SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R001200120014-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2008
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: October 27, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

SECRET
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520 ; ,, nhvo li~gbsbzy
1 82-12743
October 27, 1982
NSC - Mr. Michael Wheeler
CIA -
DOD - Col. John Stanford
1e1
Subject: Soviet Nationalities Policy Paper
Attached is the first draft of the Soviet Nationalities
policy paper. This paper will be the main topic of discussion
at the next meeting of the Nationalities Working Group, which
will take place on Friday, October 29 at 11:30 a.m. in room 6226
of the State Department.
Attachments:
1. Desired Distribution for Policy Paper.
2. Revised Membership List for
Nationalities Working Group.
3. Soviet Nationalities Policy Paper.
State Dept. review completed
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DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
Dr. Richard Pipes
Walter Raymond
Paula Dobriansky
Carey Lord
Andrew Marshall
Col. Fred Geissler
Fred Littlepage
Robert M. Bowe
Walter Jajko
NSC, Rm. 368
NSC, Rm. 372
NSC, Rm. 300
NSC, Rm. 336
DOD/OSD/NA Rm. 3A930 Pentagon
DOD/OSD/NA " " 11
DOD/OSD/NA "
DOD/ISP Rm. 3D239 Pentagon
DOD/DUSDP/SAS, Rm. 3D882 Pentagon
DIA/DIO, 2C 238, Pentagon
25X1
CIA/NIC, 7E62 Hq.
CIA/NIC, 7E62 HQ
CIA/DD/SOVA,
CIA/DD/SOVA,J
/USSR 7E62 HQ
4D3115 HQ
CIA/SOVA,
CIA/NIO
CIA/SE,
CIA/IAD
25X1 25X1
395-5646
395-6923
395-3912
395-4684
695-1811
697-1313
697-1312
697-2720
695-1090
695-0074
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W. Scott Thompson
Gifford Malone
John Aldriedge
Mark Dillon
Lisa Jameson/
Chris Squire
E. Willis Brooks
Paul Smith
Tom Simons
Dick Combs
Ray Smith
Jim Schumaker
Mark Palmer
Jeremy Azrael
Steve Sestanovich
Charles Fairbanks
Hugh Montgomery
Paul Cook
Don Graves
Igor Belousovitch
Eric Willenz
Robert Baraz
Al Kapusta
Steve Steiner
Andrew Marshall
Col. Fred Geissler
Fred Littlepage
Robert M. Bowe
Walter Jajko
Dr. Richard Pipes
Walter Raymond
Paula Dobriansky
Carey Lord
CONFIDENTIAL
Soviet Nationalities Working Group (NWG)
Address Phone
USIA, Messenger-Rm. 709 (1750 PA)
USIA, to it a it If
USIA/EU, Messenger-Rm. 822 (1750 PA)
USIA/EU,
VOA Room 2344 HHS-N
USIA/P/REU, Rm. 904 (1776 PA)
USIA/Prob. of Comm. Rm. 964 (1776 PA)
State/EUR/SOV, Rm. 4217
State/EUR/SOV, Rm. 4217
State/EUR/SOV, Rm. 4219
State/EUR/SOV, Rm. 4219
State/EUR, Rm. 6226
State/PM, Rm. 7327
State/S/P, Rm. 7330
State/HA, Rm. 7208
State/INR, Rm. 6531
State/INR, Rm. 6635
State/INR, Rm. 4844
State/INR, Rm. 4844
State/INR, Rm. 6842
State/INR/SEE, Rm. 4758
State/INR, Rm. 4743
State/EUR/P, Rm. 5229
DOD/OSD/NA Rm. 3A930 Pentagon
DOD/OSD/NA "
DOD/OSD/NA "
DOD/ISP Rm. 3D239 Pentagon
DOD/DUSDP/SAS, Rm. 3D882 Pentagon
DIA/DIO, 2C 238, Pentagon
DIA/DB-1-E-1 2302 B Bldg. Arl. Hall
Is to Do is go
FBIS/US
1016 Ke
CIA/NIC
CIA/NIC
SR Analysis Group,
y Bldg., 1200 Wilson Blvd.
CIA/NIO
CIA/SE,
CIA/IED
CIA/SOV
CIA/DD/
CIA/DD/
/USSR 7E62 HQ
4D3115 HQ
SOYA,
SOVA,
7E62 Hq.
7E62 HQ
NSC, Rm. 368
NSC, Rm. 372
NSC, Rm. 300
NSC, Rm. 336
NSA, Rm. 2737A
rnti inFNTIAl
724-9349
724-9122
724-9296
724-9295
755-4422
724-9269
724-9651
632-3738
632-9559
632-8670
632-1712
632-1010
632-2478
632-1964
632-2590
632-0342
632-2292
632-9204
632-9204
632-2225
632-9194
632-3289
632-0850
695-1811
697-1313
697-1312
697-2720
695-1090
695-0074
692-5004
692-5004 25X1
395-5646
395-6923
395-3912
395-4684
5X1
ox1
5X1
632-0220 25X1
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U.S. Policy and Soviet Nationalities
The Problem
In defining United States policy toward Soviet Nationalities,
four basic questions must be answered. First: What is the nature
of current nationalities problems within the Soviet Union -- do
they pose a threat to Soviet power, and on what time scale?
Second: Should the United States attempt to influence the
development of ethnic and nationality problems within the Soviet
Union? Third: Assuming the answer is affirmative, should our
influence be directed at long-term evolutionary change, at
short-term troublemaking, or at both together? Fourth: What
tools does the United States have at its disposal to achieve its
policy objectives, and what should it be doing with them?
Background
In the prior work of the Nationalities Working Group
(1978-80), the four questions noted above were addressed in one
form or another and seemed to be answered in the following manner
(there was no policy document formally agreed to by all
agencies). First, there was a general assumption that the
current nationalities situation within the Soviet Union was one
in which the problems, though potentially very significant for
the Soviets, did not pose a direct threat to Soviet power.
Second, there was general agreement that the United States should
closely monitor the development of Soviet Nationality problems
and that there might be occasions when attempts to influence
those problems would prove beneficial to U.S. interests. Third,
there was a general inclination to promote the rights and
freedoms of Soviet national minorities, but not to undertake
actions which could be construed by the Soviet authorities as
direct attempts to weaken their hold over national minority
areas.* Fourth, there was general agreement that the United
*There were, however, two major exceptions to this policy. The
United States continued its non-recognition of the illegal Soviet
incorporation of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Also, the Carter
Administration continued to support "Captive Nations Week," which
is based on a 1959 Congressional Resolution calling among other
things for the independence of the Baltic States, Ukraine, White
Ruthenia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Idel-Ural, Cossackia,
Turkestan and other ares within the present borders of the Soviet
Union. Recent Presidential proclamations honoring the week have
stressed our support for Baltic independence, but have omitted
reference to other "captive" areas within the Soviet Union.
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States should seek to expand its cadre of private and government
experts in Soviet national minorities questions; that it should
expand its information distribution and collection efforts for
Soviet national minorities, particularly with regard to radio
broadcasting and publications distribution; and that it should
closely examine opportunities to expand its official and
unofficial presence inside'the Soviet Union, particularly on
national minority areas. Translation of this agreed approach
into activities was significant, but imperfect. It focussed
more on research and analysis than on activities designed to
influence the situation.
With the advent of the Reagan Administration, and the
continuing deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations, it is fair to
ask whether the general assumptions made on nationalities
matters by the prior Nationalities Working Group still hold
their validity, or whether they have been outpaced by changes in
the U.S.-Soviet relationship and our own information about the
nature of Soviet nationalities problems. Therefore, a
reexamination of the four basic questions is in order.
1. What is the nature of current Nationalities problems
within the Soviet Union -- do they pose a threat to Soviet
power, or do they not?
There is no prospect within the next five to ten years that
Soviet nationalities problems will pose or be capable of posing
a direct threat to the Soviet regime. Nationalist activities
within Ukraine, Georgia, Lithuania, Estonia and elsewhere do
cause the Soviet leadership some minor problems, but the
overwhelming power of the central authorities, their awareness
of the nationalities dimension in Soviet politics, and their
determination to keep nationalities problems under control are
not in question, nor will they be in this period.
That said, there are important nationalities problems which
could present a growing force for decentralization and could
preoccupy the Soviet authorities in the not too-distant future.
The general direction is important even if this is a long-term
issue. For example, there are two issues, those of military
manpower and labor distribution, which will pose increasingly
serious problems for the regime over the next two decades. Both
of these are related to the explosive growth of the Moslem
nationalities and the relatively slow growth of the Slavic
nationalities within the USSR. These growth patterns will
result, by the turn of the century, in perhaps as much as
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one third of the Soviet Armed Forces being composed of Moslems,
acute labor shortages in European Russia and substantial labor
surpluses in Central Asia and perhaps the Caucasus.
Because the Moslem populations of the Soviet Union have
proven even more difficult to assimilate than other national
minorities due to virtually unbridgeable cultural, language, and
religious differences, the Soviet authorities will be faced with
a number of hard choices in the 1990s. In the economic sphere,
they will have to allocate increasing resources to Central Asia
to take advantage of labor surpluses there, or force Central
Asians to move to European Russia or Siberia. Either course
will hold the potential for exacerbating nationalist tensions
and prompting a revival of Russian, as well as Central Asian,
nationalism. In the military sphere, the increasing Central
Asian component in the Armed Forces will lead naturally to
pressure for the Russians to give up their virtual monopoly of
high command positions. It could also lead to increasing
attempts at "modernization," usually in the form of
assimilation, i.e., Russification, of Central Asian elites and
urbanization of others, to provide a more useful recruiting
base. Once again, such pressures will inevitably create a
greater potential for increased tension between the Russian and
the Moslem nationalities.
Clearly, therefore, nationalities problems will bulk
increasingly large in the calculations of the Soviet leadership
throughout the next several decades. It is just as certain,
however, that the central authorities will have the power to
surmount any combination of likely internal problems -- barring
the unforeseen, such as a general war or economic collapse.
What is uncertain is whether they will have the acumen to manage
the problems without debilitating (even if non-critical)
frictions. Therefore, nationalities problems, while they will
almost certainly not threaten a fatal weakening of the Soviet
system,will turn into an even more obvious vulnerability of the
Soviet system, and one which might be useful to us.
2. Should the United States attempt to influence the
development of ethnic and nationality problems within the Soviet
Union?
At issue here is whether and how Soviet nationality problems
can be turned to U.S. advantage. While the collapse of the
Soviet Empire would be in the U.S. interest, the Empire is not,
as indicated above, about to collapse from internal causes and
cannot be brought to the point of collapse at an acceptable cost
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through outside intervention in the immediate future. But
Soviet policy toward the minority nationalities is beset with
contradictions. At a minimum, U.S. policy should not help
shield the Soviet leadership from the costs of these contra-
dictions. Carefully handled, they could be used to advance
U.S. interests, since a Soviet leadership which is not
fundamentally sure of the loyalty of its national minorities,
a leadership which in an era of growing scarcity of resources
is faced with an unending succession of difficult distribution
decisions, a leadership which, in short, is preoccupied with
the costs and problems created by its own internal policies is
not likely to be as effective a competitor for influence in
other parts of the world.
3. Assuming the answer is affirmative, should our
influence be directed at long-term evolutionary change, at
short term troublemaking, or at both together?
There is no doubt that, in keeping with this Administration's
strong support of the Helsinki Accords, actions aimed at
increasing the rights and freedoms of all groups within the
Soviet Union -- including the majority Russians themselves --
is a legitimate objective for U.S. nationalities policy and
serves our interest in sharpening the contradictions inherent
in the leadership's policies. Beyond this, however, it is also
in the interest of the United States to engender within the
Soviet leadership some uncertainty about the ultimate loyalty
of the regime's minority nationalities, a factor which could
inhibit Soviet foreign policy behavior if played correctly.
However, U.S. actions to encourage such an uncertainty must
be carefully calculated, based on indirect action if possible,
and founded on accurate information. Our overall policy should
be cast in terms of Soviet constitutional guarantees and interna-
tional agreements the Soviets have signed. We should seek to
encourage diversity, pluralism, decentralization, democracy
-- and independence in such specific cases as the Baltic states.
We would not seek, as a matter of declaratory policy, explicitly
the break-up of the Soviet Union.
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4. What tools does the United States have at its disposal
to achieve its policy objectives, and what should it be doing
with them? As information compiled recently by the Nationalities
Working Group indicates, a good deal of progress has been made
in recent years in upgrading our capabilities to gather and
distribute Soviet nationalities information. However, it is
equally apparent that our ability to keep tabs on the primary
national minority groups could still be profitably expanded.
And we need significantly to increase our capability to have an
impact on the situation. One of the primary objectives of the
Nationalities Working Group should be to continue to seek
methods to build up these capabilities.
This is particularly true now that the Soviet authorities
have mounted an increasingly severe campaign of repression
against all dissenters and unauthorized information flows into
and out of the Soviet Union. We will have to run harder, in the
present environment, just to keep from losing ground. The
President's declared intention to upgrade and modernize RFE and
RL facilities is a welcome step, and vitally necessary if we are
to be successful in foiling Soviet attempts to prevent an
accurate picture of the world from reaching its national
minorities. We will wish to consider what broadcasting policies
are most likely to maximize useful U.S. influence in the short
and long, terms.
One fundamental way in which we could improve our knowledge
of, contact with, and impact on Soviet minority groups would be
through the establishment of additional U.S. Missions and the
expansion of official and unofficial exchanges between the United
States and the Soviet Union. It is ironic that the possibilities
for such increased contacts have been severely constricted by the
very factor which has led to a heightened interest in Soviet
nationalities questions and Soviet vulnerabilities -- the parlous
state of U.S.-Soviet relations. The Nationalities Working Group
should examine the subject of U.S.-Soviet contacts more
thoroughly to determine whether U.S. interests are better served
by maintaining two Missions -- an Embassy and a Consulate General
-- inside the USSR, or by a carefully planned expansion of our
presence into the other republics.
We also need to examine how our exchanges and contacts can be
expanded and shaped to give particular priority to nationalities
matters. For example, we should consider how to increase our
"presence" in Central Asia and with Soviet Moslems. We might
reconsider the ban on exhibits in this light.
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In addition we need to look at other ways to increase
religious contacts/influences as this dimension is central to
many of the different nationalities situations.
It is also clear that not enough h1ps been done in the public
affairs area to enhance Western awareness of Soviet Nationalities
issues and to highlight Soviet vulnerabilities and problems in
this area. Two methods by which the Nationalities Working Group
might be able to encourage this process would be through the
sponsorship of private studies and seminars on the subject, and
through the hosting of public conferences on Soviet Nationalities
questions.
The plight of many Soviet human rights activists who are
currently persecuted by the Soviet authorities is directly
attributable to the efforts of these persons to assert their
national traditions. The Nationalities Working Group should
work with the appropriate public bodies, such as the CSCE
Commission, Amnesty International, the American Psychiatric
Association, and others to ensure that adequate attention is paid
to Nationalities questions at the various human rights meetings
which these groups regularly support or attend. Particular care
should be taken, however, to avoid expressions of support for
persons whose activities can only be construed as nationalist or
separatist in character, and not human-rights related.
In general, we need to examine the level and kinds of
resources devoted to understanding and influencing the
nationalities situation in the Soviet Union. It is clear that-
more can be done, particularly on the political action front.
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Sovi t Nationalities PoliC Pa er - Bremer Cia
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