LETTER TO ADMIRAL BOBBY R. INMAN FROM DICK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002200010019-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 19
• Content Type: LETTER

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February 24, 1982
Admiral Bobby R. Inman, USN
Deputy Director for Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Bobby:
Attached you will find a copy of the National Academy
of Sciences proposed study on "National Security Regulations
of Technology Transfer and Scientific and Technological
Activities of Universities and Professional Societies" I
mentioned on the phone. I believe it will be helpful
if they act as an honest broker. I have, however, urged
them to get outside support in order to avoid any appearance
of a conflict of interest.
Sincerely,
NO REFERRAL TO O SE). y''arAI E
APPLIES
~- a~3
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February 4, 1982
2 1 0 1 C O N S T I T U T I O N A V E N U E
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20418
SUMMARY OF PROPOSED STUDY OF
NATIONAL SECURITY REGULATIONS OF
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL
ACTIVITIES OF UNIVERSITIES AND PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES
The transfer of militarily, and to an extent economically, sensitive products,
capabilities, know-how and knowledge to the nation's adversaries and competitors has
attracted increasing public attention. The reason is the notable strides made by the
Soviets and the Japanese (for example) in successfully competing with us in military or
economic spheres, respectively -- strides made possible in large measure by their
apparent ease in harvesting the fruits of American research and development.
Such technology transfer can take many forms including the overt and clandestine
acquisition of hardware and technology, and collection of data and information in the
open and secret literature, by means of person-to-person exchanges, through attendance
at conferences, symposia and other open forums and gatherings of scientists and
engineers, and:-through their nationals' participation in university research and
education.
Traditional means by which the government seeks to protect its vital stake in
.promoting the nation's security and technological leadership include classification of
military and diplomatic secrets; surveillance and controls of foreign visitors through
visa and travel restrictions; a variety. of foreign trade treaties and agreements; and
restrictions, outside the military and intelligence security classification systems,
having to do largely with export control regulations. Such export controls include the
following:
* International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), administered by the Department
of State under the Arms Export Control Act of 1976;
* Export Administration Regulations (EAR), administered by the Department. of
Commerce under the Export Administration Act of 1979;
* Provisions of the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, administered by the U.S. Patent
Office; and
* Regulations of the Department of Energy, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
especially as they involve the so-called "born secret" doctrine as applied to
nonmilitary atomic energy research.
While not the principal regulator in any of the above, the Department of Defense is
the principal source of military and technological expertise and advice to which the
various enforcement agencies must, by law, turn.
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
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There-.is a. particular sub-set of the general issue that poses a dilemma for the
government and. the university-based scientific and engineering community -- one that
both parties, and the country generally, have a high stake in resolving in a mutually
constructive and satisfying way; and one, unhappily, in which recent developments point
more toward polarization than consensus. At risk of oversimplifying, the issue can be
stated as follows:
On the one hand, cognizant government officials believe that there is a category of
unclassified research results, in specific fields, whose free and open publication or
dissemination, especially to unfriendly foreign nationals, could pose an undue threat to
the national interest and, at times, the national security. Indeed, they have evidence
that the Soviet military posture has been notably strengthened by access to such
information in the past. Accordingly, they believe it is essential to control foreign
access. (Examples of areas that have caused recent concern include work involving
magnetic bubble memory, laser-optics and inertial confinement fusion, very high speed
integrated circuitry (VHSIC) and computer science and mathematics research concerning
principles applicable to cryptology.) On the other hand, many scientists and engineers
in academia hold that free and open communication and assembly are imperatives of our
society. They believe such open communication is the sine qua non of creative
environment that promotes and perpetuates the strength and vitality of the educational
and scientific endeavors upon which our technologies are based.
Over the-past two-to-three years, efforts by government agencies to limit or
restrain in advance open dissemination of certain research results through the
enforcement of one or more of the above-mentioned regulations appear to have intensified
and accelerated. The participation of foreign students and scientists in certain open
conferences, laboratories and classrooms, and the desire of scientists to openly publish
or disseminate their findings, have therefore begun to engage the active interest of the
enforcement arms of the above mentioned agencies. As a result, there is today a growing
sense of confusion and alarm within the academic scientific and technological community.
From our soundings among the government and academic communities, we conclude that
a balanced and objective. assessment of the issues is both necessary and timely and that
the Academy can serve as an "honest broker" in such an assessment. The interdependance
of government and the universities in advancing science, technology and national
security requires the prevention of a serious breakdown of mutual confidence. We
therefore propose to undertake a review involving the following elements:
* A general review of the application of the principal, relevant regulatory
policies and practices with special emphasis on the ITAR and EAR, in two or three
characteristic fields of science and technology (e.g., cryptology, very high speed
integrated circuits, artificial intelligence) to be selected by the study panel in
consultation with the sponsors.
* A review of the principal policy and operational concerns of the respective
government agencies, universities, scientific societies and researchers. Industrial
issues will not be considered. The goal is to.identify those issues where common
agreement exists, to expose where apparent differences of goals are based essentially on
misperceptions and misunderstandings, and, perhaps, to narrow and sharpen the issues in
which genuine differences exist. Implicit in this task is the belief that there may
exist a number of specific concerns of scientists and universities that, are based either
on a misunderstanding of agencies' intentions or a failure of such agencies to
communicate their intentions clearly.
These first two tasks will involve an exploration of: (i) the intended and proper
reach of the regulations vis-a-vis various categories of science and technology; (ii)
the identification of certain areas of science and technology that can be mutually
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understood to be outside the operation of ITAR and EAR; (iii) some approaches to
providing more certainty and predictability into the enforcement procedures so that
universities and individuals whose work or activity may be subject to regulation are
better able to comply; and (iv) some alternative procedures, if possible, that might
prove acceptable to all. of the concerned sectors.
* A rigorous evaluation of a number of critical issues must also be undertaken in
order to improve both the effectiveness and general credibility of our export control
regulations as applied to science and technology. Discussions held with representatives
of the involved agencies as well as the affected scientific and university community
have yielded the following examples:
(1) What do we know about the innovation and technology transfer process that
will contribute to the review and improvement of export control policies; what is the
appropriate balance between policies to stimulate and to protect critical technological
leadership?
(ii) What are the practical problems with and alternatives to requiring
universities to enforce compliance by its students, faculty and visitors? Are the
essential qualities of the university that assure our science and technology base
compromised by certain forms of regulation?
(iii.) What kinds of scientific and engineering advice would contribute to the
development and enforcement of more effective control regulations?
(iv) What sort of control on information transfer is it realistically possible
to achieve in light of the number and diversity of scientists and engineers in the
academe?
Membership of the study panel will include wise, distinguished individuals deeply
conversant with the goals of science, the nature of universities, and of national
security concerns, and with expertise in a variety of scientific and engineering
disciplines, R&D management, trade regulation and control, and constitutional law.
Liaison members representing the respective government agencies and scientific
institutions should also be appointed to assist the panel in its deliberations and in
devising effective means for communicating its final conclusions and recommendations.
A detailed plan of-work for the study has been formulated, which must be reviewed,
revised and adopted by the panel, once appointed. In general, the study will begin with
sessions in which the committee will-receive overview presentations of issues, national
objectives, laws and procedures from the respective government agencies and the
scientific and technology community, including, where relevant, industry as well as
academe. The balance of the committee's work and deliberations will be conducted
primarily in private.
Briefings by the agencies, including classified briefings where necessary, the
development of case studies and, if needed, the commissioning of analytical papers,
in-depth deliberations of subcommittees and the full panel, and a 5-day workshop to
draft the final report are examples of the techniques to be used. A combination of
consultants and one or two full-time professional and administrative staff members
dedicated to the effort will be employed to aid the panel.
The overall effort will be 12 months in duration, at a cost of approximately
030,000. Government funding is requested. The final product will be a public,
unclassified report of the panel's findings and recommendations. A progress report will
be prepared at the end of the first six months.