PFIAB STRATEGIC AND MILITARY TASK FORCE BRIEFING ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R000300030054-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 54
• Content Type: MEMO

ApprQved For Release 2007/05/SEC RDP83M00914R000300030054-1
15 April 1982
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Chief, Technology Transfer Assessment Center
OSWR/DDI
SUBJECT: PFIAB Strategic and Military Task Force Briefing on Technology
Transfer Problen[_
1. On 8 April 1982, I briefed Dr. John Foster's PFIAB Strategic and Military Task
Force on the Soviet effort to acquire militarily significant Western technology. The
briefing was a follow-up to an earlier briefing on the overall technology transfer problem
given to the full PFIAB membership on 11 March. In addition to Dr. Foster, Task Force
members attending included Martin Anderson, Glenn Cambell and Mrs. Clare B. Luce;
Anne Armstrong and Leo Churne also attended the morning session. Dr. Foster's Task
Force has a number of technical consultants, and several of them also participated in the
all-day session: Alexander Flax, Director, IDA; Eb Rechten, President of Aerospace
Corp. (and member of the DCI's S&T Advisory Panel); Roland Herbst, R&D Associates;
Ivan Bennett, Dean of Medicine, New York Universit Roland Schmitt, Vice President,
R&D, General Electric; and Gerald Johnson, TRW.
2. The briefing covered in some detail the Soviet program and transfer modes -
legal and illegal - used for acquiring US and Western technology. At Dr. Foster's
request, each of the modes by which Western technology is lost was identified, and
several examples of each were presented for ten major weapons systems and high-
technology areas. An analytical judgment was offered regarding the relative value of
Western technology acquired through each transfer mode. The briefing was concluded by
providing an overview of Intelligence Community responsibilities in the technology
transfer field and some highlights of recent CIA and Intelligence Community activities
such as intelligence support to the High-Level COCOM meeting and establishing the
Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee and the analytical units at CIA, DIA and the
FBI dedicated to the technology transfer problem.
3. The PFIAB Task Force's principal concern is is to identify specific actions that
can be taken to cope with the Soviet technology acquisition effort. As the result of the
day's briefing and discussions, they now know there are no simple solutions to the many
related problems that make up the technology transfer loss problem, including the
following: counterintelligence efforts both in the US and abroad are being forced beyond
narrow definitions of classical espionage, i.e., who is to protect unclassified, defense-
related industrial technology from Soviet Bloc intelligence; the need for industrial
security to protect Western firms from Soviet Bloc industrial espionage activities
extends beyond defense contractors to high-technology civilian firms; export controls
provide little protection from hostile intelligence- directed illegal trade activities - in
fact, export control enforcement agencies have little or no capability to even detect
such illegal trade activities; and, the Soviets and their Eastern European surrogates are
nmvind For Release 007/05/03: CIA-RDP83M00914R000300030054-1
 Approved For Release 2007/05I c A TRDP83M00914R000300030054-1
StJECT: ' PFIAB Strategic and Military Tas' F ce Briefing on
Technology Transfer Problem
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actively pursuing the most advanced technology our society is developing through open
academic and commercial exchanges with the leading industrial nations of the West. The
Task Force expressed concern about the range of Soviet technology acquisition efforts
but showed particular concern for those new leading-edge technologies being targeted
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4. The Task Force members, representing government, industry and academia,
had no unique solution to the multi-dimensional problem described, but it is clear that
they now have a better understanding of the problems that the National Security and the
Export Control and Intelligence Communities are presently wrestling with. In response
to Dr. Foster's request for a CIA paper on solutions to the problem, I declined, stating
that we were ready to work with his Task Force on the problem, but I did not think it was
appropriate to have CIA prepare such a paper. At the conclusion of the day's briefing
and discussion, I pointed out that there were some basic differences in analytical opinion
concerning what CIA and the FBI believed were the most significant military
technologies being acquired by the Soviets and that they should hear from Mr. O'Malley
on his views. Also, I noted that DIA differed on the relative value of openly vs.
clandestine) acquired technologies and suggested they should hear DIA's side of that
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issue.
SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2007105i ic ' RDP83M00914R000300030054-1
SUBJECT: PFIAB Strategic and Military Task Force Briefing on
Technology Transfer Problem
Distribution:
Orig. - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ED/CIA
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - Executive Registry
1-DDI Re istr
1 - OGC
1 - ICS/CIS
1 - D/OSWR
1 - OSWR Chrono
2-TTAC
1 - C/TTAC
OSWR:TT
SECRET
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