ANSWER ON PERSHING II

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R001000110002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 30, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/02121 :CIA-RDP83M00914R001000110002-1
CONFIDENTIAL
30 December 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Executive Director 5K
Chairman, National Intelligence Counci l
Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence (~~
FROM:
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staf
SUBJECT: Answer on Pershing II
1. This memorandum (reviewed by NIO/SP, NIO/USSR, D/SWR, and D/SA) is an
answer to your question of 27 December about Soviet anxieties over the
Pershing-II (P-II) missile versus the Pershing-I (P-I).
2. The Soviets are very unhappy about P-II for three basic reasons:
-- Range: Unlike the P-I (which cannot reach beyond the border
between Poland and the USSR), the P-II (with its nominal
range of ]800 kms and from bases in Germany) will be able
to strike targets in the Western USSR; (in fact, however,
the Soviets are aware that the contractor for the P-II
originally claimed it would have the potential to fly 2500
kms and, thus, would be able to reach Moscow and some sites
up to the Urals).
-- Flight-time: The short time of flight for the P-II, for
example -- first visible to sites on the Poland-USSR border
soMe 8-10 minutes before impact, decreases Soviet warning
time; in the context of warning against nuclear attack,
8-10 minutes essentially is useless to the USSR.
-- Capability: Unlike the P-I (which cannot destroy hardened
targets), the accuracy and yield combination for P-II,
because of its MaRV capability, will allow it to be used
successfully against hardened targets; e.g., buried command
and control centers, ICBM sites, and nuclear warhead
storage sites.
The Soviets complain publicly about the first two points, in their own right
and as a cover for the third point. And the Soviets stress the first point,
which is easily grasped by people at large. 2sxi
3. The import to the USSR, once P-II is deployed, is:
e r ~~
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-- In effect, the USSR's sanctuary will be gone; a nuclear
exchange in Central Europe beyond the extent of the
tactical battlefield would likely involve the USSR's
territory right away, unlike the situation for the past
20 years -- so a Soviet military planner might argue -- where
the nuclear damage would begin in NATO and Eastern Europe
and conceivably could be limited to those areas.
-- The USSR's ability to control its military forces in Europe
will be at risk and the long term investment in hardened
command and control centers will have been, in effect, wasted.
-- The perceptions and reality of the nuclear balance between
the USSR and the U.S. will have changed in favor of the U.S,
reversing the trend of the last decade into which the USSR
has invested so heavily.
-- And the Soviets may connect all of this in their minds with
their interpretation of MX, and of the Carter Administration's
PD-59, to conjure a vision of crippling U.S. first strike at
the start of a nuclear conflict in Europe.
4. In my view, all of this is quite well understood by the USSR and they
are very serious about reaching an accord with the U.S. or putting the U.S. in
an analogous position. The USSR no doubt realizes that, depending on the
details, both may occur. 2sxi,
5. I have left out the connections and logics of all this in Europe
because all that was beyond the basic uestion. If ou want to have such a
view, please let me know.
6. In the meantime, I hope this helps. If I may do more to assist you,
on the Soviet issue, please call and let me know.
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SUBJECT: Answer on Pershing II
Distribution:
1 - A/DCI
1 - EXDIR
1 - C/NIC
1 - A/DDI
1 - DDS&T
1 - NIO/SP
1 - NIO/USSR
1 - D/OSWR
1 - D/BONA
1 - D/EURA
/r - E R
1 - DDI Reg
1 - C/ACIS
1 - ACIS Chrono
(30Dec82)
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