CONSUMER DISSATIFICATION WITH INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R000300050007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2009
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: September 20, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

p /I /")
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DOC82: BYE*054*82
D/TO: DCI
D/DOC/DATE: 820920
EC/DATE: 820921
ASS: T
ODEWD: Y
D/SUBJECT: CONSUMER DISSATIFICATION WITH INTELLIGENCE
D/CPYSER: 001 002 003 004 005 006
D/KEYWORDS: PFIAB INTELLIGENCE
D/TYPE: I
D/UPDATE: 820922
D/ORIGINATOR: PFIAB
D/O/OFFICE: ANNE ARMSTRONG
D/ACTION: DDI
D/ACT/DATE: 821004
COMPLETED 37469.000 CTIME=15:29 STATUS III
PFIAB/NSC Review Completed.
?
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CU E SECREETARIAT
4 _Ocoer
Rei-,mss. P.T:ea"se coordinate -w~ the CONIC ands prepare
~^esporse for=DCI `. signature (;I :have _::ac know:
1 edged{,recei pt ;to: Col . Wood:; who: will :inform
Anne Armstrong ghat DCS w111 be replying on
:his return)
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9 . c;~ PiIC':
~Nr
ComptM ,Ft
13 D. EO
id D/Pers:-
t 1$. D/-.OEA'' :
-16" 'C/PAD/OEA
17 SA./IA "',
18 l AO/DCI
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Alliff AsrAgffAgff
Rf)l1Tl ICS UP UPOrT A
(Security Classification)
CONTROL NO. BYE 054-82
cy a/
BYEMAN
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:
w
Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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(Security Classification)
TO:
.1
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RETURN
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TOP SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
September 20, 1982
Dear Bill:
In response to your letter to me of July 29, and our subsequent brief
conversation on September 8, I thoroughly understand your assertion
that you. need specifics in order to better address the problem of
consumer dissatisfaction with intelligence. However, the interviews
and the seminar were conducted under the ground rules of anonymity for
those concerned to insure their complete frankness. I think that my
pledge of anonymity can be preserved and at the same time your need
for specificity can be met by the enclosed transcript of their comments
and precise paraphrases without assigning them to their sources (Attach-
ment 1).
I also enclose a list of those interviewed and of those who participated
in the seminar in the office. The same lists were contained in the
semi-annual report to the President (Attachment 2).
I would like to reiterate that Ambassador Weiss in
mied
everyhcase cwas oncurs completely
by Fred Demech of the PFIAB Staff and that Captain in the accuracy of the transcripts.
Let. me reiterate that both in the semi-annual report and in Leo's and
my meeting with the President, we strongly empsiztwo
we
first, in particular, regarding the consumer/producer project
ingdtheironeeds
concluded that the consumers were much at fault in nothrelaying
and dissatisfaction or (indeed their satisfaction)
the producers. Secondly, we emphasized that in general we were most
pleased with the tremendous progress that has been made under your leader-
ship in strengthening our intelligence capability almost across the Board.
With best regards.
Sincerely,
% 11)A&2_41
Anne Armstrong
Chairman
The Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
BYE -054 - 82
Washington, D. C. 20505
Cy
Enclosures: a/s
CODEWORD MATERIAL
APPENDED
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN SEPARATED FROM
- CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
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with the.Polic,
Discussions once Estimates
Diplomatic and lntelliq
nterviews with the following senior
This commentary .is based on-}officials*-
V
ided with an advance outline
Each ea the which w above individuals were prov
of ons were n ,
areaould be discussed. The discussi
outline- Our purpose was to determine
however, confined to the outlmakers, the consumers of intelligence,
the perspective of the policy
have had
addition to those listed as having been interviewed,
officials, e.g.,
In ad
a number of private conversations wjzth other
and
and - - /
'rnn r'rnnr -,c'r'!c',rnrr .
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product they receive.
our d
of the pto the strengths and weaknesses is-
as these sorts of issues during
cussions:
for longer term plan rovision of
roduct be improved, e.g..* F'
How could the P w points?
e
. intelligence product you receive?
now useful is the crises or
e .g., support during
in what ways,
or both?
If useful, ;no
ou prov.-de 1-01-.111
more:--diverse v1
I.C., i.e., do
'feed back" do You provide to the uent inter
mow.muchal guidance, or have freq
Y etc.? the
changeS? ertise within
traite
assessment Of
experienced, the eerienxpced, well
at
your
these highly capabl e,
e
ar
experts? adership intentions
insight into foreign 1e hts?
-- How important is you obtain such ins-9
?and motivations and do y to the
h and frequently
interviews were ..Were tailored meeting wit
-of
p the person were discussed.
r.esorier ilia specific subjects
and more on all the interviews-
narrower
accompanied
ence to Polic makers- relevant
of Intelli they were not seeing
1. Avai labilit ,?e In one
:officials we r?- convincedtheir.resp"nsA- liti
ence which impacted on ---? had been dew
intellig cr~_s.s
specific instance, ence related to the of the
doesn't et all
to certain seasindic ied t t hhat at oes see very ac( s indicated is that
hnical issues no
In a
in another,
ence on economic and tec
_ial's office
intellig of the problem in the
Part o hand-carried to the offic It is not
much NUMIntelligence i s he
and it must be read courier waits. [mme
while the these officials s has taken t
from the
an
intelligence is available
evident that anyone on th
exactlyy
determine of use to their bosses.) e past
to him in
which time to which might be to their
however,
ity
ence p ro ted
,
entire Commun
its
economic intelligs'rath good... n o Of
thought that the epast) .the functions unaerlined in the p and divided uncertain as what sort of
(and he reorganized have
mi ht
that had recently was quite uncerta to
L s .,~ ~t aff . _ n,aae clear that xt,con-
g
S
- .La~.~
economJ-U y-r-- be rece_LVy-
would now reorganiza 1on e
product to discuss its f .- was sat
s 1e that
izing
f
r"
o
emphas
made sense -
sumers ~_ a van -4
in on
receiv g
s
.
ence i
intellig
}fnr:~~~ .~f. r ^" TOP SEC ET/SF1'!SIT[t'E
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timely intelligence in the
response to providing t far more
the Community and see below
existing crises situation was excellentas a whole
equivocal with regard to r3n9e planning)-
attitudes on I.C. inputs to long-
for mker's
l
2. Util?t
ze pressed disa_
f Intelligence in SatisfyinqPo
Requirements.
ence without mu
pointment with the content wasf onhcurrent lintel g on-`- hou olmuch e
the emp as little emphasis ~
erspective and with very the flow ofComment:
historical p
so large that it was rather undifferentiated.
areas 0 poiso massive
material was
This view was repeated i material of not much use to the harassed
t general distain of intelligence an relevant to long
undifferentiated flow o
d said that
erm policy and ? a ? .:continued a
with an ability g term cy plan not l providing id that in
s. in p - -- said
intelligence was not a major element
roduct of
to think through major policy op
found the intelligence Commm' ni t P
ell brie ed on
w
general, e. g. , --- - - It to
what to to use. expect Exceptions eptions exiCapeatals before his
stressed the importance of relating
the norm.
olitical intelligence which is not tintelligence to pthat might be on the edge of a majorware
cited as onn with example a given foreign government without being be
oen
gotiatio ! would be negotiating mig esnaan
that the ministers with' "liana therefore not really be in a p
a~-
their way out politically - has had problems
ve commitments.
to focus on s eclsrm,am~ such.
to make effective the Infell_igence community
U. S. some insieeclat at program.
prw the
th ht as on ro
asst e, Soviet response nse tohe e
would like like some in =f' eeg., the
Not unreasonably this area.
soviets view our major initiative in they were ut intenhanciellignegnce
programs were troubling the Soviets
purpose. B
was does not believe that the
deterrence which was their p
htendency
mute on the subject. - speculates,
Community looks at possible alternatives or sp
is to come up with a consensus best estimaatte1?pts to provide in-
lied a comparable observations Though pressures limited
dependent views, bureaucratic pressures and time p ence
the degree to which competing assessment couldbeoofferedntel-
o was a reluctance on the part
c
commented that there
Community to offer alternative hypothesis.
As a result,
perhaps of raid to go out on a limb.
were the obvious and 1thought
tended to Sri on the side of caution saying r Some provided
in
short t.ey were rat e initi a ti ve
a di ence varied. '? ~a~ y. o f ,expanding
that the utility of in the category
im,,ediate inputs, useless.
knowledge," and a good deal was rather
that the material was undifferenti atreadnd ileany-t thing longer than two pages probably would
repeated theme
ort on
fied with the crises suPP
--crises longer
i
s
was sat
ntelligence was inade uate for the non
thought i
range robl-
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NT)
once WUI?:2 .
F~uman zntelliq our technical
Capabilities vs. th desired.
3. Technical HUriINT was less . en
outstanding while uestion in
ilities were there was no 9 u with
s to come i%,
capab aid that
t officials
ence Comm unity Of foreign
he ability o ions the Ions a9 less pro
and motivations was much
into intentions and friendlY s that it was
insights both adversary a collection
and societiesr would like it to be. V means of -a rofit
ductive than noted than
to develop too nwasl clear -- would P of
easier
undoubtedly but the implicat The made uac very
HUMINT, HUMINT insight- arepO
e
it was al from a better telligence Estimats both
a great de `hat National In
is such was on short on
HUMINT unity z
us greed that trumentstelligence
agreed that Comm ? reacti?n was
the In to motivation# intelli 9ence is coming
V i
intelligence rel..4ting most With the rest of .
In. - - SIGINT. can do the
mixed collection and only HUMINT ~~.
from technical it the case functions' rather
that isn his policyn,aking re
to support ,~ collection systems. that the
. needs ? big buck Be believ
job ed design
about (protect source) - t
as concerned o f NRO The tendency was NRO
was o
his view and balances. s stems.
harsh in a c ecks other collection Y to ,rob
u
~ . ed down
were znades which compe wed with and the tendencY.was
Jas
cos systems to enormously were the
escala~-- Thermal :ER) by virtue of
systems (unit simply that
costs tended to " Some Comm
Peter to Pa Paul" ence Y the fact
y
and despite these re
the throat" Of the I n ,t,llig the NRO In short, e
Ong Personnel i such programs. since 'they
fact of st the support f or eople in
there was li aid on by technical P but this
qu INT
. ements in l the NRO. - in HUM
ro ram office n support an increase believed that MpAGs
Own the P g tended to. Be also believ
guidance the budget.
revealed that
was not reflected in -
n countries- ram of its
in foreig ,MINT
could do more Independent
f or H PrOent: I
modest Hill. Tprog needs
a he
Hill
has gone to the being well received on Hill the
aollesking why tai
own which lored to
is not the ction 1S not ther sources that Answe whr:at MINT is good but
learned from o. he sees of HU should be
own HUMINT collection said that attention NT
of HUMI
its
needs.l i more is required and that of the on shothe source
that a grea, deal a clearer assessment how g that
roviding dif ficult to ),now said
addressed to P he finds it is)?
mation ence
the infor
collection reliable ~,.it olitical intell~g The reason
is and thus how s inert' it was u sus the
over -t w-' deal of t t get into
there was an ht that a good Community can utility of
personally ththg the intelligence is the all
for this was that this in turn limi clear that
n officials and It is perfectly intention
heads" of foreig [Comment into
use better insig
nce. while technical
political intaes9e e and could advcrG?~i 1es. BUM :[NT INT is
olicytakers rincipal such. insights,
of our P ,.vide
and moivatwill occasionallyP
collection uitful and u11dcrutili7?cd -source.
potentially a fr
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? marginal diversion o00M
impact of a viould $
the potential enCe to to liUMINT, make a
investigate technical intelli9f devoted to a pay
orn off?
to giet ally related
resources fhn i intelligence , ht i t . take art
less of techcae How long might
only p other
diferenCethat the problemhtsto see whether
Substantial determine is. If so, we oug ection can be
We may well
ding cons-train an inadequate 11UMINT aPPropriate for
to funding ated with a matter more aware of the
roblems.assoc... of course, made
the
p This-- is, should be akers w--th
overcome. However, among policym
to consider.
f dissatisfaction
feeling- ?, Tntell17
adequacy of n.Ut-.& --- - - and FeeaDa'-.. ent~
Taskin no one was
of Guidance,
the fact that virtually to find any
4. provisi?n Despite it was hard
unites ence product, about it. Within Qretoo
aence Comm intellig . _ _- o~-t-inQ ~,,,sv
as
- uiiy..~ 1 {
satisT-J-m" official u everyone w
olicymaking appeared that the Intelligence Co
p it tell that not much
that
time to it appeared
the ence on a
li
nce
form of intel
g one in
indifferent) to (In some insta
ured- if some that almost no
what was req to determine
as evident uirements or
d
lt w
e
effort was ma
existed.) for stating reattemPting to
specific subject the mechanism a is and the
any agency understood tood determin ed the requirements
ow priorities ar will bring satisfy
b ing not
la which ether in effort,
devise a P Community closer together modest and guidance.
intelligence orities, but this of feedback
inadequacy imself as having
and establish Pher.i general in sees h the
including
likely to affect as to who direction to
the e question uidance an d talked,
re' we
ide 9
h
o
mho. _P+ to w
?,-.; 1 ; yv to prov
the respons'---- - red. None of ~
b1litY~ side of as the
could not be is responsibi
saw this as h the policy
~ that tasking "came outof cited and as having a men
state unity in the Intelligence Comm edCa.questions'-
thought describe
on key intellig did not
interface with for commenting In talking
responsibility that surprised. once again,
that fashion. he was that
indicated to
me in the impression or securing
his function to was left wlo11oWed in developing
to procedure which was f clear.
the precise is not terribly
guidance within enCe Corn unit -
Intelliq namely as a
the
one major sense he thought
Within
5? Coordinat1was useful Further, each instance
that material from. and i d that to
confided and said
conduit for receiv ing half of
s trying t duplicate in a word, had one
e to do SO -
wa i period=
was not oquipped about this mat matter, if much better ob
j held the
shed."
and pers s blunt it could do a scathing- Altsho
onnel, as rather should be abolished-"
monbeequy quite
'-' on to w he thought to rewrite and
reacL__o in high regards ar.gelY really represented
they serv ed 1
as concernee available and therefore
AS far as. he w otherwise
package material
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 does is
the analysis thawould Profit
lie said that that
ability. be believes depends
a redundant cap At a minimum' eople. d
in most part bad. umber of better Pon Central America arid had
fewer number
for intelligence that did
from having
uses r Said, however. Nevertheless, ous
3,013
almost solely on - with be cau t
uses elationship they tended to beSult, some-
never close working whole
o as [ SO a r Comment:
a very ht on im the pact on plicy and
thoh ed.
that . usiOns they advance if there is
corr~,nent ike-? to deinnthe -once
l
eme rig determine
before it reaches the
501
it was difficult to
became too of held in high
tiim
ts interviews, product
Erom these intelligence
as a
any whole is n
coordinati?,yithin -
makers. Several of~
i
pol
cy mrmunit
.~ telli ence Co Specificallyy
esteem.
the In subject.' because ex_
Ex ertise Within this was poor
6, concern on analysis tries like the
voiced h l: capability for
~icials that in some coon data- But
et good in mind
nceded
V,
to g
, co
tho
don't have a modes avai.laleo
was lacking- it was difficult
aside e was and China, that ?people data 'Which unity
e Cornet
Soviet Union stated to present Intelligenc
from that, do not know how that the country
aside they in a given
and therefore problems back9rated person to
one of the more difficult and deep allow a
with a long stem does not oslavian analyst
lacked people The sya Russian or Yug said that we
a specific area. a
or in her entire career as er,t. ecialixe nand also
spend his/ economic exP who could sp country
afinancial or for analysts living in that
or as rams time to have PrOg ending some yugosalvia
needed erhaps sp advanced academic adegree-
on study country. P work toward an conducted foreign generals
completing L Ome years a9?- from first class foreign
hat, s" information ence
rn which compared om the Intellig ens which
in whichsts and that the conclusi
fr Among th analysis is
~ournali Superior. on: of addi tional
were is not collecti ,rgued
the journalists the issue is partly a matter argued
were: ial; it roblem. e Must,1 offer
advanced Supertly a structural P enCe and funds casual it is Partly Intellig of specialty.
and it in the area tended
; structure other narrow inadequacies
e the career within a r intelligence .cited
-hang advancement that our roblem and i end e p were
long-term - men tinneto language 1 uanguagage capabilities our language
be related
in some measure to b e believed questions about h serious ar on the Arab
our capabilities
China and Japan where also has particular
commenting suggests le read local
quote various areas. evidence our people -
ability in ves the e.g-; hether useful
lots,
sources of us
where belie ''
world ,cial. wondered, available of Soviet exP
are suPerf- other relatively disappearance better 15
ior was
dual
d
inly no
the gra
certa
viet behav
a ers an
newsp P cited ass was Staffs
tine. athat our iday even?though 0 t0 edcthat P lit . rl9ly to in
- estimating it is today no increas ica
than of w - he w,, forced our politl
years ago nose. that with of
better theweref too small and also is not impressed w
uld
n to
we o
ad begu
embassies cases,
some id that
I
abil.itieS - n sa
rely
?i
s cap
forei n ne
--`---
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?- said that the
focus away from collection and into analysis. rove thh
object of a recent increase in Nevertheless,o imPemarked that r
" u h
analytical capability way there simply are not eno 9
"still has s a a long way to go," that h competent analysts available.
attaches available nor are there enoug e ualified
[Comment: The lack of trained analystsand countered9 Iq n a study
experts is aproblem . have previously encounter.
participated in' for -- found that othiirsSiudirtrabian
expertise was close to nil, despite the expertise of the
that country..-. Similarly the Soviet expe
represented in the past by the an able
=
and has dried up. Our . - to
officer, has- no background in Soviet affairs and does not speak
Russian.
7. Distribution of Assets Within the Intelli. ence Community.
robabl appropriate that i?ntelli9ence
Most officials 'thought it was p y
priorities focus primarily on the Soviet Union, WarsawionPactht
and China. However, they were universal in their. opinis
meant that Third World coverage would be deadveequate that
from time to time, we would miss an important
thought too much effort was devoted to ae sucon
better? control erifi
cation such as SALT compliance, thus argued n wasting
that at .,should ignore
0
be used elsewhere.
of insight
little vel of
SALT compliance but, that the level
detail were not justified. _ gained hzc)
as to the adequacy of functional (as contrasted togeo9raP
distribution of the intelligence effort.
a. Adequacy of Lon -Ran e Intelli ence vs. AdeouiicY ofkSus Support
of these policy omakers
to Crisis Situations The great majority
were convinced that the intelligence whichltthey see tends to support
only near-term and crisis situations,Ce bile America, asought
satisfied with the crises support ar ranth pghtlems.
intelligence was inadequate for the nabion-crislityetos to the future.
worries as to the adequacy of
Because of the - system of distributing codeword
while i
em,
material (a courier waits it is read) immediate rostat
that there is a tendency to focus othignmore ore longer documents
i.e., current intelligence and largely
dealing with more complex and futuretoriented material.that there
_ said virtually the should be some sort of an institutional structure
day-to- e day which prescsauureses and
the policymaker to draw back ence and policy'related issues.
focus on the longer term intellig warning
said that today's intelligan~imesofXCrisis, butan otainyterms of
system, especially during 9- g lannin stated that did not rely very
much long-range
onnintelligence contributians dealineg
planning although there were some .important.
regard,, cited the Intelligence Community's study on1Sovieteenergy
and -efforts on the Yamal pipeline.
product was of little
that by and large the Intelligence Community p
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thought that in a
ener ally well
use for long-term Planning.
the Intelligence Community 9
is situation. people, cited the reCeoodLinsights.
goo
cris received
serves the substantive contribution of
serves which as to the
Israeli crisis not very optimistic As to the 'sr and because
was, however' range planning. and intentions of
use
ligence in long- useful
intel ___A ; nsiQht into mot - m-C.An a terribly
h
e
t
of a dun ? they are. not- unanml L-xeneral
foreign leaders' There seemed to be support and
instrum Comment: enCe ran P_--
ent. ~_----- crises intelli9 e o lcy_
ity of short-range e,~.for;
for the va longer ;-.:-g
dictent .7
egy enc_
al
util
lue of ?n
serious in m
""?
e
dain
-
to
d i s ,.--~---- ID anning='"'Tfi3-s seems
~
rommunit Products
Gi-1r^-
9. Comments o
crate luncheon discussion with. product
At
VIE 11--3/8? a S Intelligence Comm
the latest copy ewasad available
asked if had read d indicated that a it-
bad a chance to rdocument.
Soviet strategic forces. et that
on but had not y
to at the PFIAB
b considerable dissatisfaction with to texpressed some that the "well
h
noted in particular took footnotes which were i,Moreover, the
consistently the estimate. ositions
Positions. thinought the consensus P that
left" of the consensus in Passing,
impression on commented, had
was persuasive, which
were not particularly of the experience also
Very much - review exercise. this .represented
it reminded
jointly shared in the and said that described
up the subject of NTE 3-1-3/8 erformance? brought 1e of bad intelligence p ad been presented
a good example
the strategic force balanCe which concerned, was was a briefing o which, as far as ncerd during the
by that was pre discuss this
to will want to
"precisely Adthe kind Of?ba1Comment: was not asked for
C te
In geon
ar ter. Admini indicated that they did in one
In general. Ding NIE's, although areas that
privately.] of ong the substantive a
its views on matters indicating e.g-F such-as C31.
case provide a information developed, carefully-
they.would like see i IE 11-3/8 very
a major point of discussion and
[Count: inten end to review
become
strongly recommend that it ~t a whole.]
the PFIAB as as
consideration by cited
western Europe- also had.
Soviet pipeline to He mentioned that eventually
a ood job in this area. rivate oil firms, that a
doing 9 alked with p soviet
gone to outsiders and t the direction of belimpede the
coming the innuate bias e could really comment interesting
at makes this cow'
over U.S. spported tec chno that confirmed by
(The thing re
cut-off of
pipeline development.
;s contradicted by production which
is that it see below.) One area of
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y -
? connection with.
been particularly useful was in
cited as having indicated that there had been a majorwas
the pipeline issue. and that intelligece
battle nup'the contention that continuance of thetpipe_
-s
useful in supporting
line or support of the pipeline
ly a cut-Off of wUusd supportfwould seriously
and that converse shed eventually
that
impede the Soviet interest. "-_- :on this ussue but e lost the battle 1hadhbeen helpful
. ICo~iIIient' Note contradiction
the intelligence commented that the ft-tended
with wi ew' ood
a in that t on assessment was rather 9 could perhaps delay
t p
support the contention that while the U.S. g we could not
the t by ano nd sm maakorta make more costly the Soviet
CommentforNote indthis.reg aed In that
response
significantly impede it? I view.l
supports the view rather than the
to how :explained the difference between
to anstion as t ereral both
were and 'on the substance of this 1SSaid that in g
intelligence insights, eventually
receiving the same er, that believed that
couldg uld not. However, the intelligence assessment which
i.ide., to thaatPU.S.ting support was not greatly en which
d, around
was brought
accep "
Comment Soundings, with OSD staff suggest this concuus xon
isal ? I_? there is still a wide divergence in view on
is not supportable;
the pipeline-]
During discussions with to,nt on
,Competinq Analyses.
invited one of the senior analysts, to avoid
products offered the view that th~eantelligbackwards Community's
product. inadequate because they it was also
icy were as the discussion developedf ._felt
a policy orientation. t. and, -to some extent, ersonnel within
Community) at b tremain ence Community (or at least key p eriti-
the clear the
These Intelligence rgemain essentially unchanged from earlier pods-
t
or at least a good number of them, had a bias which
people,
These
terial which was
felt was contrary tthehinPositielligenon ce of ma the current
was of rather Accordingly quality. There was also some discussion
developed
as to to the nature co oor ntributions to Intelligence Community--
sum and substance of the dlWhichlosharpsy hathat aiittewa
ature of extremely 1 wd
p F'xreel- The rovide commentary at was
and dive r d rs t m the eo P ewmmxaity consensus. occasionally, itr that
rs
a difficult but i ossible t too do o so (a few exampressureenottt?)? erdotthe Pcleathe
feels under considerable pressure
sbyrthe
of non-concurrenCu? it was even rng that that that if es
Intelligence Community on (noting being 'cut off" patience
and dollars) could well result in laces a
with itcd difffferereenAlces Also,
great deal of emphasis upon seems rapidly produced prod ucts.. not to have too much p
within the intelligence Community and place makes or those who tend to non-Concomment whiohv1OUS y
slows for other significant
Of the process aOwpersonally viewed the - as a whole as
was s that p
Offered
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having "captured It was clear that what meant
what we had heard from others, namely
by that was, precisely
that the is still largely peopled by those analysts whoortive
were turning out material under the Carter Adeinistrationlsupp
of arms control proposals like SALT II.
that these people were hardly objective in their analysis.
As a final point call your attention to a 1980 Study, "The
Impact of Intelligence on the policy Review and Decision Process."
am indebted to for digging this out.) One finds in this document a validation of the principal pDints contained
d
above. For example: "In regard to crisis management _ ? ?
"
impact of intelligence is strong." As to "policy management eneral such
general,
the policy people "were consistently critical." In
intelligence "was irrelevant to, the
most C serious and pervasiveaof?"
As to feedback, it represented "the gaps." other cogent insightWe in
came to our attention after
significance is two-fold:
It supports our investigation without exception, and
-- Nothing seems to have been done to correct previously
identif ied problems.
Perhaps this latter comment can be a useful point of departure for
PFIAB.
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 MEETINGS AND IN tKV1.w-
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T:~e cTask. Force had several meeuug' addition, a
roducts. In d d ch through
re.sponsible~for producing intelligence p e roducts.
olicymakers were intervieweuring Mararchnth p
number of current senior p
June 1982, in order to gain their views on the utility
included were:
Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs
Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance,
Mr. James Buckley,
Science and Technology
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Mr. Thomas Enders,
Affairs
Mr. Robert Hormats, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and
Business Affairs
Mr. Peter Constable, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Richard Burt, Director of the Bureau of politico-Military
Mr. Ric
Affairs, Department of State
Mr. Paul Wolfowitz, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department
of State
Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and
Mr. Hugh Montgomery,
Research (INR), Department of State
tze U.S. Representative for Theater. Nuclear Force Negotiations
Amb. Paul Ni
Mr. Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
retary of Defense
U;,der Sec
Gen. Richard Stilwell,,USA (Ret), Deputy
for policy Review
Mr. Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy
chard DeLauer, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Mr. Richard
Engineering
Mr. Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment, Department of
Defense
RADM B. A. Burkhalter, USN, Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency
Mr.. Richard Pipes, National Security Council Staff (U)
Additionally, in July 1982, a seminar discussion was held with the
following former government officials:
Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former Assistant to the President for
National. Security Affairs
Amb. U. Alexis Johnson, former Ambassador to Japan
Amb. Richard Helms, former DCI and Ambassador to Iran
Ret.),'former Chief of Naval Operations
Adm. George Anderson, USN ( former Deputy DCI
Adm. Bobby Inman, USN (Ret.),
nn ---;:F m(+mher (U)
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