IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOZIER CASE FOR THE RED BRIGADES: AN EARLY ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R000300020028-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 28
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007iO~J~~~~IA-RDP83M00914R000300020028-1
28 January 1982
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOZIER CASE FOR THE RED BRIGADES:
AN EARLY ASSESSMENT
Summary
The conclusion of the Dozier kidnapping will be viewed
by the Red Brigades as a humiliating defeat inflicted by the
Brigades principal enemy, the Italian Government. It imposes
immediate pressure on the Brigades to attempt another specta-
cular incident to regain credibility. The manhunt for Dozier
has damaged the operational abilities of some of the columns:
the Rome and Veneto columns, which were hit hardest, may not
be capable of carrying out a major operation anytime soon.
The Dozier incident may deepen ideological fissures between
factions of the Brigades, strengthening the position of those
advocating attacks on traditional Brigades' targets, including
Italians involved in the commercial, industrial or legal sectors.
This memorandum was prepared for the Office for om a i
of the International Terrorism Center, Office of G o a ssues. 25X1
It contains information received by 1000, 28 January 1982.
Questions and comments should be directed to the Chief,
International Terrorism Center
G r M 82-10038
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The End N
Italian counterterrorist squads rescued General Dozier
early in the morning of 28 January in a
t oroug y pro essional operation. The as overrun
by a unit of the regular police, not the carabinieri as
ally believed. The police also raided
t approximately the same time. Dozier s guar s
o~e~c. no resistance
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with caution an were able to launch their assault witnout
the Brigades obtaining forewarning.
The Damage
The successful assault and the immediate surrender of
Dozier's captors is a severe tactical and humiliating propa-
ganda blow to the Brigades. The Italian media and the
Government will be quick to exploit this. The remaining at-
large members of the group that kidnapped Dozier probably
are on the run or deep underground. If the Italians can
quickly exploit those arrested, more arrests and damage to
Brigades capabilities will ensue.
The Italian manhunt for General Dozier was unprecedented,
even in the Moro case, and has severely damaged the Brigades
in the Veneto area and in Rome. Over 50 Brigades suspects
have been arrested, including Giovani Senzani, head of the
Rome column. verrun, and documents
and weapons seized.
A total accounting of seized weapons is still lacking,
but it appears a sizeable portion of the Bri ades' supply of
standoff weaponry has been captured.
the Italians also seized numerous documents, w is
may shed light on Brigades' operations and organizational
structure.
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The Brigades will now be under heavy pressure to carry
out another operation to regain credibility among their
members, their supporters, and the Italian populace. The
timing of the next operation will depend in part on whether
Italian authorities maintain police pressure against the
Brigades. The Brigades must also assume that some of their
arrested members may be providing the police with names and
other information.
There will be a tendency among some Brigades members to
go to ground until the pressure is eased. Countering this
will be pressure from the Brigades leadership to recover by
striking at "imperialism." Another attack against a senior
US military or diplomatic official would definitely bring
the entire Italian security force to bear on the Brigades
and compound the damage already done by the Dozier case.
Brigades' objectives in the immediate future may include
softer targets such as police officials or prison officers.
The Brigades may also seek to assassinate or kidnap an
Italian political figure. Assassination may be the preferred
tactic for the near term while the Brigades try to rebuild.
Assassination operations involve far less logistical work
and expose fewer personnel. The Brigades may also consider
targetting lowerranking US military or diplomatic personnel
or their dependents who are less well-protected.
Dissension
From the Brigades' perspective, the disasterous conclusion
to the Dozier case strengthens the position of the traditionalists
within the organization who are inclined to attack the
manifestations of "imperialism" within the Italian state and
economy. Thus, those who favor attacking the judiciary,
police, and prison officials can point out that the Dozier
case brought unacceptable damage and pressures on the organi-
zation. Those who believe in worker agitation and attacks
on industrialists and factory foremen can make the same
argument. ?
Those members who argued for the internationalization
of the Brigades' struggle will be hard-pressed to defend
their position that striking at NATO officials is a good
tactic for the organization. The call in the first Dozier
communique for a common front with other West European
terrorist groups has been met with silence by those groups.
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Neither the provisional Irish Republic Army, nor Basque ETA
have even issued statements offering support. The West
German Red Army Faction has also been silent, although we
continue to believe that the RAF has not abandoned plans for
future attacks on US targets. The RAF, however, is likely
to read the Dozier case as indicating assassination attacks
are more promising and less risky than kidnappings.
The ideological splits between various factions of the
Brigades will not cause the dissolution of the organization.
The group will probably go throu h an extended eriod of
self-criticism and examination.
Prognosis
The Brigades have been badly hurt by the Dozier case,
although not mortally. The case will be examined by the
group in both ideological and tactical terms, which could
well produce as yet unforeseen modifications in Brigades'
command and control, tactical objectives, ideological emphasis
and modus operandi. The olive have over 50 t rr r'
custod
The Italian authorities have momentum, and
further police actions should suppress the Brigades for the
near term. The enormous pressures on the Brigades' leader-
ship to regain their credibility by carrying out another
spectacular incident suggests that the prudent course for US
and Italian authorities is to anticipate another major
attack in the near future.
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