SOVIET SYSTEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R001900220037-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 37
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/0 GREflA-R DP83M00914R001900220037-2
Executive Registry
82-2597
8 March 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of'Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Soviet System
1. I continue to press for products which provide for us and the policy
community a more specific understanding of how the Soviet system works. I
have asked for a picture of the Soviet prison and slave labor camp system, a
picture of the potentially dissident elements by the Baltic Republics, Ukraine
and the Moslem population, and, along with this, something on labor dissidence,
alcoholism and health troubles. Somewhere along the line we should have a
look at the exile groups. This morning I note a report on a solidarity group
formed by exile Bulgarians which may or may not have connections inside the
country..
is gathering from public sources andi
information about Soviet financial and commercial
entities formed to operate around the world along with the kind of contracts
and agreements they have been developing.
3. Now I ask you to put out an agenda of a detailed picture of the
Soviet "military industrial complex". Let's see if this would start off with
a detailed listing of the description of the major facilities within the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to evaluate how they are directed and
operated, their physical and managerial relationship with civilian plants,
and the convertibility from one to the other. I note in the current report
of the Joint Chiefs on "Military Posture" the comment that the comparison
of the dollar.spending of the U.S. and.the Soviets needs to be weighted some-
how to reflect the fact that the Soviet production is much more standardized
and therefore the same amount of dollars turn out more weapons for the Soviets.
How this forces the Soviets to keep their military production high and to
spread the product around the world when their own needs have been saturated
may be an important offshoot of this situation. My hunch is that the Soviet
special purpose plants cannot be readily converted and maybe they have trouble
pouring out weapons for unemployment and worker dissatisfaction.
L ? M .
William J. Casey
F c /4'o