PROSPECTS FOR ANTI-US TERRORISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R000300020013-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2007
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: October 6, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

Intelligence
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Information available as of 6 October 1981 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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PROSPECTS FOR ANTI-US TERRORISM
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FOREWORD
This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum examines the sources
and implications of recent terrorist acts and threats against the United
States, and estimates the extent and nature of the threat posed by the
leading perpetrators of these acts and threats.
It should be stressed that there are a number of intelligence gaps on
several of the specific questions discussed in the Memorandum and that,
consequently, the assessments it presents are in many instances based
heavily on judgment.
Note: This Memorandum was requested by the Director of Central Intelligence and was produced
under the auspices of the Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council. It was coordinated with the Central
Intelligence Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; and the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State, the Treasury, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the
Marine Corps.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
It is our judgment that the Ramstein (Germany) bombing and the
attack on General Kroesen, Colonel Qadhafi's threats against US
personnel and facilities, and the various other threats and terrorist
incidents of the past few weeks directed against the United States spring
from disparate conditions and causes.
There are reasons, nonetheless, to anticipate an increase in anti-
American terrorism in Latin America, the Middle East, Western
Europe, and to a lesser extent in southern Africa.
The Libyans, radical Palestinians, and the West German Red
Army Faction (RAF) pose the most immediate major terrorist threats to
the United States, but other terrorists harbor strong anti-American
feelings and have the ability to strike US interests.
There continue to be numerous ties among terrorist elements,
including Libyans, Syrians, radical Palestinian terrorists, and some in
Western Europe. We are agreed that some collaboration among these
elements in future attacks is likely, but we differ as to whether the re-
cent West German incidents indicate that such collaboration has begun
(see paragraph 8).
There is no evidence of a Soviet hand behind recent anti-US
terrorist incidents. However, Moscow bears some indirect responsibility
because of its continuing support for governments and entities that
practice terrorism, and its efforts, particularly in Western Europe, the
Middle East, and Latin America, to stir up anti-American sentiment.
The assertive stance the United States has taken in several regions
of the world also contributes to an atmosphere that is likely to
encourage an upsurge in terrorism directed against US interests in the
next few months.
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The Implications of Recent Anti-US Terrorism
1. US personnel and property were the target of a
number of terrorist attacks and threats in August and
September 1981. These incidents included Libyan
threats to attack President Reagan and key American
facilities; the bombing of the headquarters building of
the US Air Force, Europe, at Ramstein Airbase in
West Germany; the attempted assassination of General
Kroesen, CINC USAREUR, near Heidelberg; Palestin-
ian threats to attack US interests; the attempted
murder of US servicemen in Turkey; and the attack on
the US military training team in Honduras. In our
judgment these attacks and threats were not coordi-
nated but were the products of diverse regional and
local situations.
DISCUSSION
2. The most important elements in these situations
are:
- The reactivation of the Red Army Faction (RAF)
in Germany.
- The growing anti-American spirit on the left of
the West German political spectrum opposed to
US "neutron bomb" and theater nuclear forces
policies and the efforts by West German radicals
and terrorists to exploit these sentiments and
draw public attention once more to themselves
and their activities.
- The probable reactivation of extremist elements
in Fatah after a period of relative dormancy and
the emergence of radical Palestinian splinter
groups.
- A perception by many Arabs and Palestinians of
US association with recent Israeli activities, in-
cluding Tel Aviv's aerial attacks on Iraq and on
Palestinian targets in Lebanon; Palestinian frus-
tration at the reelection of Prime Minister Begin;
anger at the resumption of deliveries of military
aircraft by the United States to Israel; and inter-
necine Palestinian and Arab Quarrels.
- An increasingly confrontational stance by Libya
toward the United States, catalyzed by media
allegations of US activities against Libya and by
the US-Libyan military clash over the Gulf of
Sidra.
3. American interests have been and will continue
to be targeted by terrorists because:
- Terrorism is perceived to be a legitimate political
weapon and instrument of foreign policy by
numerous countries and groups that are anti-US
in their ideology.
- US interests are worldwide, highly visible, and in
many cases easily accessible to terrorists.
- The US presence, notably its military and diplo-
matic aspects, is widely regarded by leftist, and
radical elements as the visible symbol of "im-
perialism" and "neocolonialism."
- Attacks against US interests and personnel will
often serve to embarrass a host government
because they will receive publicity and so serve
sometimes to highlight alleged government in-
competence and vulnerability.
- The occurrence of spectacular terrorist acts, such
as the bombing at Ramstein, tends to have a
"demonstration effect." Terrorist groups, which
may have nothing in common other than visceral
anti-Americanism, are prone to emulate one
another as each event receives publicity.
4. US policy in recent months toward Central
America, Africa, the Middle East, Western Europe,
and international terrorism is perceived by radicals
and revolutionaries as confrontational. The growing
emphasis on combating "terrorism" has produced the
very publicity that terrorists seek and has provided
them with a rallying point. Some agencies note that
there is no hard evidence to support these judgments.'
5. This shift in US policy is interpreted by some
groups as a dare to which they are both inclined and
able to respond. Whenever the United States asserts
' The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the Senior Intelligence Officers of the military
services.
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itself by employing or threatening to employ military
power and pursues policies that are disliked by fringe
groups, the chances increase that its adversaries will
respond with their own available (terrorist) weapons.
There are reasons, therefore, to anticipate an increase
in anti-American terrorism in Latin America, the
Middle East, Western Europe, and to a lesser extent in
southern Africa. In particular, Arab terrorism may
soon be sparked by closer and more overt US-Israeli
security and strategic arrangements and by the re-
sumption of the Camp David process. There is no
statistical evidence yet, however, that such an upsurge
is occurring.
6. Another question of continuing concern is the
degree to which various international terrorist groups
and states hostile to the United States may work
together against US interests. In this regard, of particu-
lar concern is the possible expansion of links among
Libyan terrorists, radical Palestinians, and terrorists in
Western Europe. Additionally, there are links between
Syria and some radical Palestinian groups, and Iraq
and such groups. Other supporters of anti-US interna-
tional terrorists include Cuba and South Yemen. There
are, moreover, numerous contacts among West Euro-
pean terrorist groups. These links may presage more
coordinated anti-US terrorism than is currently the
case.
7. There is evidence, for instance, that Libya and
the radical Palestinians-either separately or in con-
cert-have initiated planning for a new campaign of
anti-US terrorism. reported
negotiations between Libya and the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) to undertake joint
action against the United States and particularly Presi-
dent Reagan. The Libyans have proposed that the
PFLP-provided with Libyan weapons and money-
undertake terrorism against US military, political, and
commercial interests in Europe. The PFLP is cur-
rently debating this proposal.
8. Some agencies believe that there is a Libyan or,
to a lesser extent, Palestinian role in the revival of
German terrorism, a belief that is based upon past
German-Palestinian cooperation in terrorism (as in the
Entebbe and Mogadishu hijackings), the training of
German terrorists in Palestinian or Libyan camps, and
Fatah's reported plan to use "Europeans" in the
resumption of attacks against US and Israeli interests
in Europe. Even in the absence of an RAF connection
to the Palestinians in the recent string of terrorist
incidents, it is possible, they believe, that renewed
Palestinian terrorism in Western Europe might inspire
joint RAF-PFLP operations.' Other agencies, however,
doubt that there is any Palestinian or Libyan role in
recent German terrorism. They cite as reasons for this
position the lack of evidence of radical Palestinian or
Libyan attempts to propose joint operations with the
RAF (as there apparently have been, for example, with
the Italian Red Brigades), their belief that the RAF has
access to all the logistic support it needed to mount its
recent operations without outside help, and, most
importantly, the fact that Ramstein and senior Ameri-
can officers were mentioned as possible RAF targets in
their internal documents at least six months before the
revival of Palestinian or Libyan interest in terrorist
operations in Western Europe.'
9. Although we hold no hard evidence of a Soviet
hand behind recent anti-US terrorist events, the Sovi-
ets bear some responsibility for anti-US terrorism in
general. The USSR supports both governments (includ-
ing those of Libya, Cuba, South Yemen, and the East
European states) and entities which, in turn, support or
conduct terrorism. The Soviets' support for terrorist
training (particularly in the Middle East), their provi-
sion of weapons, their anti-American propaganda
campaigns, and their efforts to foster cooperation
between terrorist groups all provide a backdrop which
in some cases favors anti-American terrorism.'
10. In the coming months, the major terrorist 25X1
threats to US interests abroad will be posed by Libya,
radical Palestinians, and the West German RAF. The
Cubans, too, might present a major terrorist problem
to the United States under certain conditions, especial-
2 The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the Senior Intelligence Officers of the military
services.
' The holders of this view are the Director, National Foreign
Assessment Center, and the Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State.
' For a detailed discussion of the Soviets and international terror-
ism, see
The Intelligence Community has undertaken various new initia-
tives-in collection, liaison activities, collation, and analysis-aimed
at drawing a more precise picture of the relationships between
Soviet and Soviet-client support on the one hand, and terrorist
groups on the other.
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ly if Castro felt his rule were endangered by the
United States. All of these have a capability and the
will to carry out anti-US terrorism either individually
or, in some cases, cooperatively. All enjoy the support
of extremists in different regions and loose links to
other states or groups that employ terrorism.
Libya
11. The most serious near-term terrorist threat to
the United States is that posed by Libyan leader
Muammar Qadhafi. On 13 August 1981, Libya's "Free
Unionist Officers" publicly declared:
... we shall hit at US interests anywhere and
undertake the physical liquidation of anyone who
permits himself merely to think of harming the
life of the leader of the Great 1 September
Revolution, beginning with Ronald Reagan.
More recently, Qadhafi threatened to assassinate Presi-
dent Reagan and other senior US Government offi-
cials, and to attack US nuclear facilities abroad in the
event of another military confrontation with the United
States. Qadhafi reportedly declared that he would
"fight the President in my own kind of war ... all it
takes is money and I have enough to pay even for his
own people to kill him." We believe that Qadhafi's
remark, made in the wake of the Gulf of Sidra
incident, was a defensive response to allegations in the
US media and elsewhere that the United States was
seeking to eliminate him. Senior Libyan officials also
authorized the assassination of the US Ambassador to
Italy.
12. On 1 September 1981, Qadhafi declared that
Libya would attack US nuclear depots. in the Mediter-
ranean area and cause "an international catastrophe"
if America again "attacks" the Gulf of Sidra. Libya
may have the resources to make such an attempt
either by means of a terrorist attack or the use of
aircraft or missiles. One report suggests that his threat
to attack US nuclear depots is only propaganda but
that Qadhafi is planning to attack an undefended US
ship in the Mediterranean. Indeed
reported that the Commander in Chief of
tt ern armed forces stated that a Libyan "air
death squadron" composed of Libyans and Palestin-
ians was undergoing training. This may be related to a
Libyan threat to attack the USS Nimitz in the event of
another armed clash with the United States.
13. These threats are consistent with Libya's estab-
lished pattern of supporting and conducting terrorist
activities. Qadhafi has targeted world leaders (includ-
ing Anwar Sadat and Valery Giscard d'Estaing) for
assassination in the past; he considers assassination a
justifiable foreign policy weapon and has the resources
to carry out such an act. While Qadhafi has not
succeeded in assassinating any world leaders, his
agents have killed 12 Libyan exiles so far, and Libyan
agents have recently sought to employ Italians who
they thought, probably wrongly, were associated with
the Red Brigades to carry out additional assassinations
of Libyan dissidents in Italy.
14. Over the Years Qadhafi has supported such
diverse terrorist groups and liberation movements as
the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Japanese
Red Army, and the radical Palestinians; he identifies
himself with forces striking out against "Zionism" and
the "imperialist oppression of the West." Recently, he
has focused increasingly on the United States as a
target. A recent report from a source whose reliability
has not yet been established claims that some members
of Libya's Revolutionary Committees of pro-Qadhafi
zealots have been ordered to prepare for operations
against US interests in the Middle East, Italy, Greece,
and Turkey. It is possible that this is related to
Qadhafi's public threats against US military installa-
tions. The incident in the Gulf of Sidra has contributed
to Qadhafi's aggressive, confrontational stance vis-a-vis
the United States. The very act of standing up to the
United States is interpreted by Qadhafi as an act of
revolutionary courage and will in all likelihood
prompt him to seek further opportunities for
confrontation.
15. While he does suffer from exaggerated emo-
tional reactions, Qadhafi is not psychotic. His judg-
ment and reasoning at times are faulty. Driven by his
messianic vision of an Islamic revolution, Qadhafi has
a distorted ethnocentric perception of political reality.
While his tirades seem erratic, he is not a captive of his
impulses and has demonstrated a capacity for patienc25x1
and careful planning over time. Having now identified 25X1
the United States as his principal opponent, there is a
strong possibility he will mount a sustained terrorist
campaign against US interests. We believe that his
assassination threats against President Reagan should
be taken seriously.
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16. Despite shifting moods in Libyan foreign policy,
Qadhafi continues to be driven by three causes:
championing his version of Islam, assisting people
fighting wars of "national liberation," and defending
the "Arab Nation" as he defines it. In promoting these
causes Qadhafi has supported groups whose connec-
tion to Islam, national liberation, or Pan-Arabism were
highly tenuous. Libyan support for terrorist groups
seems to reflect the following priorities:
- Palestinians, particularly extremist groups like
the PFLP, the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine/General Command (PFLP/GC), the
Popular Struggle Front (PSF), and the Front for
the Liberation of Palestine (FLP)-and possibly
the Black June Organization (BJO), which
Qadhafi hopes to use in assassinating Palestinian
"moderates" including Yasir Arafat.
- Muslim groups, such as the Moro National Liber-
ation Front in the Philippines and the Pattani
United Liberation Movement in Thailand, which
are minorities in states ruled by non-Muslims
and, perhaps, Muslim extremists in countries like
Bangladesh and Indonesia. Qadhafi has also as-
sisted the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Oman/Bahrain (PFLO/B) and the Polisario
forces fighting Morocco.
- Antigovernment groups in southern Africa, Latin
America, and, to a diminished extent, Western
Europe. Libya has in the past trained members
of the Italian Red Brigades and the West German
RAF. Currently, Libya also trains Salvadoran
terrorists and possibly additional Latin American
terrorists as well.
17. Qadhafi has also dispatched assassination squads
to Western Europe and the United States as a part of a
campaign to silence critics of his regime. Exiles who do
not return to Libya voluntarily are either to be
kidnaped or murdered. The assassination teams ap-
pear to be made up of members of Libyan Revolution-
ary Committees, the Libyan Intelligence Service, and
Palestinian operatives. Some of these operatives even
travel on passports identifying them as members of the
various "People's Bureaus," which have replaced the
regular Libyan diplomatic establishments. Because of
the negative publicity this campaign has generated,
Qadhafi may have become more discriminating in the
Libyan dissidents he will target.
18. There are growing indications that the United
States may be confronted by increased terrorism on
the part of radical Palestinians or dissident members
of Fatah. Although recent incidents of Palestinian
terrorism in Western Europe (such as the attack on a
synagogue in Vienna, efforts to smuggle arms into
Austria, and bombings in Rome, Istanbul, and Athens)
have been directed against Israeli and Jewish interests,
Palestinian-sponsored terrorist acts may be increasing-
ly carried out against US interests as well. Khalil al-
Wazir, one of Arafat's closest colleagues, has report-
edly said that Fatah terrorism would be conducted in
Europe only under the most unusual circumstances.
Nevertheless, a number of reports suggest the possibil-
ity of Palestinian terrorism against US interests:
- Increasing pressure has been placed by radical
Palestinian groups, by Fatah militants and pro-
Communists, and by Libya and Syria on PLO
leader Arafat, particularly in the past year, to
approve the resumption of international terror-
ism and the targeting of US interests.
- Radical Palestinians, supported by Syria and
Libya, are seeking to embarrass Arafat by
launching terrorist attacks in Western Europe
against US and Israeli targets and to sabotage
growing PLO-European ties. The recent attack
on the Vienna synagogue is an example of this
effort.
- Elements in Fatah have recently undertaken
renewed preparations for terrorist acts, including
reconnaissance missions in Europe, recruitment
of terrorist cadres, caching weapons and explo-
sives abroad, and planning of specific acts. These
plans include the use of non-Palestinians for
terrorist operations.
- The "triggers" for such terrorist operations were
to be the reelection of Prime Minister Begin in
Israel and the resumption of the delivery of
aircraft by the United States to Israel, both of
which have already occurred.
- A majority of the PLO Higher Military Commit-
tee favored mounting sabotage operations against
Saudi oil installations if the Saudis fail to cut off
oil supplies to the United States.
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- Dissident Fatah personnel supported by Syria
have formed "terrorist teams" to mount oper-
ations against US interests.
- The Black September Organization (BSO),
Fatah's terrorist wing, was apparently reactivat-
ed without Arafat's permission in February or
March 1981 under PLO United Security Chief
Salah Khalaf. According to the same source, the
BSO may have arranged to collaborate with the
Italian Red Brigades.
- The BSO has also considered with Iraq the
possibility of Iraqi assistance for BSO operations
against Israeli and US interests in Europe.
19. It appears that recent developments in the
Middle East-including Israeli-Palestinian hostilities
in Lebanon, the Israeli bombing of an Iraqi nuclear
facility, Begin's reelection, and the resumption of US
aircraft deliveries to Israel-have intensified the strug-
gle for control of the PLO. On one side is Fatah leader
Arafat, who is still striving to achieve a diplomatic
solution to the Palestinian problem, is seeking support
from conservative Arab regimes including Saudi
Arabia, and is trying to improve his image in Western
Europe and the United States. On the other side are a
number of small but radical Palestinian splinter groups
which oppose Arafat's leadership of the PLO, mili-
tantly seek to undermine the Camp David accords,
wish to see a broad revolution throughout the Middle
East, and are prepared to serve the aims of radical
patron states like Syria, Libya, and Iraq. In addition,
there are radicals within Fatah who oppose Arafat and
what they perceive as his less militant approach to the
Palestinian problem.
20. Some of the most radical Palestinian splinter
groups are offshoots from the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine, which was for a number of
years the most active Palestinian group in internation-
al terrorism. That group's terrorist activities began to
decline in 1978, and the group was relatively inactive
by 1980. However, there are reports of training of
West European terrorists, including members of the
German Red Army Faction, at PFLP-run training
camps in South Yemen.
21. The Arafat camp has not been inactive. There
have also been reports of the training of Turks,
Irishmen, German rightists, and Armenians at Fatah
camps in Lebanon. According to one report, Fatah was
training Armenians as a result of a Soviet request. The
Soviets also requested that Arafat offer Cuba coopera-
tion with Latin American revolutionary movements,
and he apparently agreed to this request.
West Germany
22. The recent anti-American terrorism in West
Germany is the work of the Red Army Faction and its
sympathizers. The attack on Ramstein AFB has been
claimed by the RAF, and we have had indications for
some time that the group was indeed planning a return
to international terrorist violence and that some attack
was planned at Ramstein. From documents seized at
captured RAF safehouses and from the confession of
captured RAF member Peter Boock, we have learned
that other US installations, West German Chancellor
Schmidt, and a gathering of senior NATO officers at
Heidelberg Castle were also considered targets by the
group. However, the attack on Ramstein and the
attempted assassination of General Kroesen indicate
that the group is increasingly focusing on US targets.
23. The current round of RAF violence appears to
be aimed at transforming the group into the vanguard
of the German extraparliamentary left, which has
been demonstrating against theater force moderniza-
tion and enhanced warhead production. In the early
1970s, the RAF gained supporters and recruits by
attacking US targets during a period of widespread
protests against US involvement in the Vietnam con-
flict. The RAF probably hopes to capitalize on current
leftist sentiment against US foreign and defense poli-
cies in order to renew its support among extreme
German leftists. At Ramstein, the United States may
have been the immediate target, but the German left
was almost certainly meant to take notice. The left is
not likely to rally to the RAF, however, since contin-
ued anti-US terrorism in Germany is likely to reduce
popular support for the German "peace movement."
24. The resurgence in RAF terrorism follows a
period of decline after the Mogadishu hijacking of
October 1977. This decline was the result of arrests,
deaths, and "retirements" of key RAF personnel.
Consequently, the RAF shifted its tactics from de-
mands for money or the release of jailed terrorists to
those of low risk aimed at "punishing the establish-
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ment," in order to provoke a "Fascist state" and
popular revolt. The decline in RAF terrorism con-
vinced security authorities that the terrorists were
rebuilding their organization outside West Germany.
On 25 June 1979, General Alexander Haig, then
SACEUR, was the target of what was probably an
RAF assassination attempt.
25. The recent RAF attacks reflect a reanimation of
the group despite the disruptions caused by police
efforts during the middle and late 1970s. Evidence
taken from a Paris safehouse, in 1980, as well as
findings after a traffic accident in July 1980 that
resulted in the death of two RAF activists, suggested
that attacks were planned against prominent US or
West German personalities, such as that which took
place against General Kroesen.
26. Notes found in the Paris safehouse indicated
that the RAF was trying to recruit personnel from the
ranks of the "anti-Fascist" groups ("Antifa") in West
Germany as well as from its "legal" supporters, and
wished to use its "legals" to create public disturbances
connected with causes like antinuclear protests and
squatters' rights in order to broaden its base of support.
27. Despite ups and downs, the RAF has continued
to maintain links to other terrorists. For example,
individual members of the RAF have participated in
PFLP operations, and the PFLP has in the past
engaged in terrorist operations to force the release of
RAF prisoners. The RAF was identified in the mid-
1970s as a conduit of weapons and forged documents
for the Japanese Red Army. Additionally, the RAF has
had contacts with radicals and terrorists throughout
Western Europe-the Dutch Red Resistance Front,
Swiss anarchists, the Provisional Irish Republican
Army (PIRA), and Italy's Red Brigades.
28. The involvement of West German terrorists
with the PFLP offers them logistic support as well as
an expanded international field of operation. It has
enabled such terrorists, through flight to several
Middle Eastern countries, to avoid criminal prosecu-
tion. The training of such terrorists in Palestinian
camps has expanded their knowledge of the use of
weapons and ability to practice sabotage.
The Coming Anti-American Terrorist Threat
29. In addition to the RAF, Libyan, and Palestinian
terrorist threats, a number of other regimes and
entities currently harbor grievances against the United
States and have the capability to strike US targets
abroad. The foremost among these include:
- Guatemalan and Salvadoran insurgents and other
Central American revolutionaries who perceive
the United States to be collaborating with con-
servative regimes in order to prevent political
change in the region.
- Iranians who see an American hand behind all of
Iran's woes.
- The Syrian regime, which perceives the United
States to be in collusion with Israel and its
conservative foes in the Arab world.
- Radical Armenian terrorists who have expressed
support for radical Palestinians, are anti-Ameri-
can and anti-Israeli, and resent Armenian emi-
gration from the USSR to the United States.
- Castro's Cuba, although it is unlikely to move
against US targets in the absence of a major
deterioration in US-Cuban relations.
- Turkish leftists who have mounted a number of
attacks against US personnel and installations in
Turkey.
- The Italian Red Brigades, which have the capa-
bility to attack US targets, although doing so
would be a departure from past practice.
- Croatian extremists who are aggrieved at US
prosecution of their compatriots and US extradi-
tion of accused Croatian terrorists to Sweden.
- Puerto Rican separatists who have attacked US
military interests since December 1979 and have
declared themselves to be "at war with the US
military."
30. International terrorism is likely to increase in
the next year, and a higher percentage of it than in the
past may be directed against the United States as US
foreign policy is perceived to be more assertive. While
there is no indication that the United States is cur-
rently facing a massive escalation of terrorism, the
events of the past few weeks indicate that we do not
yet have sufficient means to anticipate where terror-
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L
ism against Americans will occur and what forms it Europe, particularly in West Germany, and diplo-
will take. The most likely focus of anti-US terrorist matic/corporate interests in Latin America, the Mid-
violence will be against military targets in Western dle East, and Western Europe.
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