US-SOVIET COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD: HOW THE LDCS PLAY IT.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R001200090003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

"-~Approve~~or I~elease'~~~11~ ~IA-RDP83M00914R001200090003-1~'
Flo +i'`Jr%a'
TO: 41x,~e 'b 1) SP.
FROM:
SUMMARY:
0\1 ol t~ ~-Qyv\\o 4y\
-INA uo
'A,
FILED:
INDEXER:
REMARKS:
q 0
x -~ Lauto
.NO 56 135 WHICH MAYFOR BE USED 36-150
CORRESPONDENCE CROSS REFERENCE
 Approved For Release 2007/04/18: CIA-RDP83M00914R001200090003-1
The Director of Central Intelligence
22 April 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Thomas Reed, NSC Staff
1. In connection with the map, entitled Soviet Presence and Influence,
1982, (Tab A) on which I briefed the President yesterday, I had the Directorate
of Intelligence prepare thumbnail summaries of the state of play in the countries
marked in red as players in the actual and potential extension of Soviet influence
shown on the maps. (Tab B)
2. At Tab C is a paper analyzing the threats faced by key strategically
situated countries, commenting on the usefulness of US aid to countries facing
conventional threats, and suggesting types of assistance to deal with internal
threats from subversion, insurgency, and instability.
1
3. Early next week you will have a study called US-USSR Competition for
Third World Influence--How the Game is Played. It. reviews the ebb and flow in
this sweepstakes over recent years and undertakes to evaluate the pluses and
minuses, the assets and liabilities of each side.
4. All this is offered as an intelligence contribution to NSSD 1-82.
Attachments:
A. Map
B. Soviet Presence and Influence, 1982
C. US Assistance to Strategically Situated. Countries
DISTRIBUTION: SA/IA
DCI
DDCI
CHM/NIC
DDI
EXDIR
 631625 4-82
Kielbali
Confidential
ape end hifDuence91992
~t
Arctic Ocean
Soviet domination
Soviet supported aggressorlproxy
Soviet presence and/or influence
Threatened by insurgency backed
by Soviets or proxy
Highly unstable and vulnerable to
Soviet influence
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
with Soviets
Critical choke point
~o r j
J 'The Bahamas
1 a'
Cuba\ e
Dpminican
R
~-> ._Antigua and 8a000a
Jemaka
St. Lucia 'GOminlca
St. Vincent and
the Grenadines - + Grenada
ada
Trinidod and Tobago
~.
Venezuela ?\Guyane
Greenland
(Den.)
North
A tla ntic
Ocean
Iceland .
Portuap Spain
ofGibrafter*
So uih
A lanii c
Ocean
C.A.R. -Central African Republic
F.R.G. -Federal Republic of Germany
G.D.R.-German Democratic Republic
U.A.E. -United Arab Emirates
The United Staten Government has not recognized
the incorpnratlon o+ Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Boundary representation
is not necessarily authoritative.
cotnoros
oeoitand
K
Mauritania
Guinea
Niger
A Irg e r ita
n
Nigeria
1 Came
Gabon
Poland
Yugo
Libya
CAR.
Zambia
Botswena
Turkey
YP dab
Egypt
S~d an
ttilopia
Tq:
malia
Seychelles
Strait of Hormuz
Strait of
Bab et Mandeb
T (`~ p C
/1orea )
c S/Korea
China
Japan
~ J
hailan
J I ,~ erunet '1, L.5"
EofMalac\MalaYs::iJJn\
Indonesia U
~~acs, cy
D
Australia
Arctic Ocean
tC~~1
s c~
Solomon
c Islands
Venaatd '.
forth
Pa Clilc
Ccean
Hours
Tunalu
Fiuir,
i '.
New
Zealand.
~v
Kiribati
Western
Samoa
lunge
 Approved For Release 2007/04c 1 -RDP83M00914R001200090003-1
US ASSISTANCE TO STRATEGICALLY SITUATED COUNTRIES
Introduction
US military and economic assistance to countries in
strategic regions serves several purposes: to maintain their
friendship, to strengthen local defenses against external
threats, to deny them reasons for turning to hostile alternative
sources of aid, and to help their governments remain strong
enough to maintain control over internal political, economic, or
social forces. In most cases, US assistance serves some of these
purposes better than others.
The US and the USSR seldom compete directly by providing
assistance simultaneously to the same country, but they frequently
support opposite sides in regional conflicts or attempt to per-
suade nations to switch donors. Major exceptions are North Yemen,
where both provide military assistance, and Egypt, where the USSR
still gives some technical and economic aid. Both superpowers
also gave aid to Iran before the fall of the Shah. Iran and Iraq
now have military supply relations with both the West and the
Soviets.
The major Soviet asset in giving aid is Moscow's ability to
work rapidly, with a minimum of red tape, for longterm
objectives. Moscow's major disadvantages are the comparative
inferiority of Soviet military follow-on support and its limited
ability to provide economic assistance. Moreover, Soviet aid is
usually given only to central governments and subversive groups.
In contrast, the US has a' wider variety of material and human
resources available and can assist a broader range of public,.
u lic, and private sector recipients in target countries.
This paper analyzes the threats faced by key strategically
situated countries, briefly comments on the usefulness of US aid
to countries facing conventional threats, and suggests types of
assistance to deal with internal threats from subversion, insur-
gency, and instability. For the purposes of this study, key
strategic regions are those which the US or the USSR (or both)
 Approved For Release 2007/04/18: CIA-RDP83M00914R001200090003-1
SECRET
view as crucial to their national interests because nations
within these regions possess valuable and scarce minerals such as
oil or control essential access routes. In some cases these
countries could provide military facilities which the US or USSR
believe they need.
Threats to Strategically Placed Countries
Strategic Access through Gibraltar, the Dardanelles, and the Suez
Canal
Within the Mediterranean basin, Turkey and Spain--present
and future NATO allies--are both threatened primarily by politi-
cal instability. Turkey's viability as a NATO member continues
to be tested by serious societal problems. The military regime
in Ankara has worked to revitalize a bankrupt economy--largely
with OECD consortium aid--and to clamp down on rampant terrorism,
but underlying problems of high unemployment, rapid urbanization,
and overpopulation persist. In Spain, regional and class divi-
sions continue to generate violent forms of dissent--particularly
Basque terrorism--despite impressive economic growth and efforts
to mold a common Spanish culture. The very newness of Spanish
democratic institutions makes it doubly difficult fo an
government to overcome profound societal cleavages. rII 25X1
Impending entry into NATO has significantly increased
Spanish fear of involvement in a nuclear war. Ankara, in
contrast, is more concerned with a conventional military threat
from the Warsaw Pact. Despite a standing army of nearly a half-
million men, an obsolescent weapons inventory makes Turkey ill-
equipped to defend the Bosporus, the Dardanelles, or the 300 mile
border with the USSR and Bulgaria. It might even have trouble
coin with Greece, its Arab neighbors, or domestic insurgents.
Pro-western Morocco confronts several potentially
.destabilizing problems: the six year-old Saharan war is a costly
drain on an already burdened economy; a militarily more powerful
neighbor, Algeria, supports the Polisario front; and
domestically, Islamic fundamentalists could threaten the King by
joining forces with the firmly entrenched sic ist opposition,
especially if economic problems worsen.
Tunisia must cope with ongoing efforts by Libya to subvert
the moderate Bourguiba regime. High unemployment, limited
opportunities for educated youth, stagnating agricultural
production, and the subsidies and wage increases demanded by a
well-organized labor movement threaten internal stability. The
ability to fund social programs will be further cut as Tunisia
becomes an oil importer.
 Approved For Release 2007/04 RDP83M00914R001200090003-1
The most serious potential threats to the Egyptian govern-
ment are internal: income disparities, housing shortages,
deteriorating public services, unemployment, and rapid population
growth. Young people--half the population--are particularly hard
hit and susceptible to the blandishments of both Islamic and
leftist extremists. Egyptian leaders are also concerned about
the military threats posed by Libya and Israel.
Security of Other Major Shipping Lanes
The Straits of Malacca
Security pressures on the governments in Thailand and
Malaysia are generated by conventional threats from the
Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea. Malaysia's nagging Communist
insurgency presents little domestic threat to public order, but
serious concern is generated by the volatile racial mix in
Malaysia--44 percent Malay, 36 percent Chinese, 10 percent
Indian, and 10 percent indigenous tribes. An important goal of
the government is maintenance of racial peace. Indonesia
contends with endemic domestic violence due to racial hostility
and growing economic dissatisfaction of the masses. The
Philippines face two serious domestic insurgencies: a decade
long Muslim rebellion in the south and a broader based rebellion
led by the armed of the Communist Party of the
Philippines.
The Panama Canal
Panama's economic problems are generally less severe than
those elsewhere in the Caribbean Basin, but the country has begun
to feel the effects of political turmoil and economic decline
afflicting the rest of Central America. Other societal problems
include: disparities between extremely poor rural areas and
highly commercialized Panama City, an unemployment rate of 15
percent or higher, and a steadily increasing current account
deficit. Panama faces relatively little short-term vulnerability
from Cuba. Castro, however, has co-opted or bribed key
Panamanian officials to aid Cuban-backed subversion in countries
such as Colombia. Moreover, a number of foreign radicals reside
in Panama who could be used for subversive purposes against
local targets, if Havana were to decide on such a course.
Strategic Access to Persian Gulf Oil
The Arabian Peninsula is rife with regional rivalries.
North Yemen is trying to cope with an insurgency sponsored by
Soviet-backed South Yemen, which also poses a conventional
threat. Oman's foreign policy reflects its fears of subversion
and military aggression by South Yemen or the Soviet Union.
25X1
 Approved For Release 2007/041 4-RDP83M00914R001200090003-1
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates
all fear subversion and the possibility of conventional attack by
Iran. Kuwait has similar concerns regarding Iran and also has
lingering fears of Iraq from past border disputes.
Iran and Iraq both face internal subversive threats from
several factions, in addition to the immediate conventional
challenges of border war. Iran is also wary of the Snuipt nion
and its increased military presence in Afghanistan.
Pakistan is burdened with severe political, social, economic
and security problems. It faces major security threats from its.
traditional enemy, India, and from the Soviets in neighboring
Afghanistan. Islamabad fears that India and the Soviets will act
together to put military pressure on Pakistan or that one or the
other will exploit domestic tensions resulting from minority
separatism and domestic political position to the military
regime of President Zia ul-Haq.
Strategic Access to Minerals and Bases in Africa
Somalia, an important US supporter on the Gulf of Aden, is
challenged by an Ethiopian and Libyan-sponsored guerrilla threat
as well as by mounting tribal unrest. A coup staged by
disaffected military officers who see pro-western President Siad
as a major source of the count economic, military and tribal
problems is also possible.
Despite some improvement in relations between Somalia and
Ken a, Nairobi is suspicious that Mogadishu still has irredentist
designs on Kenya's Somali-inhabited northeastern province. In
particular, Nairobi fears that US military aid could strengthen
Somalia su ntly to threaten Kenya's control of that
province.
Sudan faces serious economic problems. Limited foreign
exchange reserves, a massive foreign debt, and a poor credit
rating are pressing concerns, as is-the possibility of public
riots over commodity shortages. Libya is attempting to exploit
widespread Sudanese discontent through cross border terrorist and
sabotage operations.
A siege mentality prevails in economically troubled Zambia
where President Kaunda sees threats from several domestic
forces. Zimbabwean leader Mugabe fears both hostile moves by
renegade whites and tribally-related armed clashes between rival
ex-guerrilla forces. Both Kaunda and Mugabe believe that their
domestic opponents are abetted by South Africa.
Zairian President Mobutu's regime is unpopular and could
face major challenges from disgruntled civilians, military
 Approved For Release 2007/04/51?C RDP83MOO914R001200090003-1
personnel, or regional dissidents, especially if the steadily
deteriorating economy worsens significantly in the next several
months. Mobutu's ill-equipped and poorly-disciplined armed
forces probably could not suppress an outbreak of.unrest in
copper-rich Shaba or elsewhere before it would paralyze the
country and menace his regime.
The Value of Foreign Assistance
Globally, the US has provided about $94 billion of military
and economic assistance to 120 countries in the 1977-81 period,
including $41.5 billion of aid to the strategically situated
countries listed in this paper. In that same period, the USSR
provided approximately $57 billion of military and economic
assistance to 57 developing countries, all of which it considered
to be strategically located. A large portion of the US aid to
strategically situated countries has been oriented toward
bolstering their defenses against conventional military threats,
an appropriate objective considering how many of them fear
aggression from neighbors. Conventional military assistance also
helps to keep military forces content and politically reliable.
This aid, however, has not been particularly effective in
enabling governments to cope with insurgencies, subversion, and
threats to government stability deriving from economic
ration, ethnic unrest, and domestic political violence.
Possible Nontraditional US Assistance
Most of the countries mentioned in this paper would welcome
and probably benefit from additional US conventional military
assistance, given their pressing needs to increase their
perceived security against regional competitors, assure the
loyalty of their militaries and demonstrate at least implied
security ties with the US.
Neither conventional military nor economic aid is of much
value in combatting the major internal threats these countries
face, however. In most instances, coping with these threats
requires a combination of societal reforms and moves to
strengthen the government's ability to rule. Nontraditional
forms of US assistance could be especially useful in working
toward the latter objective.
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2007/04/A~C RDP83M00914R001200090003-1
Most central governments in the developing world are, for
example, ill-equipped to deal effectively with modern forms of
domestic political violence or with foreign-backed subversion.
This suggests that major benefits could be obtained through a
concerted effort to improve their police, intelligence, and
protective services in a number of ways:
-- Stepping up VIP protection training for important leaders
(Most Middle Eastern and African countries),
-- Providing such special intelligence collection
capabilities as communications intercept and overhead
reconnaissance and photo interpretation capabilities for
those countries fighting or fearing active insurgencies
(Pakistan, Philippines, Zimbabwe, Panama),
-- Providing more US-based counterinsurgency training for
government troops,
-- Assisting in improving operational coordination and
information-sharing among often fragmented intelligence
and police services, and
-- Putting US diplomatic pressure on neighboring countries
to curtail the use of their territory for terrorist or
insurgent safehaven (Basque ETA use of southern
France). lIII
Additional amounts and kinds of US assistance could
strengthen the ability of central governments to bring more of
their national territory under more effective control through
improved administrative services, especially in multiethnic or
tribal societies. This might include:
-- Expansion of leader grants and other training
opportunities for local administrators and
civilian/military leaders.
-- Assistance in developing health and other human services
in more remote areas to attract support for the central
government.
-- Training in public relations and opinion sampling
techniques to help governments accurately ascertain
public attitudes and to inculcate favorable ones.
One of the most effective forms of economic assistance to
strategically located countries is that which would help them
develop new exports or make their existing exports more
competitive in the world market. In addition to various kinds of
new investment, increasing the transfer of technical knowledge
(production techniques, foreign marketing strategies) from the US
private sector would be perceived as a significant commitment to
Aonroved Far Release 7nrl 1rid11R ? (:IA-Rr1P 4ntlnnOJADnnionnnnnnn
 Approved For Release 2007/041,Ip -R DP83M00914R001200090003-1
these countries' well-being and security. This could take many
forms, including:
-- Bilateral training programs offered by US industries to
counterparts in these countries (the phosphate extraction
and marketing industry in Morocco).
-- Underwriting surveys to help them decide where their
competitive advantage would lie in developing new
exports.
-- A willingness by the US to open further our markets to
their products and t pressure other developed countries
to do likewise.
Most of the forms of military, police, intelligence,
administrative, and economic assistance listed above are not
exceptionally expensive, but they all have other kinds of
costs. Enabling governments to improve their social control
capabilities, for example, would inevitably create accusations of
US association with human rights violations. Moreover,
strengthened local security and intelligence forces would, at
some point, probably use their new capabilities against US
targets in their countries. Finally, efforts to expand foreign
exports have the potential to cut into US exports and even into
domestic sales by American industry. Nonetheless, the potential
overall gain for US security interests in these strategically
situated countries may make these costs acceptable.
25X1
 Approved For Release 2007/04/18: CIA-RDP83M00914R001200090003-1
SECRET
US: Military Aid to Strategically
Situated LDCs*
Million US $
Total Military Aid
Grants
Recipient
1977-80
1981
1977-81 197
7-80
1981
1977-81
Grand Total
52,586
10,641
63,227
977
305
1,282
Total to
Strategically
Situated LDCs
29,110
2,350
31,460
234
32
266
Spain
1,117
197
1,314
80
4
84
Turkey
546
546
10
1
11
Morocco
383
51
434
Tunisia
108
22
130
Negi
Negl
Negl
Egypt
3,013
555
3,568
Thailand
932
172
1,104
36
Negl
36
Malaysia
215
67
282
Indonesia
220
52
272
32
Negl
32
Philippines
238
32
270
76
25
101
Panama
35
1
36
Negl
Negl
Negi
Oman
6
51
57
..
..
..
North Yemen
177
18
195
..
..
..
Saudi Arabia
17,299
870
18,169
..
..
..
Bahrain
8
1
9
..
..
UAE
32
23
55
..
..
..
Iran
4,098
4,098
..
..
..
Kuwait
26
47
73
..
..
..
Iraq
Negl
Negl
..
..
..
Pakistan
254
73
327
..
..
..
Somalia
41
41
..
..
..
Kenya
57
25
82
..
Sudan
297
45
342
..
2
2
Zambia
1
Negl
1
..
..
..
Zimbabwe
Negl
Negl
Negl
..
..
Zaire
48
7
55
..
..
..
*Strategic countries being considered in this paper that have
not received aid from the US are not included in this table.
 Approved For Release 2007/04/1 ES EC 15,W DP83M00914R001200090003-1
F I
?US: Economic Aid to Strategically.
Situated LDCs*
Million US $
Total Economic Aid
Grants
Recipient
1977-80
1981
1977-81 197
7-80
1.981
1977-81
Grand Total
26,255
4,735
30,990 17
,595
695
18,290
Total to
Strategically
Situated LDCs
8,132
2,361
10,493 2
,512
189
2,701
North Africa
307
115
422
145
24
169
Morocco
360
65
225
--875-
T-O4
Tunisia
147
50
197
60
5
65
Sub-Saharan
Africa
845
303
1,148
343
53
396
Kenya
152
50
202
80
10
90
Somalia
115
57
172
81
30
111
Sudan
163
109
272
102
5
107
Zaire
223
30
253
40
8
48
Zambia
169
33
202
17
17
Zimbabwe
. 23
24
47
23
..
23
Europe
697
276
973
107
1
108
Spain
392
75
467
31
-Ti
Turkey
305
201
506
76
1
77
East Asia
1,328
402
1,930
351
51
402
Indonesia
842
225
1,067
120
16
136
Malaysia
7
2
9
10
2
12
Philippines
455
120
575
164
29 ?
193
Thailand
224
55
279
57
4
61
Latin America
66
10
76
15
2
17
Panama
66
10
6
35
2
3-7
Middle East
4,299
1,176
5,475 1
,528
29
1,557
Egypt
4,208
1,145
5,353 1
,465
29
1,494
Iran
18
18
North Yemen
57
21
78
56
56
Oman
6
Negl
6
..
Saudi Arabia
10
10
20
7
7
 Approved For Release 2007/04/18: CIA-RDP83M00914R001200090003-1
SF1RFT
USSR: Military Aid to Strategically
Situated LDCs*
Million US $
Total
1977-81
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
Grand Total
42,825
9,554
2,425
8,92
4
15,848
6,074
Total to
Strategically
Situated LDCs
17,016
2,808
1,387
5,71
1
4,583
2,527
Afghanistan
2,632
19
206
50
8
1,669
230
Egypt
33
..
13
7
13
Ethiopia
3,676
1,100
750
126
1,700
India
3,394
649
95
24
3
2,107
300
Iran
698
474
224
Iraq
2,561
154
41
2,29
7
11
58.
Kampuchea
25
..
1
0
15
NA
Kuwait
51
51
.
,
..
Morocco
NA
NA
North Yemen
783
1
13
76
7
2
Pakistan
20
1
19
South Yemen
874
100
250
51
4
10
Spain
28
2
8
..
..
Sudan
4
4
..
..
Vietnam
2,005
225
..
1,14
5
620
15
Zambia
232
30
...
19
2
10
*Strategic countries being considered in this paper that have
not received aid from the USSR are not included in this table.
 Approved For Release 2007/04/1 - DP83M00914R001200090003-1
US: Economic Aid to Strategically
Situated LDCs*
Million US-$
Total Economic Aid
Grant
Recipient 1977-80 1981 - 19/
/-
6u 19-61- 977-81
South Asia 390 79 469
23 29 52
Pakistan 390 79 469
23 29 52
*Strategic countries being considered in this paper that have
not received aid from the US are not included in this table.
aData for 1981 are estimated.
bMinimum estimate. Includes only grant food aid and Peace Corps.
 Approved For Release 2007/04/18: CIA-RDP83M00914R001200090003-1
rNFCRFT
USSR: Economic Aid to Strategically
Situated LDC's*
Million US $
Total
1977-81
1977
1978 19
79
1980
1981
Grand Total
14,447
774
3,722 5,1
22
3,306
1,523
Total to
Strategically
Situated LDCs
12,154
710
3,696 3,9
04
2,619
1,225
Afghanistan
858
1 4
35
395
27
Ethiopia
372
25
2
94
189
62
India
1,140
340
800
Kampuchea
495
NA
150 1
30
130
85
Morocco
2,000
..
2,000
..
North Yemen
93
,.
38
..
..
55
Pakistan
225
..
225
..
..
South Yemen
90
..
90
Turkey
2,220
620 1,6
00
.
Vietnam
4,655
345
570 1,6
45
1,105
990
Zambia
6
..
..
..
..
6
*Strategic countries being considered in this paper that have
not received aid from the USSR are not included in this table.