OBSERVATIONS ON TALKS IN EUROPE ABOUT THE KVITSINSKIY/NITZE INITIATIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002100120018-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2009
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: October 27, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXXECUT3'VE SECRETARIAT
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State Dept. review completed
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October 29, 1982
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Per our conversation, attached is the Rostow report.
Please note its highly restricted distribution.
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Attachment:
8233142
McManaway
Executive Secretary
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SUPER SENSITIVE 8233142
OFFICE OF
THE D~REGTOR
October 27, 1982
Subjecto Observations on Talks in Europe about
the Kvitsinskiy/Nitze Initiative
These are the highlights of the conversations I had
in Europe, fallowing my briefings of the Prime Pinisters,
Foreign Ministers, and Defense Ministers of .the Allies
who have agreed to deploy Pershing Its and GLCMs (October
11-23). The briefings were of course based on my talking
points, which I left behind in each case.
(1) My interlocutors were uniformly grateful for the
fact that we sent someone to inform them about the Rvits-
inskiy/Nitze trial balloon and the Soviet response. They
were equally pleased by our assurance that the Allies
would be consulted about possible compromise plans when,
as, and if there is anything concrete enough to consult
about. '
(2) They heartily, even enthusiastically approved
our handling of the soun~3ing and the President's decision
to keep the channel of communications open. One of their
major political and public relations problems is still an
uneasy feeling that the USG is "not serious" about arms
control, but is pretending to negotiate with the Soviet
Union while building up its forces for a confrontation,
perhaps even a limited nuclear war in Europe. Therefore '
evidence that we are serious, determined, alert to pos-
sible opportunities and positive in our response to them,
is manna from heaven for them politically.
(3) I was very struck in these talks by the~tone
of determination all iffy interlocutors displayed about
going through with the deployments on schedule unless
there were a prior agreement. Nobody suggested a delay.
All said it would be disastrous to yield or seem to
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yield to Soviet bluster, propaganda, or threats.
Several asked me to emphasize to you.and to the Soviets
the strength of Allied determination to_stick to the
deployt schedule:
f~~ There is an element of paradox in their att-
tude orr the substance of the negotiations. They want
us to bez.firm in pressing the zero/zero solution and yet
flexible-iz~ nur approach to the negotiating problem.
Since this is out own position, too, I had no trouble in
reconciling f,x-mness and flexibility. The Allies seemed.
satisfied wiimh the situation so far. At a press confer-
ence in Germany, Ambassador Fred Ruth, who had been with
Rohl and Genschex during my conversations with them,
told the assembled press that the Government of the
Federal Republic is convinced that the United States
is negotiating seriously and in good faith; strongly
supports the zerodsolution in INF; and is energetic,
flexible, and imaginative in its approach to the prob-
lems, and alert to the possibility of progress. I did
not object to his statement.
(5) Everyone with whom I spoke emphasized that if
the negotiations fail to produce a satisfactory agree-
ment it'fiust be manifest that the failure is the fault of
the Soviet Union, a?d similarly that if we;se~tle in the
'end for anything less than the zero solution, it should
be clear that we do so only because the So~riets adamantly
refuse to accept the zero/zero outcome. In that context,
they all recognized that we are in a favorable tactical
position for the moment. It was equally apparent to
everyone, however, that the Soviets will probably soon -_-
try to reverse our present tactical advantage by making-
a plausible proposition we will have to reject.
(6) I explained our policy of extreme secrecy far
everything associated with this venture as based on our
desire to keep the channel available in the event the
Soviets decide to use it. My interlocutors were im-
pressed by the .fact that we had kept the story out of .
the papers for three months, although several noted
the Murray Marder article, and wondered why the jour-
nalists had not followed up on its hints. Several were
particularly impressed by our policy of secrecy because
they realized the story would have a favorable r-espouse in
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Western public opinion and politics. .They all promised
full cooperation in keeping the entize subject secret
despite the desire expressed by some to_be able to use
it politically. I asked them not to use regular cables
if they wanted to communicate with us on the matter,
but to ~ so by sending (or receiving) travellers.
(7} Of course they all undertook to keep us in--
formedabout any approaches the Soviets might make to
them, o~ any rumors that came their way.
(8} There was a good deal of interesting, if in-~
conclusive, talk about what light the episode sheds on
Soviet attitudes and. tactics. Everyone agreed that
Rvitsinskiy is an able, ambitious, and cynical career-
ist who was not operating on his own. The following
questions were asked and discussed but not answered:
(i) Is Rvitsinskiy's position evidence of a division
in the Politburo? (ii) Are the Soviets simply trying to
smoke out our fall-back position? (iii) Can any hard
decision be made during the transition period? There was
general agreement that we must conduct ourselves on the
assumption that there is in the Soviet hierarchy a con-
siderab~;e and highly placed group willing at the right
time to conclude a mutually acceptable agreement, al-
though we can have no idea now whether that group will
prevail. ~ .
Full memoranda of conversation are on file. ~--
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