SOVIET PROPAGANDA ALERT NUMBER 4

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002100120056-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 56
• Publication Date: February 26, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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l
Qrntiona
Communication
Agency
Uniied States of America
Washington, D. C. 20547
FES 2 6 193Z
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
William J. Casey
Director, Central Intelligence A9ency
FROM: Charles Z. Wigk /~2~/
nl rPctnr l / (/
SUBJECT: "Soviet Propaganda Alert Number 4"
Enclosed is the fourth issue of "Soviet Propaganda Alert"
produced by our Office of Research under the auspices of
Project Truth's Executive Committee.
In January, the Soviets continued to accuse the U.S. of
interfering in the internal affairs of other countries,
notably Poland, and of seeking military and geopolitical
superiority. Specifically, Soviet propaganda:
o Charged that the U.S. is interfering in Polish
internal affairs by, among other things, provocative
radio broadcasts (VOA and RFE), "inhumane" economic
sanctions, "slanderous" declarations, and CIA plot-
ting.
o Derided and denounced the USICA television program
Let Poland Be Poland.
o Portrayed the U.S. as escalating the arms race and
striving for military superiority and eventual world
domination in a glossy publication, Whence the Threat
to Peace.
USICA
o Criticized the Reagan Administration for allegedly
"reviving the Cold War" and conducting a campaign
of "fabrications and slander" to discredit the USSR
and socialism.
1~ ac~sJ ~i
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6W HMO J E.- ; a7m R U111
Propaganda i
February 17, 1982
Soviet propaganda in January continued to accuse the U.S. of inter-
fering in the internal affairs of other countries, notably Poland,
and of seeking military and geopolitical superiority.
o Poland. Soviet media charged that the U.S. is interfering in
Polish nternal affairs by, among other things, provocative radio
broadcasts (VOA and RFE), "inhumane" economic sanctions, "slander-
ous" declarations, and CIA plotting. The television program Let
Poland Be Poland was derided and denounced. According to the
Soviets, the U.S. goal is to undermine "normalization" and subvert
socialism in Poland.
No. 4
Re: Project Truth
Summary
o U.S. Strategic Policy. A glossy Soviet publication called
Whence the Threat to Peace sought to counter the Pentagon's Soviet
Military Power (which it imitated in appearance) by mustering
acts and gures" on U.S. military capabilities. The publica-
tion's theme is that the U.S., maintaining its tradition of an
offensive strategic policy, is escalating the arms race and
striving for military superiority and eventual world domination.
o The Reagan Administration. Assessing President Reagan's first
yearl? Soviet commentators dwelt on the gloomy state of U.S.-Soviet
relations. They criticized the Administration for allegedly "re-
viving the Cold War" and conducting a campaign of "fabrications and
slander" to discredit the USSR and socialism. The "myth of the
Soviet threat," they contended, has been used to justify Western.
aggressiveness worldwide and escalation of U.S. "preparations for
war." President Reagan's handling of domestic economic problems,
especially unemployment and the budget, also came in for criticism.
Soviet propaganda on other issues involving U.S. policy in various
parts of the world included the following:
o "Wedge-driving" efforts to emphasize differences and conflicts
between the U.S. and its West European allies, especially the FRG.
o Allegations of CIA links with the Italian Red Brigade terrorists
and complicity in the kidnapping of U.S. NATO General Dozier.
o other disinformation campaigns implicated the U.S. in the failed
coup attempt in the Seychelles, and suggested that the U.S. is con-
spiring to overthrow the governments of Ghana and Nicaragua.
Office of Research
International Communication Agency
Lni--,:,,.,t.,., n r
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POLAND
Poland was one, of the most important subjects in Soviet propa-
ganda during January. Dominating Soviet treatment of the
Polish situation were themes of alleged U.S. interference in
Poland and condemnations of U.S. policy toward the martial law
regime. The amount of actual reportage on internal develop-
ments in Poland was limited and had a rather pessimistic tone.
Much effort was devoted to refuting Western statements on
Poland and denouncing Western actions. Soviet commentators
drew heavily on Polish media and government pronouncements to
support the Soviet line. By this they evidently sought to im-
part a sense of authenticity to the Soviet version of what is
going on in Poland, and to project the impression that the
Poles and Soviets share the same viewpoint.
On Poland, as on other subjects, the Soviet media made exten-
sive use of Western (usually noncommunist) ,nedia items to
buttress their claims.
Continuing U.S. Interference Alleged
The general Soviet line on U.S. conduct vis-a-vis Poland was
the following: The U.S. is disappointed over the increasing
stabilization and normalization inside Poland. Strife and
.chaos were required by the U.S. scenario for counterrevolution
and the overthrow of socialism there. Now, not yet resigned
to failure, the U.S. is continuing to mount various futile,
last-gasp attempts to disrupt Polish affairs. These include
economic sanctions, subversive radio broadcasts, projects such
as "A Day of Solidarity with Poland," etc.
Some of the other.major Soviet themes elaborating this basic
line were:
o U.S. hypocrisy. The U.S. is hypocritical to condemn and
enact sanctions against Poland on the pretext that the declar-
ation of martial law entails human rights violations, while
the U.S.'maintains excellent relations with states that are
truly oppressive and that violate human rights. (South Africa,
Turkey, Chile, and El Salvador, among others, are commonly
cited.) Some Soviet commentaries argue that the U.S. is unjust-
ified in condemning martial law in Poland since martial law is
recognized under American law as a legitimate measure to restore
order under threatening circumstances, and it has been put into
effect in parts of the U.S. on various occasions in recent
decades. A further point made is that the U.S. is hypocritical
to. declare its desire to help the Poles while at the same time
cutting off economic aid to them.
o CIA involvement. The CIA and U.S. Government in general
have been deeply involved in supporting and inciting "Solidar-
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ity extremists" and other groups bent on civil war and the
overthrow of socialism in Poland. Subversive broadcasts by
RFE and RL (the "CIA mouthpieces"), VOA and other stations also
try to provoke counterrevolution--for example, by broadcasting
"instructions" to Polish "extremists."
o Anti-Polish slander. The U.S. and NATO are running an
"anti-Polish campaign," slandering Poland and giving a false
and outrageous version of developments in Poland. The Soviet
Union and Soviet-Polish friendship are also targets of this
campaign. The January 11 NATO ministers' statement on Poland
is one of the most offensive products of this campaign in the
Soviet view.
o U.S. pressure on allies. The U.S. is pressuring other coun-
tries, particularly its West European allies, to go along with
American policy but is encountering considerable resistance.
Soviet media reported and criticized Western European state-
ments condemning martial law (January 5 EC statement, January 11
NATO statement) but Soviet commentary implied that the Western
Europeans are "long on words, but short on deeds." In other
words, regardless of what they say (perhaps as an effort to
appease the U.S.), they are unlikely to take any measures--such
as trade sanctions--which would seriously harm their economies or
endanger the prospects for European security. _
Soviet Media React to U. S. Sanctions
The Soviets denounced U.S. economic sanctions against Poland as
inhumane actions which will affect the Poles adversely but not
influence the course of events in the directions desired by the
U.S.
As to measures taken against the USSR, Soviet commentators
claimed these would not hurt the Soviet Union in the slightest.
They contended that history has shown such actions are doomed
to failure--and furthermore, they tend to backfire and harm the
state enacting economic sanctions more than its intended target.
Gloating over West European failure to follow the U.S. lead on
sanctions, Soviet propagandists stressed that Western European
countries are far more dependent on trade with the Soviet bloc
than is the TJ.S., that they understand the importance of vital
East-West economic links, and that they are unlikely to take the
severely self-damaging step of cutting off these ties.
Soviets Blast "A Day of Solidarity with Poland"
The Soviet line on "Let Poland Be Poland" was established imne-
diately after the President's January 20 announcement of the
program:
o The program constituted interference in internal Polish
affairs. Such interference is contrary to international
agreements such as the CSCE Final Act and the UN Charter.
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'o The program was subversive in its intent, designed to incite
the Polish people against the government. In the long run, it
is part of a general plan to undermine socialism in Eastern
Europe and to destroy the Warsaw Pact..
o The program and other Solidarity Day activities underscore U.S.
hypocrisy. No such "solidarity" has been shown for the victims
of the massacre of Indonesian communists, the persecution of
left-wing activists in Chile, or the subjects of repression in
El Salvador and other countries. The hypocrisy is compounded
by U.S. claims of wanting to help Poland while simultaneously
cutting off food aid.
.o The U.S. is putting on the program not out of friendship for
Poland, but because its imperialist and hegemonist plans for
the country were frustrated. The. program is only part of the
large-scale anticommunist effort of the U.S.
o The U.S. forced its West European allies to take part in the
program. Many of these countries would prefer not to because
of the damage it will do to peaceful coexistence, but the U.S.
wants to regain its dominant position in the alliance.
o The program was part of a massive U.S.-West European. propaganda
campaign. This campaign is unprecedented in scale and recalls
1950s Cold War activities.
o Mr. Reagan supervised preparation of the program. USICA was-
responsible for producing it.
0 The program and U.S. propaganda plans are doomed to fail.
With minor variations on these basic themes, the Soviets
attempted at once to diminish the impact of the program and to
exploit it as an example of U.S. anticommunism. Predictably,
initial reaction to the program was:that it was a fiasco and
had. perhaps even damaged the U.S. position by showing how little
support there was among the West European allies.
Adopting tones ranging from righteous.. indignation to sarcasm
and heavy irony, Soviet media put out a barrage'of articles and
broadcasts. On the. program itself, commentary tended to stress
its "Hollywood" aspect and the low level of usage by even close
U.S. allies. Some commentaries claimed to detect disagreement
with, the U.S. position in the statements of Messrs. Trudeau and
Schmidt.
In what has become a propaganda pattern, the Soviets rushed out
a program on Radio Moscow's English world service which was
clearly a direct response to the planned U.S. show. Hoste.; by
the well-known propagandist Vladimir Pozner and entitled "The
Friends and Foes of Poland," the program was introduced as
follows:
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This is not a show. Hollywood stars past and present
are not involved in it, nor does it offer you such
entertainment as heads of state sharing a rostrum with
traitors. This is a documentary. It offers you the
views of ordinary people and furnishes documented and
verifiable facts. Those views. and those facts will help
you decide who are the friends and who are the foes of
Poland.
Somewhat less temperate were the remarks of TASS news analyst
Yuriy Kornilov:
What is of interest is that the "independence" of states
and "noninterference" in the internal affairs of other
states are being persistently invoked in Washington by
those who not so long ago tried to "bomb back to the
stone age" the revolutionary Vietnam, .who have unleashed
and continue their undeclared war against the sovereign
Afghanistan, who try--wherever it is possible, be that in
Chile or in El Salvador--overtly or covertly to strangle
any attempt by the peoples to decide their own future.
Appeals "to pray for freedom" are launched by those who
encourage and aid the most reactionary, dictatorial, and
hated regimes, who are arming the Israeli aggressor
which in the eyes of the whole world is occupying the
native Arab territories and wants to drown in blood the
struggle of the Palestinian people for its own national
existence.
Human rights are being invoked by those who created in
their own country a state system of institutionalized
arbitrariness, who shoot to kill the "disobedient" in
Miami, send the national guards and police armed to the
teeth to "pacify" the fighters against racism,.and
handcuff the leaders of the flight controllers' trade
union which was brave enough to try to protect its
basic rights. Truly there is no limit to Washington's
dissemblance.
Pessimistic Reportage on Life in Poland
Soviet media coverage of actual developments in Poland was sparse,
particularly early in the month. Most stories had a distinctly
pessimistic character, pervaded with cautions that the internal
situation is still "difficult," Polish attitudes are "extremely
complicated," economic problems will not be easily solved, and
other "threats to normalization" (CIA plotting, antisocialist
extremists) still remain. Such stories were presumably designed
both to prepare the Soviet people for a protracted period of
troubles in--and" because of--Poland, and to justify martial law
as a means of coping with such a serious situation.
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The pessimistic tone of such Soviet features was somewhat tem-
pered, if not offset, by optimistic notes. These were at least
partly intended to reassure worried citizens of socialist bloc
countries. Soviet commentators rarely failed to mention the
constant progress in "normalization" of life in Poland under
martial law. Uplifting stories about Polish servicemen stead-
fastly doing their duty--with many of them rushing to join the
Party--and interviews with Polish workers relieved that "work
rhythms" had returned to normal in their factory were intended
to foster the impression that things are calm and,' overall, are
developing along positive lines (from the Soviet viewpoint).
Another common type of optimistic media feature focused on the
"fraternal bonds" between Soviet Russia and socialist Poland.
The 37th anniversary of the liberation of Warsaw by the Soviets
was amply publicized. Polish gratitude for this was under-
scored, perhaps with the implication that Poles have lasting
obligations to the Soviet Union which had better be honored.
Some Soviet commentaries also seemed to suggest a parallel
between Poland's rescue from fascism in 1945 and its more recent
"rescue from counterrevolution." For Soviet audiences, it was
no doubt reassuring to be told that Poles were now honoring
Soviet war memorials rather than desecrating them.
Coverage of Polish Foreign Minister Czyrek's visit to Moscow
also served to put Soviet-Polish relations in a positive light.
The phrases chosen by the Soviets to characterize Czyrek's visit
inJica.ted that relations had considerably improve:] since the
declaration of martial law.
PROPAGANDA PUBLICATION: Whence the Threat to Peace
Soviet propaganda booklets lauding the "peaceful nature" of
socialist policy and condemning the "aggressive imperialist
militarism" of the West are nothing new. The most recent pam-
phlet of this sort, however, titled Whence the Threat to Peace,
gained unusually great attention. Published by the USSR Minis-
try of Defense in six languages and released in mid-January, the
78-page booklet was a reaffirmation of public Soviet strategic
policy and, more specifically, the major Soviet rebuttal to the
1981 Department of Defense publication Soviet Military Power.
Whence the Threat to Peace was accorded an exceptionally large
promotion in the Soviet domestic and foreign-targeted mass
media. It was previewed, excerpted, and discussed by news
commentators, and a rare Soviet military press conference was
held. Interestingly, however, the print run was reportedly not
large, and there were no reports--as of late January--of efforts
to distribute it widely.
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The booklet's fundamental thesis is that U.S. strategic policy
has traditionally been offensive, and the Reagan Administration
is carrying on that tradition with a vengeance. The ultimate
goal of the U.S., contend the publication's authors, is world
domination achieved through development of military superiority
(first-strike capability) over the Soviet Union.
Whence the Threat to Peace attacks Soviet Military Power for
allegedly presenting a distorted and exaggerated picture of
Soviet military strength (for example, by excluding comparative
data on the U.S. and NATO). According to the Soviets, the "myth
of the Soviet threat" has been concocted in order to "frighten"
the public, and justify and mobilize support for a Western arms
race for superiority.
To summarize briefly some of the other central points of the
Soviet argument:
o The U.S. bears the blame for obstructing arms negotiatio-is,
hindering peace and international cooperation, pressuring other
countries, and trying to destabilize sensitive situations. It
is driven by a desire to destroy socialism, which is growing in
strength and thus becoming increasingly frightening to the capi-
talist world.
o By mounting its noisy campaign against socialism, the U.S. is
also striving to distract attention from domestic difficulties
(deep social and economic problems). Furthermore, an active
arms industry, fed by international tensions and antisocialist
feeling at home, means huge profits for Western capitalist-
imperialist circles.
o The USSR is and has always been dedicated to peace. Its
military establishment is for the purpose of defense. Soviet
military developments have been responses to Western actions;
the U.S. always initiates every new phase of the arms race.
o The U.S. must accept the realities of the world situation
and stop its confrontational foreign policy and futile drive
for military and geopolitical superiority.
o There is currently a rough parity between Soviet bloc and
Western forces in Europe. U.S. and NATO military power is more
than adequate for defense needs. Thus the present balanced
situation should be acceptable to both sides.
o The USSR favors arms control and reductions, but they must be
carried out fairly. Providing the West considers the legitimate
defense needs of the Soviet Union, agreements can be reached.
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Techniques
While "ideological" material is integrated into Whence the
Threat to Peace, the authors rely mainly on a massive mustering
of facts and figures (real and imaginary) to support their
arguments. Adding to the persuasive appeal of this approach is
the booklet's relatively sophisticated, smooth, "Western" style
of presentation--which attempts to "mirror-image" that of its
American-produced target, Soviet Military Power.
A favorite Soviet propaganda technique is liberal use of
Western--especially reputable and noncommunist--sources to
support the Soviet position on issues. Material is very care-
fully selected, of course, and often taken out of context or
manipulated in a misleading fashion. This method is taken to
an extreme in Whence the Threat to Peace, where a tremendous
amount of data and' analyses comes From Western newspapers, jour-'
nals, and government documents. Most of the photographs are
Western. The primary purpose is to establish credibility for
the Soviet argument--the Americans' claims are "disproved" with
their own data.
ASSESSMENTS OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S FIRST YEAR
Soviet media commentators provided an unrelentingly negative
appraisal of President Reagan's first year on the anniversary
of the Administration. As is their habit, they focused primar-
ily on foreign policy and especially U.S.-Soviet relations,
with secondary 'attention to U.S. domestic economic and social
problems. There was much ado about the revival of a "Cold War
mentality" in Washington--charges that the Reagan Administration
is "fanning the flames of anti-Soviet hysteria" and "seeing the
'hand of Moscow"' wherever a problem for the U.S. exists. Lack
of "realism" on the part of U.S. leaders was bemoaned, and there
was no expression of hope for improved relations in the near term.
Soviet critics of the Reagan Administration tended to adopt a
mocking, ironic tone when discussing Washington's current views
on the Soviet Union, as if seeking to underscore the sheer
absurdity--from the Soviet perspective--of such views.
One of the favorite themes of Soviet propagandists was the
alleged "moral posturing and hypocrisy" of the Reagan Adminis-
tration. They cited as a prime example of this the "harsh
treatment" of striking American air traffic controllers as op-
posed to the "pious" stance taken on Polish Solidarity.
'Regarding the U.S. domestic scene, Soviet commentators focused
on'economic ills. The emphasis was on unemployment--the num-
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bers of unemployed, their suffering, and the alleged indiffer-
ence and callousness of U.S. Government leaders, who have
"failed to take steps to remedy the situation." The Soviets
inevitably contrasLe(l unemployment in the West with the "guaran-
teed full employment" of the socialist-bloc countries.
President Reagan's State of the Union message to Congress was
also used as a peg for criticism of the Administration's domes-
tic economic policy. Soviet commentators stressed that the
President. "had to admit that the economic situation is very
bad...it was impossible not to admit this." Noting that
Reagan had promised to reduce the enormous U.S. budget deficit,
they declared that he had "failed to produce results" and was
now warning the American people not to expect speedy improve-
ment. Nonetheless, "President Reagan expressed his determina-
tion to continue the present course of reducing appropriations
for social needs combined with colossal military spending"
(Moscow World Service [English], 27 Jan. [FBIS, 27 Jan.)).
Soviet journalists asserted that in seeking to balance the
budget by cutting funds for social programs without controlling
military spending, the Reagan Administration was moving to
"take away from the U.S. working people much of what they had
achieved during long years of hard and stubborn struiggle"
(Moscow Television, Jan. 30, [FBIS, Feb. 1]).
WESTERN EUROPE
Major issues directly concerning Western Europe, the U.S., and
the USSR are covered in the preceding sections on Poland and
Whence the Threat to Peace. Other Soviet propaganda themes on
Western Europe included:
o Continued "wedge-driving" between U.S. and Western Europe.
The Soviet media continued to stress the differences between
American and Western European geopolitical. concerns, while at
the same time emphasizing the unity of interests among all those
sharing the European continent--including the Soviet Union.
Among the Soviet allegations repeated again this month were U.S.
indifference to European security concerns, failure to consult
adequately with European allies before making decisions, and
willingness to sacrifice Europe in a war if necessary for U.S.
"victory."
o Alleged CIA link with Red Brigades. Charges of CIA-Red Bri-
gades complicity, already made during the 1978 kidnapping g and
murder of Aldo Moro, were revived in connection with the kid-
napping of U.S. NATO General Dozier. Referring to non-Soviet
sources of information, the Soviet media reported that the Red
Brigades, as other terrorist groups, are known to work with, and
sometimes on instructions from, the CIA. The CIA would welcome
a terrorist action such as the Dozier kidnapping, argued the
Soviets, because it would hurt the image of the anti-NATO peace
movement while creating sympathy for NATO at a time when opposi-
tion to it is strong and growing.
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U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD
Soviet propaganda output in January was routine as far as the
Middle Fast, Latin America, southern Africa, and other regions
are concerned. American policy in the Middle East came in for
most attention.
Middle East
The U.S. was strongly criticized for.vetoing the proposed U.N.
declaration on sanctions against Israel. Trips by Secretaries
Haig and Weinberger to the Middle East were characterized as
U.S. "interference" in the internal affairs of sovereign
nations and efforts to impose American imperialist will on that
part of the world. U.S. support for "the Israeli aggressors"
was blaste:i, and commentaries on this and related themes--for -
example, on the strength of "pro-Zionist" elements in influen-
tial U.S. circles--were designed to portray the U.S. as hostile
to Arab interests in the Middle East and always on Israel's
side.
In contrast to this picture of U.S. anti-Arab bias, the Soviet
Union's sympathy and support for Arab peoples were emphasized.
This, in addition to being explicitly stated, was conveyed in
glowing reports on Arab delegations in Moscow, Soviet technical
aid projects in Arab countries, friendly meetings of Arab and
Soviet citizens, etc. Propaganda attacks against Israel, parti-
cularly in connection with the Golan annexation, also served to
reinforce the image of the USSR as friend and ally of the Arab
peoples.
Latin America
The harshest Soviet propaganda on Latin American "issues was
heard on Radio Peace and Progress (R.PP)- to Latin America. These
broadcasts described alleged CIA operations in Nicaragua as "a
conspiracy of large proportions... aimed at assassinating the
Sandinist leaders and sabotaging the economy." A typical re-
port concluded:
All this U.S. underground work in Nicaragua is part of
the U.S. aggressive political strategy against this
country. Washington is exerting direct pressure-on the
Nicaragua Government by telling it how the Nicaraguans
should live and manage their internal affairs, whom they
should or [should] not befriend. If they do not obey such
dictates, Washington threatens an armed invasion, dragging
along in its aggressive plans other states of the continent.
[Present U.S. activity] is...the prelude of a collective
intervention that is being prepared. (Moscow RPP in
Spanish [to Latin America], Jan. 18 [FBIS Daily Report,
Jan. 26] )
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Commentaries similar in substance but generally less inflamma-
tory in tone than the RPP broadcasts appeared elsewhere in the
Soviet mass media.
Africa
Toward the end of January, the Soviet media began a disinforma-
tion effort on U.S. policy vis-a-vis Ghana. A familiar pattern
of operation became evident: Soviet media, vaguely citing
Ghanaian media sources, ran a story that Washington was involved
in planning a coup in Ghana because of U.S. displeasure over the
change of leadership there. One Soviet report, for example,
charged that, because a "secret agreement" Washington had with
the previous Ghanaian government was terminated by the fall of
that government, the U.S. decided to provide "planes and mer-
cenaries for an invasion" (Izvestiia, Jan. 24 ). Citing Radio
Accra as its information source, TASS reported that the U.S.
hoped to destabilize Ghana "through economic boycott, slander,
[and) ethnic strife." Once Soviet media gave worldwide circu-
lation to such.vaguely-sourced stories, they were picked up by
communist and noncommunist news media outside the USSR. Fre-
quency of repetition alone was relied upon to infuse them with
a degree of credibility, at least for some audiences.
CHEMICAL WARFARE
Several prominent and numerous minor Soviet media items dealt
with the subject of chemical-biological warfare (CAW). Much of
the material appeared to draw upon recent publicity in the
Western mass media of the issues surrounding the development
and proposed production of binary weapons. Soviet sensitivity
to Western charges of Soviet use of CBW in Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan was evident in outraged Soviet denials of such
activity and the intense campaign of countercharges, which show
little sign of abating.
The Soviets raised standard accusations against the U.S.:
o The U.S. is stalling bilateral CW (chemical warfare) talks
because it is "on the way to preparations for large-scale chem-
ical war."
o Ample evidence, some available from Western sources (articles
in The Washington Post and Armed Forces Journal are cited),
shows that the U.S. has appropriated huge sums for CW develop-
ment. The Reagan Administration, especially Secretary Haig,
advocates binary munitions production and has "pressured" the
Congress into: earmarking funds for it. (As in other situations,
the Soviets used--selectively--Western-sourced figures and other
"facts" to enhance the credibility of their claims.)
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o The U.S. is, trying to picture the Soviet Union as the
aggressor in this area; it has used "slander and lies in
order to justify its own dangerous course of increasing the
arsenals of such weapons and to ascribe to others its own
militarist plans."
A CASE STUDY: Continuing Soviet Campaign to Link the U .S.
with Seychelles Coup Attempt
On November 25, 1981, an attempt to overthrow the government of
the Seychelles failed. Michael Hoare, an individual with a long
history of mercenary activity in Africa, led the group of armed
men, most of whom returned in a hijacked airliner to South Africa
from where they had mounted the attempt.
On December 1, President Rene of the Seychelles issued an offi-
cial statement on the attempted coup, in which he noted that it
was organized in South Africa but that the South African govern-
ment disclaimed any responsibility. He accused two Seychellois
exiles of involvement. No accusations were made against the
U.S. or other Western governments, and the U.S. was implicitly
thanked for its message of support to President Rene.
Notwithstanding. their inability to produce any evidence of. U.S.
involvement in the event, the Soviets launched a campaign to
lay-the blame on the CIA. To outline briefly the key elements
of- their efforts to date:
o Immediately after the coup attempt failed, Moscow domestic
radio reported unnamed African radio commentators as noting
the "undoubted participation of Washington." The Soviets were
unfazed when the official Seychelles account of the failed coup
made no suggestion of U.S. involvement and clearly placed the
blame elsewhere.
o During the first week of December, in TASS and in radio
broadcasts to Africa, Moscow continued to blame the U.S. for
conspiring with South Africa to "mastermind" and fund the
attempted coup. TASS referred to-nameless "news analysts" as
the source of statements that CIA agents were involved.,
o Subsequently, articles appeared in various African newspapers
(Nairobi Nation, Lagos Daily Times, Ethiopian Herald, and
others) speculating on U.S. involvement and repeating variations
.of the Soviet themes. in January, the Times of India picked up
the story, stating that "it is widely believed in southern
.'Africa]" that the attempt "had the backing of several intelli-
gence organizations of Western governments....."
(over)
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o A January 12 Izvestiia article on alleged CIA activity in
Africa cited an article in the Paris journal Afrique-Asie as
saying that the attempted coup was staged by the CIA in cooper-
ation with the intelligence services of South Africa, Israel,
and Morocco.
Typical characteristics of Soviet disinformation campaigns are
evident in this case:
o The first appearance of the theme is in-Soviet domestic
media.
o False information is attributed to foreign sources (often
vaguely identified) to give spurious authority to the
fabrications. (Foreign sources cited by the Soviets in these
situations may often be nonexistent.)
o Repetition is relied upon to establish the charges and endow
them with an aura of credibility (at least for some audiences).
There is often no attempt to establish even the appearance of a
factual basis for the charges.
o The Soviets take advantage of the willingness of some non-
communist media to accept undocumented accusations. Once these
media carry the material, Moscow can replay it, treating it as
if it were further confirmation of the original (Soviet) line.
Prepared by: PGM/R Staff
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