DCI REMARKS TO PFIAB 13 JANUARY 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R000300010029-1
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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
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• Content Type: REPORT

CIA-R DP83M00914R000300010029-1
The Director of Ccntr31 intelligence
Vt:ishin6ton. D. C. 20505
EYES ONLY--PLEASE RETURN
20 January 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Counsellor to the President
Chief of Staff to the President
Deputy Chief of Staff to the President
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Here is a presentation I made to the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board at its first meeting
last week. I thought it would be useful to you as an
update on the present state and activities of the
Intelligence Community.
William J. Casey
ttachmertt?
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1 to Each Addressee above
1 - 0/Dci ChrQnQ
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DCI REMARKS TO PFIAB
13 January 1982
- Familiar surroundings - familiar faces
- We look forward to doing important constructive work together
- PFIAB has a distinguished record and tradition in prompting and
supporting the CIA in photographic reconnaissance and communications
intelligence where Bill Baker and Johnny Foster were towers of strength, in
extending its work from largely military matters to currencies and fuels
and minerals where Leo Cherne and John Connally played a leading role, and in
resisting restrictions which Ed Williams pronounced unconstitutional. I remember
more than one shootout in the Cabinet Room between Ed and Justice Department
officials.
- Your outside experience can similarly help us appreciate the evolution
of events and needs in today's world and how intelligence should adjust to
accommodate to these needs.
- In December, Admiral Inman and I presented to the NSC a 6-month study
which the Intelligence Community did on the challenges we see during 1985-90
and the emerging technologies available and the capabilities and resources
needed to meet those challenges. I will touch on these capabilities as I go along.
- Great deal to be done - challenges intensify - rebuilding job long-term one
- The Intelligence Community lost 40% of its funding* and 50% of its people**
between 1968 and 1980***.
- The Board can help validate large capital requirements to modernize an
increasingly obsolete worldwide communications system and to erect a new building
*In constant dollars--real purchasing power.
**Attributed mostly to closing of large SIGINT bases overseas.
***These are figures for the Community. For CIA alone, figures are about 25%
for each--due in large measure to pullout of SEAsia.
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on our grounds in Langley to recover the time and efficiency lost from having
our CIA people scattered in Washington, northern Virginia 25X1
and southern Maryland.
- You can endorse and encourage legislation to make it a crime to disclose
the identity of under cover intelligence agents in order to damage the American
intelligence system in the kind of a campaign waged by a tiny group which has
already cost lives and threatened families and damaged the morale of dedicated
people around the world.
- We believe strongly that all our human collection can be improved
substantially if we are relieved of the Freedom of Information Act. Close to 5%
of the time of our experienced operational people is consumed in seeing that
we don't let out information which would endanger our people or damage our sources
in response to Freedom of Information queries. Worse still, we don't know how
much friendly intelligence services hold back for fear that our exposure to
the Freedom of Information Act will compromise them. Nor do we know how many
agents have left us or won't have anything to do with us because they won't
risk their lives and reputations with an intelligence service whose adversaries
have a legal right to poke into its files. We do know that no other intelligence
service in the world operates under this kind of a handicap. The only other
countries, Australia and New Zealand, which have this kind of a law exempt
their intelligence services. That's what we're asking for.
- Feel pretty good about the first year. Not battering from Congress and
media but denial of resources, hesitation to make use of capabilities and
imposition of restrictions which had dampened spirits. Recognition that new
Administration intended to use the Intelligence Community and support it with
renewed resources quickly lifted spirits and morale.
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The Reagan Executive Order, while fully preserving the requirement to
meet the requirements of the Constitution and all the laws, carried a positive
mandate. What was most important, it permitted us to reduce the operating
guidelines which officers around the world need to consult from 130 pages of
legalisms to 30 pages of reasonably clear instructions. When you consider that
these officers are not lawyers, you can imagine how that will increase their
effectiveness.
Our technical collection facilities do a remarkable job in covering weapons
testing and deployment, military formations, nuclear activities, monitoring
compliance with arms limitation and non-proliferation treaties and indication
and warning of military plans and actions.
All this requires large capital outlays and extensive computer and other
processing capabilities. This means large budgetary requirements which have
squeezed analytical, human collection and research and development activities.
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All this technical collection tells a lot about enemy capabilities. We
need human intelligence for deeper insight into intentions, plans, systems.
We collect human intelligence through the clandestine service and through
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overt means largely by having the diplomatic service, the military attaches
ask for it. We're getting good new
recruits and training them hard. The watchword is to push responsibility on
them as quickly as they can take it and weeding them out promptly unless they
show distinct promise. I'm told that we're doing better than ever in bringing
information in
Human intelligence takes time. I'm
convinced that intensified effort will pay off, because there is a growing
dissidence and willingness to blow the whistle on Communist regimes. We get
_]of our human intellingence from We believe 25X1
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strongly that all our human collection can be improved substantially if the
Freedom of Information Act is removed as a deterent for both agents and liaison
So we are now getting and can expect an increasing flood of facts.
These are only as good as our ability to cross-check and verify them, weave
them into a mosaic and understand their meaning. That's the task of our
analytical apparatus.
For over a quarter of a century this analytical apparatus had been
organized along functional lines. When I found it, divisions for strategic
analysis, for political analysis, for economic analysis, for geographic and
societal analysis and for science and weapons. We have converted this to a
geographic organization. Problems and crises almost always come up on a national
or regional basis. State and Defense, NSC and our own operational directorate
are organized on a geographic basis. Under a functional organization, a new
problem would have to be attacked in separate duchies in its military, economic,
political and technical aspects. The normal thing would be for specialists in
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each duchy to have a go at it, form their conclusions, and get them approved
at the top. Then the interdisciplinary evaluation would be thrashed out,
coordinated and negotiated by busy office directors. These are analysts who
turned administrators, overburdened, pressed for time and too frequently grown
thin on substance. Under the new organization, working analysts attack the
problem in a multi-disciplinary manner from the beginning. When it is worked
out, the analysis is approved in one chain of command. Political, economic
and military analysts are sharing information on a constant basis. We already
find this bringing more effective and coherent analysis, more speedily done,
and saving large amounts of coordinating time. We expect it to enable us to
restore some analysts turned administrators back into analysts.
The logic of this organization has been recognized before. It's an enormous
task and no one was willing to tackle it until we switched John McMahon from
chief of the operational directorate to chief of the intelligence directorate.
He analyzed where and how the work was done in great detail and bit the bullet.
His reward has been appointment as Executive Director. One of the problems with
CIA is that it has tended to be four separate duchies, the Operations Directorate,
the Analytical Directorate, the Science and Technology Directorate, and the
Directorate of Administration rather than one integrated organization. McMahon
has a track record, unique in CIA history, for being a strong and versatile
manager running the clandestine service, reorganizing the analytical service,
developing or running technical collection capabilities in both the photographic
and signals area. As Executive Director, his mission is to make the directorates
more cohesive and mutually supportive.
Reorganizing the analytical apparatus provides a fresh opportunity to
improve both the quality of analysis and its relevance to decisionmaking.
Bob Gates, a career CIA employee who has served as National Intelligence Officer
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for the Soviet Union and as a member of the NSC Staff under Scowcroft,
Kissinger and Brzezinski, has become chief of the analytical apparatus which
is no longer called NFAC, for National Foreign Assessment Center. That was a
little pretentious and created the appearance and perhaps a sense of being some-
thing apart and separate from CIA. So Bob Gates is DDI, chief of the Directorate
of Intelligence as it's always been called except for the last few years.
More important, Bob is full of fresh, bold and innovative ideas for improving
the quality and relevance of our analysis of the Niagara of facts that come
pouring in from the cameras and recording capabilities and the stations we have
around the world. Bob moved, in his first week on the job, to establish that in
the future all present and prospective division chiefs will have at least one
year of experience in a non-intelligence consumer of intelligence products
(State, Defense, NSC or other). Each analyst will be required to refresh his
substantive knowledge and perspective through regular outside training. All
DDI research programs are to be re-evaluated. All analysts will be evaluated
and promoted on the quality of their work, and each piece of work will be
considered in terms of its relevance, timeliness, quality in writing and presen-
tation, innovativeness and imagination, and above all its accuracy. These evalu-
ations, accompanied by comment by the head of the unit, will be kept in a career-long
production file for each analyst. To assure input and challenge from outside,
each office will be required to develop an aggressive program of contacts,
conferences, and seminars on important subjects. A roster of outside contacts
and consultants on each country or general subject area who will be asked
regularly to review drafts and provide critical commentary.
In this business, intelligence estimates are the bottom line. The
highest duty of a Director of Central Intelligence is to produce solid and
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perceptive national intelligence estimates relevant to the issues with which
the President and the National Security Council need to concern themselves.
When General Bedell Smith took office as Director of Central Intelligence,
he was told that President Truman was leaving in 20 hours to consult with
General MacArthur at Wake Island and that he would want intelligence estimates
on seven issues to study on the plane. Smith assembled the chiefs of the
intelligence community in the Pentagon at 4 p.m., divided them and their
staffs into seven groups, told them they would work all night and have their
assigned estimate ready for delivery at 8 a.m. President Truman had his
estimates as he took off for his discussions with General MacArthur.
We haven't yet attained that tempo--but we get them out a lot faster
than previously. First thing I did was ask what Cuba is up to. I was told
an estimate was in process. When it came it was weak and short on Soviet
support and influence. I sent it back. All in all, it took something
like four months to get it out. When I looked into it, I found that the
first draft of that estimate was done in June of 1980, almost a year earlier.
It was better than the 6 or 7 drafts that followed. This first draft did
predict a new aggressiveness from Cuba. This perception was diluted and
toned down in the subsequent drafts. Earlier there was a draft on Nicaragua
which predicted what happened there, but never got out at all. This work was
available at a time when those developments certainly should have been
carefully considered. Sadly, these perceptions were strangled in the clearance
and coordinating process so that in the case of Nicaragua they never reached
policymakers in a national estimate and in Cuba they were delayed while Cuba's
new aggressiveness inflamed Central America and would have reached policymakers
in diluted form if the final draft had been approved. Estimates don't linger
around any more. We established an accelerated time table for producing an
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estimate which gets factual input from all elements of the community and
bringing it to the table at the National Foreign Intelligence Board as within
a couple of weeks and faster if necessary. At this table the chiefs of each
element of the Intelligence Community--DIA, NSA, CIA, the military services,
FBI, Energy, Treasury--sit as a board of estimates. Everyone can and does
speak up with the assurance that it is my responsibility to both frame those
estimates and reflect significantly different views that may exist in the
intelligence community. Thus we have done away with conclusions by consensus
and negotiation. Policymakers get a full range of credible and substantiated
conclusions.
During the summer we produced comprehensive estimates which became the
basis for comprehensive policy initiatives on the threat to Central America,
Soviet Potential to Respond to U.S. Strategic Force Improvements, the Persian
Gulf, the Middle East, and the China-Taiwan problem. We broke new ground with
first time estimates on technology transfer, the decline of the Soviet economy
and the dependence of the Soviet military on western trade and technology.
You have a list of key estimates issued during our first year and the
conclusions of our Senior Review Panel after a detailed study of the
relationship between National Intelligence Estimates and policy issues
addressed by the NSC during 1979 and 1980 and those issued in 1981. (Appendix A)
What do these estimates tell us about where we stand in the world and
the threats we face? They lay out a sobering if not frightening picture
of Soviet capability and forward movement on a broad, but ominously inter-
related, variety of fronts.
Strategic - within a couple of years of being able to knock out our land
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Superior conventional forces and intermediate range missiles on the central
front in Europe.
Ability to project power as first seen in moving tanks and other heavy weapons
to link up with Cubans in Angola and Ethiopia and currently reflected in ready
airborne divisions, in plans and exercises to run through Iran very quickly
and tanks and other mobile weapons prepositioned in Yemen, Libya and possibly
Syria.
Military Assistance is a more subtle but nevertheless effective Soviet tool for
creating Third World dependency. Two years ago we sold twice as much arms
to the Third World as the Soviets. Today they offer better terms and delivery
to sell 50% more than we do. Their provision of a growing preponderance of
military advisors is both cause and effect of this.
Propaganda - we have had difficulty in getting attention to yellow rain in
Indo-China and Afghanistan, to the rapid pace which SS-20s targeted at Europe
are being installed and to Soviet and Soviet proxy supply of weapons and training
of insurgents in Central America. At the same time, the Soviets have had success
in proclaiming their peaceful intentions and denouncing us in mass demonstrations
against U.S. weapons in Europe and against our assistance to legitimate governments
in Central America. The Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty
are being shaken out of their long lethargy to tell the truth about real issues
but they need more and better facilities to overcome Soviet jamming and do an
adequate job of offsetting a far stronger Soviet effort.)
Subversion and Insurgency - while we've put the great bulk of our effort into fol-
lowing the Soviet military threat, over the last six to seven years we've been more
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severely damaged by destabilization and economic aggression. Events have
demonstrated that we could not safely renounce assistance to our friends
against subversion by our adversaries. In the aftermath of Vietnam, the Soviet
Union soon began to test whether the U.S. would resist foreign-provoked and
supported instability and insurgence elsewhere in the Third World. Fully
aware of the political climate in this country, in the mid-1970s they developed
an aggressive strategy in the Third World. It avoided direct confrontation
with the U.S. and instead exploited local and regional circumstances to take
maximum advantage of third-country forces (or surrogates) to attain Soviet
objectives. This enabled Moscow to deny involvement, to label all such conflicts
as internal, and to warn self-righteously against "outside interference." There
is little disagreement among our analysts that Soviet and proxy successes in the
mid- to late 1970s in Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia, South Yemen, Nicaragua, and
elsewhere have encouraged the Soviets to work with the Cubans, Vietnamese and,
recently, the Libyans ever more aggressively to threaten new targets, notably
in Africa, Central America and the Middle East.
We're making good progress in a program to rebuild CIA paramilitary
capability and a program to rebuild and to cooperate with the Pentagon in a
common effort to maintain paramilitary and anti-terrorist capabilities, with
CIA handling the clandestine aspect and the military the overt aspect. We've
done an estimate identifying stability factors in countries where actual or
potential instability is a matter of concern and rating them according to
the degree of this threat. To keep a continuing watch on this and to develop
assessments and evaluate strategy to deal with these threats, a Center for
Instability, Insurgency and Terrorism is being established in the DDI.
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The Technological Race
The Soviets have a far-flung effort, far beyond ours, to perfect missile
defense, develop laser and directed energy weapons, anti-satellite weapons,
permanent space stations and anti-missile defense. They have well over a
hundred new systems in development, much of it based on our technology.
One of the first things I did was call for an evaluation of what the
Soviets had gained in acquiring technology from the West. The facts accumulated
in such alarming proportions that we established a Technology Transfer Center
around mid-year. By early October we had established that the increasing
sophistication, accuracy, power, impenetrability and countermeasure capability
of Soviet weapons, against which we must defend ourselves, was based on our
own expenditures in research and development to a far greater degree than we
had ever dreamed. We established that the Soviets were conducting a massive
far-flung and well organized effort to get technology from the West through
trade, theft, illegal purchase, espionage, scientific exchanges and study
I I
started to hire and train about 100 young scientists a year. This now has
produced an organization of about a thousand experts who identify Soviet
technology needs, target where they might be acquired in the West and roam
the world to search out details and samples of targeted Western technology.
This has been enormously successful. The Soviets have had a huge free ride
on our R&D military and our civilian technology. We have paid for much of
the vastly increased military threat which will now require us to increase
our military spending by hundreds of billions of dollars over the years
immediately ahead.
we learned that the Soviets had 15 years ago
 There is the constant threat of a breakthrough which could tip the
strategic balance against us, particularly in laser and directed energy and
in space systems where massive programs are under way. We have identified
some 40 design bureaus and research centers working on lasers and directed
we know that during the
mid-80s there will be a huge increase in their space launchings aimed at
establishing permanent manned stations in space.
indicating possible military use of space.
Warning
To meet the challenge of Soviet weapon development, we need additional
technical capabilities which will take years to develop. In the meantime,
to prevent technological surprise we must count on extending our human
intelligence.
To maintain adequate warning capability and attack verification, we
will also need new technical capabilities. These are specified in the future
capabilities study which I described earlier. Meanwhile, we are upgrading
our warning machinery. In the early days of CIA, much of the intelligence
operation was built around a weekly watch report. This has disappeared.
Over the last few years, there has been only a monthly warning meeting of
officers at a relatively low level. We have returned to a weekly indications
and warning meeting conducted by the top officials of the CIA's Intelligence
Directorate, NSA, DIA, and State. They will be charged with reevaluating
each trouble spot and producing a watch report for the President, Secretary
of State, Secretary of Defense, and the President's National Security Advisor
at the end of each week. We are presenting next week to the National Foreign
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Intelligence Board the report of a working group on warning which will be
the basis for improvements in the warning process and which I believe can
result in a more effective networking of the warning capabilities of the various
elements of the Intelligence Community, a more aggressive and persistent search
for warning indicators, a more frequent and systematic challenging of previous
judgments, and improved and automatic intelligence input to crisis management.
Counterintelligence
Finally, we are taking a broad new look at how we can develop more
adequate protection against the intensified espionage, disinformation and
terrorist activities conducted, more or less in concert, by the intelligence
services of the Soviets, Cubans, East Germans, Libyans, and their other proxies
and partners in crime, including a large number of terrorist organizations.
The working relationship between FBI and CIA, as Judge Webster said this week
in a letter to the Post, is close and fully cooperative. Still, the challenge
is a large and growing one and a counterintelligence subcommittee chaired by
Senator Chafee has shown great interest in how we can meet it better. We have
organized and have started to pursue an evaluation of the counterintelligence
challenges and capabilities required during the balance of the decade, paralleling
the capability study completed this year on intelligence challenges and capabilities.
So, you see there is a lot going on, on which we will welcome your assistance
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? 13 January 1982
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES (1981)
ed of William Leonhart, 25X1
was asked to compare National Intelligence 25X1
Estimates during a irs ree quarters of 1981 with those during 1979 and
1980 in relevance, tempo and quality. They reported that in 1979-80 there
was substantially less use of the Community and a dearth of interagency
estimates directly pointed to critical policy issues in the manner followed
since the late spring of this year under revised NIC procedures. Timeliness
of intelligence advice and rapidity of response time has much improved in 1981.
Design of analysis/estimates--in content shaped more closely to specific policy
problems and in forms more useful to policymakers--has also been significantly
enhanced.
Finally, in 1979-80, there was substantial evidence of capacity for
pertinent anticipatory analysis going unused because of insufficient linkage
between the policy and the intelligence communities. Some of these cases
later developed into major policy issues involving instability in Eastern
Europe, the Middle East, and Central America. Our impression is that, in
1981, performance in converting perceptive basic studies in NFAC into effective
inputs for policymakers has been materially improved.
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