ESTIMATE ON LAW OF THE SEA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R001000100022-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: January 21, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT .
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Routing Slip
 Approved For Release 2006/08/3'IO HADM MO0914ROO1000100022-0
21 January 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Ch.ief, Geography Division/OGI
FROM:
Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Estimate on Law of the Sea
This is my summary of the. essentials of the estimate. I would like
to have your editorial or substantive corrections or improvements.
William csey
 Approved For Release 2006/08/31 : CIA-RDP83M00914R001000100022-0 DCI
21 Jan 82
The Intelligence Community completed in December an intelligence estimate
on the implications of a comprehensive Law of the Sea treaty and the possible
consequences of its failure. It departs from an earlier estimate the Intel-
ligence Community issued in 1977 in several respects. These departures result
from changes in perceptions and changes in attitudes resulting largely from
greater knowledge and experience gained in negotiating the treaty and from
reflecting on its implications in a world in which market forces and the
ability to deal with them are perceived to be more meaningful and effective.
The major departures are these:
-- We see the navigation regime as more stable and predictable than it
was perceived to be in 1977. The disincentives to commercial seabed mining
created by the proposed treaty are more clearly and seriously understood,
as are objections made by both the private sector and governments of the
industrial countries. It has also become clearer that arrangements to
protect seabed investments could be worked out through means other than the
treaty.
-- There is greater concern that acceptance of Third World ideological
principles in a seabed mining treaty would establish a negative precedent
for other future global negotiations on matters such as outer space, the radio
spectrum and Antarctica.
-- We now place a lower value on avoiding the risk of losing important
navigational overflight freedoms because without the treaty the nation can
still protect its navigational interests by relying on principles of customary
international law supplemented when necessary by timely and purposeful exercise
its power (explain and illustrate exercise of power).
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2006/08/31 : QIA-RDP83M00914R00l000100022-0
 Approved For Release 2006/08/31 : CIA-RDP83M00914RO01000100022-0
Significant conclusions in the current estimate are:
-- The requirement of mandatory transfer of technology to and sharing
of revenues with an international seabed authority would deter investments by
some U.S. seabed miners. There is also concern that access to seabed mine sites
by private enterprise could be impeded by a seabed authority dominated by other
countries. There is further concern that advantages in mine sites, financial
arrangements and technology collected by the seabed authority would make it
a powerful competitor for private seabed interests and even that future amendments
of the treaty could freeze out private enterprise altogether.
-- The treaty would provide significant advantages in inhibiting the
large-scale expansion of geographic claims by coastal states and preventing
them from imposing restrictions on warship transit and other military activities.
-- In the absence of a treaty there would be doubt whether the United States
could maintain certain navigational rights by relying on customary international
law. Thus, a successful treaty process, therefore, is in the United States'
interest whether or not it is a signatory.
-- A U.S. walkout of the Law of the Sea conference would not be joined by
other industrial countries but would enable Moscow and developing countries to
complain and propagandize about the unresponsiveness of the U.S. to Third World
demands. This would not impair long-term relationships with allies, industrial
partners or, after the rhetoric, impact on the important economic and political
ties between the developing countries and the U.S.
2
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2006/08/31 : CIA-RDP83M00914RO01000100022-0