LETTER TO HONORABLE WILLIAM P. CLARK FROM WILLIAM J. CASEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R001900210043-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2007
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: May 7, 1982
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2007/02/22 CI;A-RDP83M00914R00
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C.20505
7 May 1982
Dear Bill,
I believe that we can strengthen our
arms control posture by cautiously injecting
an economic component into our approach.
Earmarked "A" is a suggestion that might be
suitable for use in a speech. Earmarked "B"
are a couple of pages which provide some
backup taken from the longer paper entitled
"Vulnerabilities of the Soviet Econom
d
y an
Possible Policy Initiatives for the US" which
!.sent over a couple of weeks ago.
Yours,
William J. Casey
The Honorable William P. Clark
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20505
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1. One obstacle to arms control that is often overlooked is the Soviet
industrial structure itself, which is vastly different from our own.
2. We have a military sector. They are a military sector. The entire
Soviet system--with, its five-year plans, its resource-allocation process,
its command economy--is designed and operated to provide Just enough butter
to enable the production of more and more guns.
3. Some experts argue that the Russians couldn't shift resources away
from the military sector even if they wanted to--for instance, to revive their
faltering economy because this -.kind .of resource--shift A s- beyond the capacity
of.the rigid, weapons-production structure they've built. Other experts-say
a resource shift can be accomplished without fundamental structural change,
but only over a period of years.
4. Let us at least consider the possibilities. Certainly we should
not subsidize this system. W2 should see that our technology and know-how
is not available to make it more efficient or more threatening. Perhaps
we can go further, to explore in concert with our allies what economic and
arms-control inducements in the West can offer in return for a Soviet program
to shift resources away from the military sector and toward peaceful, productive
uses.
Tab A
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rr
1. One obstacle to arms control that is often overlooked is the Soviet
industrial system itself, which is vastly different from our own.
2. We have a military sector. They are a. military sector. The entire
Soviet system--with its five-year plans, its resource-allocation process,
its command economy--is designed and operated to provide just enough butter to
enable the production of more and more guns.
3. We now recognize that. a key element in Moscow's- abilityto keep this -
system alive.through the 1970s was help from the West, in the form of credits
to buy equipment, technology, and food. In addition, the Russians helped
themselves by acquiring Western technology through espionage, and by earning
hard currency through exports of oil, arms, and gold. US inertial guidance
technology and US precision-grinding machinery have directly produced the
accuracy and MIRVing of Soviet missiles...-improvements that in turn have
mandated budget-busting appropriations for MX and Trident.
4. But now--even with so much help from the West--the Soviet industrial
system is faltering. The-economy is spiraling down toward an extended period
during which annual growth rates will be in the 1 percent to 1.5 percent range
Tab B
at best. The food situation, which is appalling under normal Soviet circumstances,
is worse now that it has been in years. The entire Soviet empire is careening
toward economic disaster.
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5. Kremlin leaders have an obvious solution to their problem--they can
spend less on arms and more on the kinds of technologies, products, and
investments that will stimulate growth and raise standards of living. Of
course, if they "stand down" so can we.
shift is beyond the capacity of the rigid, weapons-production industrial
system they've built. Other experts say a resource shift can be accomplished,
6. But "standing down" may not be as easy for the Soviet Union as it
looks. Some experts believe that the Russians couldn't shift resources away
from the military sector even if they wanted to, because this kind of resource
but only over a period of years.
7. Let us at least consider; the possibilities of bringing=about such a
1 11
resource shift. Certainly, we in the West should not be subsidizing the
Soviet arms-production system. Rather, we should work to insure that our
technology and our know-how are not available to prop up the Soviet system--
which only makes it more eff;cient and thus more threatening. This is the
very least we should do.
8. Perhaps we can also go further. In concert with our allies, we can
and should explore what package of economic and arms-control inducements we
in the West can offer in return for a genuine, long-term, verifiable Soviet
program to shift resources away from the military sector and toward peaceful,
productive uses.
2
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