EA REGIONAL MEETING ON FY 1984 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROPOSAL FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002300060012-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: June 1, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Routing_ S
Comet
14. I; D/Pens-,:
15 D/OEA. "~ .,
16 C/PAD/OEA
17 SA/IA
is AO/DCt"
---
State Dept. review completed.
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CONFIDENTIAL
NSC
ACDA
Agriculture
AID
CIA
Defense
JCS
OMB
Treasury
UNA
USTR
Peace Corps
OPIC
SUBJECT: EA Regional Meeting on FY 1984 Foreign Assistance
Proposal for East Asian and Pacific Countries
Attached is a paper summarizing the results of the meeting
which was held on May 17, at the Department of State concerning
our FY-1984 Foreign Assistance Proposals for East Asian and
Pacific Countries.
L. Paul Bremer II
Executive Secretary
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
- Joseph Presel
- Raymond Lett
- Gerald Pagano
Col. John Stanford
Maj. Dennis Stanley
William Schneider
David Pickford
Harvey Feldman
Richard Heimlich
Everett Alvarez
Thomas Clegg
State Dept. review completed.
(Declassified upon removal
of CONFIDENTIAL. Attachment)
GDS 6/1/88
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1 ..
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM
ce~
Mav 22, 1982
TO: T - lr. James Buckley
FROM: EA - John H. Holdridge
SUBJECT: EA Regional Meeting on FY 1984 Foreign Assistance
Proposal for East Asian and Pacific Countries -
Summarized Results
The meeting, held.on May 17, 1982, and chaired by DAS
Daniel O'Donohue, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Department of State, discussed US foreign policy objectives and
priorities in East Asia relating them specifically to. the
funding requirements necessary to meet our priority objectives..
Except for Treasury's questioning the need for doubling
Indonesia's FMS program from its $30 million 1981 lever., and
OMB's concern for holding down all levels, the discussion
revealed a strong general consensus on both our foreign policy
objectives in the region and the funding levels necessary to
achieve the objectives. Given the severe funding constraints
which will probably govern the budgetary process, and the
caveat that we are working to not exceed FY-1983 levels (as
reiterated by OMB) except with the most compelling
justification, it was agreed that we could meet our policy
objectives in the Pacific with minor increases except for Korea
and Thailand.
The largest increases over the FY 83 proposal recommended
were for Korea (to $300 million from $210) and Thailand ($50
million direct credits and $75 million guaranteed credits from
$50 million direct credits and $41 million guaranteed.
credits). These levels would be an important step in
redressing the military imbalance between North and South Korea
and would assist Thailand in initiating urgently needed
purchases of advanced systems.
I should highlight our desire to encourage Burma's
increasing propensity to emerge from its self-imposed
isolation. We believe that cur proposal for a new FMS program
of some $3 million in dinect' c'r.edits will be a cost-effective
political signal while ,.assisting Burma to meet some of-their
modes t'mil.itar:-purchasing requirements.-
CONFIDENTIAL
5/21/88
Ra
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-2-
The only exception to the general consensus on levels was
concerning the PL 480 funding levels. There was agreement on
straightlining Title II in Indonesia for FY 1984.. AID
questioned the desirability of funding Indonesia's PL 480 Title
I program at $20 million and this may remain an issue. There
was also some discussion over PL 480 levels for the Philippines
which may also remain an area of disagreement.
It was agreed at the meeting to refine fundamental
objectives so as to give better focus to development and human
rights. These changes are reflected in the attached revision
to the discussion paper.
It was noted that the proposed levels (Increment I) of
military assistance (FMS, ESF) would represent an increase in
budget outlays of only $5 million or some 4 1/2.percent over
the FY 1983 proposal. This small increase would result from
the proposed $3 million in direct credits for Burma and the
added $2 million in ESF for Thailand. Most of the proposed
increase is in guaranteed credits for Korea and Thailand which
do not affect budget outlays. The base (minimum) and increment
I (proposed) levels are attached.
In conclusion,.I would like to express the Bureau's
appreciation for the involvement-and contributions of the other
agencies to the formulation of the FY 1984 package. As you
requested, we intend to make the process a truly interagency
effort.
CONFIDENTIAL,
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FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES PAPER TO SUPPORT INTERAGENCY
MEETING ON FY-1984 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROPOSAL FOR
EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC COUNTRIES
The purpose of the interagency meeting scheduled for
May 17, 1982, at the Department of State, is to discuss the
integration of military and economic assistance for FY 1984
into a single strategic package the Pacific Strategic
component of our global strategy. Once we have agreed on how
our regional priorities mesh with both the broad and specific
foreign policy objectives outlined by the Secretary, program
resources can be tailored logically to best support our
priorities.
Upon conclusion of the interagency meeting on May 17, the
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs will submit a written
summary to the principals of the major points of consensus and
issues for bilateral and multilateral assistance.
Program resources for East Asian and Pacific countries
should be allocated to support the following regional foreign
policy objectives:
--- Direct protection of our treaty relationships with
recipient countries, i.e., the Philippines, Korea and
Thailand. Assistance to these countries has the ancillary
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effect of strengthening our relationships with such ofher
treaty allies as Japan, Australia and New Zealand which do not
receive credit or grant assistance but do tend to view it as an
indicator of our resolve to remain a Pacific power.
-- Strengthen the front-line states, Korea and Thailand, to
help deter North Korean or Vietnamese aggression.
-- Maintain unhampered use of military facilities in the
Philippines; enhance enrout",access to facilities in other East
Asian countries. Maintain liberal over-flight rights and ship
visits.
-- Maintain and enhance defense relations with East Asian
countries with strategic proximity to key sea lanes of
communication in the region and those that link East Asia to
the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. These include Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Aid to
Thailand specifically strengthens our relationship with all the
ASEAN countries.
Assure. continued access to significant commercial
markets and basic raw materials. This includes all of the
ASEAN countries and Korea. East Asia's rapidly growing
economies and their ties to the US are of increasing
importance. Indonesia is noteworthy as an OPEC country which
.CONFIDENTIAL
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provides some six percent of US petroleum imports and generally
plays a moderate role in the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), the
Islamic Conference,-and OPEC.
-- Insure that economic assistance serves an overall
security/foreign policy objective, as well as furthering
developmental goals designed to alleviate the economic and
social degradation that can spawn.domestic violence and invite
external intervention. Self-confident, stable governments will
be more inclined to improve their human rights situations. The
U.S. recognizes that abuses undermine governmental legitimacy
and often become a destabilizing factor.
-- Maintain and strengthen our ties in the South Pacific,
thus blocking Soviet attempts to gaininfluence. Encouragement
of Fiji's support of US peace initiatives in the Sinai and its
participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in Lebanon
(UNIFIL) are cases in point. US assistance in improving the
agricultural and fishing techniques of Pacific island nations
is a relatively low-cost investment in regional stability.
-- Strengthen ASEAN and US ties to ASEAN. ASEAN has
emerged as a. major force for stability in Southeast Asia and is
of central importance to US interests in the region. Although
US ties to ASEAN are strengthened primarily through our
bilateral relations with ASEAN's member nations, some economic
.: CON= ID.EN.TIAL
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assistance to the region is an important signal of the
importance which the US attaches to ASEAN per se.
-- Control refugee flows through continued assistance to
and cooperation with Thailand and other countries of first
asylum.
-- Impede the flow of narcotics, through support for
suppression efforts by Burma and Thailand.
-- Encourage gradual improvement in relations with Burma;
strategically located and. emerging from self-imposed isolation,
Burma has made clear it seeks closer ties with the US.
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CONFIDENTIAL,
PACIFIC STRATEGIC
($ in millions)
CUMULATIVE
untrY
FM SG
FMSD
ESF
DA
PL-480
FMSC
FMSD
ISF
DA
i.lippin~s
50
--
50
40
14
rea
220
--
--
--
--
ailand
50
50
10
28
--
donesia
55
--
--
65
24.8
l.aysia
13
--
--
--
rma
--
--
--
12.5
,rALS
388
50
60
145.5
38.8
PL-480
Excludes DA for South Pacific and ASEAN, plus centrally funded Asia Regional Programs.
Excludes IMET which is done separately.
MARKS: With the exception of DA for the Philippines and PL-480 for Indonesia, these are Levels
oposed for FY 1983 (with some adjustment for inflation). If these levels should prevail into FY 1984,
e regional threats and needs remain relatively the same. Therefore, the proportional shares would
main the same.
funds for the region were reduced below these minimum levels, the reductions would be spr~adl
oportionately. This chart is not a reflection of estimated requirements which will surely:'be:higher
ns.idering the increasing Soviet, North Korean and Vietnamese threats.
CONFIDENTIAL
GDS 5/19/88
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PACIFIC STRATEGIC
($ in millions)
Co.ntrz
FMSG
FMSD
ESF
DA
PL-480
Philippines
--
--
--
--
--
Korea
80
--
--
--
--
Thailand
25
--
2
3
--
Indonesia
5
Malaysia
nu rma
TOTALS
, 11*
97,
3
2
12.5
FMSG
50
30:0
CUMULATIVE
ESF DA. PL-480
50 40 14
75 50 12 31
500 53 62 158 38.8
The increased levels of FMS levels and direct credits for Korea will be an importaii.t, step- in
redressing the military imbalance between North and South Korea, while providing some economic
relief for a country whose payments to the U.S. on previous loans have long exceeded"the. FMS
credits provided, at the same time that their military procurement requirements remain high.
The increased guaranteed credits along with the direct financing will assist Thailand to
initiate urgently needed (in view of increasing Vietnamese activities and force improuements.)
major, multiyear purchases of advanced systems such as attack aircraft and integrated.a'.ir.
defense and command and control systems.
The increased levels of development assistance will enhance military security by permittiny
more timely completion of projects designed to improve living standards.
The ESF increment would enhance socio-economic development of the poorer areas along...the-Lao
and Kampuchean borders.
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