NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R000600120010-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2009
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: January 21, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2009/05/01 : CIA-RDP83M00914R000600120010-6 I
Juoi7 add-on
CONFIDENTIAL WITH
SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT
NSC Review Completed.
January 21, 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SUBJECT: National Security Planning Group Meeting
The President will chair a meeting of the National Security
Planning Group on Friday, January 22, 1982, at 9:30 a.m. in the
Situation Room of the White House.
Papers for the one agenda item -- Cuba -- are attached.
Principals only should plan to attend this meeting.
William P. Clark
CONFIDENTIAL WITH
SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT
Review on January 21, 1988
THE WHITE HOUSE
Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP83M00914R000600120010-6 .
 Approved For Release 2009/05/01 : CIA-RDP83M00914R000600120010-6
SECRCT%S.EN.4.SITIVE
wdv _
RESPONDING TO FLOGGERS IN CUBA
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The arrival of eight Floaaer.crates.in Cuba is the first
shipment since 12 Flogger fighter aircraft were delivered in
1978. Renewed Soviet shipment of Flogger fighter aircraft to
Cuba is a serious act in and of itself. It also is represen-
tative of a Cuban military buildup which is increasingly
threatening our interests. We must respond on both accounts.
The attached paper seeks the President's approval of a series
of political, economic, and military measures which take
account of the Flogger issue in the context of our broader
strategy to counter Cuban interventionism and to meet the
Global challenge posed by the Soviets and their proxies.
Although the Floccers appear to fall into "gray area" a of the 1962 US-Soviet Understandings on Cuba, continued Soviet
modernization of the Cuban air force with aircraft such as
2locaer seriously undermines the value of the 1962 Understand-
ings to us.
A Cuban Air Force composed of modern aircraft such as
=logger could threaten targets in the Southeastern United
States and Central America. Apparent US acquiescence in
Flogger---deliveries could open the door to further Soviet
qualitative improvements in Cuban military capabilities (e.g.,
modern submarines, amphibious forces). Finally, a US failure
to respond to this purposeful Soviet act could be misread--by
regional states and by the Soviets themselves--as American
reluctance to counter challenges posed by the Soviets and
their proxies.
In sum, this Cuban military buildup already represents a
substantial threat to US interests in the area and, if unchecked,
would provide,the Cubans with an unacceptable military capability
to complicate our crisis management across the board. It could
also lead to the Cubanization of Central America and directly
threaten the Panama Canal. Thus, we must take actions to try
to arrest Cuba's military modernization, not least because if
we eventually have to go to the source, each additional Soviet
arms shipment to Cuba will make that definitive action on our
part ever more costly in US blood and treasure.
We want to respond to renewed Soviet deliveries of Floc-
aers to Cuba -- and to the broader Cuban military threat they
represent -- in a manner which will -contribute to our longer-
term efforts to counter Cuban intervention in the region and
SECRET/SENSITIVE
RDS-3. 1/20/02
Approved For Release 2009/05/01 : CIA-RDP83M00914R000600120010-6 -