THE POST-FALKLANDS ENVIRONMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R000300040028-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 28
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For RUfe'
1 July 1982
The Post-Falklands Environment in Latin America
I. In South America, despite cooler relations between
Washington and several capitals, there is strong
sentiment for repairing relations.
-- The utility of the OAS has been lessened, but
proposals to exclude the US are not likely to
prosper.
-- Although five countries withdrew from UNITAS naval
exercises (to avoid high profile identification
with US), this contrasts with the dispatch of
Venezuelan military teams to El Salvador (where
Caracas' concerns dictate cooperation with US
objectives).
II. Concerns over other territorial disputes have been
heightened.
-- Chile will press even harder for some US
involvement in its Beagle Channel dispute with
Argentina.
-- If Argentina's Bignone manages a transition to
civilian rule, we would not expect a return to
Galtieri's militarily aggressive policies in the
Channel. However, he might have to resort to some
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sabre rattling on the Beagle dispute to dampen
domestic discontent.
Greater military cooperation between Peru and
Argentina may persist, increasing Chile's fears
that the two (and perhaps Bolivia) could move
against it. Chile may take defensive measures that
could escalate tensions.
Elsewhere, the Falklands war probably has made
leaderships more chary of initial use of force.
-- Venezuela, however, is saying that historical
errors by the US, as well as the UK are to
blame for its longstanding territorial dispute
with Guyana. Caracas hopes Washington and
London ultimately will press Guyana to
compromise.
In Ecuador, even if the military comes to
power, we expect the administration to avoid
any border incidents in its territorial dispute
with Peru.
III. The Falklands episode will fade quickly in Central
America, primarily because the-area is caught up in its
own crisis and--despite some support for Argentina and
.criticism of the US--depends heavily on Washington.
In El Salvador, US support will remain the most
critical element in the effort to avert Communist
takeover.
 Approved For Release 2007/
ew will persist only in the absence of US
assistance, not because of the Falklands.
I
zz= In Honduras-=, the Falklands aftermath coincides
growin with
g local perceptions of US
unreliability, but
this vi
Guatemala, the Falklands has permitted the new
government to reassert its claim to the former
British colony of Belize, but direct action is
unlikely; President Rios Montt hopes for a
resumption of US aid in the growing war with
guerrillas.
Nicaragua was antagonistic toward the
US before the
Falklands, which simply provided another
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over the last few months. y
Army strongman Daysi.
Bouterse 25X1
Opportunity to criticize Washington and seek wider
acceptance among fellow Latin countries.
Suriname's ties with Cuba have expanded ra
d
turning g toward Cuba because he is attempting to
consolidate his Power base and finds Cuban
and advice appropriate models
to his needs.
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