POSSIBILITY OF US-USSR GRAIN AGREEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R000600030093-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2009
• Sequence Number: 93
• Publication Date: July 21, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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Approved For Release 2009/09/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000600030093-5
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220
July 21, 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: WILLIAM P. CLARR
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
FROM: _ Interagency Group
SUBJECT: Possibility of US-USSR Grain Agreement
NSC review completed.
The representatives from State, Defense, Agriculture,
Commerce, USTR, CIA and NSC met at Treasury to consider the
timing of any announcement and the scenario for consultations
with the allies if a decision is ultimately made to extend in
any way the US-USSR Grain Agreement.
The conclusions of the group were:
1. The grain agreement is sufficiently connected
with East-West economic issues in general (including sanctions)
that no decision on the agreement should be taken until (a) the
U.S. Government has had an opportunity to analyze any measures
that the Poles announce on July 22, the Polish National Day, and
(b) the U.S. Government consults with the allies as to what the
reaction to the sanctions should be, i.e., to what extent, if
any, do the measures warrant relaxation of sanctions.
2. Consultations with the allies will most probably
be at NATO on Monday, July 26. Therefore, a decision on the
agreement should not be taken before the end of July.
3. The need for consultations with the allies will to
some degree be affected by the extent to which Polish actions
call for a relaxation of some sanctions. If Polish action is
minimal and the U.S. Government eventually decides on extention
of agreement, from a foreign policy point of view we would want
to delay the announcement, but from a domestic standpoint the
delay should be as short as possible. Before any announcement,
or before any approach to the Soviets, the NATO countries and
Japan, Australia and New Zealand need to be informed.
Classi6eQ by mAR a F? .(s L..~?o
O Oeclasslty t8 Review tot
SECRET Oechssitication on ~~ f~E _
Approved For Release 2009/09/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000600030093-5