SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND COMMUNICATIONS TASK FORCE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R000300060053-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2007
• Sequence Number: 53
• Content Type: REPORT

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l.. Reestablish the little-used National Security Council (NSC) Committee
h- 2. Consider a larger inter-agency forum, chaired by the Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs or the Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs, designed to provide for periodic policy level and
intelligence level interchange on key intelligence questions. (See Analytical
and Political Task.Force Report, p. 15.)
k,._ 3. Review the human intelligence program to ascertain if an adequate
long-range program exists. PFIAB will look further into this area over the
next six months. (See Analytical and Political Task Force Report, p. 15.)
4. Improve intelligence insight into foreign motivations and purposes.
(See Analytical and Political Task Force Report, p. 15.)
'.-- 5. Request that key policymakers specifically assign to a staff member
the responsibility for important intelligence studies which require
prompt policy level attention and feedback. (See Analytical and Political Task
Force Report, p. 15.)
o
and Political Task Force Report, p. 15.)
f Users established originally by the Ford Administration. (See: Analytical
ur--- 6. Give priority attention to the following:
a. Increase career opportunities for intelligence specialists who
devote their careers to one geographic or functional area, and
b. Provide a means to bring experts currently outside the
Intelligence Community to responsible positions within it. PFIAB will work
with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to overcome impediments to
bringing such experts into the Intelligence Community. (See Analytical and
Political Task Force Report, p. 15.)
7. A system should be established which will allow policymakers to
better understand how the Intelligence Community functions. (See Analytical
and Political Task Force Report, p. 15.)
8. Arrange for an independent analysis of Soviet economic strengths
and weaknesses, enlisting from outside the Intelligence Community highly..
qualified Soviet experts and such other experts in economics,. engineering,;.:
demography, finance, etc...., (See Economic and Natural ResourcesTask Force
Report, p. 34.)
9. Add the field of foreign economic intelligence to the current
responsibilities of either the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade or the
Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs in order to provide timely guidance and
feedback to the economic intelligence effort. (See Economic and Natural
Resources Task Force Report, p. 34.)
10. Develop an intelligence communications process that fully responds
to the current scenarios of Presidential national security action.. (See
Science, Technology, and Communications Task Force Report, p. 37.)
NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED
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11. Incorporate anew effort in the existing SAFE program, namely, D Y
integrating it with oncoming communications systems and techniques. (See Science,
Technology, and Communications Task Force Report, p. 38.)
12. Place strict controls on dissemination and distribution of.advanced
technologies incorporated into National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) projects.
(See Science; Technology, and Communications Task Force Report, p. 38.)
13. Designate a focal point for review and clarification of policy,
program integration, and oversight of U.S. efforts to control technology
transfer to Communist countries. (See Strategic and Military Task Force
Report, p. 41.)
14. Initiate a review of two propositions:
--- That Soviet and Warsaw Pact agents involved in technology transfer
activities be publicly exposed and returned to their homelands.
-- That the Soviet and Warsaw Pact facilities which illegally intercept
government and private communications be dismantled. The Board is not persuaded
that the purported disadvantages to such actions outweigh the advantages.
(See Strategic and Military Task Force Report, p. 42.)
15. Implement effective procedures to control the transfer of technology.
This will require the selection of a manageable number of critical technologies
to be controlled and the issuance of clear guidelines for the use of. industry
and the research and development (R&D) community. (See Strategic and Military
Task Force Report, p. 41.)
16. Strengthen U.S. measures in support of the Coordinating Committee (COCOM)
and seek to secure effective bilateral agreements with other friendly governments
to achieve the same objectives. (See Strategic and Military Task Force Report,
p. 42.)
17. Design an effective American public awareness campaign regarding the
Soviet collection program, which can be extended to our allies. (See Strategic
and Military Task Force Report, p. 42.)
18.' Guard against releasing national security data through commercial
contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and limit the opportunity
of the PRC to establish a larger intelligence infrastructure in-the U.S..
(See Strategic and Military Task Force Report, p. 43.)
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These studies all identified essentially the same problem areas uncovered
by this Task Force and discussed above. Although many recommendations for
improvement were made in previous studies, from our interviews an:-I meetings we
concluded that the problems have not been corrected. In short, the problems
ACTION
are of an enduring nature.
'^
Based on its work, this Task Force makes the following recommendations:
1. The little-used NSC Committee of Users established by the Ford
Administration should be reestablished. While the Cabinet-level briefings
initiated by the current DCI will hopefully improve the satisfaction with
intelligence of the entire policymaking community, other measures to accomplish
.the same objective are needed.
2. The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs or the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs should chair
an interagency group to provide systematic interface on key intelligence
questions between policymakers and the Intelligence Community.
3. The adequacy of long-term programs for human intelligence should
be reviewed. PFIAB will conduct an investigation in this area over the next
six months.
4. Primary, but not exclusive, emphasis should be placed on
improving intelligence on foreign intentions and motivations.
5. Request that key policymakers specifically assign to a staff
member the responsibility for important intelligence studies which require
prompt policy level attention and feedback.
The DCI should give priority attention to:
a. Increasing career opportunities for intelligence specialists
who devote their careers to one geographic or functional area, and
Community to responsible positions within it. PFIAB will work with the DCI.,.
.to overcome, current impediments to bringing such experts into the Intelligence
b. Increasing access of experts currently outside the Intelligence!
7.. A system should be established which will allow policymakers to
better understand how the Intelligence Community functions.
TASK FORCE MEMBERS
Dr. David Abshire - Chairman
Dr. W. Glenn Campbell
Mr. Leon Jaworski
Amb. Clare Boothe Luce
Dr. Paul Seabury
Amb. Seymour Weiss
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE NEEDS
Each aspect of the increasingly stressed Soviet and Warsaw Pact economies
t
.
requires detailed and accurate day-by-day observation and assessmen
William J. Casey, as a member of PFIAB, in late 1976 summarized the. needs
of economic intelligence directed against the Soviet Union:
Over the period 1977-85 policymakers will have a
need for more precise intelligence and estimates
on:
1. The level of the Soviet military effort and its
impact on the Russian people.
2. The stability and the vulnerabilities of the'Soviet
economy and its ability to carry the military burden
placed on it.
3. The economic leverage we may have to induce the
Soviets to scale down their military effort.
4. The significance of technological, financial and
organizational impacts provided by the West to the
growth and vigor of the Soviet economy and its ability
to sustain a high level of military effort.
It is encouraging to conclude our observations by recognizing that these
economic intelligence needs are now understood not only at, the top levels of,
the intelligence community, but also by those who direct Soviet economic
intelligence within the CIA. Since critical economic policy decisions are
likely to be required in the immediate and long-range future, current efforts,
which have already produced substantially improved economic intelligence in
support of these needs, must continue, and, where possible, should be
increased. I
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. FINDING. The CIA's assessment that the Soviet economy faces severe
stresses has such potential effect on major policy decisions that it must
undergo independent analysis.
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34-
with
mend that ti
e
RECOMMENDATION. We recom
the
from outsid
PF IAB, arrange for an independent analysis, enlisting
-Intelligence Community highly qualified Soviet experts and such other experts
in economics, engineering, demography, finance, etc., as may be required.
2. FINDING. Further strengthening of economic eiintelligencce iisressential
to enable effective use of our greatest national strength
economy. This requires prompt and creative moves to produce economic
intelligence analyses and estimates that will support developing and choosing
with due speed among:,.
a. Tactical measures to support policy decisions to.discourage or
retaliate against threatening or adverse Soviet behavior.
- b. Strategic measures to decisions to or
coerce long-range modification of S
RECOMMENDATION. We suggest that either the Cabinet Council on
Commerce and Trade or the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs be requested to
o effort.
add the field of economic intelligence their ce economic intelligence n
ordetr to provide ti timelly guidance and feedback to the
3. FINDING. Within the past two decades, Soviet studies in the U.S.,
both inside and outside the government, have declined, as have. the number of
specialists in Soviet affairs. The CIA today has less than one-fourth the
number of economic specialists
during year to repair this long
project has been in operation
neglect of our understanding of the Soviet economy, and to increase and
The CIA reports
improve the staffs required for this urgent continuing task.
se their
that it plans to improve the quality of its analysts and tosincreaincrease
number by one-third within
through FY 88.
RECOMMENDATION. The Board strongly he endorses urgency of this
in rapidl
continuing effort, especially in light of the
assembling competent analytic staff and in building an adequate data base.
TASK FORCE MEMBERS Dr. W. Glenn Campbell
Mr. Leo Cherne, Co-Chairman Mr. Peter O'Donnell
Gov. John Connally, Co-Chairman Mr. Ross Perot
Dr. David Abshire Mr. Joe Rodgers
Dr. Martin Anderson Mr Robert Six Mr. Alfred Bloomingdale . .
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