligence] col- lellction missions in Western Europe-there is~ no evidence to date that Aeroflot uses such collection capabilities in the United States' air space. However, the CONUS overflight capabilities of Aeroflot along vJith their unevaluated collection capabili- ti~s does present a threat of unknown di- rr ensions. All recipients of this message a e advised to take appropriate actions to s; feguard sensitive communications and on- g~ing operations." According to some Air Force authorities, theif e is reason to believe that Aeroflot has already engaged in some form of electronic intelligence, such as monitoring VHF and UHF at certain locales along their flight paths in the lJnited States. A,cr Force liaison officers at FAA assigned to r~onicor Communist airline flights over the i United 'States stated that the various air con- trolEers covering the northeastern US reported rec wing requests at a rate of as much as fou per month from Cubana, Lot, and CSA airl nes to overfly the restricted regions of the Hudson Valley and Connecticut on their flig is to and from Montreal. They requested these routes in order to "avoid the heavy traffic" of their authorized flight routes. F~erhaps the Watervliet Arsenal near Al- bary, the Knowles Atomic Power Labora- tories, or the many electronic and naval fa- cili ies of the Hudson Valley and Connecticut are specially designated high priority targets for the Soviet intelligence data collection ef- fort. (continued on p. 56) Angola January,1975-Portugal attempts to F{2) estabi'rsh independent Angola with alf {3) parties represented in transitional gov- {4) ernment-MPLA (Supported by Soviet { Union] attempts military seizure of power but is opposed by FNLA (sup- ported by PRC and Zaire, and tacitly, the US) - July,1975?-MPLA requests and re- ceives Cuban troops. and arms, US be- gins supplying arms to FNLA and UNITA in August,1975 4ctober,1975-Aeroflot utilized in C/~' transporting much of 15,000 Cuban troops #a Angola By early 1976-Cuban forces defeat FNLA/UNITA in convention combat; FNLA/UNITA begin guerrilla oper= ations Throuthaut 1976-Soviets rearm Cu- ban and MPLA forces; process still con= timing Mozambique June, 1975-Independence-Establish- ment of Marxist People's Republic. Apri1,1977-US intelligence reports heavy influx ofSoviet/East European arms-mast likely destined for Rhode- Sian and South African black liberation forces-Aeroflot utilized for arms ship- meet Mexico September, 1977-President Portilla F{1) announces political reforms which per- met Communists to farm legal party and. participate in elections. 1.977 Ethiopia September, 1974-Radical military P{2) junta overthrows monarchy of Haile Se- lassie January, 1975/76-Civil war between. government forces and Eritrean seces- sonists February, 1977-Col. Mengistu seizes power from Provisional Military Gov- ernment-cuts ties with U and West March,1977-Castro visits Ethiopia Apri1,1977-200 Cuban military adv- sors airlifted to Ethiopia utilizing Aeroflot aircraft; US facilities closed and military advisors expelled May,1977-Mengistu visits Moscow- C/F{3} series of military and economic agree- merits negotiated' July, 1977-Heavy fighting breaks out between Ethiopia and Somati "Leber- anon" forces September, 1977-$SOO,million arms agreement signed with Soviet Union {48 M1C aircraft; 200 T-54/55; SAM and ATK missiles} November,1977-Soviets begin large scale arms and personnel airlift-Hera- tint aircraft plays significant role hair- lift; by January,197f3, estimated 2,400 Soviet and. surrogate advisers arrive May,1978-Ethiopia receives 224 Mies-launches counteroffensive {continuer! next page) Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 against Somali forces November,l9?B-USSR-Ethiopia sign. long term Treaty of Frientlship Zambia. Mid-'?()s-Zambia accepts Soviet j East European military equipment for Rhodesian black liberation forces Soviet Aeroflot aircraft: most likely ut- tized to transport arms to Zambia 19?8 Jamaica.. December, l9?6-Leftist Premier Min- later Manley assumes power with. large . majority ApriI,19?9-Manley flies to Moscow to establish closer trade and economic ties.. 50,000-~ a 40,000 a 0 20,000 10,000 Table Five Soviet Transport One Time Lift Potential for Contiguous Power Projection (PERSONNEL) Medium Range AIRCRAFT ALLOCATION Long Range Short Range Short Range F(1) Aeroflot VTA ~ ~ Additional ~ _ ~ 100 IL-76's Long Range Long Rannge l IL-14 AN-12 AN-24 TU-124 IL-62 AN-22 IL-76 Aircraft Type Aeroflot and surrogate airlines have requested .transcontinental "charter" flights which have coincided with mis- sile firings, troop maneuvers, and prac- tice Strategic Air Command alerts. The continual desire of Aeroflot and sur- rogate carriers to establish scheduled or non-scheduled "courier" and "spe- cial" flights to southern California and CSA*s April IO-,12 "Special Flights" and the Space Shuttle Launch ON APRIL. $, two days before the Space Shuttle was to make its first launch from Cape Canaveral, FL, the US received an extraordinary request through unusual diplomatic channels from GSA (Czecholsavakian Air Lines) fora "special flight"' through US air- space on April 10 which, it quickly, became clear to US officials, would overfly the Cape (or very near it) during the launch. CSA had never requested any uch special flights in recent years.:: This one was requested at the last minute, through unusual channels, and '; in a way that. raised eyebrows through- j out government agencies concerned.' with such matters.: The flight was to leave Prague early April. 9, fly to Montreal, then go on to Havana, and return early on April 14, the morning of the launch, flying near tale Cape, enroute to Gander, New- foundland to refuel before returning to Prague. A number of US officials wanted to deny the overflight rights, but the channels and ;mechanisms fur doing so are often complex and time- consuming, and as of late evening, April. 9, the Havana-Newfour~diand flight was: still an. When new Federal.. Aviation Administrator J. Lynn Helms learned of the problem through other channels ` late that evening, he ;took quick and decisive action. to deny CSA's overflight '' rights during a critical four-hour time window the next morning. As soon as the Shuttle launch was postponed, CSA began filing.. alternate; schedules that might,. it appeared, coincide with the final .April 12 Shuttle' launch. Helms subsequently denied two more such. CSA flights out of Havana which were to fly through FAA's Miami. oceanic area. Thus, it is clear that FAA's Helms is keenly interested in the overflight. issue and personally following devel- opmenis, far more so "than some FAA officials have. in recent years. (What the CSA flights were carrying was Holm known at Journal press time. The two events may be totally unre- lated, but AFJ has also learned that about the time of the Shuttle launch, two Soviet reconnaissance aircraft flew ' close enough off the Florida coast to "garble up" the Shuttle's UHF' com- munications channels. 'with their own traffic-and persisted. in doing so until. the North American :Air defense Com- mand directed them onanather course.) The Editors' denial of west coast landing rights has effectively denied the Soviets the routes which they desire across the Pacific. the Seattle area, which would pass through some of the most sensitive de- fense-related facilities, is of great con- cern to Defense Department authori- ties. To date they have been successful in convincing the CAB and the State Department that it would be inimical to the security interests of the United States to authorize such flights. The Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 Covert Operations The use of legitimate Aeroflot oper- atiions for the insertion of undercover agents and clandestine forces into the des- ignated target is a tactic repeatedly em- ployed by the Soviets. It is highly likely that Aeroflot is the primary means of in- troducing Soviet intelligence agents and other covert operatives throughout the world, but especially in Africa and other less developed regions. During the 1968 Czech crisis, an un- us~ually large number of Soviet "govern- ment officials" were observed debarking Aeroflot planes at Prague; in fact, several accounts reported that Soviet "civilians" debarking at the Prague airport imme- diately seized the airport while being led by the former Director of Aeroflot op- erations there. At Kabul, Soviet comman- dos, ferried in an Aeroflot aircraft in a routine flight, reportedly seized that air- port prior to the advance of the airborne forces. There is good reason to believe th:~t most of the Soviet combat brigade elements recently introduced into Cuba were surreptitiously brought there by Aeroflot over an extended period of time so as not to arouse suspicion and alarm the United States. "Showing the Flag" and Explicit Power Projection 'The use of military and technological assets of one country to impress, or indeed, to intimidate another country in the guise of "showing the flag," or "gunboat di- plomacy" is an ancient and accepted prac- tice brought to its peak by the British in the 19th century. . 'Though a late arriver in the competition for global influence and power, the Soviets have, since World War II, more than made up for their tardiness. In particular, since the expansion of Aeroflot into the world's lesser developed regions in the '60s, that carrier has been effectively utilized by the Soviet government as an instrument of po- influence and power projection. Throughout parts of Africa, Aeroflot is thf; only means for international travel. For example, Burundi and Rwanda have re 1272 1 95! . . .. Soviet Union {Aeroflot} 344 172 62 6 406 178 Ptlland (1.ot) 562 488 126 150 688 638 Romania (Tatum) 192 288 $ 4 200 292 Czechalslovakia (CSA) 536 544 Q 4 526 548 East Germany (Interflug} 0 0 6 12 6 12 Bulgaria (Balkan} Culaa {Cabana) ~ 288* 0 * 284** $ 488 0 .186 8 776. 4 470 ? Cabana's routes from Havana/Montreal into JFK, New York should be confined to only over-water routes beyond the US air defense zone. ? No "charter flights" should be permitted until quid pro quo charter authorization (now denied US carriers to the Soviet Union) is granted. ? If charter flights are granted under quid pro quo conditions, a minimum of I S days notification should be mandatory. ? Perform rigorous and continual inspec- * Flight-a single transit, %e., one-way trip. ** Authorized Overflights, Havana-Montreal'. f tion of all communist Bloc aircraft in con- fortuity with US Government regulations and agreements and international conven- tions with the foreign carriers. Interna- tional agreements provide for frequent and thorough inspections, some on a "no no- tice" basis. The Soviets used to conduct such inspections zealously when Pan Am was operating into Russia; the US has not conducted any such inspections of Aeroflot planes operating in the US during recent years. ^ ~ ^ Tabjt Communist Bioc civil Aviation Informatio n Communist Albania Bulgaria flemoeratic China Cuba Czech. E. Germ. Hungary N. Korea Outer Pataml Romania USSR Vietnam Bloc State Kamuchea tPRCi (GDR} MongoHs If'AO 2-LTR Cksiguafor' LZ (Cambad~? CA Ctt OR IF' MA JS LO RO StJ VN State Airline Balkan CAAC Cubans GSA Intern Maler CAA of DPRIC Lot Tarom Aeropat Air Vietnam ICAO Member No B Jd Yes 15 Feb f0 Jun 4 .Apr No 30 Oct 15 Sep No 4 Apr 30 May t4 Nor 12 Apr 6'1 74 49 47 d9 7? 4'7 65 7Q SU ltl.$TA Memtier.... Na _21 Sep 15 Feb..... No 20 Jun 18 Apr No:.. i5 Jan No... No. b Apr No No No ?0 5b 47 45 73 45 Dipkunatic Relations with tTS No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Ves No t?3 CAB:. 4C~2 Permit No No No -Yes Yes Yes No No Nn Na Yes Yes Yes No Bi-Lateral Air Transport Agreement . No No Nu Yes Yes Yes Na Yes No _ No Yes Yes Yes No ., FrtA Ap Dyed AIPs No Yes No No No Y~ No Yes No Na Yes Yes Yes No Piar Permission 7 Wurk. 10 413 Hrs ?Yes **Yes 2 Work- 7 Days 3 flays 3 Work R,Nuired for Entry ng Days Days (1/F fQ ing trays (?/F 14 30 Days [lays (3 Days Days Ser[es weeks LNDG LNDC suggested Diplomatic Clearance Yes Yes. Yes Yes R.yuired for Entry Paltry Permit valid 48 Hrs. Changes must tie 24 Hrs submitted void if AJG does 18 Hrs ne~f ester _. Et+cart Grew Required Yes Yes.. Flight Plan Required 4li Hrs 3d Mirrs. Flight Notification 24 Hrs MSG Required "Czechoslovakia Requires: 72 Hrs Adranee Notice for Non-Gouunerciat Flights with. 6 or less people Source: FAA/AtA 24 Hrs Advance Notice for Non-Commercial Flights with. more than b people Ig' Worki~ bays Notice for NonSeheduled Commercial Flights "`E. Cermm~y (GDR) Requires: 48 Hrs Advance Notice i5 bays Advance Native for A jG remahdng in GDR far extended period of time 72 Hrs Adraace Notice for series of 3 or more Flights Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 Presidential Courage and the April 1980 'Iranian Rescue Mission AS WE REMEMBER AND HONOR this Memorial Day the eight men who gave their lives at Desert One last April 25th, the men from that rescue mission would tell ~ you there is one casualty for whom there will never be a medal, although they believe he deserves it most-former Presi- dent Jimmy Carter. The men of Joint Task Force 1-79 speak of Jimmy Carter with a respect that bor- ders on awe, a reverence almost, that one seldom hears from military men-because they expect courage of leaders who order hazardous missions, just as they believe those leaders should be able to expect cour- age of them. There is an unwritten axiom of special military operations: the world hears about them only when they fail, never when they succeed. A basic premise of such work is that it be deniable; thus the guts of even the most successful missions aren't advertised. Secrecy strictures are so tight and enduring that the truth behind them rarely surfaces; when it does (if ever), it is invariably long after the mission. A re- grettable but frequent by-product of that secrecy is that the people who risk such missions seldom obtain proper credit- publicly or professionally-even for acts of the most compelling courage. Presidential courage takes many forms. The nation has just seen one kind-in the graceful, reassuring calm and infectuous humor with which Ronald Reagan reacted to his attempted assassination on March 30th after taking a bullet through the lung. But the nation has not even heard of Jimmy Carter's courage a year ago. With the mission's first anniversary here, the men he asked to rescue our former hos- tages want Jimmy Carter_to be given credit for a form of courage which they say far transcended theirs. At this time last year, the nation was clamoring for some kind of Presidential action to resolve the hostage crisis. Some civilians in government, despairing of ever recovering the hostages, had even proposed u B-52 raid to level the holy city of Qom. Their patience, like others', was exhausted, hopes having been dashed once too often from the on-again, off-again diplomatic channels through which the Administra- tion hoped to recover the hostages. Carter had ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ready a rescue mission eight days after the hostages had been seized, and the first plan was ready on December 20th (al- beit, its planners had cautioned, with ele- ments of risk that concerned them greatly). The mission, the President and its plan- ners had emphasized, was to be a rescue, not a punitive or retaliatory raid. For five months before last April 16th, when Carter finally approved launching it, the President had made it clear that the nation would pursue one goal-"To protect our national honor and interests, and bring the hostages home alive." Throughout the task force's planning, the "operative" word was "alive." And, Carter had emphasized qui- etly to the few people really privy to his thinking, he felt the Presidency bound to resolve the crisis along Constitutional lines-diplomacy first; military options would be used only if diplomacy failed. Late last March, Carter's hopes were high that release of the hostages was im- minent. Through a complex, prearranged scenario, Carter was to get a set of signals from Iran that were supposed to trigger a positive public statement from him; given it. Iranian officials had agreed, the hos- tages would then be transferred to gov- ernment control, the first and crucial step leading to their freedom. As Jody Powell recounts those trying days, the signals from Iran came three days late-through a co- incidence, shortly after midnight on April 1st, the 150th day of captivity- and the morning of the Wisconsin primary. At seven a.m., Carter made his positive state- ment, announcing at the White House that the crisis was abating and that the hostages would soon be home. But it soon became apparent, once again, that the Iranians were unable or unwilling to follow through. Carter was later criticized brutally for his awkwardly timed statement: political pundits charged that he had politicized the hostage issue to win a primary. But there is one powerful indication that the President had read the diplomatic sig- nal in good faith: it was given enough credence within the Pentagon that a senior officer relied on it to disapprove the planned early deployment of some of the rescue team members to the Persian Gulf. Within days of that hopeful news, however, the crisis and apparent danger of losing the hostages reached new heights: Iranian spokesmen announced (previously they h~td only "warned") that some hostages would be tried as spies. Under Iranian justice, spies are shot: those convicted be- fore noon are executed by sundown; those convicted after noon are executed by noon the next day. Carter's advisors were well aware that some 460 Iranians had already been executed after such quick "trials." All promising diplomatic avenues had run their course with no favorable outcome. Carter did not need to be reminded that it is proper for a President to use military force when diplomacy fails or stalls. Yet Jimmy Carter was profoundly aware, when he approved the Iranian hos- President Carter attending services for the eight men who died at Desert One. (Washington Post photo.) tape rescue mission a year ago Thursday, April 16th, that the mission might not succeed. He had asked in a final White House review before the entire National Security Council that evening (according to a former White House official present at the three-hour meeting), "'What are the chances of success'?" Recollections of that meeting vary slightly, but six people who were present agree that the President was told some- thing very close to this: "The mission has high prospects for suc- cess. But if something goes wrong, the odds become somewhere between zero and 100 percent, and those two numbers could be vert? close together. We won't know how close, or how far apart, until we get into Iran..Any number of unforeseen fac- tors, none of which we can precisely predict or control, could cause the whole thing to go to hell in a handbasket." Factors such as desert weather, Iranian forces turn- ing up in the wrong place, a last minute move of the hostages, and equipment fail- ures were cited. One of the four Carter was specifically warned about-equipment failure would later cause the mission to fail; another factor he was warned about, weather, contributed to the abort at Desert One. Based on the factors they could control, the briefer told the President, he and his men were confident they could free the hostages and bring them home alive. (To- day, intelligence sources say, debriefings 60 armed forces JOURNAL international/May 1981 Approved Far Release 2007105/07 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 "Also I heard the voice of the Lord, saying, Whom shag I send, and who will go for us? Then said I, Here am 1C; send me: ' _ Isaiah 6:8 Captain Richard L. Bakke United States Air Force of the former hostages confirm that the rescue force knew the precise location, down to their very rooms, of 95% of the 51 men and two women they tried to res- cue-and would quickly have located the others based on information gleaned during the mission.) But the briefer was equally clear in telling the President that there could be casualties on both sides if some- thing went awry, according to one White House official present in the Situation Room that evening. In that case, the Presi- dent was told, "Perhaps one aircraft crew could be lost somewhere along the way; three to eight hostages killed or wounded; three to eight rescue team members killed or wounded; and an indeterminate number of Iranians, depending on how they elect to respond." Thus, James Earl Carter knew last April that the mission he was ordering was not without substantial risk, that it might fail, and that there could be casualties, even among the hostages he had sworn to bring home alive. ' It was not the kind of prognosis that made a Presidential decision to execute the mission easy. Jimmy Carter still had the courage to try. Carter demonstrated that evening last April 16th another kind of Presidential courage-unique, perhaps unprecedented, in recent American military history. At one point in the briefing, national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski asked, "How can we talk to the commander if we need to?" Carter cut the question off abruptly: he told Brzezinski, "We won't!" He turned and said, "I know you'll be busy. Your mission comes first. If you have time to tell us what's happening, that would be nice. But don't feel you have to give us play by play status reports. I will not sec- ond guess or interfere." Carter also em- phasized that he would follow the chain of command: the President to the Sec- retary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Joint Task Force Commander. The Task Force Commander, he said, should not concern himself with an.y other counsel. Other senior military officers who were present confirm that dialogue. And add, they have never heard of a President in recent times giving or following such clear guidance to a commander. Carter said, "[ won't interfere"-and he didn't. (That vignette is a striking contrast to the memories of other commanders on other recent but far less sensitive oper- ations. [During the 1976 crisis in Lebanon, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld not only monitored operations closely from the Pentagon's National Military Command Center, but-his aides bragged later to the Pentagon press corps-Rumsfeld him- self was in "direct radio-telephone com- munication" with the boatswain's mate driving one of the landing craft standing by offshore to evacuate American person- nel from Beirut.] Carter's vow not to "in- terfere" was also a striking contrast to his image as a President obsessed with detail-wont, it was said, to micromanage national security issues in particular.) The men of JTF 1-79 understood the risks too. They knew what the President had been told of their odds. The night before they flew into Desert One, in a few moments set aside for quiet meditation, one of the men was asked to serve as chaplain. He ended the brief "ser- vice" by leading his comrades in singing "The Battle Hymn of the Republic." Some of the men found a few moments to lie on their backs on the desert floor and rest as they talked about the mission. As he looked up at the stars over Southwest Asia just a few hours before he was killed-a young aircrew member turned to one of his comrades and said quietly, "1 don't mind sacrificing for the things 1 believe in." Had the mission gone forward from Des- ert One, the rescue team would have re- ceived amessage from their commander at their loge head the next night: the quote from /saiah, "Whom shall I send, and who will go for us? ... Here am I; send me." (In mid-February, Major General James B. Vaught, the Commander of JTF 1-79, Staff 'Sergeant Dewey L. Johnson united States Marine Corps was invited to Hermitage, PA with some of the former hostages to unveil a monu- ment dedicated to the eight men who died the day after that brief worship service at their Mideast staging field. The towns- people of Hermitage did not know of that service: but at the very moment Vaught unveiled the monument, a 200-person choir began singing "The Battle Hymn of the Republic.") Three days after the tragic events of Desert One, President Carter flew to a secret location to meet with most members of the rescue force immediately upon their return to the US. Carter says today that for him, it was the most emotional moment of the whole rescue operation. As Carter stepped off the helicopter, Colonel Charles Beckwith-a "big, burly sort of guy" who grew up in Ellaville, Georgia, 15 miles north of Plains, and who commanded the rescue team that would have gone on from Desert One to Tehran-saluted the Presi- dent. At first there was silence; then Carter embraced him. Beckwith apologized for "failing." Carter said he could not accept the apology. Beckwith led him inside a building where his men were waiting. They were still in combat fatigues; bruises and minor burns were evident on some, and others still wore hasty first aid bandages and dressings over their injuries. Carter told the men Beckwith had tried to apologize, and that he had refused to accept it. He told the men he considered them heroes; they were all part of the same team, Carter said, and their efforts had shown the world that America believes in freedom and will fight for it. One of the men recalls that Carter then asked them, "What can I do for you?" A young Army or Marine Corps noncom- missioned officer spoke up: "Mr. President, give us another chance. Don't write us off because we didn't hit a home run for you the first time." Carter was deeply moved by that charge from men whose comrades had died trying to carry out his orders. Later, Carter was equally moved when several Iranians in [his coun- armed forces JOURNAL international/May 1981 61 ~ Aooroved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 "Also I' heard...the voice of ,the I.c-rd, saying, whom shall I send, and. who will go for us? Then said I, Here am I; .send :me." ,.. Isaiah b:8 try asked him to let them go on the next mission to rescue the hostages: they were ashamed of their countrymen holding Americans like common criminals, they told the President, and they wanted to .prove that his agony, and the hostages', was not what Islam and Iran stood for. Jimmy Carter's courage last April took other forms. Surely the hardest decision for any commander to make, be he a mili- tary man or a President, is to abort a mission once launched. (It is more than the issue of built-in momentum or wishful thinking and "can-do" daring: extricating a force once committed is always a haz- ardous operation, and fraught with far more risk than usual in a clandestine op- eration.) When Beckwith had to recom- mend aborting the operation because his men at Desert One were one helicopter too short of the number preagreed upon for the operation's next phase, Vaught re- layed that recommendation-and en- dorsed it-to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was asked, "How long do you have before you need a final decision?" Vaught told General David C. Jones, "No more than ]0 to 15 minutes." Jones asked Vaught to stand by while he checked with Defense Secretary Harold Brown and the President: eight minutes later, Jones con- firmed the President's endorsement of Vaught's gut-wrenching decision. (Carter went on TV early last April 25th and said, "It was my decision to cancel ...") But as another member of Vaught's rescue team observed, "If you think it was a `gut-wrenching' decision for Vaught, think what it must have been for Jimmy Carter 9,000 miles away! "Sure, we could have improvised. Yes, we had the courage to go on and try. But we might have gone on and left a wreckage of heroic, but unproductive valor all the way from Desert One to Tehran. "We were there to recover the hostages alive, not litter the desert with brave dead. Vaught didn't second guess us; Jones didn't second guess us; the President didn't sec- ond guess us. Jesus Christ, man, do you have any idea what kind of guts that Captain Lyn D. Mclutosh united States .4ir Force takes?" Finally, the men who "failed" Jimmy Carter last April ask that America re- member: "We failed; he took the heat. He took full responsibility. That's courage. It may have cost him his Presidency." (Actually, the men didn't fail; their eyurpment did. As Vaught understated it at the February 14th ceremony in Her- mitage: "One of the things we learned, or reaffirmed, was that machines like he- licopters don't have souls; they aren't very patriotic; and they really don't care if they're going to Tehran or Timbuktu when they decide to quit on you.") (When 1 watched General Vaught unveil the monument to his eight men two months ago, he summarized their sacrifice in a way 1 wish their families and President Carter could hear this Memorial Day: "The mission was not a `foolish under- taking' or a `fiasco,' as some have said. It was a very best effort by a small group of courageous and brave Americans. Never did a small group of Americans try harder to do what they thought was right than those who went forth into that desert last April. There is no failure in failing: there is only failure in failing to try-and those who gave their lives knew that, even as they died-and 1 thank God for them.") But 53 live Americans did come home safely. Did last. April's rescue attempt -Author's Nate: Throughout Jimmy far= !, ter's Presidency, I doubt there has been =; any more vocal critic of his national security policies (or former Defense '. Secretary Flarold Brown's execution of them) Iha~ me personally or than Armed`Forces ,laurnad editorially, even though neither has any particular po- litcal persuasian Had I known last No- i ~vet~ber all of what I know today abaut Jimmy Carter's courage last April, I' ~ still would have voted against him last November 4th. But this nation produces good Presidents, and iris special courage last. April ranks Jimmy Carter atrtong the bravest:.. ~^ Captain Charles T. McMillan, II United States Air Foree help? The overwhelming majority of the former hostages with whom I've talked since their return believe it did help, and that it would have been successful. It prod- ded diplomats to try again; it gave di- plomacy another chance. And, as one per- son told me, "At that time, we were able to confront our captors on a one-to-one basis-and win. A trained US force com- ing over the wall (or however) would have met pathetic resistance from that disor- ganized, confused, ragtag band of second string revolutionaries. "They were brave when they had half a million Iranians with raised fists shouting behind them, but they would not martyr themselves to silence. Carter ended up be- ing a martyr in silence: he didn't have half a million fists behind him in the Sit- uation Room. "And that's the difference." ^~r^ THIS CDMMENTA'RY ALSt~ AP- PE,4RED in the Washington Star's ed'- tortal secrion; "Comment," on Easter ~S'undtty, A~~if 19t1t, `$ '- `~ ~ , Editors' Note: The men who tried to rescue our former hostages last April have established a college scholarship fund for the 17 children of the men killed or incapacitated at Desert One. The scholarship fund is named in honor of the late Colonel Arthur D. "Bull" Simons, who risked his life repeatedly trying to rescue fellow Americans from incarceration during World War II, Vietnam, and from Iran. Every Ameri- can wanted to go to Iran last year to free our hostages; not all of us could go. But all of us can thank the men who did go by contributing, whatever our means, to the Bull Simons Schol- arship Fund for their children. Send your tax exempt contribution to: Colonel Arthur D. Simons Scholarship Fund P.O. Box "Eight" Dallas, TX 75221. ^ ~z ^ 62 armed forces JOURNAL international/May 9981 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 'rhe Colonel Arthur D. Simons :scholarship Fund Thee Iranian rescue team members are establishing a college s~~holarship fund for the 17 children of their comrades who were killed or incapacitated attempting to free 53 fellow Americans April 2~4 and 25. Thiis scholarship fund is named in memory of the late Army Colonel Arthur D. Simons, a legendary soldier who risked his life repeatedly to rescue his fellow Americans. Many of the American sarrvic:emen who planned, and some of those who attempted the rrrlsslon to rescue 53 American embassy hostages from Iran, served ~~ith Colonel Simons during his career. Thiis scholarship fund has no overhead. Every penny you c. ntribute will apply directly to the scholarships. Tax-exempt status has been approved under Section 501(cX3) of tll~e Internal Revenue Code. However, the issue is not a tax dleduction. Rather, it is to ensure that these youngsters will have an opportunity to go to college without further burden on their fzimili:es. Col. Arthur D. Simons Scholarship Fund Box "8? Dallas, TX 75221 I Enclosed is my contribution for scholarships for the children of the I I American Servicemen who gave their lives in Apri1,1980, trying to rescue I I their fellow Americans from Iran. I I ^ $1 ^ $5 ^ $10 ^ $20 ^ $50 ^ $100 -other I ~ I I Name I ~ Address ~ I - I I I I - I I Tax Exempt Identification Number: 750 96 4565 I I I L---------------------------------J EDITORS: You have permission to reprint this advertisement or portions of it, without further approval. Color separations a~~ailalble gratis upon request. Call 202-296-0450. ~~ Aar~roved Far Release 2007105/07 :CIA-RDP$3M00210R000300050004-5 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 Eluding the world's largest navy, von Luckner prowled 30,000 miles-and terrorized Allied sea lanes. He concocted an elaborate Norwegian disguise for his armed windjammer and crew. And bluffed his way through the British blockade. Then from January to July 1917, German Count Felix von Luckner hunted prey from North Atlantic to South Pacific, sinking 14 Allied and neutral merchant ships while dodging British warships. His disarming technique: sidle up to the target on some innocent pretext...then suddenly haul down the Norwegian flag, hoist German colors, reveal weapons, seize the vessel, take aboard all personnel, and sink her. No one was ever hurt or killed. His multinational "prisoners" ate well and thoroughly enjoyed themselves. Still, the raids .4:.1!;1 March. Biggest'v~ctim, English freighter . Horrrgartl, sunk after being; ~elieved;of .' champagne cargp our banner day' ";Luckner 1'ater~recalls ~.~_ a.M~~~;~.~,.LL' had a disruptive effect on Allied war logistics that extended beyond the sinkings themselves. Fear of the "Sea Devil" upset sailing schedules and delayed some badly needed war cargoes. What about today? With all the technological advances in offensive systems, could a potential adversary slip through defense perimeters unde- tected and unidentified? To counter such a threat, the IBM Advanced Signal Processor brings to de- tection, identification and location systems some remarkable capabilities. Because of this processor, which is now air- borne, land-based and aboard ship, detection sys- tems are able to process target data from a variety 2 r9~.1QJanuary191,7.,Seeadlersnks2'Erglish `'"~, freighters,near;Aiores, , ~~ _ ?, 3. 21,lattuary-5 March. Cruising equatdriat "' ~tiantic, Seead/er-sinks 4 French. bar`ks,' ~ ~~~. Canadian schooner and bark, English bark, Italian sailing ship. Luckner has offered r`noney"~~! d charnpaghe to anyone rivho sights a target. esutt is f1oGk,gf eager taokouts in rigging: ~ Y' Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 o:f sensors...identifying and pinpointing threats in real time with far greater accuracy. Both in offense and defense. The Advanced Signal Processor also means that America's antisub- marine forces for the 1980's can quickly adapt to changing threats, through the flexibility to handle new techniques and new sensors. The same capability extends to sys- tems that analyze signals from remote battlefield transmitters. And transmis- siions from satellites. Multipurpose systems like these Seeadler is boarded and searchetl by~Britsh result from IBM's special skill: our ability to marshal many specialized systems to a common purpose. -~ ~ ~ ~.~- ~ ?~ ~ -?? ~? ?. ? ?~. ~ We've also done it in command and control. In communications, naviga- tion, electronic countermeasures and a wide range of other fields. In fact, the more complex the task and systems are, the more IBM can help. 0 Federal Systems Division Bethesda, Maryland 20034 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 Approved Far Release 2007105!07:CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 People Memorial Day, 1981 THIS POEM was writ- ten by then PFC Sam Hall on Armistice Day, 1944, while in class be- ing trained for intelli- gence duty. At 10:45 a.m., the students were commanded to stop work and sit at attention while the bugle sounds heard during a soldier's day were played over the pub- lic address system. End- ing in taps, the moment spurred Hall to write this poem for the dead sol- diers who could no longer hear them. ^ xr ^ General of the Army Omar N. Bradley The Soher's Soldier In whale memory, like that of the eight men who died last April at Desert One and all of the sol- diers, airmen, sailors, Marines and Coast Guardsmen he served so well as Veterans Admn- istratorafter World War II, we commemorate this issue. ^ ~ ^ armed forces JOURNAL international/May 1981 Dead Heroes by Sam Hall' Dead Heroes hear one bugle call; Not Lights Qut, Call to Quarters, Taps; Sound no Retreat for them, 'Twill fall. unheard. The lowered Flag that flaps protesting'gainst The pole finds no salute in answer To the sound of To the Colors, And the glow of setting sun upon Their mound but glorifies their Silent sleep. They'll hear no Bugled call but one yet for that One they all must keep aware; Before the last note's done, some New and haloed-sun. will see their Souls leap up at Reveille. ^~^ ~~ flnnrn~~arl Fnr Rclaaca ?nn7lntiln7 ~ C;IA-R?P8'~ non 108000300050004-5 I Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 I Darts & Laurels To the Commander, Carib- bean Contingency Joint Task Force-whose first 1981 press release we've just read, wrap- ping up the new command's first year of ~ operations-for not recommending that his 70-man headquarters be disestablished. We need its people elsewhere: the com- I mand is redundant, a political waste an- I pounced to defuse President Jimmy Car- , ter's embarrassment over the self-imposed 1979 fiasco over the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. Having read all of what CCJTF accomplished in 1980, we feel all the more strongly about what we said in our March issue: the Pentagon needs more forces, not more headquarters. To the Journal reader who keeps bugging us [o ask Harold Brown the follow- ing questions: ? `Mr. Secretary, where did it all go wrong?" ? "Sir, having spent almost a trillion dol- Lars in the past four years, how did we end up second best?" ? "Secretary Brown, are we stronger now, ~ in a relative sense, or are we weaker than we were four years ago?" ' "What, Sir, would you recommend to your successors to compensate for your stewardship?" ? "Harold, had you had a freer hand, what would you really have done?" To the Journal subscriber who recently joined the White House Presidential scheduling staff under Michael Deaver-for candor. When we asked how she liked her job, she told us, "If you have to go back to work, it's a great place to start." ?.~ _i1~.y and former C'iA Director advertently) admitting why he is no longer Director of Central Intelligence. In a New York Times Magazine article of March 29th, "Why We Shouldn't Build the M-X," Turner wrote, "To construct a base for it will require, according to some es- timates, 40% of the country's total cement production for three years." He must have gotten the numbers from the same sources he got his optimistic mid-1978 intelligence on Iran, and checked them about as care- lessly: He's only off by a factor of forty. USAF tells us that the total M-X cement need will be about 1'/z-million tons over an eight-year period,. or about '/z of one percent of US production. Admiral Turner is said to be lecturing, consulting, and writ- - ing a book about military strategy. That's hilarious! ^ ~r ^ Star Status AIR FORCE From To BABCOCK, Leon W., Jr. Comdr, 601 Tac Control Asst CofS, Oper, Allied Brigadier General Wg, USAF in Eur, APO Forces Central Eur, APO NY NY BISHOP, Charles E. Comdr, 23rd Air Div, N VComdr, 9th AF, TAC Air Brigadier General American Air Def Reg, Comd, Shaw AFB, SC Duluth Intn'1 Airport, MN DREYER, Christian F., Jr. Comdt, Sq Officer Schl, Comdr, 601 Tac Control Brigadier General Air Trning Comd, Maxwell Wg, USAF in Eur, APO AFB, AL NY DYER, Pintard M., I I I CofS, 15th AF, SAC, Comdr, 12 Air Div, SAC, Brigadier General March AFB, CA Dyess AFB, TX FAURER, Lincoln D. Dep Chairman of NATO Dir, Natl Sec Agency & Lieutenant General Milt Comd, Brussels, Chf, Central Sec Ser Belgium GERAN, Daniel B. Dep CofS/Comps, USAF Dep Dir of Budget, AF Colonel in Eur, APO NY Compt, Wash, DC IRIONS, Charles C. Dep Dir for Log (Strat Retired Major General Mob), J-4 Office of Jt CofS, Wash, DC LINDEMAN, William E. Dep CofS/Plans, Pol, Prog Retired Brigadier General & Requirements, J-5, Aerospace Def Comd, Peterson AFB, CO ROBERTSON, Edin W., I I Chf, Milt Asst Advisory Retired Major General Gp, Spain, APO NY SULLIVAN, Dennis B. Comdr, 12 Air Div, SAC, Comd Dir, North Amer Brigadier General Dyess AFB, TX Air Def Comd, Combat Oper Ctr, J-3, North Amer Air Def Comd/Aerospace Def Comd, Cheyenne Mountain Complex, CO SYLVESTER, George H. VComdr, AF Sys Comd Retired Lieutenant General ARMY ADAMS, Robert B. Dir of Resources & Mgmt, Dep CG; USA Finance Bc Brigadier General Dep CofS for Log, Dept of Acctng Ctr, Ft Benjamin Army, Wash, DC Harrison, IN DELANDRO, Donald J. CofS, USA Recruiting Dep, The Adjutant Gen for Colonel (P) Comd, Ft Sheridan, IL Admin Sys/Exec Dir, Milt Postal Ser, Wash, DC GARD, Robert G., Jr. Pres, Natl Def Univ, Ft Retired Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, Wash, DC GOODPASTER, Andrew J. Super, USMA, West Point, Retired Lieutenant General NY LEWI, Kenneth E. Dep CG, 21st Support CG, 3rd Support Comd, Brigadier General Comd, USA Eur, APO NY USA Eur, APO NY ODOM, William E. Natl Sec Council Stf, Asst Dep CofS Intel, Dep Brigadier General White House, Wash, DC of Army, Wash, DC POINTER, Robert W., Jr. Proj Mgr, Cannon Art Asst CofS, G4, 8th USA/ Colonel (P) Weapons Sys, Picatinny Asst CofS, J-4, UN Comd/ Arsenal, NJ US Forces Korea/Asst CofS, C-4, Comb Forces Comd Korea, APO San Francisco 68 armed forces JOURNAL international/May 1981 Approved For Release 2007!05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 Star Status A11; lri)' (continued) BARBER, William R., Jr. Asst CofS, G4, 8th USA/ Asst DCofS for Log for Brigadier General Asst CofS, J-4, UN Comd/ Sec Asst/Chf, Log-Read US Forces Korea/Asst Ofc, USA, Wash, DC CofS, C-4, Combined Forces Comd Korea, APO San Francisco SCOTT, Willard W., Jr. CG, V Corps, USA Eur, Super, USMA, West Lieutenant General APO, NY Point, NY S~TUBBLEBINE, Albert N., I I I CG, USA Elect R&D CG, USA Intell & Sec Major General Comd, Adelphi, MD Comd, Arlington Hall, VA MARINE CORPS JOHNSON, Mannon A., Jr. Dir, Matl Div, Instal & Log Exec Dir, Supply Oper, Erigadier General Dept, HQMC Def Log Agcy, Alex, VA NAVY CONNER, Donald L. Comdr, Construction Dep Comdr for Plning Fear Admiral Battalions, Atlantic NAVFACENGCOM HERBEQ2GER, Albert J. Exec Asst to Asst Sec of Asst Comdr for Persnl Ftear Admiral Navy (MRA&L) Distribution, NMPC IIOWE, Jonathan T. Dir, Pol Milt Policy & Milt Asst to Dep Sec of Ftear Admiral Current Plans Div, OP-61 Def JOHNSTON, Fred W. Special Asst to Dir, Plans Comdr, Sea Based ASW Ftear Admiral & Policy, J-5, JCS Wings, Atlantic LONG, L. J. Comdr in Chf, Pac US Extension of tenure Admiral Navy ~/IARRYOTT, Ronald F. Comding Ofcr, Naval Air Comdr, Iceland Def Force Rear Admiral Station, Moffett Field D/IETCALF, Joseph, I I I Comdr, Cruiser Dest GP Dir, Plning & Prog Div Rear Admiral EIGHT PvI00NEY, John B. Dir, Total Force Plning Dir, Oceanography Div, Ftear Admiral Div, OP-11 OP-952/Oceanographer of Navy 1~1'ILLIAMS, James D. Comdr, Sub Div Comdr, Naval Base Seattle Ftear Admiral SIXTEEN ^ ~r ^ MEMOS FIRST DQ:LIVERY of the Tactical Digital Facsimile (TDF) units has been made to thf: Naval Electronic Systems Command by Datalog Division of Litton Industries. This communications system is capable of transmitting and receiving words and pi