CONTRACTING FOR THE POLYGRAPHING OF CONTRACTORS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002900150006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2007
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 2, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/09/07: CIA-RDP83M00914R002900150006-3
DDA 82-2604
2 November 1982
I,DUIRANDUNI FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Executive Director
FRO`.1: Harry E. Fitzwater
Deputy Director for Administration
SUBJECT: Contracting for the Polygraphing of Contractors
1. In accordance with your direction to contract for the polygraphing of
contractors, the Office of Security has contacted several Agency annuitants to
determine if any of then would be willing to form a small organization to do this
job. We are awaiting their response but in the meantime are continuing to explore
other leads. A large organization is not required since the only personnel resources
currently dedicated to the polygraphing of contractor employees is an Agency husband
and wife team who life on the west coast. The husband works full time and the wife
works approximately two days a week.
2. There are polygraph organizations used for clearance of commercial people but
none that we would recommend using for sensitive intelligence programs. I am informed
that the Office of Security has scrubbed this list thoroughly.
.3. Incidentally, and for clarification, the number of polygraph operators dedicated
to the industrial polygraph program has little effect on the clearance and processing
time of contractor employees since the majority of employees are never polygraphed. The
vast majority (98 percent) of those polygraphed are after they have had access to
classified material. The backlog of industrial clearances is generated by the lack of
investigative agents. Initially we looked at contracting out investigations but believe
hiring more confidential correspondents (annuitants) is more cost effective. We have now
doubled our confidential correspondent staffing to reduce the. backlog, rocessing time.
Since 1 February 1982, Security has sustained a level of closing aboul industrial
field investigations per month.
4. I hope you will agree with the approach that we are taking in this matter. If
so, we will try to implement it as soon as possible.
STAT
Ha T E. Fi &ter
Distribution:
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Executive Director
FROM: Harry E. Fitzwater
Deputy Director for Administration
SUBJECT: Contracting for the Polygraphing of Contractors
1. In accordance with your direction to contract for the polygraphing of
contractors, the Office of Security has contacted several Agency annuitants to
determine if any of them would be willing to form a small organization to do this
job. We are awaiting their response but in the meantime are continuing to explore
other leads. A large organization is not required since the only personnel resources
currently dedicated to the polygraphing of contractor employees is an Agency husband
and wife team who lire on the west coast. The husband works full time and the wife
works approximately two days a week.
2. There are polygraph organizations used for clearance of commercial people but
none that we would recommend using for sensitive intelligence programs. I am informed
that the Office of Security has scrubbed this list thoroughly.
.3. Incidentally, and for clarification, the number of polygraph operators dedicated
to the industrial polygraph program has little effect on the clearance and processing
time of contractor employees since the majority of employees are never polygraphed. The
vast majority (98 percent) of those polygraphed are after they have had access to
classified material. The backlog of industrial clearances is generated by the lack of
investigative agents. Initially we looked at contracting out investigations but believe
hiring more confidential correspondents (annuitants) is more cost effective. We have now
doubled our confidential correspondent staffing to reduce the backlog and processing time.
Since 1 February 1982, Security has sustained a level of closing about industrial
field investigations per month.
4. I hope you will agree with the approach that we are taking in this matter. If
so, we will try to implement it as soon as possible.
STAT
Ha E. Fi & ter
c
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 Approved For Release 2007/09/07: CIA-RDP83M00914R002900150006-3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
25 October 1982
NOTE FOR: DDA
Some time ago the DDCI asked
you to contract out polygraphs of
contractors and to divert any freed
up resources toward the staff rein-
vestigation program. Would you please
let us know if this has been done.
EA/DDCI
Distr:
Orig - DDA
2 - 0/DDCI
1 - ER File
STAT
Approved For Release 2007/09/07: CIA-RDP83MOO914R002900150006-3