ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE FUTURE CONTINGENCIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002700030003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 22, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP83M00914R002700030003-1
SECRE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
NIC 9487-82
22 November 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
NIO/NESA
SUBJECT: Analysis of Possible Future Contingencies
1. The ramifications of a number of possible key events - some
apparently positive and others negative - deserve examination. I have put
together the list below, and plan to put out short, informal memos
examining their implications for use by appropriate officials around
town. I see these memos not as research projects but as the distillation
of the experience and thinking of intelligence officers and managers. As
we have discussed previously, I believe this kind of analysis, plus
forecasting of likely trends, is missing from the normal production
processes.
2. While several subjects or hypothetical scenarios appear to merit
this kind of treatment, I plan to start with the following short list:
a. Husayn decides to negotiate on basis Reagan initiative
with West Bankers but w/o PLO authorization: Likelihood; who
will be Palestinians; reaction of PLO; Syrians; Saudis; Iraqis;
Egyptians; Israelis; benefit or detriment to US; impact on
Jordan of failure.
b. Because of nuclear and technology transfer issues, the new US
military relationship with Pakistan has largely aborted:
Likely Pakistan policies; effect on Afghanistan; China; India.
c. As of Sumner, 1983, a negotiated withdrawal of foreign forces
from Lebanon has not been achieved. Both Syrian and Israeli
force levels are down, but PLO remains as is. Both Israeli and
Syrian surrogate forces are in place. What are costs to US of
this situation, and regional impact?
3. Should these prove useful to consumers, I may follow up with some
or all of the subjects included in the following, somewhat longer, list:
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a. Contrary to expectation, Arafat does give a meaningful mandate
to Husayn and also makes a statement of recognition. Will the
PLO split; reaction of Syria; Israel? If a split occurs, would
this benefit our policy, or work to its detriment?
b. As of Summer, 1983, petroleum producing states have dipped into
reserves and decided to cut security assistance. Likelihood
and impact on security and economic assistance programs in
Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Jordan, Lebanon,
Pakistan.
c. Israel's official policy on West Bank/Gaza changes positively
and accepts the principle of territorial compromise with
Jordan. What options for territorial compromise have been
considered in the past, and what formulas may now be available?
d. Iran ultimately succeeds in a military breakthrough, and
advances into Iraqi territory. Saddam is overthrown, and a
more "accommodating" regime created. Reaction of Syria;
Jordan, Gulf States; Saudi Arabia; Turkey.
e. Khomeini dies, and the Iranian succession is contested. Soviet
troops move into Azerbaijan with the stated objective of only
ensuring order in that province. Likely reaction of regional
states to US desires to deploy troops to the general area;
attitudes towards the Soviet action.
f. Economic stringencies and political dissatisfaction lead to
prolonged unrest Egyptian
Diplomatic relations with Israel are broken,
although the regime identifies with the moderate Arab
consensus. Likely reactions of Israel; Arab states; Soviets;
likely regime policies towards US.
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1 --1
NIC 9487-82
22 November 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intellgience
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Analysis of Possible Future Contingencies
NIC/NIO/NESA
Distribution:
1 - DC I
1 - DDC I
1 - Exec. Dir.
1 - SA/IA
---I- ER
1 - DDI
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - DDI Registry
2 - NIO/NESA
22 Nov. 82 25X1