SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP MEETING RE THE VERSAILLES SUMMIT, APRIL 6, 1982 10:00 A.M.

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CIA-RDP83M00914R000500120021-5
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18
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December 22, 2016
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November 5, 2009
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21
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April 5, 1985
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MEMO
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Approved For Release 2009/11/06: CIA-RDP83M00914R000500120021-5 ACTION INFO DATE INITIAL DCi ;DO Cr" =3 EXDIR' 4 D/IC$' ': 5 DDI 6 DDA 7 DDO 8 NUT- .9 Chm/fflc, 10. 'GC tti ti4 :. 12 Compt:~' 13 Di EEO 14 L)/Pens 15 D/OEA-- 16 C/PAD,OEA - = 17 SA/IA 18 AO/DCI 19 C/IPD/OIS . 20 1 21, p-, M 71 - - 22 ;: SUSPENSE NSC review completed. Approved For Release 2009/11/06: CIA-RDP83M00914R000500120021-5 Approved For Release 2009/11/06: CIA-RDP83M00914R000500120021-5 crr~o~rm,~ T1. 1 :~.. , - , R!' Y couNciL. Mf11 idaNatuw. 11 . alas April 5, 19a2 *2172 1ORA uii ?OR Nancy Bearg Dyke Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs L. Paul Oreii Executives Secretary art an.t Of State #3aaid Pickkfoid Executive Secretary Department of the Treasury Robert P. Meehan Assistant for Interagency Matters Office of the Secretary of Defense, ltay stand Lett Executive Assistant to the Secretary Department of Agriculture Jean Jones Director, Executive Secretariat Department Of Commerce William V. Vitale Director., Office of the Executive Secretariat Department of Energy William Schneider Associate Director for :iational Security =lid International Affairs, Office of Management and Budget Thomas B. Coreack. Executive Secretary Cen t..ra: IE te13. genre Agency Dennis Whitfield Executive Assistant to the USTR Roger Porter, Special Assistant to the Prttact r for PoU y v.~lrz~unrzzr_, Q?! James Burnham, Special Assistant to the C:;airrnan, Council of Economic Advisers Charles F. Stebbins, Executive Assistant to the Chai.zn, Joint Chiefs of Staff SUBJECT: Senior Interdepartmental Group Meeting re the Versailles Summit, April:'6, 1982 10:00 a-=, 1k 7 Cfl:'1 _ ENTZ1AL ? r t-4- M=1 At [ .:?~, J j Approved For Release 2009/11/06: CIA-RDP83M00914R000500120021-5 Approved For Release 2009/11/06: CIA-RDP83M00914R000500120021-5 CON -f-0-9 YIKL The Senior Interdepartmental Group for the Versailles Sumit kiLL a+ee:t &t LO 00 . a,. m_ as April 6 , 1482: in Room 3 45; QBDB. Two draft ?documents. attached to this announcement, will be considered at the meeting: __ the "Strati Paper" for the 'Versailles Shit -- a tasking memorandum, establishing responsi- bility and schedule for preparation of the President's Briefing Book. A third draft document on 010 trade theMS at the SUMIt Will be csrczisted and discussed at a later :aeeting, Agency representatives are requested to bring specific written ttsp if ~y f r thdraL.i t is ing r? id~ii 6. a-~L&. chael Q_ Wh eler Staff Secretary A,ttaCIMMUta T'bTIAL Approved For Release 2009/11/06: CIA-RDP83M00914R000500120021-5 CONFZDENTZAL Approved For Release 2009/11/06: CIA-RDP83M00914R000500120021-5 Versailles Economic Summit June 4-i, 1992 STSATEG t PAPER B.S. Osctives Thaws : The President's central theme throughout the European trip will be to affirm shared Western values and to revitalize Western economic and military strength in support -of -these values. He will stress t tie importance at! the ali aos as a symbol of shared ~?.al~. es, ? d as t.t_lft key to '--he of war_ He vtu project himself as a strong. fader -coamitted to the .pram vAt4OA o peace -and freedom. At Versaill , the President viii strike themes sounded at Ottawa to seek t ' ` aawcy . ' = t hasi' i ?vf i^/13- ~srm f CtTiII ttal pril data of z -i flatIonary qrowth and propose new initiati to siw farward toward fust y libersIiaation of world trade, and to wanitor and restrain the flow of credit to the Soviet union. Major Objective s - To confirm the necessity of reducing inflation, of pr ti q private actor -217tiv; ty, --specially p r v ete invest.- meat, axed of greater reliance on market signals as essential elements in revitalizing Western economies. To explore avenues fox gra;at.-.z fie t # i gence of policies, thereby showing sensitivity to the. in-terna*ional consequences of U.S. policy. - To obtain a political commitment to (a) resolve problems facing the multilateral trading systems, without restoring to bilatarslism or protectionist actions, (b) to extend the frieciples of free trade to new sectors such ae saw s inVe tmesst-, hig4 technology and agriculture and to seek to incline more fully new countries, such a9 the newly indus- rr_ a' ixinq countries, and (c) to work far a ptouctive ITT Ministerial this fall as an .initial step in this direction. - To reach final agreement among the Summit countries on the objective of, and a means for, mnitoring and restricting the volume and terms of official credits to the Soviet U: fott. Other Objectives: - To initiate a process leading toward a frame~ror.Jc for international investment flows, similar to the GATT for trade i.n goods, thereby enhancing the climate for free inter- national capital flows. i'r'`p";rt r1s Approved For Release 2009/11/06: CIA-RDP83M00914R000500120021-5 - Approved For Release 2009/11/06: CIA-RDP83M00914R000500120021-5 IT ICI I Imo,. - To reiterate the importance of agricultural policy, for -deeslopment, as presented at Cancun, and propose extending the "food teams" concept to a multilateral basis. TO focus energy diz_assions on the value of market forces=-in addressing the global energy prpbleae, but also to acknowledga the need for greater attention to secure supplies of energy in the west. settina The Annual Economic Summit takes place or* June 4-6 in era rsajes, Pry.. Thts immit is the erg.. 3~ and t'1ae fizet. of -a now raaad of Eosic Summits, which have . bece a major feature of the International economic system. At Ottawa, President Reagan re-established U.S. head ersl-Sp in the eccnamic sphere by a forceful presentation and defense of his economic program. Despite sharp differences aver interest rates, East-West trade and North-South relations, the communique issued at Ottawa reflected all of the Mited States' major objectives -- an upbeat tone, no hint of protec- tionism, unified albeit ambimous positions: an North-South and East- e,t issues, and a -chairman's Sim ary, on political issues that expressed an extraordinary degree of consensus among t -be, siU s on t-be nature if the S-Criet mat and the Neste= response to it. 3(uch of the "upbeat" tone em ating frost Ottawa can be attributed to the President's confidence that his economic program would lead to sharply lower inflation and sound, vigorous growth in the United States. While skeptical, the other participants adopted a "wait-and--sae" ? attitude about the U.S. program, an imaginative and attractive economic plan that had not yet been fully implemented. Economic and political events since Ottawa have wvrtseasd certain alliance issues, particularly in monetary, trade and East-west relations: severe recession in the u.:5.,- sharply rising unemployment throughout the industrial world (except Japan); persisting high U.S. Interest rates; projections of massive budget deficits in the U.S. and Europe, especially in France; collapse of the U.S. Trigger Price Mechanism for steel imports and more aggressive European marketing for subsidized agricultural products; Approved For Release 2009/11/06: CIA-RDP83M00914R000500120021-5 Approved For Release 2009/11/06: CIA-RDP83M00914R000500120021-5 S 3 - be .ghten d tension Within the .EMS due to 4i r t3 ~erorre>mic pe>licy among EuroPean Countries; and isition of martial law in Poland and tensions within the alli.:.;ce over application of economic sanctions. 34en these events, the President.'s success at Ottawa ii331 mot b y -to duplieata. Even of tic activity is str gtheninq, unemployment in Europe will be at historic high levels, generating immense pressures for governments to soma thiacl. Meanwhile, many Europe-an leaders are engaging in a certain amount of escape goatism' to transfer rezPc i i L fly for the i.r poor tic performance to the U.S.* and U.S.. interest rates in particular, rather than =dartaking the necessary domestic policy actions to reduce inflaf.fot and revitalize growth in their economies. ' poor sacroisconomic setting, and the attempt to place hrlam& on the U.S., will color trade, monetary and aid discussions. -As -importantly, unless the U. S. economy is pexfzrminq better than new expected by late Spring, the skeptics at . home and Abroad will be lobbying stsnngiy for agree a AM Policy actions not consistent with our economic program. . Economic d i.ffi . z ties will spill over into the ms. po ticj s; is im as vali -- r airing to . ropean ct* to East-West relations., including Poland and Soviet -credit restraint. Views of other Participants and U .S. Strate+ y ~r .r~,~ w,~.her E Lie...u ~~----z.L..~ 1 e Frenh nd `o rope } . ,s+7 mmdt pa 1.n: J` '?Fii i short-term domestic economic issues -- unemployment, high interest rates, monetary policy -- with particular focus on U.S. economic policy. The Vn.i.teed States prefers to stress larger-term and more international issues such as trade and Zest-West relations, to sores areas where progress has bmn made such as energy and North-South relations, and to play out the adverse consequences of domestic politics, such as subsidies, demand stirnuslus measures, etc. on multilateral trading and financial relations and ul tin tea ' spects . for domestic recovery and growth. All 1+* = part icipa tg in the &t s;;it -w" ill -vita t {; a interest rates as the factor now troubling strong economic recovery or otherwise disturbing international etc relations. For the French and perhaps the Italians, the recommended seluticn involves expansionary fiscal, and neanetary policy to attack unemp loytnent directly. most, howe er. a t3r's~ anti- -inf3 aticnar r -at=re gi42t but are critical of the by t~ ?`S~ ~~ or projected U. S. budget deficits which they be2.feve are holding U. S. interest rates far above._,. __ FIV i~;ricf ,TIAL C1. I L-1 Approved For Release 200109/11/06: CIA-RDP83M00914R000500120021-5 Approved For Release 2009/11/06: CIA-RDP83M00914R000500120021-5 UUM 1ULIU I tML just fled levels. The concern about U. S. interest rates is tied to the desliar; s role as an international currency.-. and the dominant influence of the .urv--o14 ar r t aver E rope .interest rates. The Europeans, in particular, hold their position on all other issues, such as -trade issues, restraint on credits to the Soviet Unicn, hostage to U. S. action on deficits and interest rates. Japan will seek to avoid being isolated in the trod. ,diactissi , thus warding off direct criticism of its trade policies. in part, japan -wiiii base its defense on the "undervat ued* yen, caused by capital outflows attracted to the U.S. capital market by high interest rates. Tot this settSang, t se U. g. ust take the otfenalva by enp a i.zing -positive objectives .rathetr than dwelling on the criticisms of U. S. dossiestic policy. To this end, we have concentrated on the following topics in the preparatory process: greater economic policy coordination, especially as it relates to coamvn o#rjectivea such as red cinq inflation, controlling the growth of ear supply. and promoting sound private sector growth; trade in the broadest sense as it relates. to exchange of industrial goods, services, capital, and agriculture, to domestic adjust aseat policies, to technological innovation and to investment; energy security building on sound i3o estic market policies (which have been achieved now in most Summit countries) and international cooperation to protect against vulnerability of supplies; and -- East Wiest economic relations, with particular emphasis on means .to avoid growing Western vulner- ability to the debt build-up in the Soviet Union. Improvement in the U.S. economy or altered expectations in the U. S. financial markets would significantly improve the climate at the Summit, and may make more ac - i-evahle U. S. objectives in the international areas. Versailles and NATO The proximity of the Versailles Summit and the NATO Summit in Bonn makes particularly important a constructive meeting of the minds on the long-run economic prospects of the Western nations. Approved For Release 2009/11/06: CIA-RDP83M00914R000500120021-5 Approved For Release 2009/11/06: CIA-RDP83M00914R000500120021-5 LUG ILHAL :`he two 8a~ .its =uld aet n -,aetio a process of shaping a reinvigoratedworld ecorcmy sy-4tern for. the 1-3805tegimting iln_ the ? L1r z3~ a iii ~i-1 vh ti L'~ W~j November 1.982. Convergence of views- on economic Policy and on a stronger ecoro.mic future will go far to insure a more atti t-cde t;s r i Ke stare daf en se weed at . T? S nmc wit s Should rea.f fi r= .fxmda=en ta.i We-stsxa vra aez of polIt#oa l ffreod= and eccmoaaf opparLun:ity in the face cf gaol*-j=W L ita ,r -S`IULISSa'a'a --nd --c= 43 .C fa. . e af C5 5 SIS* .9V &anfiow- Approved For Release 2009/11/06: CIA-RDP83M00914R000500120021-5 Approved For Release 2009/11/06: CIA-RDP83M00914R000500120021-5 (Gi~tr. ii~-it~irrn i,isr iiezel .S b jr~ct: '/er ~.~i 11cs Summit -briefing :ta.tarials State i'.i.tison: :?;arshall Casse - F; Rm. 7250 '1S, 632-1089 ':SC F.i.?t; .;on: r ury N au - 7ttt. 392, Or".0a, 395-6761 State S/S-S projrr_t ,3m white , Rm. 3241 VIS: 632-8062 Tho- Prr_s?(4,-nt will partlr?ipate in the Summit Meeting of indu:;trialized ca-entries, to be held Juno 4-6, 1932 at V :ers- illcs France. The ;.37urpose of this :w-mooram'u:n is to assign responsibility for the pr*par. at ion of briefing r:ratnrials to be included in the President's briefing he k. Car the S :^riit; ~Le /ttachment I. The guiding principins for all Sun. i.t ter infi-aq rateria1 are hr?vity, cl?iri::y and , ros-t inportantiy, relevance to the issues -z^d 1~.e1 of Dra,ter3 'Should be Ly Gf ' SSt;eS 5: 3ch the i eat :'?~3t? s c3 lea t:t?s :-,;y r3= se, and provide appropriate r??s_ nor ses. Dr3`ters _'iou i 3 3ix0 seek to i-Sure that t e P:.si